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Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
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Kaufmann, New York: Random House, 1966) 
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CW The Case of Wagner (trans. Judith Norman, New York: Cambridge 
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York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
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and M. Montinari, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986) 
SE ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ (trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997) 
TI Twilight of the Idols (trans. Judith Norman, New York: Cambridge 





WB ‘Richard Wagner in Bayreuth’ (trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997) 
WP The Will to Power (trans. R. J. Hollingdale and Walter Kaufmann, New York: 
Random House, 1967) 
WS The Wanderer and His Shadow (trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
Z Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and Nobody (trans. Graham Parkes, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 
 
References to the aphoristic works will cite the abbreviated title followed by the 
aphorism number (for example: AC 43) and to the works divided into longer sections 
(The Birth of Tragedy and the Untimely Meditations) the section number (BT 5, HL 4). In 
the cases of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, On the Genealogy of Morals, Twilight of the Idols, 
and Ecce Homo, references will be to the part and section numbers (TI 5.1, EH 2.1). The 
discussion of previous works in the third part of Ecce Homo, ‘Why I Write Such Good 
Books’, will be cited by the appropriate abbreviation followed by the section number 
(EH, ‘BT’ 3). Passages in the prefaces to Nietzsche’s works will be referred to by ‘P’ 
followed by the section number (GS P3). In quoting from the Nachlass, references will be 
to the volume, notebook, and note numbers of the Kritische Studienausgabe (KSA 12: 
11[105]). Where appropriate, I also cite the relevant section from The Will to Power. I 
follow the Kaufmann-Hollingdale translation. If a section from The Will to Power is not 
indicated, the translation is my own. As regards the Kritische Studienausgabe Briefe, 
references are to volume and letter number (KSB 6, 450).  
 
Works by Montaigne 
S The Essays of Michel de Montaigne (trans. M. A. Screech, London, England: 
Penguin, 1993) 
T Montaigne, Oeuvres complètes (eds. Albert Thibaudet and Maurice Rat, Paris: 
Gallimard, 1962) 
 
For textual references to Montaigne’s Essays I give five numbers. The first Roman 
numeral joined by a period to an Arabic numeral refers to the book and essay number, 
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The English translation is that of M. A. Screech, The Essays of Michel de Montaigne. The 
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Nietzsche’s writings are replete with attacks on past philosophers—Socrates, Plato, 
Kant and Hegel: all these are subject to his censure. Even Schopenhauer, whose 
philosophy is of fundamental importance to Nietzsche and whom he greatly admired, is 
not immune from criticism: his philosophical pessimism is persistently mocked in 
Nietzsche’s later work. In this context, Nietzsche’s unwavering reverence for 
Montaigne appears all the more remarkable. It is probable that Nietzsche first began to 
read Montaigne’s Essays in 1870, and their impact on him was substantial. Writing a 
few years later, he has this so say on the essayist: ‘That such a man wrote has truly 
augmented the joy of living on this earth...If I were set the task, I could endeavour to 
make myself at home in the world with him’ (SE 2). Montaigne’s example as a 
philosopher served as a major inspiration for Nietzsche’s own philosophical project, and 
what is more, Montaignean themes receive extensive treatment in Nietzsche’s middle 
works. But the Essays continue to be of major importance for Nietzsche into his late 
works. Thomas Brobjer, in his study of Nietzsche’s philosophical reading, notes the 
resurgence of Nietzsche’s interest in Montaigne during the period 1883-5, an interest 
that remains strong until the end of his writing life.
1
 In Ecce Homo, one of his final 
published works, Nietzsche yet again singles out the essayist for exceptional praise: ‘I 
have something of Montaigne’s mischief in my spirit, who knows! Perhaps in my body 
too’ (EH 2.3). I follow WD Williams, therefore, in arguing that, from the Untimely 




 Perhaps Nietzsche found Montaigne so immediately compelling because their 
visions of the world coincide in the most fundamental respects: sharing a Heraclitean 
view of reality, both are affirmers of becoming. But Nietzsche’s admiration for 
Montaigne is based not just on his celebration of transience. Nietzsche’s thought on a 
whole range of subjects is prefigured in the Essays: on the overcoming of suffering, on 
philosophy as a way of life, on the need to critically engage tradition, on the art of 
psychological dissection, on experimental philosophizing, on morality as custom and 
the link between cruelty and conscience, on the multiplicity of the self, on ethical 
                                                             
1 Brobjer, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Context, p. 90. 
2 Williams, Nietzsche and the French, p. 172. 
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naturalism, on healthy self-love. Montaigne is an exemplar for Nietzsche as a 
philosopher, psychologist, sceptic and naturalist, and this is not to mention similarities 
in style. Montaigne’s essay form and Nietzsche’s distinctive aphoristic style provide the 
freedom to tackle a range of issues from many different perspectives. The extent to 
which other features of Nietzsche style are to be found in the Essays is also remarkable: 
the widespread use of comic sarcasm and irony, the ad hominem attacks, a delight in 
imagery and metaphor, the constant rhetorical attempts to provoke and engage the 
reader. Indeed, Nietzsche’s innovative approach to philosophical writing seems 
unthinkable without Montaigne. 
It is thus my contention that the Essays were crucially significant in shaping 
much of Nietzsche’s philosophy, a significance not fully appreciated by scholarship 
hitherto. In fact, there has yet to be a thorough exploration of the Nietzsche-Montaigne 
relationship in the form of a book-length study; and much of the previous scholarship 
touching on this area has been chiefly concerned with examining the more general 
subject of the influence of the French philosophical tradition on Nietzsche’s thought: for 
instance, Williams’s Nietzsche and the French, and Brendan Donnellan’s Nietzsche and 
the French Moralists. Williams argues that Nietzsche admired Montaigne more than 
any other of the French moralists and that we may discern the clear influence of the 
essayist on Nietzsche’s writing as early as the Untimely Meditations (1873-6). 
Moreover, he claims that Montaigne played a major role in Nietzsche’s turn away from 
the romantic pessimism of The Birth of Tragedy, his first published work. Stressing the 
importance of self-knowledge, the Essays revealed to Nietzsche the need for a 
psychological approach to philosophical problems. What we thus find in his middle 
works, as in the Essays, is a penetrating examination of the true springs of human action 
and motivation. For Williams, Nietzsche takes over and expands upon Montaigne’s 
ideas on morality as custom and the mutual dependency of good and evil. Furthermore, 
he proposes that the notion of ‘becoming what you are’—forming oneself according to 
the inner laws of one’s own being—is at the heart of the Essays as well as Nietzsche’s 
middle and late works. 
Like Williams, Donnellan observes how both share a belief in the 
interdependence of good and evil and an appreciation of the significance of custom for 
the formation of moral conscience. Unlike Williams, he emphasizes Montaigne’s 
influence on Nietzsche as a free thinker and sceptic. In addition, Donnellan argues that 
much in the Essays anticipates Nietzsche’s ‘ambiguous attitude’ toward scientific 
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enquiry: suspicious of the notion of mechanical law, both thinkers agree on the 
limitations of a causal-deterministic mode of reasoning.
3
 Another issue on which we 
find agreement is the fundamental importance of the body. Donnellan underscores the 
extent to which both Montaigne and Nietzsche frequently demand that their readers 
heed the wisdom of the body. Donnellan also draws out similarities in style, noting in 
particular how both the essay and the aphorism promote an open-ended and 
experimental mode of philosophizing.  
Only a handful of scholars have deemed the Nietzsche-Montaigne relationship 
to be a subject worthy of study in its own right. While Williams and Donnellan focus on 
the importance of the Essays for Nietzsche’s middle period, David Molner, in his article 
‘The Influence of Montaigne on Nietzsche’, looks to Nietzsche’s late works. Molner 
highlights three aspects of the Nietzsche-Montaigne relationship. Firstly, elaborating on 
Donnellan’s examination, he argues that Montaigne’s harmonious ‘balance of body and 
soul’ is the inspiration behind Nietzsche’s ideas on the intimate connection between 
physiological need and philosophical thought.
4
 He also argues that Nietzsche found in 
Montaigne a ‘partner in torment’, someone who knew all too well the pain of bodily 
suffering.
5
 Secondly, Molner examines the impact of the Essays on Nietzsche’s style of 
philosophical writing. Building on Donnellan’s insights into the parallels between the 
essay and the aphorism, Molner stresses how a flexibility of style allowed both thinkers 
not only to overcome the dogmatism of traditional philosophic discourse but also to 
engage in honest self-presentation. Finally, Molner suggests that Montaigne, given his 
refusal of resentment and complete affirmation of life, may have been a ‘sketch’ for 
Nietzsche’s conception of the overhuman.  
In Vivetta Vivarelli’s ‘Montaigne und der “Freie Geist”’, the attention is again 
on Nietzsche’s middle works, Human, All Too Human especially. Vivarelli takes up a 
line of thought present, but not pursued, in Donnellan: Montaigne as a model for the 
Nietzschean ‘free spirit’. Indeed, for Vivarelli, it was Nietzsche’s reading of Montaigne 
that prepared the ground for his close study of the later French moralists, beginning in 
the late 1870’s. By juxtaposing quotations from the Essays and Human, All Too Human, 
Vivarelli draws out certain features that are common to both Montaigne and the ‘free 
spirit’. Foremost among them is an ‘unquenchable thirst’ for freedom, freedom, that is, 
                                                             
3 Donnellan, Nietzsche and the French Moralists, p. 26. 
4 Molner, “The Influence of Montaigne on Nietzsche”, p. 81. 
5 Ibid., p. 85. 
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from the ‘tyrannical’ forces of conventional opinion, custom and habit.
6
 What both seek 
above all is absolute intellectual independence, a complete detachment from any social 
obligations that may alienate one from oneself. In line with Williams, Vivarelli also 
proposes that Montaigne’s ‘cheerful wisdom’ served as a kind of ‘antidote’ for 
Nietzsche against the life-denying sickness of Schopenhauerian pessimism.
7
 
Dudley Marchi discusses the Nietzsche-Montaigne relationship in a chapter of 
his Montaigne among the Moderns. Unlike previous scholars, Marchi explores 
Montaigne’s significance for Nietzsche’s early philosophy, his thinking on the historical 
in particular. Marchi argues that we can see a similarity in ‘discursive characteristics’ 
between Nietzsche’s tripartite historical schema of the antiquarian, the monumental and 
the critical, as outlined in ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’, the 
second of his Untimely Meditations, and Montaigne’s approach to the historical in the 
Essays.
8
 The writings of both thinkers reflect a deep tension between revering the past 
and living vigorously in the present. For Marchi, both Montaigne and Nietzsche 
promote an active engagement with tradition. Not only do both thinkers use digestive 
metaphors to capture the process of taking the past into oneself but they also stress the 
need for an active forgetting that would open up a space for the unhistorical. Marchi 
suggests that, beyond Montaigne’s sceptical independence, it is the essayist’s creative 
appropriation of the Greco-Roman tradition that Nietzsche most admired. 
Although not strictly concerned with the influence of Montaigne on Nietzsche, 
Dorothea B. Heitsch, in Practising Reform in Montaigne’s Essais, uses Nietzsche as an 
‘interpretative means’ to come to terms with specific aspects of Montaigne’s writing.
9
 
Heitsch argues that we should view Montaigne, a thinker who takes up an extra-moral 
position, as akin to the Nietzschean immoralist who goes beyond good and evil. In this 
connection, Heitsch also observes the extent to which both thinkers approach morality 
from a determinedly psychological perspective. Further developing a theme already 
touched on by Molner, Heitsch emphasizes how both Montaigne and Nietzsche see 
writing style as having a physiological basis. For Heitsch, Nietzsche follows the essayist 
in understanding philosophy as inherently autobiographical, and expressive of the 
philosopher’s character and physical nature. Another important parallel between the two 
                                                             
6 Vivarelli, “Montaigne und der ‘Freie Geist’”, p. 85. 
7 Ibid., p. 100. 
8 Marchi, Montaigne among the Moderns, p. 135. 
9 Heitsch, Practising Reform in Montaigne’s Essais, p. 5. 
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thinkers, Heitsch suggests, is the way they both demand attentive and competent readers 
who will engage their texts actively and creatively. 
Most recently, Jessica Berry has claimed, in ‘The Pyrrhonian Revival in 
Montaigne and Nietzsche’, that Montaigne makes a ‘substantive contribution’ to 
Nietzsche’s thought by giving ‘impetus’ to the naturalism that begins to develop in 
Human, All Too Human.
10
 Berry argues that Nietzsche follows Montaigne in viewing 
metaphysical explanations as ‘psychologically suspect’: both thinkers understand the 
dogmas of religion and metaphysics as ‘pathological’ and symptomatic of psychological 
ill-health.
11
 Moreover, both insist that we go astray to the extent that we treat the human 
being as above and apart from other creatures. For Nietzsche as for Montaigne, the task 
of philosophy must be to ‘translate’ humanity back into nature, to bring us back into 
conformity with the rest of the natural world. Berry also claims that Nietzsche’s 
naturalism has its ‘roots’ in the Pyrrhonian scepticism that Montaigne seems to endorse 
in the Essays. Taking up these themes again in a chapter of her Nietzsche and the 
Ancient Skeptical Tradition, Berry attempts to show how scepticism motivates the 
naturalisms of both Montaigne and Nietzsche. Berry proposes that Pyrrhonian 
scepticism, a ‘naturalistic’ scepticism, is compatible with the kind of ‘methodological 
naturalism’ that Nietzsche would wish to advance.
12
  
Why has the Nietzsche-Montaigne relationship received so little attention? The 
first issue to consider is the comparative neglect of Nietzsche’s middle works, Human, 
All Too Human and Daybreak in particular, and the extent to which the Untimely 
Meditations have been deemed worthy of philosophical interest only insofar as they 
foreshadow central themes of Nietzsche’s later writing. The relative disregard of these 
works is crucial, since it is in the Untimely Meditations that Nietzsche offers Montaigne 
as a philosophical ideal above all others, and it is in Human, All Too Human and 
Daybreak that Montaigne’s influence as a moral psychologist, sceptic and naturalist is 
most obviously apparent. Furthermore, this first problem has been compounded by a 
second: Montaigne is virtually ignored as a serious thinker, his Essays taken as a work 
of literature, not philosophy. But the features of Montaigne’s philosophical writing that 
have led him to be routinely overlooked in histories of Western philosophy would, for 
Nietzsche, make him more of a philosopher, not less. Indeed, on the Nietzschean 
                                                             
10 Berry, “The Pyrrhonian Revival in Montaigne and Nietzsche”, p. 498. 
11 Ibid., p. 499. 
12 Berry, Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition, p. 95. 
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account, it is only the ‘prejudices’ of the Western philosophical tradition that have 
prevented us from seeing Montaigne as a major thinker.  
In his study of the Essays, Richard Sayce offers a number of reasons to account 
for Montaigne’s exclusion ‘from the ranks of officially recognized philosophers’.
13
 First 
is his complete ‘immersion’ in becoming: for Nietzsche, Montaigne is thus free of one 
of the troubling ‘idiosyncrasies’ of most other philosophers, who are united in ‘their 
hatred of the very idea of becoming’: ‘Heraclitus will always be right in thinking that 
being is an empty fiction’ (TI 3.1-2). Second is Montaigne’s practical orientation and 
his rejection of metaphysical speculation: Nietzsche also denounces metaphysics and, 
no less than the essayist, sees genuine philosophizing as grounded in lived experience. 
Third is the unsystematic form of Montaigne’s writing: in Nietzsche’s view, ‘the will to 
a system is a lack of integrity’ (TI 1.26). Fourth is the way he emphasizes the 
importance of the body over that of the soul: Nietzsche’s Zarathustra declares: ‘Body 
am I through and through, and nothing besides; and the soul is merely a word for 
something about the body’ (Z 1.4). Another reason, as suggested by Ullrich Langer, is 
the very personal nature of Montaigne’s writing:
14
 in this way, Montaigne shows an 
acute awareness of what Nietzsche claims very few philosophers have been willing to 
admit: ‘In the philosopher…there is nothing whatever that is impersonal’ (BGE 6). It 
thus becomes apparent that everything which separates Montaigne from the Western 
philosophical tradition moves him closer to Nietzsche. And in his overcoming of that 
same tradition, Nietzsche found a sympathetic voice in Montaigne.  
The final matter to bear in mind, as regards the dearth of scholarship in this area, 
is Montaigne’s apparent orthodoxy. It simply doesn’t seem credible that a Catholic 
conservative and staunch defender of the status quo could be an important exemplar for 
a thinker as revolutionary as Nietzsche. But to accept such a view would be to fail to 
seriously engage the radical intent of the Essays. For Montaigne is a profoundly esoteric 
thinker, his mask of piety adopted for prudential reasons, as protection against the 
censors in Rome and the ruling Catholic power. Writing at the end of the 16
th
 century, 
Montaigne risked imprisonment and perhaps execution, if he openly questioned 
Christian dogma.
15
 Yet, this is not to deny that there has been a sharp divide in the 
literature, between those scholars who accept Montaigne’s professions of faith as 
                                                             
13 Sayce, The Essays of Montaigne, p. 161. 
14 Langer, “Introduction”, The Cambridge Companion to Montaigne, p. 2. 
15 Giordano Bruno, the Italian philosopher and mathematician, was arrested in 1592 and burned at 
the stake in 1600, for holding beliefs contrary to the Catholic faith. 
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genuine and those who do not. However, I agree with David Schaefer that it is the latter 
group that make a more forceful argument, having a far greater weight of evidence on 
their side.
16
 Just to mention some of the heterodox elements of the Essays: not once 
does Montaigne even imply that we should see the life of Jesus or the lives of the 
Christian saints and martyrs as exemplary; he rarely quotes from the Bible, which is 
never taken as authoritative on any question; he rejects the idea of an immortal soul and 
the assumption of our superiority over other creatures; he denounces asceticism and 
encourages the enjoyment of sexuality; he seldom mentions sin and advises against 
repentance; he argues that our conceptions of God are nothing more than 
anthropomorphisms. With good reason, the Essays were eventually placed on the 
Church’s index of proscribed books in 1676, Montaigne having failed, by the time of 
his death in 1592, to make the alterations recommended by the censors at the time of 
publication. 
But of course, for our purposes, the crucial question is not the relative merits of 
the case for Montaigne as conservative or revolutionary. What matters is how Nietzsche 
actually saw him, and on this there can be no doubt: it is the heterodox, not the 
orthodox, Montaigne who is Nietzsche’s exemplar. As himself a master of the esoteric, 
Nietzsche sees behind Montaigne’s mask of piety. Indeed, Laurence Lampert argues 
that we may understand the ‘virtuous dissimilation’ of figures such as Montaigne and 
Descartes as allowing them to ‘fight covertly’ the battles that Nietzsche has the freedom 
to wage more ‘overtly’.
17
 And Nietzsche was fully aware of the presence of the Essays 
on the ‘Index in the Vatican’ (KSA 13: 11[65]). For him, not only is Montaigne not a 
Christian, but his thought is something that Christianity—in the person of Pascal—had 
to defend itself against (KSA 12: 7[69]). In a letter to Heinrich von Stein in March, 
1885, Nietzsche recommends the reading of the Essays as a substitute for his own 
‘dangerously strong wine’ (KSB 7, 584). Only the ‘dangerous’ Montaigne can explain 
Nietzsche’s need to return time and again to the Essays for inspiration. Only this 
Montaigne could be his ‘spiritual father’:
18
 he could have made himself ‘at home in the 
world’ with no other. 
                                                             
16 Schaefer, The Political Philosophy of Montaigne, p. 42. 
17 Lampert, Nietzsche and Modern Times, pp. 246, 263.  
18 Sarolea, German Problems and Personalities, p. 97. For Heitsch, Charles Sarolea is perhaps ‘the 
first writer to realize the kinship between the two authors’ (Practising Reform in Montaigne’s Essais, 
p. 24n54). Sarolea offers a very brief, but very insightful, discussion of the Nietzsche-Montaigne 
relationship: ‘The real and esoteric Montaigne is, like Nietzsche, a herald of revolt, one of the most 
revolutionary thinkers of all times’ (p. 98).  
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In what follows, I attempt to address this lacuna in the literature regarding the 
importance of Montaigne for Nietzsche’s philosophical development. Considering 
Nietzsche’s singular praise of Montaigne and the many points of convergence in their 
thinking, a study is warranted that focuses specifically on the philosophical influence 
that Nietzsche’s reading of the Essays exerted on his work. Such a study offers the 
following: to place Montaigne beside Nietzsche, not only gives us a clearer and fuller 
picture of what Nietzsche takes as the task of the philosopher but it also forces us to 
recognize crucial yet seldom emphasized aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophical project: 
his conception of philosophy as a way of life, his reverence for tradition, his mission to 
translate humanity back into nature, his stress on the multiplicity of the self and the 
importance of the body. To look at Montaigne through the lens of Nietzsche, not only 
affords a new angle into Montaigne’s moral psychology, which Nietzsche broadened 
and deepened, and his scepticism and naturalism, but it also allows the drawing out of 
the more radical elements of Montaigne’s thought—likely to escape attention in a 
straightforward reading—thereby making plain his relevance and importance to 
contemporary philosophy. Furthermore, an examination of Montaigne’s influence on 
Nietzsche will be helpful in illuminating the contours of Nietzsche’s thought as he 
moved away from the romanticism of The Birth of Tragedy to the sustained 




Chapter 1: The Philosopher’s Task 
Chapter 1 deals with the importance of Montaigne for Nietzsche’s Untimely 
Meditations, in particular ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ and ‘On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for life’. Considering that Nietzsche always saw 
’Schopenhauer as Educator’ as essential to an understanding of his mature philosophy, 
his tribute to Montaigne in this work must be taken seriously. In section I, I discuss how 
Nietzsche’s admiration for Montaigne announces a reorientation in his thinking, as he 
breaks free from Schopenhauerian pessimism. While other commentators note 
Montaigne’s significance in this respect, they have failed to explain what precisely 
Nietzsche finds so appealing about Montaigne’s distinctive ‘cheerfulness’. I suggest that 
Montaigne earns Nietzsche’s praise for his capacity to celebrate—despite its suffering—
the joy and wonder of life. Furthermore, displaying no fear of a world of becoming, 
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Montaigne possesses the fortitude to celebrate the transience of existence. I thus argue 
that Nietzsche’s reading of the Essays gave impetus to the development of his own 
conception of a ‘pessimism of strength’. I also examine the way in which both thinkers, 
seeking to restore innocence to becoming, view laughter as the most appropriate 
response to the contingency of the human condition. I conclude this section by 
suggesting that, in encouraging his escape from Schopenhauer, Montaigne becomes a 
new exemplar for Nietzsche. 
 Section II takes up Nietzsche’s distinctive conception of philosophy as a way of 
life. In ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, he promotes a distinctly Hellenistic conception of 
the philosopher, where philosophy is understood as art of living rooted in practical 
activity. I argue that Nietzsche places Montaigne at the centre of this work not only 
because of his affirmation of life but also because the essayist so clearly anticipates 
Nietzsche’s own conception of the philosopher. For Nietzsche, Montaigne’s freedom 
and intellectual independence allow him to lead a genuinely philosophical existence. 
Furthermore, I discuss how Montaigne’s attack on the medieval scholar, based on a 
Greco-Roman understanding of the philosopher, informs Nietzsche’s polemics against 
the German education system. I end section II by exploring the extent to which 
Nietzsche’s plea, at the beginning of ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, to free ourselves from 
convention and return to authentic existence follows the Montaignean demand that we 
liberate ourselves from the tyrannical force of custom. Moreover, I suggest that the 
influence of the Essays, in this connection, extends beyond ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, 
helping to shape Nietzsche’s later notion of the philosopher as a ‘free spirit’. 
 Despite Montaigne’s reverence for the great figures of the Greco-Roman world, 
he is in no sense a thinker enslaved by tradition. Always retaining a healthy intellectual 
distance from the ancients, Montaigne’s engagement with the past is fundamentally 
critical. In order to understand his complex relationship to the historical, I propose that 
we should look to Nietzsche, who examines, in ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of 
History for Life’, three distinct ways in which the individual relates to the historical: the 
monumental, the antiquarian, and the critical. Section III draws out the many aspects of 
Nietzsche’s discussion of the historical that are clearly prefigured in the Essays. I argue 
that Nietzsche sees in Montaigne a preeminent example of what he calls the ‘plastic 
power’, the capacity to transform and incorporate the past into oneself. Both thinkers 
promote an active forgetting so as to ensure the creative assimilation of the past. 
Furthermore, on the Nietzschean account, a critical approach to the historical is an 
xvii 
 
essential task of the philosopher. Having achieved self-knowledge and intellectual 
independence, the philosopher must confront the additional task of creating new cultural 
values. I claim that Nietzsche offers Montaigne as a philosophical ideal above all others 
because he embodies this kind of ‘critical spirit’. 
 
Chapter 2: The Art of Psychological Dissection 
In Chapter 2, I move onto Nietzsche’s middle period and discuss Montaigne’s 
importance for Nietzsche as a psychologist and sceptic. Section I deals with Nietzsche’s 
turn to a more psychologically-orientated philosophy, his recognition of the importance 
of self-knowledge and the art of psychological dissection. I explore how Montaigne’s 
undermining of metaphysical speculation by way of a psychological approach 
anticipates Nietzsche’s more incisive examination of the all-too-human motives 
underlying artistic, religious and metaphysical ideals. Next I examine the extent to 
which Montaigne’s scepticism inspires Nietzsche’s attack on philosophical and 
religious dogmatism in Human, All Too Human. Both thinkers emphasize the 
limitations of language and the errors constitutive to reason. I end this section by 
arguing that Nietzsche takes over from Montaigne a form of sceptical attitude in which 
doubt coexists with the relentless pursuit of knowledge and an unconditional affirmation 
of life. 
 I begin section II with a discussion of how Nietzsche, like Montaigne, 
understands the exemplary philosophical life in terms of a continuous process of 
experience and experiment. For both thinkers, the philosopher must use his or her life as 
a means to knowledge. In this way, the ‘free spirit’ of Nietzsche’s middle works follows 
Montaigne in adopting an experimental mode of philosophizing. Next I examine 
Montaigne’s influence on Nietzsche’s moral psychology. First I explore the way in 
which both thinkers seek to undermine the metaphysical foundations of morality; they 
agree that, at the most fundamental level, morality is nothing other than obedience to 
custom. Then I examine the intimate connection both see between cruelty and 
conscience, and I propose that the Essays prepare the ground for Nietzsche’s re-
evaluation of ‘egoistic’ actions. For Montaigne as well as for Nietzsche, the notion that 
the highest moral actions are guided by wholly selfless behaviour represents a 
misunderstanding of human motivation. Both recognize that the virtuous and wicked 
alike draw pleasure from their behaviour. 
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 In the final section of Chapter 2, I begin to trace the influence of the Essays on 
Nietzsche’s thought beyond the free spirit trilogy of his middle period. Throughout the 
Essays, Montaigne questions the notion of a fixed and unified soul. In his middle and 
late works, Nietzsche absorbs what Montaigne has to say on the nature of the self and 
launches an even deeper critique of what he calls ‘soul atomism’. Both thinkers 
repudiate the traditional understanding of the soul in favour of a new conception of the 
soul as a ‘subjective multiplicity’, dissolving the supposedly singular ‘I’ into a plurality 
of wills and persons. Furthermore, determined to complicate our psychological lives, 
both Montaigne and Nietzsche seek to uncover the myriad motivational pathways that 
lead to action. I conclude this section by examining the extent to which Montaigne 
anticipates Nietzsche in understanding behaviour as determined by motive forces that 
remain below the level of conscious thought. For both thinkers, the most decisive 
operations of the soul are opaque and essentially unknowable. 
 
Chapter 3: Human and Nature 
In Chapter 3, I examine the importance of the Essays for the naturalism at the centre of 
Nietzsche’s middle and late works. In the opening section, I argue that Montaigne’s 
eagerness to celebrate humanity’s continuity with the rest of nature points Nietzsche in 
the direction of the cheerful naturalism that orients his thinking from Human, All Too 
Human onward. I argue furthermore that the ‘insane task’ that Nietzsche sets himself, of 
translating humanity back into nature, is essentially continuous with Montaigne’s 
mission to deflate presumption and place the human being back within the natural 
world. In this section I also explore the way in which both Montaigne and Nietzsche, to 
the extent that we have abandoned nature, diagnose an acute ‘sickness’ in humanity. 
And while both thinkers lament our separation from the instinctual certainty of other 
creature as a great loss, it is primarily an axiological sickness that both seek to expose: 
our propensity to create values and ideals that promote guilt and self-loathing. I 
conclude section I with a discussion of how both thinkers look to more primitive 
cultures as exemplifying a healthier form of humanity.  
 Both Montaigne and Nietzsche seek to overturn the values of asceticism, to 
repudiate the notion that the highest human ideal is that which takes us away from the 
body and the earthly. Section II begins with a discussion of the contempt both thinkers 
share for any belief system that would devalue earthly life. I then move on to explore 
the way in which, through their respective projects of re-naturalization, they aim to 
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counteract unhealthy desires of transcendence. I argue that Nietzsche discerns in 
Montaigne’s thought one of the central aspects of the Dionysian attitude: a disavowal of 
the language of redemption. In addition, I suggest that Nietzsche follows Montaigne in 
his desire to return sacredness to the earth. I conclude by returning to the issue of 
scepticism, and propose that both thinkers endorse a form of scepticism that could be 
described as ‘experimental’, rather than Pyrrhonian. This ‘stronger’ scepticism, while 
opening up the possibility of endless experiment and enquiry, allows nonetheless for a 
‘certainty of value standards’: both thinks strive to replace life-denying values with 
naturalistic values. 
 The final section of this chapter examines the affinities between Montaigne’s 
delight in corporeal existence and Nietzsche’s Dionysian affirmation of the body. For 
both thinkers, the re-naturalization of values centrally involves a reconsideration of the 
status of the body. And they agree that we should understand the human being as ‘body 
through and through’. In this section I also explore how both thinkers engage in a form 
of autobiographical philosophizing that could be called ‘body philosophy’: for 
Montaigne and Nietzsche, the self-knowledge that informs their respective philosophies 
has its basis in the ‘great reason’ of the body. I thus claim that Nietzsche looks to the 
Essays as a model work of philosophical autobiography. I end this section by arguing 
that, since Montaigne’s bodily suffering serves only to intensify his earthly gratitude, 
there can be, on the Nietzschean account, no more perfect embodiment of true 
physiological health than the philosophical example provided by the Essays.  
 
Chapter 4: Higher Naturalism 
For both Montaigne and Nietzsche, the advancement of an ethical naturalism is central 
to the task of translating humanity back into nature. Section I details how, in order to 
develop a healthy standard of moral evaluation, both thinkers adopt the extra-moral 
position of a philosophical anthropologist. Throughout the Essays, there is one moral 
prejudice in particular that Montaigne seeks to undermine: the idea of a fundamental 
antithesis between good and evil. Like Nietzsche, he understands good and evil not as 
opposites, but as mutually interdependent. What is more, both accept ‘evil’ as of 
fundamental value in the general economy of life. I argue that Nietzsche takes over and 
expands upon Montaigne’s core criticism of traditional ascetic morality: that it aims for 
the suppression of natural desires and instincts, and is, therefore, anti-natural and anti-
life. Furthermore, both Montaigne and Nietzsche cast the move away from traditional 
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notions of virtue as a return to ‘health’, that is, to a natural virtue no longer directed 
toward the transcendence of human nature, but rather toward the most vital expression 
of that nature. I conclude this section with a brief account of the way in which both 
thinkers attempt to set up a naturalistic standard of valuation. 
 Although Montaigne and Nietzsche call for a return to nature, stressing the 
health of primitive cultures, the return they have in mind is not so much a going back as 
an ascent into a higher naturalism. Section II explores the idea of a naturalism geared 
toward cultural progress, the celebration and cultivation of natural drives and capacities. 
For both thinkers, such progress is possible because human nature always constitutes an 
amalgam of first and second nature, a second nature formed by culture. I propose that 
we may understand both Montaigne and Nietzsche as advocating a self-aware 
naturalism, where the incorporation of an appropriate second nature can enhance and 
complement what is given in our body and physiology. In other words, a naturalism that 
seeks to improve on nature through the assimilation of self-knowledge. I end this 
section by arguing that what follows from this kind of naturalism is the cultivation of a 
natural, innocent and self-expressive virtue. 
 The final section begins with a discussion of how this higher naturalism might 
be achieved. Since both thinkers abandon the traditional, ascetic route to self-mastery—
reason as ruler in the soul—this is a matter that becomes especially pressing. Indeed, 
both Montaigne and Nietzsche understand reason as performing an important but 
merely instrumental role in the psyche. Their goal, however, is not to abandon the ideal 
of self-mastery outright, but to substantially revise it: they both advocate a form of self-
mastery that manifests in an instinctual, effortless and relaxed virtue. Next I move on to 
explore the many elements of Nietzsche’s conception of ‘becoming what you are’ that 
are anticipated in the Essays. For both thinkers, individuals create themselves insofar as 
they act in accordance with the laws of their own nature. I conclude by examining the 
extent to which Nietzsche follows Montaigne in conceiving life affirmation in terms of 
a love of fate. And for both, this love of fate takes the form of a complete immersion in 
the momentary present.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE PHILOSOPHER’S 
TASK 
 
Section I: ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ 
 
The significance of ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ 
No thinker is more important to Nietzsche’s early philosophical development than 
Arthur Schopenhauer. At the outset of his philosophical life, Nietzsche tells us, he came 
to the writings of Schopenhauer in a state of ‘need, distress and desire’, and discovered a 
body of work that he felt had been written just for him (SE 2). Nietzsche’s first 
published work, The Birth of Tragedy, is suffused with Schopenhauerian ideas and 
terminology, with extensive quotations from Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and 
Representation. The Birth of Tragedy is concerned, in part, with setting out a path to the 
reinvigoration of German culture, ‘a renewal and reformation of the German spirit’, 
which Nietzsche believed to be in a state of ossification and decay (BT 20). This project 
takes centre stage in his next work, Untimely Meditations, and in ‘Schopenhauer as 
Educator’, the third Meditation, Nietzsche puts forward Schopenhauer as an exemplar to 
his contemporaries. For Nietzsche, Schopenhauer’s example, owing to his ‘dignified 
distance’ from the culture around him, points the way to new and transfiguring cultural 
goals, free of the forces of money-making and the demands of the state—
misappropriations of cultural energy. In this sense, Nietzsche claims, Schopenhauer is an 
educator in the most necessary and profound sense, for by way of his example, followers 
can endeavour to raise themselves above their ‘insufficiencies insofar as these originated 
in the age’ (SE 2). 
 What is notable is that, unlike The Birth of Tragedy, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ 
contains little or no actual reference to Schopenhauer’s philosophical ideas. In fact, from 
the Untimely Mediations onwards, Nietzsche becomes progressively more scornful of 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy, even if he continues to admire Schopenhauer the man. In 
Twilight of the Idols, writing near the end of his philosophical life, Nietzsche describes 
Schopenhauer as ‘the last German of any consequence’, yet at the same time condemns 
his philosophy as a ‘nihilistic … depreciation of the value of life’ (TI 9.21). In a note 
written in 1887, he has this to say: ‘Around 1876 I was terrified to see all I had desired 
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hitherto compromised. … I grasped that my instinct went in the opposite direction from 
Schopenhauer’s’ (KSA 12: 9[42] (WP 1005)). This comment is particularly revealing, 
not only in suggesting how much Nietzsche feared distancing himself from the 
philosopher who had originally inspired him but also in showing the singular importance 
of the Untimely Meditations, the final installment of which had been published that very 
year. It is evident that, for Nietzsche, the Untimely Meditations mark a decisive turning 
point is his thinking: here, for the first time, he begins to separate himself from the 
Schopenhauerian vision of life, and move forward with his own, independent 
philosophical project. Indeed, in a letter to his friend Peter Gast in 1883, he insists that, 
as regards his later writing, ‘everything was already promised’ in ‘Schopenhauer as 
Educator’ (KSB 6, 405). 
 ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, then, is essential to understanding the origins of 
Nietzsche’s mature philosophy. In Ecce Homo, his philosophical autobiography, 
Nietzsche makes this point explicitly and emphatically: ‘Schopenhauer as Educator 
bears my innermost history, my becoming inscribed within it’ (EH, ‘UM’ 3). He 
concedes that, in retrospect, far from being a work devoted to Schopenhauer and 
beholden to Schopenhauerian ideas, this work should be more appropriately entitled 
‘Nietzsche as Educator’, such is ‘the great freedom [der grossen Freiheit]’ that ‘blows 
over everything’ (ibid.). More crucial still, and in line with the note quoted above, 
Nietzsche is adamant that the voice who speaks in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ is 
certainly not Schopenhauer, but ‘his opposite’ (ibid.). That is to say, Nietzsche, 
following the Untimely Meditations, comes to understand his philosophy not just as 
being in broad disagreement with Schopenhauerian pessimism but its antithesis, and 
dedicated to its repudiation. Thus, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche asserts that, in 
contrast to the resignation counselled by Schopenhauer’s ‘world-denying’ pessimism, he 
is offering ‘the opposite ideal: the ideal of the most high-spirited, alive and world-
affirming human being’ (BGE 56). The roots of this counter-ideal may be traced back to 
The Birth of Tragedy, and more particularly, to Nietzsche’s discussion of the Dionysian. 
 
 
Schopenhauerian pessimism versus the Dionysian  
Schopenhauer’s bleak, thorough-going pessimism is exemplified in his claim that 
‘nothing else can be stated as the aim of our existence except the knowledge that it 
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would be better for us not to exist’.
1
 Such hostility towards existence grows out of his 
metaphysics. Drawing on Kantian thought, Schopenhauer proposes that behind the 
phenomenal world represented to us by our senses our life is propelled by an all-
consuming will, which is the fundamental reality. Furthermore, this will is one of 
endless striving and desiring, never to be satisfied. In consequence, suffering is 
inescapable and ubiquitous; we are doomed to exist in a permanent state of need and 
deficiency. At times, in The Birth of Tragedy, by adopting unmistakably 
Schopenhauerian language, Nietzsche seems to endorse a kind of Schopenhauerian 
pessimism. But this could not be further from the truth. As John Sallis points out, 
‘tragedy is for Nietzsche no escape from willing and from the suffering implicated 
therein … but rather a disclosure capable of leading one back from pessimism to 
affirmation’.
2
 For Schopenhauer, the purpose of tragic art, and the highest end of life, is 
a renunciation of the will and a denial of the will to life: only by ceasing to strive can we 
hope to be redeemed from suffering. Tragic art, in other words, brings us face to face 
with the sufferings of existence so that we may accept our fate and resign ourselves to 
the futility of life. Nietzsche, while accepting it is ‘indisputable … that the only subject-
matter of Greek tragedy, in its earliest form, was the suffering of Dionysus’, draws the 
opposite conclusion (BT 10). For him, the ‘solace’ to be derived from Dionysian tragedy 
is ‘an overwhelming feeling … that in the ground of things … life is indestructibly 
mighty and pleasurable’ (BT 7). What thus becomes clear is that ‘the unequivocal and 
explicit rejection of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics found in Nietzsche’s later texts is already 
apparent in [The Birth of Tragedy]’.
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Consequently, implicit to The Birth of Tragedy is a repudiation of the 
Schopenhauerian view of existence as an arena of hopeless suffering. And although 
Schopenhauer escapes direct attack in the original edition of The Birth of Tragedy, in a 
revised edition, published in 1886, Nietzsche adds a new opening section entitled ‘An 
Attempt at Self-Criticism’, in which he openly criticizes Schopenhauer’s pessimism. 
Here, Nietzsche laments his previous use of a Schopenhauerian idiom, admitting that he 
lacked the ‘courage’ to ‘permit’ himself a language of his own (BT, ‘SC’ 6). More 
significant still, he makes clear that what is at the heart of the work is a form of 
pessimism that is the polar opposite of Schopenhauer’s: namely, ‘a pessimism of 
                                                 
1 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. 2, p. 605. 
2 Sallis, Crossings, pp. 98-9. 
3 Urpeth, “A ‘Pessimism of Strength’”, p. 142. 
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strength [Pessimismus der Stärke]’, which comes from ‘overflowing health, from an 
abundance of existence’ (BT, ‘SC’ 1). For Nietzsche, Greek tragedy had nothing to do 
with a doctrine of resignation, still less a denial of life. On the contrary, by means of 
tragic art, the Greeks triumphed over their suffering, for the essence of Greek tragedy is 
the Dionysian, an experience that has its basis ‘in desire and delight … in an excess of 
plenitude’ (BT, ‘SC’ 4). Nietzsche’s pessimism of strength is thus a radical 
transformation of Schopenhauerian pessimism, where suffering is conceived not as a 
discouragement to life but as an inducement. To gain insight into this re-imagined 
pessimism, we must look to ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, for it is here not only that, as 
already stated, Nietzsche first begins to distance himself from Schopenhauer but it is 
also here that we can see the first flowering of his own counter-ideal. For a remarkable 
feature of ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ is that, in a work supposedly dedicated to the 
example of Arthur Schopenhauer, it is another philosopher, Michel de Montaigne, whom 





‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ and Montaigne 
Generally, Nietzsche reserves unequivocal praise for pre-Socratic philosophers. 
Searching his oeuvre, one would be hard pressed to find equally complimentary 
statements on more recent thinkers (excepting Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, perhaps). 
In that context alone, Nietzsche’s comments in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ regarding 
Montaigne merit some attention:  
 
That such a man wrote has truly augmented the joy of living on this earth. 
Since getting to know this freest and mightiest of souls, I … have come to 
feel … as soon as I glance at him I grow a leg or a wing. … If I were set the 
task, I could endeavour to make myself at home in the world with him (SE 2). 
 
                                                 
4 The first mention of Montaigne in the Nietzsche corpus is in a letter to his family, December 30, 
1870, where he reveals that Cosima Wagner has given him a ‘handsome’ edition of the complete 
Essays as a Christmas present, and admits to admiring Montaigne a great deal (KSB 3, 116). Thomas 
Brobjer speculates that Nietzsche began reading the Essays in 1871 (Nietzsche’s Philosophical 
Context, p. 57). Yet Williams is surely right to suggest that ‘Cosima’s present of Montaigne … seems 
to show that Nietzsche was interested in the [Essays] some time before, but it is unlikely that he 
read them before his arrival in Basle [1869]’ (Nietzsche and the French, p. 17). 
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The significance of this statement, however, goes well beyond the mere fact that 
Nietzsche is being unusually appreciative of another thinker, particularly bearing in 
mind that in the preceding sentence he has asserted that he would place Montaigne 
above Schopenhauer ‘in terms of honesty’. And this at a time when, as Williams 
observes, Nietzsche was still presenting Schopenhauer as his philosophical ideal.
5
 
Moreover, in the light of Nietzsche’s remarks in Ecce Homo, concerning how crucial a 
reading of ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ should be for anyone who would want to 
understand the task he set himself as a philosopher, this tribute to Montaigne must be 
taken with the utmost seriousness. Accordingly, its importance cannot be overstated, as 
floating between the lines is a complete rejection of Schopenhauer’s vision of existence. 
Montaigne would have found absurd Schopenhauer’s view of human life as a realm of 
endless suffering, as well as his claim that we would be better off not existing at all. The 
Montaignean and Schopenhauerian attitudes to life and philosophy stand in direct 
opposition to each other. After all, in Book I of the Essays, Montaigne states that ‘[a] 
sad and gloomy mien shows that you have mistaken’ the ‘address’ of philosophy, and 
furthermore, that the ‘most express sign of wisdom is unruffled joy [jouissance 
constante]’ (I.26; T160, S180-1 [118-19]). Thus, Nietzsche’s admiration for Montaigne 
announces a reorientation in his thinking.
6
 And the fact that he would go so far as to 
claim that he could make himself ‘at home in the world’ with the essayist suggests deep 
reservations toward Schopenhauerian pessimism. 
 Indeed, if one looks to his earliest writings, it is apparent that, even as Nietzsche 
wrote The Birth of Tragedy, he no longer held to Schopenhauer’s pessimistic 
worldview.
7
 Of course, this invites the question of why he would strive to give the 
contrary impression in his first two published works. In response, Alexander Nehamas 
suggests that, as regards these early writings, Nietzsche made ‘a strategic decision to 
proceed in a way that would not alienate’ his then friend and mentor, Richard Wagner.
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Wagner, a staunch Schopenhauerian, exerted a huge influence on the young writer 
Nietzsche—so much so, in fact, that The Birth of Tragedy is dedicated to him. 
Consequently, in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, we can understand Nietzsche as 
                                                 
5 Williams, Nietzsche and the French, p. 18. 
6 Brobjer describes Montaigne as an ‘alien influence’ on Nietzsche during the early 1870’s, given his 
intensive reading of Schopenhauer (Nietzsche’s Philosophical Context, p. 57). 
7 Nietzsche, Writings from the Early Notebooks, pp. 1-8 (October 1867-April 1868: ‘On 
Schopenhauer’). 
8 Ibid., “Introduction”, p. xxii. 
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attempting to maintain a tension between two somewhat conflicting aims, that of 
honoring Schopenhauer’s life as a philosopher, while at the same time distancing 
himself from Schopenhauerian ideas. This he achieves by never overtly criticizing 
Schopenhauer and extravagantly praising Montaigne. Such a reading is reinforced when 
Nietzsche goes on to suggest that, along with honesty, ‘Schopenhauer has a second 
quality in common with Montaigne’: ‘cheerfulness [Heiterkeit]’ (SE 2). There is a deep 
irony to this claim. Schopenhauer, the famously morose figure who, in response to 
Gottfried Leibniz’s argument attempting to prove that we exist in ‘the best of all 
possible worlds’, develops his own counter argument to the effect that ‘this world itself 
is the worst of all possible worlds’, versus Montaigne, the indefatigably buoyant thinker 
who claims ‘the soul which houses philosophy’ should have ‘a spritely active demeanor 
and happy welcoming face’ (I.26; T160, S180 [119]).
9
 Nietzsche’s embrace of 
Montaigne, his talk of the ‘joy of living’ and ‘cheerfulness’, indicates a tacit 
abandonment of the main features of Schopenhauerian pessimism and prefigures the 
more direct and emphatic repudiation expressed in ‘An Attempt at Self-Criticism’, by 
which time Nietzsche had long since broken free from Wagner’s intellectual influence.  
This is not to argue that Montaigne was the main cause of Nietzsche’s turn away 
from Schopenhauer. Rather, it is to suggest that Nietzsche’s reading of the Essays gave 
impetus to a revolution in his thinking that was under way before he came to write 
‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, a revolution he was well aware of, but chose not to 
explicitly document. In Montaigne, Nietzsche found a new philosophical exemplar, 
whose celebration of human existence offered encouragement to the Dionysian attitude 
to life he had espoused in The Birth of Tragedy. A note penned in the year before his 
revised edition of The Birth of Tragedy offers some insight. Here, he explains that he 
saw clearly the ‘decline in cheerfulness’ precipitated by the advance of German 
pessimism, but was on guard against it—although he admits this form of ‘extreme 
pessimism … can be perceived here and there in my Birth of Tragedy’ (KSA 11: 36[49] 
(WP 91)). Based on his comments in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, one can with some 
justification view Nietzsche’s study of Montaigne as essential to the cultivation of this 
wariness, and see the Montaignean worldview as providing him with a defence against 
the world-denying aspects of Schopenhauer’s pessimism.
10
 Furthermore, his praise of 
                                                 
9 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol. 2, p. 583. 
10 As Williams puts it, Montaigne’s ‘action on Nietzsche may be said to start with the emancipation 
of his thought from the early mystical subservience to Wagner and Schopenhauer’ (Nietzsche and 
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Montaigne adds substance to the repeated claim of Ecce Homo that in ‘Schopenhauer as 
Educator’ it is really a voice antagonistic to Schopenhauer which is given a chance to 
speak. But much more than this, what we see at work here truly is ‘Nietzsche as 
Educator’: he is filling out and developing his own counter ideal to Schopenhauerian 
pessimism, for what grounds Montaigne’s joy in living and Nietzsche’s pessimism of 
strength is the same thing: an affirmation of becoming. 
 
 
Overcoming of the concept of being 
A Heraclitean view of the world pervades the Essays. Montaigne is at pains to 
emphasize ‘the uncertainty and mutability of human affairs which lightly shift from state 
to state, each one different from the other’ (I.19; T77, S85, [54]). Like Heraclitus, 
Montaigne opposes the stability of being to the perpetual flux of becoming. A 
remarkable passage near the end of ‘An apology for Raymond Sebond’ is nothing short 
of a hymn to becoming and a powerful rejection of the concept of being. It is worth 
quoting from it: 
 
[T]here is no permanent existence either in our being or in that of objects. … 
[A]ll mortal things are flowing and rolling ceaselessly [coulant et roulant 
sans cesse]. … We have no communication with Being. … [A]ll things are 
subject to pass from change to change. … [A]ll things are in a never-ending 
inconstancy, change and flux (II.12; T586, S680 [455]). 
 
And if this was not enough, Montaigne repudiates the notion of being again in Book III: 
‘Constancy itself is nothing but a more languid rocking to and fro. … I am not 
portraying being but becoming’ (III.2; T782, S907 [610-11]). Thus, nothing could be 
plainer than that the Essays celebrate transience and becoming. Indeed, Montaigne 
mocks Heraclitus for his inability to accept and affirm the consequences of his 
philosophy. Heraclitus, Montaigne tells us, owing to the terrifying uncertainty at the 
heart of existence ‘wore an expression which was always sad, his eyes full of tears’ 
(I.50; T291, S339 [220]). But Montaigne, in contrast, favours the attitude of Democritus, 
                                                                                                                                               
the French, p. 172). Vivarelli suggests that, during the period when Nietzsche was writing Human, 
All Too Human (1878-80), the Essays offered an ‘antidote’ against the effects of Schopenhauerian 
pessimism, but I want to argue that he self-administered this antidote much earlier, in 1873-4 
(“Montaigne und der ‘Freie Geist’”, p. 100). 
8 
 
who ‘never went out without a mocking and laughing look on his face’ (ibid.). For 
Montaigne, in the face of the difficulties and sufferings of the human predicament, our 
‘own specific property is to be … able to laugh’ (ibid. T292, S340 [221]). Such is the 
importance that the attitude of Democritus holds for Montaigne he comments on its 
contrast with Heraclitus again in Book III. Unsurprisingly, then, although having spent a 
great deal of the Essays highlighting the inevitability of change and the pain and 
uncertainty of human life, in ‘On experience’, his final essay, Montaigne issues no 
denial of worldly existence. His final remarks are of a piece with the tenor of the rest of 
his writing: ‘As for me … I love life’ (III.13; T1093, S1264 [854]). 
Nietzsche claims that the Schopenhauerian view that ‘this world … is an error … 
[and] ought not to exist’ stems from a ‘disbelief in becoming, mistrust of becoming, the 
low valuation of all that becomes’ (KSA 12: 9[60] (WP 585)). Nietzsche acknowledges 
that a world of becoming—of continual change, decay and death—is one of immense 
pain and suffering. In this sense, he accepts the premise of Schopenhauer’s pessimism: 
suffering is inescapable; pain is intrinsic to a world of flux and disorder. But he 
fundamentally rejects Schopenhauer’s conclusion: ‘I do not account evil and the painful 
character of existence as a reproach to it’ (KSA 12: 10[118] (WP 382)). In Twilight of 
the Idols, he comments on the traditional ‘hatred’ of philosophers toward the ‘very idea 
of becoming’, and ridicules their tendency to see ‘Death, change’ and ‘age’ as 
‘objections’, ‘refutations even’ (TI 3.1). The form of pessimism that Nietzsche 
advocates is one that accepts the ubiquity of human suffering in a world of becoming yet 
possesses the strength to affirm and celebrate existence nonetheless.
11
 In the 
Schopenhauerian conception, the flux of the phenomenal world, the transience of 
representations, must be denied and transcended. For Nietzsche, Schopenhauer was 
simply not psychologically strong enough to say yes to life (GS 370). Throughout his 
writing, Nietzsche associates an unwillingness to affirm becoming with a kind of 
constitutional weakness, with ‘decadence’. In this way, the basis for Nietzsche’s 
characterization of Montaigne as the ‘mightiest of souls’ becomes clear: Montaigne has 
the fortitude to celebrate what Schopenhauer—and most other philosophers in the 
Western philosophical tradition—could only reproach and deny: Montaigne delighted in, 
and did not fear, a world of becoming. In ‘An apology for Raymond Sebond’ 
particularly, Montaigne stresses the limitations and contradictions of sensory perception, 
                                                 
11 Nietzsche ‘promotes above all, as strongest, the “Dionysian” type that sees and wants a world of 
becoming’ (Richardson, “Nietzsche on Time and Becoming”, p. 209). 
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but he eschews any notion of transcendence to a world of being. On the contrary, 
Montaigne revels in becoming and all that sensory experience has to offer: ‘I want to 
arrest the swiftness of its passing by the swiftness of my capture, compensating for the 
speed with which it drains away by the intensity of my enjoyment’ (III.13; T1092, 
S1263 [853]). Like Zarathustra, it is as an ‘enjoyer of becoming [Werdelustig]’ that 
Montaigne loves the earth (Z 2.15). 
It is thus reasonable to propose that Nietzsche’s subscription to the Montaignean 
stance toward life acted as a spur to the development of his own conception of a 
pessimism of strength—or what he would also call ‘Dionysian pessimism’ (GS 370). In 
‘An Attempt at Self-Criticism’, Nietzsche makes clear that he believes tragedy to have 
grown out of the ‘severe will to pessimism’ of the ancient Hellenes (BT, ‘SC’ 4). 
Indeed, in the revised edition to The Birth of Tragedy, he changes the full title from The 
Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music to The Birth of Tragedy, Or: Hellenism and 
Pessimism, so the work would have a more ‘unambiguous title’ (EH, ‘BT’ 1). Later in 
his writing, Nietzsche describes the Dionysian as the ‘Saying yes to life, even in its 
strangest and harshest problems’, where one comes to realize in oneself ‘the eternal joy 
in becoming’ (TI 10.5). Therefore, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, in offering as an 
exemplar a philosopher who embraces becoming, can be understood as a continuation 
and development of a central aim of The Birth of Tragedy, what Nietzsche calls his ‘first 
revaluation of all values’: the overcoming of the concept of being and a near deification 
of becoming (ibid.). In The Birth of Tragedy, the Dionysian is a celebration of 
becoming, an experience where one is eternally satisfied with ‘incessantly changing 
appearances’ (BT 16). The Dionysian, however, also forces one ‘to gaze into the terrors 
of individual existence’, for through Dionysian wisdom we come ‘to recognize that 
everything which comes into being must be prepared for painful destruction’ (BT 17). 
 
 
Becoming and laughter 
Jean Starobinski makes a crucial point concerning Montaigne’s thoughts on Democritus. 
It is not simply that Democritus favours an attitude of laughter towards life to one of 
tears; more precisely, it is that ‘Democritus laughs at the world’s folly, but it grieves him 
just the same [emphasis added]’.
12
 A principal theme of the Essays is the natural 
                                                 
12 Starobinski, Montaigne in Motion, p. 5. 
10 
 
disorder and instability of the world—as manifested in Montaigne’s extensive 
discussions of the brutal civil wars he is living through—and the inevitability of pain 
and suffering, psychological and physical. Montaigne writes movingly of his grief at the 
loss of his great friend Etienne de La Boétie: ‘There is no deed nor thought in which I do 
not miss him’ (I.28; T192, S218 [143]). And the Essays catalogue, in detail, the 
tormenting pain of his body as he experiences the ravages of old-age: ‘bodily sufferings 
… I feel most acutely. … I am wrestling with the worst of all illnesses … the most 
painful … the most incurable’ (II.37; T738, S860 [575-6]). For Montaigne, perhaps the 
key statement of the Essays is his recognition that ‘[e]verywhere death intermingles and 
merges with our life’—his articulation of a kind of Dionysian wisdom (III.12; T1082, 
S1251 [846]). Thus, Montaigne’s advocacy of laughter is not based on a denial of 
suffering or a naively optimistic vision of human existence. On the contrary, Montaigne, 
like Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, acknowledges suffering as the central feature of our 
lives. But unlike Schopenhauer and those other thinkers who see ‘Death, change’ and 
‘age’ as ‘objections’, Montaigne wins Nietzsche’s admiration for his Democritean 
attitude, the capacity to affirm, time and again—notwithstanding its suffering—the joy 
and wonder of life.  
It is striking that, in the note quoted earlier, where Nietzsche explains how he 
looked out for the threat of Schopenhauerian pessimism, he also highlights the unique 
capacity of humans for laughter. Nietzsche goes much further than Montaigne, however, 
in offering this speculation: ‘Perhaps I know best why man alone laughs: he alone 
suffers so deeply that he had to invent laughter’ (KSA 11: 36[49] (WP 91)). 
Nevertheless, in either case, laughter is taken to be the most natural and appropriate 
response to the uncertainty, ambiguity and contingency of the human condition—and 
everything else that follows from existence in a world of becoming.
13
 Nietzsche 
proposes that, in contrast to those who harbour only ‘contempt … for all that perishes, 
changes, varies’, one should extract happiness from ‘change and destruction’ (KSA 12: 
9[60] (WP 585)). Likewise, Montaigne, who holds that ‘[i]t is normal to experience 
change and decay’ (I.20; T89, S101 [63]), rebukes the individual of ‘a morose and 
gloomy mind’, who clings to life’s ‘misfortunes and feeds on them’ (III.5; T822, S953 
[642]). More conspicuous still, the idea of laughter as a response to becoming is at the 
                                                 
13 Indeed, in the thought of both thinkers we find a full ‘recognition of the value of humour for life’ 
(Whitlock, Returning to Sils Maria, p. 267). Advocates of laughter, they allow comic mockery and 
sarcasm a central place in their writings, and if Montaigne makes frequent use of the humorous 
anecdote, Nietzsche shows a partiality for ‘jokes’ (see Lampert, “Nietzsche’s Best Jokes”).  
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core of Nietzsche’s conception of the overhuman and Zarathustra’s teaching to humanity 
in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Significantly, in the final section of ‘An Attempt at Self-
Criticism’, emphasizing the centrality of laughter to the existential attitude of Dionysian 
pessimism, Nietzsche quotes a passage from Zarathustra that expounds on the 
sacredness of laughter. Dubbing Zarathustra a ‘Dionysian fiend’, Nietzsche lets him 
speak: ‘Laughter I have pronounced holy; you superior humans, learn from me—to 
laugh’ (Z 4.13.20).
14
 Montaigne would have found such a teaching deeply appealing, 
since, for him, the supreme ‘task’ of philosophy is ‘to make the tempests of the soul 
serene and to teach hunger and fever how to laugh’ (I.26; T160, S181 [119]). Hence, 
Nietzsche’s tribute to Montaigne in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ does not constitute, like 
some passages of The Birth of Tragedy, idle remarks full of ‘the errors of youth’, but 
points directly forward to vital aspects of his mature philosophy (BT, ‘SC’ 2). 
 
 
The innocence of becoming 
For Nietzsche, Dionysian pessimism represents a progression from and deepening of 
Schopenhauerian pessimism. As we have seen, Schopenhauer’s pessimism is not based 
on some hedonistic calculus, where the pains of human life are determined to outweigh 
the pleasures. Rather, Schopenhauer’s pessimism is a ‘moralistic’ pessimism, a 
condemnation of existence as a whole: life has no value, we would be better off not 
existing, since suffering is inescapable. According to this kind of pessimism, the world, 
based on a particular understanding of what is good or bad, just or unjust, must be 
judged negatively, because human existence fails to meet a certain standard of 
happiness, a standard that any worthwhile existence should attain. Again, Nietzsche’s 
repudiation of this kind of moralistic interpretation of existence has its beginnings in The 
Birth of Tragedy, but as before, it is in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ where he first 
addresses the moralistic basis of Schopenhauer’s pessimism directly and issues a mild 
yet clear rebuke, suggesting that Schopenhauer had envisioned ‘a dreadful scene in a 
supraterrestrial court in which all life, even the highest, had been weighed and found 
wanting’ (SE 7). In the Nietzschean conception, what really is at work behind 
                                                 
14 As John Lippitt observes, the ‘idea of “learning to laugh”’ in Part IV of Zarathustra suggests the 
‘reflective appropriation of laughter’, which must be distinguished from the more ‘spontaneous’ 
laughter of Book III, the ‘ecstatic laughter of the shepherd’: ‘a laughter that was no human laughter’ 
(Z 3.2.2) (“Laughter”, pp. 106-7). While we find no evidence of the latter kind of laughter in the 
Essays, Montaigne certainly exemplifies the former.  
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Schopenhauer’s pessimism is an insidious ‘revenge’ against existence. In The Gay 
Science, he claims that Schopenhauer’s pessimism represents an ‘impoverishment of 
life’, the reaction of a suffering individual who takes ‘revenge on all things by … 
branding his image on them, the image of his torture’ (GS 370). By the time we get to 
Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche is offering a more mordant analysis: ‘Instead of naively 
saying “I am not worth anything anymore”, the moral lie in the decadent’s mouth says 
“nothing is worth anything,—life isn’t worth anything”’ (TI 9.35). 
 Dionysian pessimism is the antithesis of this ‘moral lie’, eschewing any 
judgment on life as a whole—the Dionysian is a celebration of life, even at its most 
terrible—and is indicative of ‘a superabundance of life [Überfülle des Lebens]’ (GS 
370). In ‘An Attempt at Self-Criticism’, Nietzsche claims that The Birth of Tragedy 
‘betrays a spirit which will defend itself one day, whatever the danger, against the moral 
interpretation and significance of existence’ (BT, ‘SC’ 5). For, the disorder and suffering 
of a world of becoming can only be impugned in the context of an imagined world of 
being, but if one truly affirms becoming, there is simply no standard against which the 
world can be judged and found wanting, and the contradiction that Schopenhauer sees at 
the heart of existence, our doomed, Tantalus-like fate to remain eternally unsatisfied, 
amounts for Nietzsche to nothing more than the moral projection of his own suffering 
onto the world at large. Nietzsche’s Dionysian pessimism deepens Schopenhauer’s 
pessimism in the sense that it represents the ‘disintegration of the last consolation’: the 
consolation that the circumstances of the human predicament are somehow wrong and 
indecent and that one can take revenge against life, win a kind of victory, through a 
rejection and denial of the will to life (KSA 10: 8[14] (WP 417)). Thus the aim of 
Nietzsche’s Dionysian pessimism is to ‘restore innocence to becoming’, to no longer 
view existence as an error, or punishment, and therefore worthy of condemnation. From 
the standpoint of a Dionysian pessimist, existence is blameless: ‘one cannot judge, 
measure, compare the whole, to say nothing of denying it!’ (KSA 12: 5[108] (WP 765)) 
Nietzsche’s thoughts on the ‘innocence of becoming’ and the absurdity of 
holding existence in disrepute are in conspicuous agreement with the Essays. Montaigne 
insists that ‘the opinion which holds our life in contempt is a ridiculous one’ (II.3; T334, 
S397 [254]). And like Nietzsche, he associates such an opinion with a contemptible 
form of suffering: ‘it is unnatural that we should despise ourselves. … [I]t is a sickness 
peculiar to Man [une maladie particuliere] to hate and despise himself’ (ibid.). For 
Montaigne, what prompts a damning judgment on our existence is a denial of who and 
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what we are, a denial of becoming. Humanity’s peculiar sickness thus represents a 
longing for stability, order, constancy, for being, a ‘vain desire which makes us want to 
be other than we are’ (ibid.). Montaigne also questions the coherence of the notion of a 
value standard by which to judge human life as a whole, mockingly suggesting that only 
another ‘creature’ who enjoys an existence ‘richer and nobler than we do’ could 
possibly be in a position to criticize (ibid.). He thus abstains from pronouncing a 
judgment on existence, either positive or negative, recognizing that the question of the 
value of existence has no answer; the value of life cannot be evaluated. Montaigne’s 
response to the question of the value of existence is this: ‘When I dance, I dance. When 
I sleep, I sleep’ (III.13; T1087, S1258 [850]). And in the face of becoming and the 
decay that time has wrought on his mind and body, he finds life to be ‘of both great 
account and delightful’ (ibid. T1092, S1263 [853]). These are not the words of a 
decadent, understood in the Nietzschean sense. Here is manifest the ‘superabundance of 
life’ that is the essence of Nietzsche’s Dionysian pessimism. Hence, for David Molner, 
what Nietzsche most admired about Montaigne and his ‘smiling embrace of life’ was 
that an intimacy with suffering led him ‘to a love of life rather than a morality of 
ressentiment’.
15
 Montaigne, who Nietzsche places above Schopenhauer in terms of 
honesty, rejects the ‘moral lie’ of the decadent and refuses to translate morality into 
reality. The kind of Schopenhauerian moral interpretation of the world, in which ‘life 
must constantly and inevitably be proved wrong … [and] felt to be inherently unworthy, 
undeserving of desire’ is repudiated in every line of the Essays (BT, ‘SC’ 5). So, for 
Nietzsche, Montaigne not only shares his Heraclitean denial of being but he also offers 
unambiguous support in his emerging stand against the moralistic interpretation of 
existence.  
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche makes the following statement to his fellow ‘free 
spirits’: ‘lest we lose that freedom over things that our ideal demands, it would be a 
relapse for us, in our irritable honesty, to get completely caught up in morality’ (GS 
107). This point is amplified by a note written two years later, in 1885, where he 
comments on his ‘feeling of freedom’ at no longer being ‘harnessed’ to a moral 
interpretation of the world, to the notion that ‘the concepts “reward” and “punishment” 
… reside in the essence of things’ (KSA 12: 2[206] (WP 789)). Ecce Homo also 
describes the ‘great freedom’ of ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, which can now be 
                                                 
15 Molner, “The Influence of Montaigne on Nietzsche”, pp. 84-6.  
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understood in a double sense: firstly, in the sense that Nietzsche is beginning to speak in 
his own voice, free of Schopenhauer, and secondly, in the sense that he has broken free 
from a condemnatory vision of the world. Again, in this regard, Nietzsche’s comments 
on Montaigne are instructive, for he characterizes Montaigne not only as the ‘mightiest 
of souls’ but also the ‘freest’: Montaigne possesses both the strength to affirm becoming 
and the freedom to refrain from attributing metaphysical significance to the pain and 
suffering that are its natural consequences. Both thinkers seek to overcome and move 
beyond the question of the value of existence: the only credible response they see is to 




Nietzsche states that when he abandoned his allegiance to Schopenhauer and ceased to 
be a pessimist in the Schopenhauerian sense, he turned his ‘will to health, to life’ into 
his ‘philosophy’ (EH 1.2). Furthermore, he claims that his ‘instinct for self-restoration 
prohibited any philosophy of poverty or discouragement’ (ibid.). Thus we can 
understand the Essays as providing the necessary treatment—in the form of a 
philosophy that promotes a love for and a delight in life—for the ‘long period of illness’ 
that he endured as a disciple of Schopenhauerian pessimism.
16
 But Montaigne does 
more for Nietzsche than merely aid him in his overcoming of the sickness of pessimism: 
by encouraging his escape from Schopenhauer, Montaigne becomes a new exemplar for 
Nietzsche, an exemplar who confirms the possibility of a different kind of pessimism, a 
Dionysian pessimism, the affirmation and celebration of life despite its suffering; and 
going beyond this, in terms of Nietzsche’s middle and late works, he becomes an 
exemplar as a moral psychologist (Chapter 2) and ethical naturalist (Chapters 3 & 4). 
James Conant, in his study of ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, devotes some 
attention to the Nietzsche-Emerson relationship, noting the extent to which Emerson’s 
writing ‘haunts’ the work, and how ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ ends by praising 
Emerson.
17
 To explain ‘the pervasiveness of Emerson’s presence’ in an essay that ‘bears 
Schopenhauer’s name’, Conant suggests that we should understand Schopenhauer as a 
                                                 
16 It seems that, throughout his life, Nietzsche turned to Montaigne in times of psychological 
distress. In a letter to Peter Gast in 1887 he states: ‘I was reading Montaigne to extricate myself 
from a morosely gloomy and irritated mood’ (KSB 8, 940) (Middleton, Selected Letters of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, pp. 272-3). 
17 Conant, “Nietzsche’s Perfectionism”, p. 233. 
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teacher who Nietzsche ‘has outgrown’, while recognizing Emerson ‘as an exemplar that 
continues to function as one of the authors current exemplars’ (ibid.). Of course, such an 
argument applies with even greater force to Montaigne, whose writing not only haunts 
‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ (as we shall see in the next section) but who we also find 
explicitly held up as representing a philosophical ideal that supersedes the example of 
Schopenhauer. And as Berry suggests, the ‘juxtaposition’ of Schopenhauer and 
Montaigne in this work tells us not only that Nietzsche is reading both figures 
‘comparatively’ but also that ‘Montaigne surpasses Schopenhauer in some of the very 
respects in which Schopenhauer has been a role model for the young Nietzsche’.
18
 In 
addition, Nietzsche’s ‘praise’ of Emerson—amounting to no more than an approving 
quotation from ‘On Circles’—is mild indeed, as compared with his remarkable tribute 
to Montaigne. Moreover, the Essays proceed to have a substantial impact on 
Nietzsche’s thought moving into his middle works and beyond: Brobjer, when 
surveying Nietzsche’s reading and intellectual influences, lists Montaigne as one of ‘the 
writers to whom Nietzsche most often, and most approvingly’, refers to in his published 
works.
19
 In fact, Montaigne’s significance for Nietzsche extends even to the 
fundamental issue of his conception of the philosopher and the philosophical life, the 








                                                 
18 Berry, “The Pyrrhonian Revival in Montaigne and Nietzsche”, p. 503. 
19 Brobjer, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Context, p. 8. All in all, there are 13 direct references to 
Montaigne in Nietzsche’s published works. This may seem slight, but the number of explicit 
references to the Essays belies the true extent of the Montaignean influence, which one can only 
begin to grasp by considering the countless (unacknowledged) restatements of passages from the 
Essays to be found especially in Nietzsche’s middle works. There are also a further 29 references to 
Montaigne in Nietzsche’s unpublished notes, as well as 10 references in his correspondence. 
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Section II: Philosophy as a Way of Life 
 
The courageous visibility of the philosophical life  
Why, if he has jettisoned the central doctrines of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, does 
Nietzsche offer Schopenhauer as an exemplar to his contemporaries? In what sense can 
Schopenhauer be a guide to the renewal of German culture, if his romantic pessimism is 
to be rejected? Moreover, how is it possible for Nietzsche to put forward both 
Schopenhauer and Montaigne—philosophers with completely divergent views on human 
existence—as examples of the highest humanity? The answer to these questions is to be 
found in the singular conception of the philosopher that Nietzsche outlines in 
‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, a conception that substantially informs the rest of his work. 
For what is clear is that Nietzsche rejects what has become the conventional view of 
philosophy as a merely theoretical discipline divorced from, and of no relevance to, the 
pressing concerns of daily life. Rather, in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, Nietzsche 
promotes a distinctly Hellenistic conception of philosophy, where philosophy is 
understood less as the formulation of abstract theoretical systems than as a practical 
activity grounded in lived experience and influencing all aspects of life.
20
 According to 
the Greco-Roman model, philosophy is an art of living devoted to the transformation of 
one’s character, and as Pierre Hadot explains, an individual is regarded as a philosopher 




 As a consequence, in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, Nietzsche feels free to 
distance himself from the essentials of Schopenhauerian pessimism, while at the same 
time praising ‘the courageous visibility’ of Schopenhauer’s ‘philosophical life’ (SE 3). 
And so, that ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ contains little reference to Schopenhauer’s 
philosophical ideas is not simply because such ideas have by this time become 
unpalatable to Nietzsche, but also has to do with the radical conception of the 
philosopher he is developing: instead of an analysis of the cogency of Schopenhauer’s 
arguments, we are offered insight into his character and psychology—as well as some 
                                                 
20 Conant is thus correct to argue that ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ is the work where Nietzsche first 
urges that ‘the formation of character (rendering oneself capable of exercising practical wisdom)—
which he identifies as formerly having been a central preoccupation of Hellenistic and Roman 
philosophy—once again be restored to its rightful place at the center of philosophy’ (“Nietzsche’s 
Perfectionism”, p. 220). 
21 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, p. 27.  
17 
 
biographical details. Furthermore, even though, as I have shown in the previous section, 
‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ reveals Nietzsche’s embrace of the Montaignean attitude to 
life, Montaigne, too, is praised not in terms of the content of his Essays but for his 
exceptional character—his psychological strength and honesty. In this way, 
‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ constitutes a vigorous endorsement of the Greco-Roman 
model of philosophy: 
 
I profit from a philosopher only insofar as he can be an example. … But this 
example must be supplied by his outward life and not merely in his books—
in the way, that is, in which the philosophers of Greece taught, through their 
bearing … and their morals, rather than by what they said, let alone what they 
wrote (SE 3). 
 
Montaigne could hardly have put the point better himself, such is its striking affinity 
with many passages in the Essays. Like Nietzsche, Montaigne admits that he considers 
‘the lives … of the great teachers of mankind no less carefully than their ideas and 
doctrines’ (II.10; T396, S467 [303]). And he comes to a similar assessment of the sages 
of Greek antiquity, insisting that, while these philosophers were undoubtedly ‘great in 
learning’, they were ‘greater still in activities of every kind. … [U]nderstanding had 
indeed wondrously enriched their hearts and minds’ (I.25; T134, S152 [99]). Time and 
again, Montaigne affirms the Hellenistic conception of the philosopher and casts his 
own philosophic enterprise as following in the Greco-Roman tradition: ‘All my effort 
has gone into the forming of my way of life: that is my trade and vocation [mon métier 
et mon ouvrage]’ (II.37; T764, S885 [596]). Although the Essays testify to a profound 
erudition, Montaigne’s disdain for mere bookishness and the pedantic accumulation of 
knowledge unaccompanied by practical wisdom is palpable throughout. He 
continuously underscores the fact that any insight his book contains is ground out of 
concrete, lived experience. One of the more conspicuous examples of this is when, 
during a ‘disturbance’ of the civil wars, Montaigne suffers a fall from his horse, after 
which he remains unconscious for several hours. In the Essays, this episode provides the 
occasion for a discussion of, among other things, consciousness, the nature of death, and 
the workings of memory. Montaigne rounds off his description of the incident with the 
following remark: ‘This account of so unimportant an event is pointless enough but for 
the instruction I drew from it for my own purposes’ (II.6; T357, S423-4 [272]). Thus, 
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near the end of the Essays, a work dedicated to cataloging and distilling much of the 
learning of antiquity, Montaigne can make the extraordinary yet defensible claim that 
his ‘philosophy lies in action, in natural and present practice, and but little in 
ratiocination [peu en fantasie]’ (III.5; T820, S950 [639-40]).
22
 
Montaigne’s Essays represent a remarkable engagement with Greco-Roman 
thought, one of the most celebrated and influential in the history of Western philosophy. 
Moreover, Montaigne understands his own philosophy as an effort to deepen and 
develop that heritage—even though he retains an independent voice, and attacks notions 
sacred to Greek and Roman philosophy. He sees himself essentially as a philosopher 
writing—and more importantly living—in the manner of a Hellenistic philosopher: ‘I 
seek only that branch of learning which deals with knowing myself and which teaches 
one how to live and die well’ (II.10; T388, S459 [297]). Therefore, in ‘Schopenhauer as 
Educator’, when Nietzsche, through an appropriation of vital aspects of Hellenistic 
thought, comes to elaborate his own distinctive conception of the philosopher, 
Montaigne stands as the preeminent precursor.
23
 To be sure, Nietzsche’s study of 
Montaigne is crucial to his abandonment of Schopenhauerian pessimism, though more 
significant perhaps is Montaigne’s influence on Nietzsche’s thinking as regards the 
essence of the philosophical life. A great deal of ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ resonates 
with Greco-Roman thought, and particularly with Stoicism, with its themes of self-
cultivation, freedom, autonomy, and independence. Nietzsche feels at home with 
Montaigne because the Essays so clearly anticipate key elements of his own philosophy: 
the Essays reveal, in a most vivid way, a philosopher in the Hellenistic mould 
assimilating the central elements of the Classical tradition in the process of advancing 
his own, original understanding of how to live philosophically. Hence, Nietzsche’s 
appreciation of the philosophers of antiquity and his understanding of philosophy as a 
way of life is filtered through the prism of the Essays.
24
 
                                                 
22 Frame translates this as ‘little in fancy’. Perhaps Screech opts for ‘ratiocination’ here because 
Montaigne often blurs the distinction between reason and the imagination. 
23 ‘Hadot has repeatedly pointed to Montaigne’s Essays … as embodying the ancient exercise of 
philosophy, referring to the Essays as “the breviary of ancient philosophy, the manual of the art of 
living”’ (Davidson, “Introduction”, Philosophy as a Way of Life, p. 33 (the Hadot quote is from 
“Émerveillements”, in La Bibliothèque imaginaire du Collège de France, Paris 1990, p. 122). 
24 Michael Ure, in his examination of Nietzsche’s appropriation of Greco-Roman thought, focuses on 
the middle works—although he concedes that Conant makes a ‘compelling case’ for dating 
Nietzsche’s turn to Hellenistic conceptions of self-cultivation as early as ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ 
(Nietzsche’s Therapy, p. 53n98). He thus fails to appreciate the importance of the Essays (‘the 
breviary of ancient philosophy’) for Nietzsche’s conception of philosophy as an art of living. 
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Given that philosophers in antiquity were considered such based mainly on their 
character and distinctive mode of existence—as opposed to their corpus of written 
material or public lectures—a marked feature of philosophical works in the Greco-
Roman tradition is the prevalence of biographical details. So, for instance, in On the 
Nature of the Universe, Lucretius sprinkles his defense of Epicurean philosophy with 
insights about the life of Epicurus, and in Epictetus’ Discourses, a tract admonishing its 
readers to adopt the Stoic way of life, references to the lives of Socrates and Chrysippus 
figure prominently. Thus, Nietzsche, writing in a similar vein and explicitly taking 
Hellenistic philosophy as his inspiration, has passages of ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ 
take, in a slight parody of the genre, the form of a potted biography: we learn about 
Schopenhauer’s ‘pretentious’ mother, the ‘republican character’ of his father, and his 
time working in a ‘merchant’s office’ (SE 7). We are informed of these aspects of 
Schopenhauer’s life, Nietzsche tells us, in order that we may ‘see through his book[s] 
and … imagine the living man’ (SE 2). But Nietzsche also describes these biographical 
details as ‘superficial’, for in revealing the living man what Nietzsche is actually trying 
to stress is Schopenhauer’s radical independence. Unlike a philosopher of the ilk of 
Kant, who ‘clung to his university’ and ‘submitted to its regulations’, Schopenhauer 
‘had little patience with the scholarly castes’ and ‘strove to be independent of state and 
society’ (SE 3). For Nietzsche, the condition under which the philosophical genius of 
Schopenhauer flourished was ‘freedom and freedom again: that wonderful and perilous 
element in which the Greek philosophers were able to grow up’ (SE 8). 
 Nietzsche’s characterization of Schopenhauer is strongly reminiscent of the 
literature in the Greco-Roman tradition, where the mode of life of the philosopher is 
often depicted as a journey toward autonomy, self-mastery, and freedom; indeed, in the 
Discourses, Epictetus describes the Stoic way of life as one in which, ‘every day’, ideas 
are put into action ‘that protect against attachment to externals such as individual people, 
places or institutions’.
25
 In Nietzsche view, it was the freedom and independence of the 
Greek philosophers that enabled them to be exemplars for their contemporaries, and it is 
Schopenhauer’s complete detachment from popular culture and the institutions of the 
state—whether financial, educational or political—that sets him up as the ideal 
‘educator’ for his age. Schopenhauer’s ‘dignified distance’ from the corrupting forces of 
‘money-making’ and politics, his freedom from the ‘zeitgeist’, gives him a unique 
                                                 
25 Epictetus, Discourses, p. 114. 
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insight into his own time and culture, such that in the ‘mirror’ of his life and writings all 
the insufficiencies of his age are disclosed: ‘Through Schopenhauer we are all able to 
educate ourselves against our age—because through him we possess the advantage of 
really knowing this age’ (SE 4). But of course, Montaigne, no less than Schopenhauer, 
holds a mirror up to his age, particularly the ruling class: a constant but unstated aim of 
the Essays is to ironically reveal the absurdities and shortcomings of the French 
aristocracy. Thus, always in the background of this talk of Schopenhauer’s 
independence is the implicit presence of the ‘freest and mightiest of souls’, Montaigne. 
Montaigne, famously, retired to the refuge of his estate a few years prior to 
beginning his Essays, having become disillusioned with political life. He was, he states, 
‘determined to devote myself to spending … life … quietly and privately; it seemed that 
the greatest favor I could do for my mind was to leave it … caring for itself, concerned 
only for itself’ (I.8; T34, S31 [21]). Montaigne’s quest to retain his independence, amid 
frequent calls for him to return to political affairs, is a central feature of the Essays. As 
with Nietzsche, the mode of life of the philosophers of ancient Greece is Montaigne’s 
model: their ‘inimitable’ way of life was one of continuous self-care and self-study; they 
lived ‘above the common concern’ and were ‘contemptuous of public duties’ (I.25; 
T134, S152 [99]). What Montaigne seeks above all else is freedom, freedom from all the 
‘traps’—familial, social, or political—that could dissipate his energies and take him 
away from himself. At times, his desire for freedom is expressed in the language of 
Stoicism. Admitting an Epictetean fear of attachment to ‘external things’, Montaigne 
claims that the solitude he seeks involves ‘fleeing like death from all slavery and 
obligation, and running away … from … the throng of affairs’ (III.3; T801, S928 [625]). 
Liberated from social and political commitments and ensconced in his tower, Montaigne 
achieves the critical distance necessary to dissect the culture of his contemporaries. 
What he finds is mindless ‘ambition’, ‘vanity’, ‘ostentation’, ‘artificiality’, concluding 
that ‘our manners are corrupt in the extreme and wondrously inclined to get worse’ 
(II.17; T639, S745 [497]). But perhaps the most salient parallel between Schopenhauer 
(as Nietzsche understands him) and Montaigne is intellectual independence. Like 
Schopenhauer, Montaigne was no professional scholar.
26
 The Essays reveal nothing but 
                                                 
26 It must have impressed Nietzsche greatly that Montaigne was ‘a gentleman not a scholar … a man 
who knew the ways of diplomacy and the realities of the battlefield’ (Screech, “Introduction”, The 
Complete Essays, p. xviii). In the Essays, we are seldom offered glimpses of Montaigne alone in his 
tower, reading or writing. Rather, more often than not, we see him on horseback, in the midst of a 
skirmish of the civil wars, or out on the hunt; at any rate, engaged in strenuous physical activity. 
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contempt for the Scholasticism that dominated the universities of his day and his 
criticism of the medieval scholar is trenchant. In fact, the degree to which Nietzsche’s 
polemic against ‘mere scholars’ in ‘Schopenhauer in Educator’ takes its cue from the 




Montaigne’s attack on the medieval scholar is the main topic of two successive essays: 
‘On schoolmasters’ learning’ and ‘On educating children’. But the issue of education is 
one he returns to repeatedly in the Essays. In line with his conception of philosophy as a 
way of life, Montaigne sees education as less an exercise in intellectual understanding 
than a practical activity devoted to the cultivation of character and the formation of 
judgment. He insists that we should ‘place character and intelligence before knowledge’, 
as ‘book-learning should serve as an ornament not as a foundation’ (I.26; T149, S168 
[110]; ibid. T151, S171 [112]). For this reason, he regards Scholasticism as an absurdity, 
with its theoretical abstraction and devotion to conceptual analysis based on Aristotelian 
definitions. In contrast, philosophy, on Montaigne’s account, should be an art of living, 
or what he describes as ‘a continuous training of the soul [une continuelle exercitation 
de l'ame]’ (ibid. T142, S161 [105]). Namely, a lived ethic that shapes our life and 
influences all aspects of our being: ‘Our education has taught us the definitions, 
divisions and subdivisions of virtue without any concern for establishing between us and 
it any practice of familiarity or personal intimacy’ (II.17; T644, S750 [501]).
27
 As 
Montaigne would have it, the medieval scholar is a pitiable figure—learned, but devoid 
of any true understanding. They possess only the most superficial understanding of 
themselves and how to live, and their exceptional erudition in no way informs the 
manner of their life: ‘Take an arts don; converse with him. Why is he incapable of 
making us feel the excellence of his “arts”’ (III.8; T905, S1050 [707]). For Montaigne, 
in effect, what these scholars are really doing is ‘hiding behind other men’s shadows’ 
                                                                                                                                               
This is precisely Nietzsche’s kind of philosopher: ‘We are not among those who have ideas only 
from books, stimulated by books—our habit is to think outdoors, walking, leaping, jumping’ (GS 
366). And for his part, Montaigne insists that he ‘would rather be a good [horseman] than a good 
logician [translation altered]’ (III.9; T929, S1077 [726]). In this way, both thinkers promote an art 
of living that is infused by the wisdom of the body (see Chapter 3, Section III). 
27 ‘The basic philosophy course taught in most European universities in Montaigne’s time consisted 
principally in a training in grammar and logic, set in the context of an Aristotelian classification of 
knowledge’ (Mclean, “Montaigne and the truth of the schools”, p. 145). 
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(ibid.). They have studied the opinions of the great thinkers of antiquity, but have failed 
to ‘transmute’ all that learning into themselves (I.25; T137, S155 [101]). In this way, for 
the medieval scholar, philosophy is an adjunct to life rather than at its centre, and 
learning is an academic exercise inconsequential to lived experience. But Montaigne is 
after wisdom and not learning, for, as he succinctly puts it, ‘[l]earned we may be with 
another man’s learning: we can only be wise with wisdom of our own’ (ibid.).  
In ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, Nietzsche’s polemic against the German 
university system follows a strikingly similar, if more caustic, line. His contempt for the 
so-called philosophers of his day is similarly based on a Hellenistic conception of the 
philosopher: ‘A scholar can never become a philosopher … a philosopher is … not 
merely a great thinker but also a real human being … because most of his instruction he 
has to acquire out of himself’ (SE 7). For both Montaigne and Nietzsche, philosophy is a 
journey to self-knowledge, self-knowledge won through experience and involving the 
whole of one’s being, not merely the intellect.
28
 Nietzsche sees the twin scourges of the 
German intellectual landscape as Hegelianism and an unhealthy enthusiasm for science, 
both thought systems based on ‘inhuman abstraction’. Indeed, Nietzsche praises 
Schopenhauer for his ‘antique attitude towards philosophy’, which prevented him from 
‘becoming enmeshed in abstract scholasticism’ (SE 3). For Nietzsche, the excellence of 
the arts don of his day is also in question: ‘Classical antiquity … has ceased to produce 
an exemplary effect; a fact demonstrated by its disciples, who are truly not exemplary’ 
(SE 8). He finds the lives of German scholars preposterous because their thought bears 
not the slightest relation to their life, amounting to no more than spouting the views of 
the sages of the past. In consequence, these scholars have become ‘crookbacked and 
humped’, and spend their time, akin to the Montaignean scholars who hide in the 
shadows of greater individuals, ‘consuming the moral capital we have inherited from our 
forefathers’ (SE 2). When philosophy is understood as a lived practice, predicated on 
self-knowledge, to live by the thought of another is merely an ersatz version of the 
                                                 
28 And this journey to self-knowledge is an extremely testing one: ‘It is a thorny undertaking—more 
than it looks—to follow so roaming a course as that of our minds, to penetrate its dark depths and 
its inner recesses’ (II.6; T358, S424 [273]). Paraphrasing the above, Nietzsche writes: ‘How can man 
know himself? He is a thing dark and veiled. … [I]t is a painful and dangerous undertaking … to 
tunnel into oneself and to force one’s way down into the shaft of one’s being [in den Schacht seines 
Wesens] by the nearest path’ (SE 1). Yet, at the same time, ‘everything bears witness to what we are, 
our friendships and enmities, our glance and the clasp of our hands’ (ibid.); or, as Montaigne 
phrases it, ‘[a]nything we do reveals us. … [E]very constituent of a man, each occupation, tells us 
about him and reveals him as any other’ (I.50; T290-1, S338-9 [219-20]).  
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philosophical life. For, by allowing ‘ourselves to lean so heavily on other men’s arms’, 
Montaigne explains, ‘we destroy our own force’ (I.25; T137, S155 [101]).  
That Nietzsche and Montaigne seem to be speaking with one voice on the nature 
of the scholar is explained by an otherwise apparently incidental remark Nietzsche 
makes near the end of section six of ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’. Here we are informed 
that the German system of education ‘has its roots in the Middle Ages’, and what is 
more, its ideal ‘is actually the production of the medieval scholar’. The agreement 
between them in this regard becomes even more apparent when one considers their 
respective verdicts on institutionalized philosophy, as practiced according to the 
medieval scholastic model. Whereas Montaigne proposes that philosophy now ‘means 
something fantastical and vain, without value or usefulness’, Nietzsche sees in German 
education nothing but ‘a feeble phantom bearing the name of philosophy, a scholarly 
lecture-hall wisdom … something ludicrous [eine lächerliche Sache]’ (I.26; T159, S180 
[118]; SE 8). Nietzsche completes his denunciation of institutionalized philosophy by 
rhetorically asking ‘why it is that no great general or statesman at present has anything 
to do with it’ (ibid.). The answer he provides is that where once, in ancient times, 
philosophy was a ‘source of the heroic’, for his contemporaries philosophy has become 
‘a matter of complete indifference’ (ibid.). Yet again, the sentiment expressed here 
inescapably calls to mind a passage from the Essays, in which Montaigne endeavors to 
bring home the triviality of scholastic philosophy:  
 
Aristotle never spent much of the time of his great pupil Alexander on the art 
of syllogisms: he taught him, rather, sound precepts concerning valor, 
prowess, greatness of soul. … With such armory he sent him still a child to 




Finally, both agree that many scholars have simply taken up the wrong profession. 
Montaigne laments that these individuals ‘could have been good famers, good 
                                                 
29 Montaigne was no general, but he was a statesman, and ‘on matters of war and politics … [he] 
was listened to throughout Europe as a gentleman who knew from experience, and not from book-
learning alone, what he was a talking about’ (Screech, “Introduction”, The Complete Essays, p. xliv). 
David Quint details how, in January, 1590, Montaigne wrote to King Henry IV (formerly Henri of 
Navarre, at whose court Montaigne had been a courtier more than 20 years earlier), taking ‘on the 
role of royal counselor’, to offer advice on how the religious wars might be brought to an end. 
Hence, in the case of Montaigne, we have a philosopher-statesman, whose wisdom was of profound 
practical import, perhaps helping to guide the direction of French history (Montaigne and the 
Quality of Mercy, pp. 141-4).  
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merchants, good craftsmen’ (III.8; T910, S1055 [711]), while Nietzsche maintains that, 
if career philosophers ceased to be ‘enticed’ by salaries, ‘one will become a parson, 
another a schoolmaster … [and] the most sensible of them … take up the plough’ (SE 
8).  
All this is not to deny that a great deal of the insight that ‘Schopenhauer as 
Educator’ offers into the 19
th
 century German scholar is distinctly Nietzschean. As he 
states in Ecce Homo, it is in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’—and going beyond anything 
contained in the Essays—that ‘the brutal psychology of the scholar’ comes to light (EH, 
‘UM’ 3). In section six, Nietzsche catalogues the ‘qualities that are prominently 
displayed in the man of learning’: among them (he analyzes ten different qualities), 
‘probity and a sense for simplicity’, ‘poverty of feeling and aridity’, and ‘the motive of 
breadwinning’. Furthermore, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ is to a considerable extent 
concerned with a critique of the scholarly pursuit of science—if undertaken to the 
exclusion of all other considerations: ‘As long as what is meant by culture is essentially 
the promotion of science, culture will pass the … individual by with a pitiless coldness’ 
(SE 6). Nonetheless, as in the case of Nietzsche’s discussion of the independence of the 
genuine philosopher, behind his analysis of the German education system stands the 
undoubted presence of Montaigne. Much of his thinking on the scholar—and by 




‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ begins with an impassioned plea that we free ourselves 
from the ‘chains of fear and convention’. We cling to these chains rather than break 
them, Nietzsche claims, because we are simply too ‘lazy’ to face ‘the 
inconveniences with which unconditional honesty and nakedness would burden’ us. 
What this opening section amounts to is a call to a more authentic existence, to a 
transformed life, one which goes beyond an unthinking adherence to custom: ‘Be 
your self! All you are doing, thinking, desiring, is not you yourself’ (SE 1). Such a 
demand to reconstitute our lives is a central feature of the philosophies of the 
Greco-Roman tradition. As Hadot observes, while ‘their methodologies differ, we 
find in all philosophical schools [of this tradition] the same awareness of the power 
of the human self to free itself from everything which is alien to it’—from the Stoic 
concern with liberation from externals to the Epicurean preoccupation with the 
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rooting out of unnecessary desires.
30
 Hence, the influence of Greco-Roman thought 
on Nietzsche’s conception of the philosopher in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ is clear 
from the outset, with the opening section evoking countless passages from Stoic 
literature in particular.  
A desire to return to and care for the self underpins this call to authentic 
existence: Marcus Aurelius advises the Stoic practitioner to ‘retreat into yourself … 
constantly accord yourself this retreat, and give new life to yourself’.
31
 By the same 
token, Nietzsche urges his readers to free themselves from common customs and 
appropriated opinions, and by ‘finding oneself’ or ‘coming to oneself’, lead an 
‘awakened life’ (SE 1). This is necessary because we typically live under the cloak of 
convention, deadened to life by the overwhelming force of habit and routine. For 
Nietzsche, most individuals refuse to acknowledge the ‘productive uniqueness within’, 
as the burdens of unconventionality are very often ‘unendurable’ (SE 3). Consequently, 
instead of turning inward and living according to the law of our own being, we remain 
‘wholly exterior’ and, through a combination of fear and laziness, wedded to a 
constricted and superficial life that is not of our own making. To aid this process, we 
don comfortable and comforting masks, and by way of ‘a hundred masquerades … man 
forgets himself’ (SE 4). Nietzsche discerns clear evidence of this in the behavior of the 
rising German middle-class, with its ‘feverish’ commitment to money-making. The 
‘breathless grasping’ and ‘restlessness’ of business pursuits, Nietzsche suggests, serve 
as a distraction for his contemporaries from the real task of self-knowledge: ‘Haste is 
universal because everyone is in flight from himself’ (SE 5). Nietzsche’s judgment on 
his society is of a piece with many such verdicts in the Greco-Roman tradition, and 
brings to mind the words of Lucretius (written in the 1
st
 century BCE): ‘So each man 
flies from himself … /And hates himself because he is sick in mind/And does not know 
the cause of his disease’.
32
 
However, what is most conspicuous about the call to authentic existence at the 
heart of ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ is its distinctly Montaignean tenor. One of the 
major themes of the Essays concerns the remarkable power of custom, and its capacity 
                                                 
30 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, p. 266. Hadot goes on, a few pages later, to say that the 
‘philosophies of Nietzsche and of Schopenhauer are also invitations to radically transform one’s 
way of life. Both men were, moreover, thinkers steeped in the tradition of ancient philosophy’ (p. 
272).  
31 Aurelius, Meditations, p. 23. 
32 Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, 3: 1065-1075.  
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to dull our senses and narrow our thinking, to enslave us in unrewarding lives. 
Montaigne, like Nietzsche, represents the move away from convention as a liberation 
and understands habit as a tyrannical force that frustrates self-knowledge: ‘the principle 
activity of custom is to seize us and to grip us in her claws so that it is hardly in our 
power to struggle free and come back to ourselves’ (I.23; T114, S130 [83]). For 
Montaigne, to live an awakened life we must ‘tear off the mask’ of custom, as there is 
‘no way of life more feeble and stupid than one which is guided by prescriptions and 
instilled habit’ (III.13; T1061, S1229 [830]). Montaigne also recognizes the difficulty 
faced by anyone who endeavors to eschew the strictures of convention: ‘We are swept 
on downstream, but to struggle back towards the self against the current is a painful 
movement’ (III.9; T979, S1132 [766]). And while failing to stress, as Nietzsche does, 
the complicity of our fear and laziness in this regard, Montaigne issues a near identical 
summons to authenticity: ‘Look back into yourself. … Bring back to yourself your mind 
and your will which are being squandered elsewhere’ (ibid.). For Nietzsche, unless one 
is able to unchain oneself from social convention and public opinion one ‘cease[s] to be 
aware of life’ and is ‘cheated’ out of oneself (SE 4). Insincere public personas alienate 
us from our true selves, preventing access to self-knowledge. Montaigne is no less 
conscious of this danger: ‘We cheat ourselves of what is rightly useful to us in order to 
conform our appearance to public opinion’ (III.9; T932, S1081 [729]). As regards his 
contemporaries, Montaigne finds that ‘the mass of men nowadays’ are ‘senseless’, 
‘continually bobbing about in a storm of conflicting passions’ (I.42; T252, S290 [191]). 
Accordingly, he comes to a corresponding determination on the society of his own time 
as Nietzsche does on German society of the 19
th
 century, crystallized in a statement that 
bears a remarkable resemblance to Nietzsche’s: ‘Each man rushes elsewhere and 
towards the future, since no man has reached his own self’ (III.12; T1022, S1183 [799]).  
In the foregoing observations we have seen that Nietzsche conceives the 
philosopher as an individual living a singular mode of existence. The life of such a 
thinker is one of uncompromising independence, free of the usual ties to state 
institutions, untainted by the intellectually debasing need for money-making, and 
immune to the limiting prejudices of popular opinion and social convention. 
Furthermore, based firmly on the Hellenistic model, Nietzsche’s ideal philosopher is 
one who is dedicated to the painful task of self-knowledge. Although Schopenhauer is 
offered as the embodiment of the Nietzschean ideal, it is clear that Nietzsche’s 
conception of the philosopher is also informed by the example of Montaigne. Moreover, 
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the understanding of the philosopher adumbrated above is developed and expanded in 
Nietzsche’s middle works under the guise of the ‘free spirit’. Vivarelli persuasively 
argues that we may view Montaigne as the ‘actual model’ for the free spirit of these 
works, and Human, All Too Human in particular, since in the Essays we find the same 
desire for ‘intellectual independence’, the same ‘absolute need for freedom’, expressed 
in similar ‘motifs and images’.
33
 In the preface to Human, All Too human, echoing the 
words of ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, Nietzsche contrasts the free spirit with the bound 
spirit who seems ‘to be chained for ever to its pillar and corner’ (HAH P3). 
Unsurprisingly, it is the supreme intellectual independence of the free spirit that is 
continuously stressed: ‘He is called a free spirit who thinks differently from what, on 
the basis of his origin, environment, his class and profession, or on the basis of the 
dominant view of the age, would have been expected of him’ (HAH 225). What is more, 
whereas in ‘Schopenhauer in Educator’ Nietzsche writes of the ‘dignified distance’ of 
the genuine philosopher from all aspects of the state apparatus as well as the zeitgeist, 
the free spirit of Human, All Too Human is characterized by a ‘fearless hovering over 
men, customs, laws and the traditional evaluation of things’ (HAH 34).  
But for Nietzsche, a fearless hovering over society is not enough to confirm one’s 
status as a genuine philosopher: independence must be accompanied by self-knowledge. 
In ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, he proposes that individuals internalize aspects of the 
culture of their time, which act as so many dead weights on their natural vibrancy and 
‘productive uniqueness’. The instinctive or reflexive adherence to cultural norms 
estranges them from their ‘true’ self, since each individual ‘is a unique miracle … 
uniquely himself to every last movement of his muscles’ (SE 1). What Nietzsche calls 
‘the first consecration to culture [die erste Weihe der Kultur]’ is the aspiration of the 
individual to push beyond the obscuring sedimentation of culture within, all that is not 
truly him- or herself, and uncover the authentic self buried beneath (SE 6). 
Schopenhauer accomplished this task of self-knowledge: ‘Schopenhauer strove … 
against that … unworthy mother, his age, and by as it were expelling it from him, he 
healed and purified his being and rediscovered himself’ (SE 3). And if, in the Essays, 
Montaigne writes of the power of habit ‘to seize us in her claws so that it is hardly in 
                                                 
33 Vivarelli, “Montaigne und der ‘Freie Geist’”, p. 82. 
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our power to struggle free’, Nietzsche, in Human, All Too Human, offers the metaphor 




Everything habitual draws around us an even firmer net of spider-webs; then 
soon we notice that the threads have become cords. … [T]he free spirit … 
sorrowfully again and again rends apart the net that surrounds him: even 
though he will as a consequence suffer numerous great and small wounds—
for he has to rend those threads from himself (HAH 427).  
 
This is the suffering involved in self-knowledge: to find ourselves we must discard 
cherished parts of our psyche and renounce a former, impoverished way of life that, 
although comfortable and easy and held in the reassuring embrace of custom, is devoid 
of a thoroughgoing self-awareness. Montaigne, like the free spirit, seeks to tear apart the 
net and undertake the difficult and potentially distressing labor of self-examination: ‘I 
see myself and explore myself right into my innards [jusque aux entrailles]’ (III.5; 
T824, S956 [644]). Mirroring Nietzsche’s notion of a consecration to culture, 
Montaigne deems this work to be essential, as ‘it is not enough to withdraw from the 
mob … we have to withdraw from such attributes of the mob as are within us. It is our 
own self we have to isolate and take back into possession’ (I.39; T234, S268-9 [176]).  
Montaigne’s influence, then, extends well beyond ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ 
to Nietzsche’s more mature understanding of the philosopher as revealed in the figure of 
the free spirit. The quote above from Human, All Too Human on the free spirit is also 
revealing in another important respect: Schopenhauer’s pessimism. The idea that the 
free spirit ‘will suffer … countless large and small wounds’ from their struggle with the 
net of convention is reminiscent of a passage in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, where it is 
stated that Schopenhauer ‘bore many scars and open wounds … and … acquired a 
disposition that may perhaps seem a little too astringent’ (SE 3). What is of particular 
interest here is the direct relationship Nietzsche conceives between Schopenhauer’s 
‘disposition’ and his ‘wounds’. A possible explanation for this is provided earlier in the 
section, where Nietzsche discusses the many ‘dangers’ that Schopenhauer faced as he 
began to engage in the philosophical life. Foremost among those dangers, Nietzsche 
                                                 
34 Vivarelli quotes the following passage from the Essays as exemplifying Montaigne’s 
‘unquenchable thirst’ for freedom (“Montaigne und der ‘Freie Geist’”, p. 86): ‘I so hunger after 
freedom that if anyone were to forbid me access to some corner of the Indies I would to some 
extent live less at ease’ (III.13; T1049, S1216 [820]).  
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suggests, was the threat of ‘isolation’. Schopenhauer earned his first psychological scar 
as a consequence of the ‘indifference of his contemporaries’ toward his philosophy. 
Although the philosopher has nothing but disdain for popular culture and common 
opinion, to function in society he or she is ‘forced to present a semblance to the 
world’—affirming a certain mode of behavior outwardly while denying inwardly. As a 
result of this acute tension between interior and exterior existence, ‘a cloud of 
melancholy gathers on their brows … and their perpetual bitter resentment of this 
constraint fills them with volcanic menace’ (ibid.). 
Schopenhauer expelled from himself all the limiting and constraining elements 
of his age. However, the battle to do so left an open wound, and resentment festered; his 
independence was won at great psychological cost. The consequences of this were 
profound, as Schopenhauer’s denunciation of his age became a repudiation of life itself.  
But for Nietzsche, the philosopher must not focus too incessantly on the ‘valuelessness 
of his time’, for it is his duty ‘to arrive at a just verdict on the whole fate of man’ (ibid.). 
In Nietzsche’s view, the philosopher should deliberately ‘under-assess’ the flaws and 
failings of their contemporaries, and so ‘by overcoming the present in himself, also 
overcome in it the picture he gives of life’ (ibid.). With Schopenhauer, however, the 
sufferings he experienced at the hands of his age go to the very center of his philosophy 
and his vision of humanity. Montaigne, on the other hand, is akin to the free spirit, who, 
blessed with ‘a firm, mild, and at bottom cheerful soul’, achieves freedom from the 
clutches of convention without ‘envy or vexation’ (HAH 34). Although scathing about 
the French society of his time, Montaigne accepted with relative ease the contradictions 
between the philosophical life and the concessions demanded of one to the customs of 
the time. In the Nietzschean conception, it seems, the life of the genuine philosopher is 
constituted by two existential choices. The first is obvious: the choice to engage in a 
philosophical mode of existence and all that it entails—complete independence and a 
hunger for self-knowledge—and in this regard both Schopenhauer and Montaigne are 
supreme exemplars. But the second choice is just as critical: ‘Do you affirm existence in 
the depths of your heart? Would you be its advocate, its redeemer? For you have only to 
pronounce a single heartfelt Yes [ein einziges wahrhaftiges Ja]’ (SE 3). Schopenhauer 
refused to make this second choice and affirm a Dionysian attitude to life. But as we 
have seen, Montaigne, by contrast, although doubtless exhibiting scars from his struggle 
against his age, carried no open wounds, and having successfully navigated the dangers 
of isolation, found human existence to be eminently worthwhile. 
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Section III: History and Tradition 
 
Montaigne’s historical consciousness 
A central feature of Montaigne’s writing is what could be called his historical 
consciousness, an intense preoccupation with the culture and thought of the Greco-
Roman tradition. At first glance, given the innumerable quotations from ancient texts, 
the Essays may give the look of a work totally beholden to tradition, nothing more than 
a storehouse for the wisdom of the ancients. However, despite Montaigne’s devotion to 
the great individuals of the Greco-Roman world, it would be a simplistic view indeed to 
see him as a thinker held captive by tradition. Montaigne’s historical consciousness is 
complex and his relationship to the past ambiguous. For in the guise of a traditionalist, 
he offers his own, highly original interpretations of core teachings of the Greco-Roman 
philosophical tradition. Moreover, while Montaigne borrows liberally from all the major 
philosophical schools of antiquity, he is a subscriber to none—even if the tenets of 
Pyrrhonian scepticism seem, at times, to be offered as a legitimate structure around 
which a life can be sensibly fashioned, Montaigne never actually refers to himself as a 
sceptic, and much of the content of the Essays is wholly at odds with this form of 
scepticism. 
The Essays are thus groundbreaking in many respects, not least stylistically: 
with his creation of the ‘essay’, Montaigne pioneers a new genre of literature, an open-
ended and personal style of writing, having its origins in the more traditional forms of 
the dialogue and the letter, but departing substantially from both.
35
 Most crucially, it is a 
style of writing tailored to innovation and experimentation; that is to say, in the Essays, 
antiquity is received not ‘as a set of abstract propositions or an inert corpus of 
knowledge … [since] each essay will be in an important sense a fresh start, a new way 
of approaching antiquity’.
36
 Furthermore, the very personal nature of Montaigne’s 
philosophy—as well as his innovative appropriation of tradition—can be seen most 
readily in the way that he deals with the Essays’ many ‘borrowings’ from past texts. In 
‘On physiognomy’, he explains and defends his approach as follows: 
 
                                                 
35 Friedrich, Montaigne, pp. 345-62.  
36 O’ Brien, “Montaigne and antiquity”, p. 54. 
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I have indeed made a concession to the taste of the public with these 
borrowed ornaments which accompany me. But I do not intend them to 
cover me up or to hide me. … If I had had confidence to do what I really 
wanted, I would have spoken utterly alone. … Among my many borrowings 
I take delight in being able to conceal the occasional one, masking it and 
distorting it to serve a new purpose (III.12; T1033-4, S1196-7 [808-9]). 
 
In other words, Montaigne always retains a critical distance from the ancient sources, 
allowing him the freedom not just to question and criticize but also to subtly alter and 
shape the meaning of a quotation to suit his needs. Consequently, although by way of 
quotation he ‘locates himself in a tradition and in a community of learners that goes 
back to the ancients. … [H]e does not simply take over and repeat what others have 
said’.
37
 Guarding his independence, Montaigne strives to take past thought in new 
directions, invigorating ancient ideas with fresh life. In the Essays we thus find that 
Montaigne always ‘speaks as himself through the mouth of tradition’, in such a way that 
‘what is borrowed comes together into an entirely new creation’.
38
 
Plainly, then, Montaigne’s relationship to the historical is anything but 
straightforward; and like Nietzsche, his undoubted reverence for the Greco-Roman 
heritage does not prevent him from appropriating fundamental aspects of that heritage in 
the service of advancing a profoundly distinctive philosophy. In ‘On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life’, Nietzsche engages in a systematic discussion of the 
distinct ways in which the individual relates to tradition, and attempts to elaborate the 
benefits and potential dangers of the ‘historical sense’. The central proposition of this 
work is the following: ‘the unhistorical and the historical are necessary in equal 
measure for the health of an individual, of a people and of a culture’ (HL 1). For 
Nietzsche, human life is a constant tension—exemplified in the contrary tendencies of 
the Essays—between revering the past and living creatively in the present. The problem 
with an overdeveloped historical sense, a clinging to tradition, is that the past can come 
to exert a stultifying pressure on the flow of daily life. Thus, in the Nietzschean 
conception, ‘[f]orgetting is essential to action of any kind’, and there is a ‘boundary at 
which the past has to be forgotten if it is not to become a gravedigger of the present’ 
(ibid.). Happiness is to be found in escaping the past, in living unhistorically, which 
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enables one to ‘sink down on the threshold of the moment’ and ‘be contained in the 
present’ (ibid.). Nietzsche would see in Montaigne’s playful appropriation of Greco-
Roman thought a preeminent example of what he calls ‘the plastic power [die plastiche 
Kraft]’ of the individual: ‘the capacity to develop out of oneself in one’s own way, to 
transform and incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign’ (ibid.). This plastic 
power is the driving force behind what Nietzsche terms the ‘monumental’ approach to 
history, one of three ways, he argues, in which history pertains to the individual—
alongside the ‘antiquarian’ and the ‘critical’. And as Marchi notes, this ‘tripartite 







The most conspicuous way in which Montaigne relates to the historical is by revering 
the most influential figures of antiquity—writers, philosophers, historians, statesmen 
and generals—who he repeatedly offers as models to be followed. Montaigne wants the 
reader to be inspired by these predecessors, to illuminate the present with the past: 
‘Those rare persons who have been hand-picked by the wise to be exemplary to us all I 
will not hesitate … to load with honour, insofar as my material allows’ (I.37; T226-7, 
S259 [170]). In Montaigne’s use of these rare individuals, as exemplars to take 
inspiration from or imitate, we have a striking example of what Nietzsche terms a 
monumental relationship to history. This mode of the historical belongs ‘above all to the 
man of deeds … who needs models, teachers, comforters and cannot find them among 
his contemporaries’ (HL 2). For Nietzsche, in looking to the outstanding individuals of 
earlier times—as opposed to mediocre contemporaries—we realize not only that 
greatness once existed but that it may again be possible. Although Nietzsche believes 
that the European culture of his time is in a state of ‘ossification and decay’, as we have 
seen, he also argues that the task of the philosopher is to ‘arrive at a just verdict [ein 
gerechtes Urteil] on the whole fate of man’ (SE 3). A monumental engagement with 
history is pivotal to the formation of this verdict: ‘the man of action avoids despair and 
disgust by turning his gaze backward … he flees from resignation and needs history as a 
specific against it’ (HL 2). In this way, a focus on monumental history is most necessary 
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and appropriate in times of cultural degeneration. Thus, in the Essays, Montaigne’s 
monumentalism goes hand in hand with a lament for the greatness of past ages and a 
critique of the corruption and superficiality of his contemporaries. Like Nietzsche, he 
urges his readers to overcome their contempt for the present by studying the lives of the 
great individuals of the past.  
In a sense, a monumental approach to history follows naturally from a 
conception of philosophy as a way of life. When philosophy is understood as a mode of 
living or way of being, the example of the philosopher’s outward life must become an 
object of study. A study of history—in the sense of knowledge of the great lives of the 
past—is therefore essential to the philosophic enterprise. Aspects of Nietzsche’s 
thinking on the historical are clearly prefigured in the Essays. In ‘On educating 
children’, Montaigne gives us a close definition of the monumental avant la lettre: 
History can be ‘a study bearing fruit beyond price’, the ‘object’ of which ‘is less to 
stamp the date of the fall of Carthage … then to understand the behavior of Hannibal 
and Scipio’ (I.26; T155, S175 [115]). In Book II of the Essays, this stress on the 
monumental continues. Commenting on historians, Montaigne states that the ‘most 
appropriate … are those who write men’s lives, since they linger longer over motives 
than events, over what comes from inside more than what happens outside’ (II.10; 
T396, S467 [303]). Both Montaigne and Nietzsche see monumental history, when 
explored and exploited to the full, as a potentially continuous source of direction and 
inspiration. Montaigne proposes that we should ‘always imagine [we] are with Cato, 
Phocion, Aristides, in whose sight the very madmen would hide their faults’ (I.39; 
T242, S278 [183]), while Nietzsche reveals that there ‘have been four pairs who did not 
refuse themselves to me … Epicurus and Montaigne, Goethe and Spinoza, Plato and 
Rousseau, Pascal and Schopenhauer … upon these eight I fix my eyes and see theirs 
fixed upon me’ (AOM 408). 
Monumental history is necessarily created in the realm of the unhistorical. Each 
disciple of monumental history becomes, in turn, the next link in the chain of greatness, 
a teacher and comforter to those who follow. Nietzsche offers Schopenhauer as the 
supreme educator to his contemporaries, yet abandons romantic pessimism. The 
monumental provides examples to be followed, but if greatness is to exist in the present 
and continue in the future such examples must be overtaken and superseded. If 
philosophy is an art of living, a return to the self and to authentic existence, then 





 Nietzsche’s engagement with Schopenhauer provides the occasion for his 
own self-development as a thinker, and the most appropriate title of the work that 
symbolizes their relationship, he eventually comes to understand, is not ‘Schopenhauer 
as Educator’ but ‘Nietzsche as Educator’. Likewise, Montaigne must turn his back on 
his friend and soul mate La Boétie, the greatest man who he had ever met, a man in 
whom the splendor of former ages could be witnessed once again: ‘The mould of his 
mind was cast on the model of centuries different from ours’ (I.28; T193, S219 [144]). 
While never ceasing to love him, Montaigne renounces his attachment to the kind of 
Stoical humanism La Boétie exemplified. In Books II and III of the Essays, therefore, 
we discover that the ‘Stoical humanists, once his heroes and in some measure his 
teachers, have proven inadequate and become his targets’.
41
 In this way, without the 
‘envelope of the unhistorical [Hülle des Unhistorischen]’ neither Montaigne nor 
Nietzsche ‘would have begun or dared to begin’ the self-transformation of the past. As 
it is only by setting aside teachers and tradition, by an active forgetting, that the creative 
assimilation of the past is possible: ‘The unhistorical is … an atmosphere within which 
alone life can germinate’ (HL 1). 
Montaigne is acutely aware of the crucial link between the monumental and a 
constructive disremembering. A recurring conceit of the Essays is the author’s avowal 
of an extraordinarily poor memory. The following admission is typical: ‘I doubt if there 
is any other memory in the world as grotesquely faulty as mine is’ (I.9; T34, S32 [21]). 
It is especially notable that, at the same time as Montaigne professes his admiration for 
the great teachers of the past, he also admits that, having sought their wisdom, he 
‘straightaway forget[s] the author, the source, the wording and other particulars’ (II.17; 
T635, S740 [494]). The wisdom of the past, Montaigne suggests, should be internalised 
and become the very ‘material’ of one’s own judgement. Moreover, he claims that ‘an 
outstanding memory’ can be a far from advantageous capacity, quite often leading to a 
‘settled mind’ and the submissive retracing of ‘other men’s footsteps’ (I.9; T35, S33 
[22]).
42
 No doubt, in a work demonstrating an almost stupefying recollection of 
historical detail, Montaigne’s declarations of forgetfulness are partly ironical. But they 
serve a more important function than mere rhetorical effect: the deeper intent is to create 
a space for the unhistorical: ‘Too much memory stifles his efforts at self-expression. … 
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As he forgets, he can live and express himself in the vital present’.
43
 They also provide 
a certain license for the novelty of Montaigne’s gloss on the philosophies of antiquity. 
As a consequence, in Montaigne’s feigned concern regarding the deficiencies of his 
memory, what we are really witnessing is a conscious and determined effort to stress 
‘the perpetual forgetting that is the counterpart of innovation’.
44 
In this regard, a 
common tactic of Montaigne is what could be described as the deliberate 
misrecollection or misconstrual of statements from past works, enabling him to press a 
quotation into the service of an argument differing from, or even completely at odds 
with, the spirit of the source material.  
In ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, Nietzsche describes Montaigne as the ‘freest and 
mightiest of souls’. In the light of our discussion of the historical, it is evident that 
Nietzsche offers Montaigne as a model to humankind, an inspirer of greatness, whose 
‘most essential being … posterity cannot do without’ (HL 2). But much more than this, 
Montaigne is not just another esteemed member in the pantheon of the monumental: 
Nietzsche deliberately sets Montaigne apart within that pantheon, so that he is not 
simply an exemplar of greatness but, for Nietzsche, the exemplar of greatness—‘If I 
were set the task, I could endeavor to make myself at home in the world with him’. 
Given this status, it is reasonable to suppose that in Nietzsche’s elucidation and 
illustration of the monumental in ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’ 
Montaigne is, as his most admired ‘educator’, considerably in mind. Aside from the 
agreement between this Meditation and the Essays on the proper task of historical study, 
and the importance of active ‘forgetting’, there is other, not insignificant textual 
evidence that Montaigne is a crucial but undeclared influence on Nietzsche’s notion of 
the monumental.  
The first insinuation of this comes when Nietzsche proposes that the demand for 
monumental history expresses a kind of Montaignean affirmation of life, or what he 
calls a ‘fundamental…faith in humanity’ (HL 2). In line with the entire tenor of the 
Essays, the monumental instills the feeling that human existence ‘is a glorious thing’ 
(ibid.). A Montaignean note is again struck when Nietzsche claims that the gravest 
threat to the inspiring power of monumental history is ‘[a]pathetic habit’, which ‘casts 
itself across the path that greatness has to thread … and … stifles it’ (ibid.). This 
sentiment anticipates the opening section of ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, and its 
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Montaignean call to break the chain of habit and live an authentic existence. But the 
surest allusion to Montaigne comes when Nietzsche announces that the ‘immortals’ of 
the monumental have ‘a single teaching’: ‘to regard [existence] with Olympian laughter 
or at least sublime mockery; often they descended to their grave with an ironic smile’ 
(ibid.). We should recall here the fundamental importance that Montaigne ascribes to 
the human capacity for laughter and his admiration for Democritus. Finally, it is worth 
noting that both Nietzsche and Montaigne, as regards the best means to approach the 
monumental, offer similar advice: acquaint oneself with Plutarch. Nietzsche directs 
those with an interest in history to ‘satiate’ their minds with Plutarch, and to believe in 
themselves the same way that they believe in his heroes (HL 6). Likewise, for 
Montaigne, ‘of historians of every kind, Plutarch is the man for me’ (II.10; T396, S467 




According to Nietzsche’s historical schema, ‘[e]ach of the three species of history … 
belong to a certain soil and a certain climate’ (HL 2). He puts forward the Renaissance, 
that remarkable flowering of artistic creativity, as a great monumental epoch, raised, he 
claims, ‘on the shoulders of just … a band of a hundred men’ (ibid.). But the example of 
the Renaissance also clearly shows the necessity of an antiquarian relationship to the 
historical. After all, it was only because the ideas and culture of classical antiquity were 
‘preserved and revered’, treated with ‘loyalty and love’, that such a recrudescence of 
ancient learning was possible at all (HL 3). The role of the antiquarian historian is to 
approach tradition with ‘piety’, to protect and safeguard the former achievements of the 
monumental. In this way, the antiquarian and the monumental are interlocked in a 
perpetual dance of mutual instigation: the antiquarian is the seedbed of the monumental, 
but must give way if the monumental is to exist anew—the innovations of the 
Renaissance were, to a certain extent, an impious outgrowth of a reverence of the past. 
This process plays itself out within cultures, communities and within the individual. 
Although Nietzsche’s appropriation of the Greco-Roman tradition represents a 
monumentalistic act, his admiration for that tradition is clear and explicit. In 
‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, his conception of the philosopher is expressly animated by 
the exemplars of Greek antiquity, and ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for 
Life’ begins with the admission that the ‘untimely experiences’ that prompted his 
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Meditations were occasioned ‘to the extent that I am a pupil of earlier times, especially 
the Hellenic’ (HL F).  
 For Nietzsche, a chief characteristic of the antiquarian individual is that the 
‘possession of ancestral goods changes its meaning in such a soul: they rather possess it’ 
(HL 3). In this circumstance, the ‘trivial … and obsolete … acquire their own dignity 
and inviolability’, and what is more, in the ‘rules and regulations’ of tradition the 
antiquarian individual finds ‘his force, his industry, his joy’ (ibid.). Obviously, given 
both his extensive referencing of ancient texts and his veneration of past exemplars, this 
picture of the antiquarian individual brings the figure of Montaigne immediately to 
mind. His love for the Greco-Roman tradition is profuse: ‘I readily allow myself to be 
captive to the ancients. … Ancient Rome … is of passionate concern to me. I like 
thinking about their faces. … I mutter their great names between my teeth. I venerate 
them’ (III.9; T975-6, S1128 [763]). Throughout the Essays, this sentiment is repeatedly 
affirmed. Nietzsche, however, conceives a danger in this kind of antiquarianism: if the 
preservation and conservation of tradition becomes excessive, the historical ‘no longer 
conserves life’, but ‘mummifies it’, and one’s engagement with history ceases to be 
‘animated and inspired by … fresh life’ (HL 3). In this case, the antiquarian smothers 
the creative possibilities of the monumental, past greatness leading to no future 
achievement. Yet, for Nietzsche, the most essential purpose of the veneration of the past 
must be to enable ‘the fullest exertion of the vigor of the present [der höchsten Kraft der 
Gegenwart]’ (HL 6). But perhaps Nietzsche would take no issue with a Montaignean 
reverence of the past, considering that his own professed love for the culture of Ancient 
Greece is no less ardent; in fact, he concludes ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of 
History for Life’ by describing Ancient Greek culture as a ‘unanimity of life, thought, 
appearance and will’ that has ‘achieved victory over all other cultures’ (HL 10). 
Nietzsche, however, expresses another worry concerning a disproportionate 
antiquarianism: ‘The antiquarian sense … always possesses an extremely restricted field 
of vision’, with the result that there ‘is a lack of that discrimination of value … which 
would distinguish between the things of the past in a way that would do them justice’ 
(HL 3). It is in this regard that Montaigne’s antiquarianism seems to take on an 
oppressive aspect. Although severely critical of the culture and political system of his 
day, Montaigne insists, nonetheless, that there ‘is no system so bad (provided it be old 
and durable) as not to be better than change and innovation’ (II.17; T639, S745 [497]). 
Montaigne’s antiquarianism is unbalanced by a lack of ‘measure and proportion’, by a 
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‘backward glance’ that takes ‘everything old and past … to be equally worthy of 
reverence’ (HL 3). On the Montaignean view, in matters of culture and politics, change 
and innovation are a potentially endless source of societal degradation, and so we 
should entrust ourselves to the safe arms of tradition and the ‘awesomesness of ancient 
custom [reverence de l'ancien usage]’ (II.12; T416, S490 [320]). In a sense, 
Montaigne’s antiquarianism could be said to overpower his monumentalism: he is a 
student of the great lives of the past, but refuses to affirm the conditions necessary to 
foster the greatness of the future. Because he ‘undervalues that which is becoming’, 
Montaigne is all too willing to paralyze ‘the man of action who … will and must offend 
some piety or other’ (HL 3). Nietzsche’s closing comments on the antiquarian could 
have been written with Montaigne in mind, such is the accuracy with which they seem 
to capture his thinking. He proposes that the unalterable conviction of the antiquarian 
individual is that when one considers ancient custom, that ‘great sum of piety and 
reverence’, then it is ‘arrogant or even wicked to replace such an antiquity with a 
novelty … the single unit of that which is evolving and has just arrived’ (ibid.). And in 
the Essays Montaigne declares that it ‘is greatly to be doubted whether any obvious 
good can come from changing any traditional law … compared with the evil of 
changing it. … I abhor novelty, no matter what visage it presents’ (I.23; T118, S134 
[86]). Owing to his experience of civil war, it may well seem that the stability and 
security of tradition held for Montaigne an incalculable value. 
But is it really the case that Montaigne’s relationship to the historical was 
wholly coloured by the Protestant break with the traditions of the old established faith—
and all the religiously-inspired conflict that ensued? Was Montaigne any more a cultural 
and political conservative than he was a religious conservative? In the Essays, there is 
ample textual evidence to support the view that, while pursuing the most radical 
intellectual independence, he decries any sort of cultural or political change. The 
following passage is representative of many others: ‘It is his soul that a wise man should 
withdraw from the crowd, maintaining its power and freedom freely to make judgments, 
whilst eternally accepting the received forms and fashions’ (ibid. T117, S133 [86]). 
Hence, Marchi claims that there is a ‘fundamental difference’ between Montaigne and 
Nietzsche, to the extent that ‘Nietzsche sought a break with the past … in order to create 





 However, we should, I think, be as suspicious of Montaigne’s apparent 
cultural and political conservatism as we are of his apparent piety. Indeed, I argue in 
Chapter 3 that he desires not just a renewal of French culture but the complete 
overturning of the values of the Greco-Roman tradition. Like Nietzsche, he diagnoses 
an axiological sickness at the heart of Western culture, and seeks the re-naturalization of 
the human. And as regards the supposed political conservatism of the Essays, despite 
passages like that quoted above, when one takes the work as a whole, the critique of 
conservatism to be found there is far more persuasive than any defence. As Schaefer 
rightly notes, Montaigne ‘surely cannot have been unaware that his denunciations of the 
stupidity and injustice of many existing laws would tend to weaken his readers’ 
disposition to maintain or accept them’.
46
 Moreover, his argument for political stability 
turns dramatically near the end of the essay ‘On habit’, to a discussion of historical 
examples where the only appropriate action was to overturn the laws, and concludes 
with the following: ‘Plutarch praised Philopoemen for being born to command, 
knowing how to issue commands by the laws and, when public necessity required it, to 
the laws’ (I.23; T122, S139 [90]). Accordingly, we may understand ‘his periodic 
disclaimers of intending to promote any sort of political change’ as having ‘the same 
protective, rhetorical function as the affirmations of submission that he appends to his 






In view of the stultifying cultural consequences of an immoderate antiquarianism, a 
third mode of relating to the historical is necessary, one that calls a halt to an excessive 
veneration of the past and paves the way for a new monumentalism. While the 
monumental is creative and the antiquarian preserving, the ‘critical’ constitutes a 
destructive drive to break old pieties and shatter traditions: ‘If he is to live, man must 
possess and from time to time employ the strength to break up and dissolve a part of the 
past’ (HL 3). Zarathustra opens with the section entitled ‘On the Three 
Transformations’, a figurative treatment of this threefold relationship to the historical. 
The antiquarian is represented by the ‘camel’, a ‘weight-bearing spirit in which 
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reverence dwells’, and the monumental is represented by the ‘child’, a spirit that finds 
its home in the unhistorical: ‘Innocence the child is and forgetting, a beginning anew, a 
self-propelling wheel’. The child is a creator of values, but the child lacks the power to 
seize for itself the freedom for such creation: this is the task of the ‘lion’. The lion has 
the courage to exist in ‘the loneliest desert’, and possesses the critical spirit, which 
‘must find delusion and caprice even in the most sacred’ (Z 1.1). For Nietzsche, a 
critical approach to the historical is an essential task of the philosopher. As discussed 
earlier, he understands the philosophical life in terms of two ‘consecrations to culture’: 
the first involves attaining self-knowledge by freeing oneself from the claims of custom; 
the second entails a willingness to be ‘an enemy’ to the culture and institutions that 
surround one. In ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’, both of these 
responsibilities are fused in the figure of the critical individual, whose role it is to 
‘scrupulously examine’ the past before ‘tribunal’ and ultimately ‘condemn’ it (HL 3). 
 But the philosopher is not to employ the critical spirit in an indiscriminate 
fashion: a continuous criticism would enfeeble the creative force of the monumental; 
destruction must be followed first by construction and then by conservation before a 
court of judgment is once more assembled. Consequently, for Nietzsche, ‘only he who 
is oppressed by a present need, and who wants to throw off this burden at any cost, has 
need of critical history’ (HL 2). Nietzsche’s need grew out not only of dissatisfaction 
with the society of his time and its Platonic-Christian heritage but also with 
Schopenhauer, the philosopher who he had thought offered cultural deliverance. The 
catalyst that brought Montaigne’s critical spirit to life was a personal tragedy, the death 
of his great friend La Boétie. It was to free himself from a ‘melancholy’ mood that 
Montaigne began to write the Essays. As Frame explains, ‘La Boétie was the only man 
Montaigne fully trusted as witness to his life. With him dead, the Essays must serve 
instead’.
48
 Hence, a refrain of the Essays is Montaigne striving to understand himself: ‘I 
hunger to make myself known’ (III.5; T824, S955-6 [643-4]). Oppressed by this need 
for self-knowledge, Montaigne engages the Classical authors. But this engagement, 
though often reverential, is essentially judgmental and critical.
49
 The findings of 
Montaigne’s self-study are frequently at odds with the wisdom of Stoic and Epicurean 
sages; the philosophies of Socrates and Plato are at times ridiculed. And in order to fully 
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‘the ability to stand back and look at what has been dominating us’ (“Laughter”, pp. 117-18). 
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address the existential questions and problems that propel his writing, Montaigne deems 
it necessary to break with or reinterpret the traditions in which he had assumed solutions 
were to be found: he rejects metaphysics and any transcendent basis for morality, rejects 
also the immortality and unity and the soul (Chapter 2); he denounces ascetic ideals and 
overturns the unquestioned assumption of ancient and medieval philosophy of the 
inferiority of the body and its stark separation from mind (Chapter 3); and he advocates 
a higher naturalism, aiming to overcome the traditional opposition between reason and 
passion (Chapter 4). 
 In the Greco-Roman tradition, the philosopher is conceived as an individual 
concerned with a care of the self and the cultivation of character. Irrelevant to this 
vocation, the issue of cultural renewal plays no substantial role in the philosophical life. 
With his notion of a second consecration to culture, Nietzsche thus offers a highly 
distinctive conception of philosophy as an art of living, a conception which separates 
him from the Stoical, Epicurean and Sceptical literatures. On the Nietzschean view, the 
first consecration to culture—an inward turn to the self to free oneself from the 
constraints of convention—is not the end of the philosopher’s task: the philosopher, 
having released him- herself from the insufficiencies of the age, must accomplish the 
additional goal of creating new cultural values, values which will reinvigorate society, 
freeing individuals from the repressive influence of previous cultural norms. As a 
consequence, in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche insists that we should view ‘Schopenhauer as 
Educator’ as introducing an understanding of the philosopher ‘as a terrible explosive 
power [einen furchtbaren Explosionsstoff] that is a danger to everything’ (EH, ‘UM’ 
3).
50
 This is precisely how Nietzsche sees Montaigne: he sees fit to praise the 
revolutionary Montaigne, the Montaigne of ‘mischief [Mutwille]’ and ‘danger’, as a 
philosophical ideal above all others (EH 2.3; KSB 7, 584). Nietzsche peers behind 
Montaigne’s mask of conservatism, just as he does his mask of piety, and discovers an 
exemplar in terms of both conservations to culture. Therefore, while it may be true that 
in both thinkers we find ‘the attempt to assert vital, dynamic subjectivity under the 
spectre of the authoritative past’, it is Montaigne’s ‘critical spirit’ that is a key influence 
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CHAPTER 2: THE ART OF 
PSYCHOLOGICAL DISSECTION 
 
Section I: Human, All Too Human 
 
The historical and self-knowledge 
Nietzsche sees a ‘hypertrophied’ historical sense as a grave threat to his contemporaries. 
If a culture is to develop and advance, he claims, it must cultivate a healthy engagement 
with the three species of history. Such a ‘natural relationship’ of an age to the historical 
is one that is ‘evoked by hunger, regulated by the extent of its need, held in bounds by 
its inherent plastic powers’ (HL 4). For Nietzsche, however, his time is marked by a 
morbid ‘fever of history’, which is destroying the capacity of individuals to disregard 
the past and act unhistorically (HL F). Moreover, past greatness is devalued and 
obscured in the rush to grant a measure of importance to the trivial details of even the 
most debased historical epoch. Most disturbing of all is that, in a people suffering from 
this kind of historical excess, the individual’s critical engagement with the past ceases 
to be motivated by real and pressing needs, the historical is no longer personally 
appropriated in the service of alleviating an existential burden, and the past, ideally a 
‘nourishing food’, is converted into a seemingly inexhaustible source of barren 
knowledge (HL 10). 
 The most troubling consequence of this ‘malady’ is what Nietzsche refers to as 
‘weakened personality’ (HL 5). Given the atmosphere of intemperate historicism, the 
modern German, Nietzsche suggests, has to contend with exposure to a storm of 
‘customs, arts, philosophies, [and] religions’, none of which, individually or 
collectively, answer to serious exigency or relate in any way to authentic feeling (HL 4). 
The necessary and direct result of the attempt to habituate to ‘such a … conflict-ridden 
household’ is that many of his contemporaries experience a ‘chaotic inner world’, and 
exhibit a ‘remarkable antithesis’ between inner and outer (ibid.). The past is no longer 
assimilated by the individual to enrich experience and guide action, but remains a 
superficial and artificial ‘decoration’. Such a circumstance has a devastating impact on 
the individual, insofar as it leads to the ‘expulsion of the instincts by history’, whereby 
‘no one dares to appear as he is’ (HL 5). Predictably, Nietzsche proposes that this 
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‘emptying’ of the personality first takes hold in the German education system. The 
student’s ‘head is crammed with a tremendous number of ideas derived from a highly 
indirect knowledge of past ages’, which means they are prevented from ‘evolving … a 
coherent living complex of experiences’ of their own (HL 10). Nietzsche therefore 
maintains that his fellow Germans have been instructed by education and encouraged by 
culture to ‘feel in abstractions’ (ibid.). What they have failed to appreciate is that ‘life 
itself’ cannot be successfully approached through indirect knowledge, but should be 
understood as a ‘craft which must be learned from the ground up and practised 
remorselessly’ (ibid.). 
This is the lesson provided by the ancient Greeks. For Nietzsche, there is a clear 
and effective cure on offer to his contemporaries for the scourge of weakened 
personality that besets them. What is necessary is to heed the oracle of the god of 
Delphi: ‘Know yourself’. Only then can they hope to ‘become human again’ and cease 
to be merely ‘aggregates of humanlike qualities’ (ibid.). The example of the Greeks is 
particularly instructive, Nietzsche explains, because they, too, faced the threat of 
‘perishing through “history”’, and were nearly overwhelmed by ‘Semitic, Babylonian, 
Lydian [and] Egyptian forms and ideas’. Yet, ‘through protracted application of that 
oracle’, the Greeks ‘learned to organize the chaos’, and by ‘thinking back … to their 
real needs … they again took possession of themselves’ (ibid.). Nietzsche thus begins 
‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ with a demand to the reader to ‘Be your self’. And as a 
corrective to speculative abstraction in education and culture, he urges us to consider the 
lives of the pre-Socratic sages, who forged a remarkable art of living and care of the 
soul. This is the context in which he offers Montaigne as a paragon in the philosophical 
art of living, a true inheritor of Greek wisdom. But it is not just that Montaigne 
appropriates the most enriching aspects of Greco-Roman thought; Montaigne also 
possesses, to the highest imaginable degree, the characteristics that enabled the Greeks 
to develop a culture ‘without inner and outer’, a culture that represented the ‘unanimity 
of life, thought, appearance and will’. Namely, the qualities of ‘honesty … strength and 
truthfulness of … character’ (ibid.). Such qualities are essential to the task of self-
knowledge, and as we have seen, may be ascribed, Nietzsche believes, to Montaigne as 
to no other.  
Montaigne casts the enterprise of the Essays as an effort in self-portraiture: 
‘Finding myself quite empty … I offered myself to myself as a theme. … I … decided 
to draw a portrait of myself from life’ (II.8; T364, S433 [278]). His writing, however, 
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moves well beyond the realm of a literary portrayal or a biographical account; 
Montaigne views self-portraiture not as an end in itself but as a means to the more 
important goal of self-study and self-knowledge. The wisdom of the Delphic oracle is 
affirmed continuously: ‘I seek only that branch of learning which deals with knowing 
myself’ (II.10; T388, S459 [297]). Again, the extent to which Nietzsche’s take on 
society follows that of Montaigne is remarkable. Indeed, many of Montaigne’s 
comments on his contemporaries seem to be almost paraphrased in ‘On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life’. Like Nietzsche, Montaigne is especially exercised 
by the disjunction between inner and outer: ‘most of our actions are but mask and 
cosmetic’ (I.38; T229, S263 [172]). The upshot of such shallowness and dissimulation 
is that the mass of people are ‘senseless’, merely playing roles, as ‘they understand 
neither themselves nor anyone else’ (I.25; T138, S157 [102]). Under the corrupting 
influence of a debased culture, individuals, imperceptibly but unavoidably, turn ‘masks 
and semblances into essential qualities’, and thereby ‘unlearn their own natures’ (III.10; 
T989, S1144 [773-4]). For Montaigne, too, this emptying of personality coincides with 
near boundless erudition. Memory is swamped with knowledge, but understanding and 
judgement remain ‘hollow’. In effect, what Montaigne sees at work in French society is, 
paradoxically, an ‘ignorance’ of the self ‘made and engendered by knowledge’ (I.54; 
T299, S349 [227]). But the knowledge referred to here is a frivolous form of 
knowledge, ‘sprinkled’ onto the soul, unrelated to authentic need. In the Montaignean 
conception, the only knowledge worth having—and the sole antidote to the loss of self 
fostered by French culture—is self-knowledge: ‘All men gaze ahead … I turn my gaze 
inward, planting it there and keeping it there’ (II.17; T641, S747 [499]). Accordingly, 
Nietzsche, in the fourth and final Untimely Meditation, ‘Richard Wagner in Bayreuth’, 
proposes that ‘[w]hat the individual Montaigne signifies within the agitation of the spirit 
of the Reformation’ is ‘a coming to rest within oneself, a peaceful being for oneself and 
relaxation’ (WB 3).   
 
 
Nietzsche’s move to psychology 
In ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, Nietzsche gives expression to his deep admiration for 
Montaigne by stating: ‘If I were set the task, I could endeavour to make myself at home 
in the world with him’ (SE 2). With the publication of Human, All Too Human, in 1878, 
two years after ‘Richard Wagner in Bayreuth’, Nietzsche, it appears, attempts to turn 
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this hypothetical admission into concrete reality. Having stressed the absolute necessity 
of self-knowledge in the immediately preceding works, and having offered Montaigne 
as an exemplar in the philosophical art of living, Nietzsche now follows Montaigne’s 
lead and begins to engage in a rigorous project of self-analysis. Montaigne describes the 
Essays, variously, as a ‘withdrawal’ into himself, a ‘clinging’ to himself, a ‘cherishing’ 
of himself. Nietzsche explains the genesis of Human, All Too Human as follows: ‘I was 
overcome by impatience with myself: I saw that it was high time to reconsider myself’ 
(EH, ‘HAH’ 3). For Montaigne, an examination of human behaviour more generally is a 
prerequisite to his own self-understanding, the study of the conduct of others a 
potentially endless source of self-insight. Hence, in the Essays, running in tandem with 
self-portraiture is a penetrating psychological analysis of what he calls ‘our manners and 
motives’ (I.21; T104, S119 [75]). With Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche moves 
squarely onto this Montaignean ground. His focus shifts to concerns that dominate 
attention in the Essays: the true springs of action and motivation, the basis of virtue, the 
psychological and physiological aspects of thought, and the nature of the self.
1
 
Consequently, in Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche laments the ‘poverty in 
psychological observation’ in Germany and calls for the cultivation of ‘the art of 
psychological dissection’ (HAH 35).
2
 Montaigne is clearly pivotal to Nietzsche’s 
embrace of such an art, as his foray into what could be called philosophical psychology 




We can thus see that Montaigne becomes an exemplar for Nietzsche at a critical 
juncture in his intellectual development, offering encouragement and guidance as he 
                                                             
1 This is a point already made by Williams, who writes that what Human, All Too Human represents 
is a transition in Nietzsche’s thought from ‘speculations about the universe to the study of concrete 
human actions … from the metaphysical to the ethical’ (Nietzsche and the French, p. xx). What is 
more, guided by Montaigne, ‘Nietzsche sees self-knowledge from now on as the key to all other 
knowledge’ (ibid.). 
2 Although it is with the publication of the first part of Human, All Too Human that Nietzsche first 
‘self-consciously’ casts himself as a psychologist, he ‘had been laying the groundwork all along, even 
in the earliest writings from his youth’ (Parkes, Composing the Soul, p. 3). 
3 Other factors, of course, were critical to the shaping of Nietzsche’s thought as he began to write 
Human, All Too Human. Many commentators highlight the significance of the German Materialist 
movement of the 1850’s and 60’s, and particularly Friedrich Lange’s History of Materialism, which 
Nietzsche read with enthusiasm in the late 1860’s (see Stack’s Lange and Nietzsche). German 
materialists, deploying psychological and more especially physiological explanations, sought to 
approach morality and religion from a purely naturalistic perspective. Another important but more 
immediate influence was that of Paul Rée, a psychologist who Nietzsche befriended two years prior 
to the publication of Human, All Too Human. While it is undeniable that Rée’s impact was crucial, it 
must be admitted that, given his intensive reading of Montaigne, Nietzsche was already well primed 
to be receptive to Rée’s psychological interpretations of moral, religious and metaphysical beliefs.  
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moved from the romantic pessimism of the Birth of Tragedy to the moral psychology of 
Human, All Too Human. In other words, Montaigne is an exemplar who bridges the 
early phases of Nietzsche’s philosophical career. And unlike any other pre-Human, All 
Too Human influence on Nietzsche, Montaigne’s importance only increases in the 
middle works. That is to say, if the Essays were ‘alien’ reading material in 1870, they 
were—as a foundational document on the art of psychological dissection—a matter of 
course in 1878, when Nietzsche began an intensive study of the French moral 
philosophy tradition. Moreover, given that Nietzsche is reading the Essays nearly a 
decade before the publication of Human, All Too Human, we may perhaps understand 
Montaigne as having ‘prepared the ground’ for his deep interest in other French 
moralists.
4
 But of course, as regards the French moralists, Montaigne represents a 
special case: alone among them, he is also an exemplar for Nietzsche in terms of his 
‘cheerfulness’, his art of living, and his critical engagement with the historical. Indeed, 
for Robert Pippin, the most important issue arising from Nietzsche’s study of the French 
moralists is the ‘Montaigne problem’: ‘how one might combine an uncompromising, 
brutal honesty about human hypocrisy and bad faith … with an affirmative 
reconciliation of some sort with such a weak and corrupt human condition’.
5
 
With the turn to a more psychological and personal approach to philosophy, the 
influence of Montaigne begins to reverberate throughout Nietzsche’s work. At the time 
of writing Human, All Too Human, the biographical similarities between the two 
thinkers must have struck Nietzsche forcefully; in fact, for both, the biographical and 
the philosophical are inextricably related. As noted earlier, Montaigne’s ‘raving concern 
with writing’ was provoked by a personal catastrophe, the sudden death of his friend 
Etienne La Boétie. Montaigne describes the situation thus: ‘It was a melancholy humour 
… brought on by the chagrin caused by the solitary retreat I plunged myself into a few 
years ago’ (II.8; T364, S433 [278]). Therefore, in beginning the Essays and 
commencing self-study, Montaigne engages in a form of self-therapy, very much in the 
vein of the Greco-Roman schools of philosophy. As regards the practices of such 
schools, Stoicism and Epicureanism especially, ‘every spiritual exercise is dialogical 
insofar as it is an exercise of authentic presence of the self to itself’.
6 
In Ecce Homo, 
Nietzsche describes Human, All Too Human as ‘the monument to a crisis’ (EH, ‘HAH’ 
                                                             
4 Vivarelli, “Montaigne und der ‘Freie Geist’”, p. 83. 
5 Pippin, Nietzsche, Psychology and First Philosophy, p. 22. 
6 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, p. 20. 
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1). The crisis referred to had multiple causes, the most devastating of which was the end 
of Nietzsche’s friendship with Richard Wagner, whose romanticism had coloured his 
early philosophy, particularly his conception of art in The Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche 
admits that the break from Wagner precipitated ‘a deep sense of alienation’: ‘I carried 
my melancholy … around with me like a disease’ (EH, ‘HAH’ 2). As with Montaigne 
and the Essays, Nietzsche’s writing of Human, All Too Human represents his 
formulation of a highly personal psycho-philosophical self-therapy: ‘this “return to 
myself” … was … the highest type of convalescence’ (ibid. 4). And whereas 
Montaigne’s solitude was intensified by the fact that he had, for the most part, retired 
from professional and political duties, another crucial factor in Nietzsche’s crisis was 
his realization that he would have to leave his professorship in Basel, partly for health 
reasons, partly out of disillusionment with academic life. We thus have two 
philosophers, both mourning lost friendships, both in the grip of solitude but writing 
with a new and liberating independence. 
 Human, All Too Human also unmistakably signals Nietzsche’s final escape from 
Schopenhauerian pessimism. His rejection is clear and absolute: ‘Away with these 
overused … words optimism and pessimism. … [I]t is quite obvious that the world is 
not good and not evil, let alone the best of all or the worst of all worlds’ (HAH 28). 
Hence, what was unstated but implicit in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, when Nietzsche 
raised Montaigne above Schopenhauer as a philosophical paragon, now becomes the 
express point of departure for his psychological investigations. Nietzsche traces what he 
believes to be the false beliefs and psychological errors which ground such pessimism. 
Given the rejection of Schopenhauer and the abandonment of Wagner, many 
commentators have seen in Human, All Too Human an abrupt and rather startling 
change in the direction of Nietzsche’s thought. Michael Ure refers to ‘the famous volte-
face Nietzsche performs … his painful repudiation of his former philosophical and 
cultural mentors’.
7 
But there is a tendency to overstate the apparent philosophical gulf 
separating Human, All Too Human from previous works. After all, as examined in 
chapter 1, Nietzsche refuses to endorse Schopenhauerian philosophy in both The Birth 
of Tragedy and ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’: in the former, Schopenhauerian language 
is used to reach conclusions completely at odds with Schopenhauerian philosophy, and 
in the latter, the focus is exclusively on the manner of Schopenhauer’s philosophical 
                                                             
7 Ure, Nietzsche’s Therapy, p. 15. 
49 
 
life—Schopenhauerian language and metaphysics are dispensed with altogether. 
Furthermore, similar in spirit to ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, ‘Richard Wagner in 
Bayreuth’, with respect to the eponymous exemplar, amounts to something closer to a 
subtle critique than a flattering tribute. Therefore, in many ways, Human, All Too 
Human represents an unsurprising evolution in Nietzsche’s thought, not a stark reversal. 
In fact, if one attaches sufficient weight to Nietzsche’s actual words in ‘Schopenhauer 
as Educator’, regarding Montaigne’s importance as a philosophical inspiration, his 
move toward psychological self-study is not only unsurprising but inevitable.  
 
 
Rejection of romantic pessimism 
This is not to deny, however, that, in other respects, Human, All Too Human marks a 
decisive break with philosophical views Nietzsche forcefully espoused in earlier works. 
Quite rightly, Human, All Too Human is often characterized as inaugurating a so-called 
‘positivist phase’ in his writing—a more appreciative and approving treatment of 
science and the scientific method.
 
 In ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, Nietzsche presents 
the scholar, and more particularly the scholar of science, as an object of scorn, and 
scientific study as a woefully limited and impoverished enterprise: ‘science is related to 
wisdom as virtuousness is related to holiness, it is cold and dry … it ossifies the 
humanity of its servants’ (SE 6). This attitude to science in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ 
is a continuation of that voiced in The Birth of Tragedy, where, in thrall to Wagner’s 
romanticism, he glories in the redemptive power of art. In this work, he understands art 
as inimically opposed to the spirit of science, which, with its inexhaustible ‘lust’ for 
knowledge and its ‘arrogant delusion’ that the ‘innermost essence of things’ can be 
penetrated, destroys mythopoetic illusions—the foundation of art’s ‘metaphysical solace 
[Trost]’ (BT 7, 18). In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche’s new-found enthusiasm for 
science is announced in the opening aphorism, with its title of ‘Chemistry of concepts 
and sensations’. He then goes on to explode the notion of art as the ‘completion’ and 
‘perfection’ of existence (BT 3). Far from it, art ‘makes the sight of life bearable by 
laying over it the veil of unclear thinking’, and in so doing artists are merely ‘glorifying 
the religious and philosophical errors of mankind’ (HAH 151, 220). Nietzsche no longer 
sees art and science as antagonistic, since both are necessary to a ‘higher culture’: the 
‘illusions, onesidednesses [Einseitigkeiten] [and] passions’ of art must be present in a 
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society to give ‘heat’, and with the help of scientific knowledge, the ‘evil and perilous 
consequences of overheating’ can be prevented (HAH 251). 
Such overheating occurs when we believe that artistically inspired feelings 
somehow put us in touch with a more exalted existence. For Nietzsche, his thinking on 
art in The Birth of Tragedy betrays an implicit adherence to untenable metaphysical 
presuppositions, which owe their origin not to profound philosophical thought but to 
acute psychological needs. Kant outlines the boundary to human knowledge and 
demonstrates the thing-in-itself to be unknowable. Schopenhauer, however, attempting 
the epistemologically impossible, tries to push beyond this Kantian limit and give an 
account of ultimate reality: the thing-in-itself as will. Based on this insupportable 
insight, he then understands human existence as an arena of endless willing, striving and 
desiring—and consequently endless suffering. Nietzsche comes to see this kind of 
metaphysical reasoning as based on nothing but ‘passion, error and self-deception; the 
worst of all methods of acquiring knowledge’ (HAH 9). In effect, Schopenhauer 
projects his own fears into the very structure of existence and takes his own feelings as 
‘fundamental qualities of mankind in general’ (HAH 110). In ‘On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life’, Nietzsche admonishes the reader to gain self-
knowledge by thinking back to his or her real needs. Human, All Too Human thus 
advocates the weakening and rooting out of the ‘metaphysical need’, which, although 
responsible for the ‘dazzling errors’ that have bestowed great meaning on human 
suffering, has prevented us from honestly confronting the true nature of the human 
condition (HAH 37). Nietzsche argues that in religion, metaphysics and art we delve no 
deeper into the essence of existence, and insists that the ‘thing-in-itself’, which had once 
‘appeared to be so much, indeed everything’, is now worthy of ‘Homeric laugher’ 
(HAH 16). 
Montaigne would have agreed wholeheartedly with this last remark. As Frame 
puts it, ‘[f]ewer men have been less metaphysical’.
8
 No point is stressed more 
emphatically in the Essays than the absurdity and pointlessness of metaphysical 
speculation: ‘the most gross and puerile of rhapsodies are to be found among thinkers 
who penetrate most deeply into the highest matters’ (II.12; T526, S611 [407]). He 
continuously underlines the limitations of the human mind and the impossibility of 
                                                             





 In fact, Montaigne proposes that ‘[t]o determine the limits of our 
powers … constitutes … the highest’ wisdom (ibid. T482, S560 [371-2]). Like 
Nietzsche, he holds that it is in ‘vanity’, ‘fantasy’ and the general ‘defects’ of human 
nature that the real promptings of our metaphysical questing are to be found (ibid.). In 
Montaigne’s view, we hunt after knowledge beyond our reach and then, having 
invented some dubious foundation on which to construct a metaphysical edifice, 
proceed to put the utmost trust in what we least understand. In consequence, he eschews 
metaphysics completely, in favour of self-knowledge: ‘I study myself. … That is my 
metaphysics; that is my physics’ (III.13; T1050, S1217 [821]). This Montaignean 
contempt for metaphysics must thus be borne in mind when one posits a sharp 
distinction between Nietzsche’s philosophy in the Untimely Meditations and Human, All 
Too Human. To be sure, metaphysical language is at times prominent in the latter. For 
instance, in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, Nietzsche claims that ‘man is necessary for the 
redemption of nature from the curse of the life of the animal’, as in humanity ‘existence 
… appears no longer senseless but in its metaphysical significance’ (SE 5). But as 
discussed earlier, at the very heart of both ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History 
for Life’ and ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ we find, as in the Essays, the recognition of 
the essential importance of self-knowledge. And if one considers the powerful influence 
that Montaigne obviously exerts on Nietzsche at this time—in terms of his break from 
Schopenhauer and Wagner—if one takes the essayist as Nietzsche’s most esteemed 
‘educator’, then the undermining of metaphysics via a psychological approach in 
Human, All Too Human becomes readily intelligible.  
 Montaigne alerts Nietzsche to the suspicion that metaphysical explanations are, 
to use Berry’s phrase, ‘psychologically suspect’.
10
 Human, All Too Human follows the 
Essays in ‘exposing the psychological drives behind metaphysical philosophy’, and in 
discussing ‘the dogmas of religion and metaphysics in similarly “pathological” terms’.
11
 
                                                             
9 Given that they reject any kind of metaphysical understanding of the world and thus deny that we 
can say anything meaningful about ‘the world as it really is’, it would seem that, when both thinkers 
characterize the world as ‘becoming’, they are offering an account of reality that could be called 
‘negative realism’: ‘becoming is indeed a feature of the world … but it is precisely and only this 
world’s indeterminableness’ (Richardson, “Nietzsche on Time and Becoming”, p. 212). According to 
such a view, ‘the world is “flux” or “chaos” insofar as it has no determinate structure in itself. All 
properties … are imposed by … us’ (ibid.). Looking beyond Human, All Too Human, however, 
Nietzsche moves to a position that is more radical still: ‘it’s not just that the noumenon is 
indeterminate, but that there is and can be no such thing’ (ibid.). Understood in this way, becoming 
‘refers … to the non-existence of any real or noumenal world. This carries us out of realism’ (ibid.).  
10 Berry, “The Pyrrhonian Revival in Montaigne and Nietzsche”, p. 499. 
11 Ibid., p. 514. 
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Platonic idealism, described in the Essays as ‘soarings aloft in clouds of poetry and the 
babble of the gods’, is, for Montaigne, symptomatic of a mind ‘engulfed by … curiosity 
and … arrogance’ (II.12; T526, S611-2 [407]).
12
 Hence, rather than representing the 
glory of human rationality, the most supposedly transcendent elements of Platonism are 
founded on the ‘base and earthbound’—much as Nietzsche, in Human, All Too Human, 
associates metaphysics with ‘error and self-deception’ (III.13; T1096, S1268 [856]). 
Montaigne thus concludes that ‘nothing about Plato [is] so human as what is alleged for 
calling him divine’ (ibid.). In other words, Plato’s theory of the eternal Forms has little 
to do with unearthly wisdom and much more to do with common human fears—fears 
relating to death, change and destruction. In Ecce Homo, when Nietzsche looks back on 
Human, All Too Human, he recognizes a ‘victory’ over German idealism, which, he 
claims, provides the inspiration for his title. He explains: ‘the title says “where you see 
ideal things, I see—human, oh, only all too human things!’ (EH, ‘HAH’ 1) It is scarcely 
necessary to point out how remarkably this chimes with the Montaignean sentiment 
above. Montaigne is likewise nonplussed by Socrates’ ‘ecstasies and daemonizings’, 
preferring a psychological explanation to a supernatural one, he speculates that the 
apparently otherworldly voice Socrates was wont to hear was in fact ‘a certain thrust of 
the will which presented itself to him without waiting for rational argument’ (I.11; T45, 
S45 [29]). Nietzsche also tackles this matter, but forgoes a strictly psychological 
analysis in favour of a medical diagnosis: ‘an ear-infection’, which Socrates ‘only 
interpreted differently’ (HAH 126). A final point to note here is in relation to pessimism 
(‘the … inveterate vice … of old idealists’ (HAH P5)). In chapter 1, it was argued that 
the Essays offered Nietzsche a corrective to the world-denying aspects of 
Schopenhauerian philosophy. But now it is clear that Montaigne’s influence in this 
regard is far more significant: Montaigne not only provides Nietzsche with a counter 




                                                             
12 ‘Montaigne is concerned with showing doctrinal gaps and logical fallacies in systems of thought, 
but he is perhaps more interested in debunking the self-serving pride and hubris that he thinks lead 
many of these systems—and humanity—to absurd claims. … The heart … of the “Apology” … is his 
attempt to combat presumptuousness by showing the self-serving way in which it emerges from 
human “imagination”’ (Levine, Sensual Philosophy, p. 31). 
13 In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche states that psychology (‘the queen of the sciences’) is ‘the path 
to the most fundamental problems’ (BGE 23). For Pippin, what Nietzsche is proposing here is that 
‘psychology as he understands it will replace philosophy, especially metaphysics, the formerly dead 
or deposed queen’ (Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy, p. 1). Going beyond Montaigne and 




In the Essays, Montaigne’s mocking dismissal of metaphysics is just a part of the much 
broader aim of deflating human ‘presumption’, the vain tendency of humans to see 
themselves as approaching the divine (II.12; T427, S502 [329]). He seeks to stress 
human irrationality rather than human rationality, and the power of both emotion and 
the imagination to overcome our better judgement, leading the mind to give ‘birth to so 
many chimeras and fantastic monstrosities’ (I.8; T34, S31 [21]). ‘An apology for 
Raymond Sebond’, by far the longest essay and the centrepiece of Montaigne’s work, 
amounts to a devastating sceptical attack on our capacity for knowledge. Here, adopting 
Pyrrhonian arguments, he catalogues the gross limitations of human understanding: we 
are surpassed in many ways by the animals; human beings cannot even comprehend the 
inner workings of their own minds and bodies; our senses are fallible and confuse each 
other; the greatest minds of antiquity could come to no consensus on what is good or 
what leads to happiness; the senses and reason do not put us in touch with ultimate 
reality. Montaigne thus proposes that ‘the very things which we know form part of our 
ignorance’, concluding that human reason is ‘a touchstone full of falsehood, error [and] 
defects’ (II.12; T481, S558 [370]; ibid. T523, S608 [405]). 
 Nietzsche’s turn to the art of psychological dissection goes hand in hand with an 
increasingly sceptical tone and style of argument.
14
 For the sceptic, after demolishing 
unwarranted claims to truth, the aim of philosophical discourse is to ‘re-establish a basis 
of modest facts’.
15
 In the opening sections of Human, All Too human, Nietzsche gives 
us to understand that he values ‘the little unpretentious truths’ far more that the ‘errors 
handed down by metaphysical and artistic ages’ (HAH 3). Yet, during the period of his 
middle works, as Richard Bett observes, there is very little evidence to suggest that 
Nietzsche was seriously studying any of the ancient sceptics.
16
 The Essays, it appears, 
were the main avenue for his for sceptical reading at this time. We can thus agree with 
Berry that, following the publication of the Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche’s regard 
for Montaigne as an exemplar is not merely ‘ascribable to [the essayist’s] eminence as a 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
‘always presupposed “stance toward life”’ at work behind every perspective (p. 12). That is to say, 
Nietzsche recognizes ‘the primordiality of issues of values and their psychological conditions’ (p. 
24): ‘the priority and nonreducibility of normative considerations as a condition for the 
intelligibility of our assertions and our actions’ (p. 68).  
14 ‘Nietzsche’s rhapsodic and aphoristic style, holding in balance that which is thought, shows 
similarities with the skeptical language’ (Urs Sommer, “Nihilism and Skepticism in Nietzsche”, p. 
251).  
15 Heitsch, Practising Reform in Montaigne’s Essais, p. 148. 
16 Bett, “Nietzsche on the Skeptics and Nietzsche as Skeptic”, p. 67. 
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… psychologist’: ‘[He] is also keenly attuned to Montaigne’s scepticism’.
17
 Indeed, the 
parallels between the ‘Apology’ and ‘Of First and Last Things’, the first chapter of 
Human, All Too Human, are striking, insofar as we see in both a trenchant scepticism 
directed against philosophical and religious dogmatism, a scepticism emphasizing the 
‘errors’ constitutive to reason itself. 
Suspicious of the very foundations of knowledge, Nietzsche’s critique focuses 
on the capacity for language, unique to humans, the basis of our reason and said to give 
us a higher status than any other species.
18
 As in his unpublished essay ‘On Truth and 
Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense’, he argues that language offers no true representation of 
the world: with words, we merely give ‘designations’ to things and juxtapose one world 
to another of our own making (HAH 11). The belief that language puts us in possession 
of knowledge thus amounts to the propagation of a ‘tremendous error’ (ibid.). He indicts 
logic and mathematics in a similar fashion: ‘here we are already fabricating beings, 
unities that do not exist’ (HAH 19) Following Montaigne, he maintains that what seem 
to be the highest human achievements are in fact ‘the fundamental errors of mankind’, 
with the consequence that ‘the whole of human life is sunk deeply in untruth’ (HAH 18, 
34). Montaigne was well aware of the limitations of language and its failure to map 
reality (‘Our speech, like everything else, has its defects and weaknesses. Most of the 
world’s squabbles are occasioned by grammar’ (II.12; T508, S590 [392]) and of how 
the human mind, ‘imposing … false Forms’ of its own ‘invention’, distorts reality 
(II.12; T517, S601 [400]).
19
 In this way, both thinkers ‘concede that life is impossible 
without compromising oneself with error and illusion’.
20
 Moreover, they agree that, 
with our linguistic and logical schemes, we seek to evade the lesson of flux, engaging in 
an impossible attempt to stabilize the world of becoming; but ‘the more tightly you 
squeeze anything the nature of which is to flow, the more you will lose what you try to 
retain in your grasp’ (II.12; T586, S680 [455]).
21
 
                                                             
17 Berry, Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition, p. 88. 
18 In their attack on human presumption, both thinkers also attempt to subvert the notion of a stark 
separation between human and animal life. Closing the putative gap between the human and the 
animal, they emphasize humanity’s continuity with the rest of nature (see discussion Chapter 3, 
Section I).  
19 ‘There are names and there are things. … The name is not part of that thing nor part of its 
substance: it is a foreign body attached to that thing; it is quite outside it (II.16; T601, S702 [468]). 
For Alan Levine, Montaigne, ‘raising questions about the nature and fundamental inadequacy of 
language’, anticipates ‘the linguistic turn’ in philosophy (Sensual Philosophy, pp. 87-8).  
20 Donnellan, Nietzsche and the French Moralists, p. 24. 
21 ‘Becoming entails the falsity of both our scientific and commonsense theories of the world. It 
does this by falsifying (showing to be false or inapplicable) certain concepts that belong to the deep 
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But there are other, more compelling reasons for supposing that Nietzsche takes 
inspiration from the scepticism of the Essays. For I argue, against Berry, that it is not 
Montaigne’s Pyrrhonism that attracts Nietzsche, but on the contrary, the Essays function 
as a model for him precisely to the extent that they depart from Pyrrhonism. Nietzsche 
saw well what many Montaigne scholars now recognize: that Montaigne, although 
evincing a sceptical orientation, was certainly no Pyrrhonist. The scepticism of the 
Essays represents a fundamental transformation of ancient scepticism: we find here no 
suspension of judgement, nor is the end of ataraxia or imperturbability ever pursued. 
Thus, ‘if we make Montaigne heir to the Pyrrhonian tradition’, we fail to appreciate 
‘what is new in his skepticism’.
22
 Montaigne’s goal is not indifference, but self-
knowledge; he never gives up on the possibility that we can arrive at some 
understanding both of human nature and nature at large. In fact, far from wanting to 
suspend judgement, Montaigne, throughout the Essays, ‘seeks to develop and refine his 
judgement’.
23
 Like Nietzsche, he continually offers definitive statements on a whole 
range of issues: on the conventional foundations of morality, on the savagery of ascetic 
virtue, on the dangers of anti-natural, otherworldly doctrines. This is crucial to an 
understanding of Montaigne’s attraction to Nietzsche as a sceptic, since Nietzsche 
denounces the complete suspension of judgement as well as the cultivation of ataraxia 
as life-denying, even nihilistic. That is to say, ‘temperamentally, or in terms of the 
practical attitudes and ways of life that they recommend, Nietzsche and the Greek 
skeptics are poles apart’.
24
 
In The Wanderer and His Shadow, Nietzsche describes Pyrrho as a ‘fanatic of 
mistrust’, asking rhetorically: ‘Alas, friend! Laughing and staying silent—is that … 
your whole philosophy’ (WS 213). Montaigne also laughs, but unlike Pyrrho, he affirms 
and celebrates life without reserve. Montaigne passes, while Pyrrho fails, one of 
Nietzsche’s existential tests: ‘Do you affirm this existence in the depths of your heart. 
… Would you be its advocate, its redeemer? For you only have to pronounce a single 
heartfelt Yes’ (SE 3). Pyrrho’s indifference, his lack of decision, is hostile to an 
unconditional affirmation of life, to a definitive, positive stance toward existence, and at 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
structure of all our descriptions and explanations’ (Richardson, “Nietzsche on Time and Becoming”, 
p. 211). 
22 Raga Rosaleny, “The Current Debate about Montaigne’s Skepticism”, p. 60. 
23 Levine, Sensual Philosophy, p. 72. Montaigne’s scepticism involves ‘a rejection of epoche 
[suspension  of judgement] in favour of a constant taking of different positions’ (Raga Rosaleny, 
“The Current Debate about Montaigne’s Skepticism”, p. 61). 
24 Bett, “Nietzsche on the Skeptics and Nietzsche as Skeptic”, p. 68. 
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odds with a Dionysian pessimism. Through withdrawal and a cessation of engagement 
with the world, Pyrrho attempts not to overcome suffering, but to put an end to it, by 
attaining a state of quietude. As a consequence, for Nietzsche, the ‘sceptical disposition’ 
becomes ‘a great danger to life’ as soon as it overpowers ‘the opposite disposition—to 
affirm’ (GS 111). In his late notes, therefore, at a time of renewed interest in ancient 
scepticism owing to his reading of Victor Brochard’s Les Sceptiques Grecs (an 
‘excellent study’ (EH 2.3)), we find him characterizing Pyrrhonism as ‘nihilist’, as a 
‘protest of weariness’, and as ‘representing a state in which one is neither sick nor well, 
neither alive nor dead’ (KSA 13: 14[99] (WP 437)). For this reason, Nietzsche favours a 
Montaignean scepticism, where doubt coexists with the relentless pursuit of knowledge 
and a heartfelt yes-saying to suffering and to life. Indeed, given the radical departure of 
their thought from ancient scepticism, both thinkers are equally reluctant—
notwithstanding their praise of the sceptics above all other philosophers—to label 
themselves as such, or to count themselves as adherents to that tradition.
25
 
 Montaigne and Nietzsche are in complete agreement not only that it is through 
arrogance and delusion that we attribute absolute knowledge and pure rationality to 
ourselves, but also that it is by way of achievements clouded by confusion—language, 
mathematics, philosophy—that we have managed to raise ourselves above the animals. 
For both philosophers, the destruction of the notion of humanity’s rationality and pre-
eminence serves a highly polemical purpose: they seek to utterly negate the claims of 
dogmatic philosophies that offer systematic and comprehensive explanations of the 
nature of reality. But it also represents a move that is essential to their philosophical 
aims. As Richard Regosin explains, the idea that ‘man must descend before he can 
ascend’ is fundamental to the Essays; that is to say, ‘the recognition of the boundaries of 
                                                             
25 With respect to Nietzsche’s refusal of the title of sceptic, we should also consider an ‘important 
strand’ in his thinking that could be described as ‘non-skeptical or even anti-skeptical’ (Bett, 
“Nietzsche on the Skeptics and Nietzsche as Skeptic”, p. 71). As touched on earlier, Nietzsche comes 
to reject the ‘legitimacy of the concept of “the way the world really, objectively, is”’ (p. 70): ‘What is 
“appearance” to me now! Certainly not the opposite of some essence—what could I say about any 
essence except name the predicates of its appearance!’ (GS 54) In this sense, he doesn’t share the 
sceptics concern about ‘our being cut off from the true nature of things—for the very idea of “the 
true nature of things” is simply nonsensical in his eyes’ (“Nietzsche on the Skeptics and Nietzsche as 
Skeptic”, pp. 71-2). To what extent Montaigne prefigures Nietzsche in this regard is difficult to say. 
Sometimes it appears as if he wants to retain a conception of ‘the way the world really is’, stressing 
that knowledge of such a reality is beyond our grasp. In other passages, however, we find him 
suspicious of the very idea of ‘how things are in themselves’: ‘Some animals … have yellow eyes 
exactly like sufferers from jaundice. … It is probable that the colours of objects appear different to 
them and to us. Who judges them right? Nobody claims that the essence of anything relates only to 
its effect on Man’ (II.12; T582, S675 [452]). 
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human capacity … is the absolute prerequisite to the return to the self’.
26
 The goal of 
self-knowledge is thwarted when we endeavour to transcend our humanity and grasp for 
the divine. The fantasy of redemption and transcendence is also the danger that 
Nietzsche recognizes in romantic art. Like Montaigne, however, he wishes to promote a 
philosophical way of life that ‘embraces full immanence’.
27
 In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche 
thus states that while he was under the spell of romantic pessimism his ‘knowledge was 
completely devoid of realities, and “idealities” were not worth a damn’ (again, echoing 
the Essays when Montaigne declares that he seeks ‘satisfaction’ solely ‘in realities … 
solid ones at that [la realité, encores bien massive]’ (III.9; T978, S1130 [764])). For 
Nietzsche, it was only by relinquishing such idealities that he began to stop mistaking 
himself and was enabled to commence the essential work of self-understanding: ‘That 
lowermost self, buried and silenced … slowly woke up … and … started talking again’ 
(EH, ‘HAH’ 3-4). 
 
 
The philosopher’s task 
The redirection in Nietzsche’s thought announced with the publication of Human, All 
Too Human is presaged in many passages of the Untimely Meditations, and particularly 
in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’. In the preface written to accompany the reissuing of The 
Wanderer and His Shadow in 1886, Nietzsche asserts that in the third Meditation he 
was already ‘deep in the midst of … destructive analysis’, his critique of pessimism was 
well underway, and that he no longer believed in Schopenhauer (all, by the way, clearly 
signalled by his embrace of Montaigne) (HAH II P1). Nietzsche therefore insists that 
Human, All Too Human represents a natural progression in his thinking. This claim is 
lent even greater plausibility if one considers the conception of the philosopher outlined 
in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’. As we have seen, Nietzsche conceives the philosopher 
as an individual of radical independence who liberates him- or herself from the 
‘insufficiencies of the age’. Consequently, such an individual is ‘permeated with the 
awareness of what sufferings must spring from his truthfulness … he will have to be an 
enemy to those he loves and the institutions that produced him’ (SE 4). Hence, 
Nietzsche’s liberation from Wagner and Schopenhauer, the defining influences of his 
                                                             
26 Regosin, The Matter of My Book, pp. 53-4. 
27 Norman, “Nietzsche and the Early Romantics”, p. 515. 
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early life, and his retirement from academic life, allows him to fulfil his vision of what 
it is to live an authentic philosophical life.  
With Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche’s critical engagement with his 
philosophical and cultural heritage begins in earnest, his ‘destructive analysis’ takes 
centre stage, he begins to write without admiration or reverence for the forces that 
shaped him. In ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’, he states that there 
is a ‘boundary at which the past has to be forgotten if it is not to become a gravedigger 
of the present’ (HL 1). Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche claims, grew out of a period 
in his life in which his ‘illness ‘required’ him ‘to forget’ (EH, ‘HAH’ 4). Yet again, 
Montaigne can be seen as a major inspiration. There are striking similarities between 
‘An apology for Raymond Sebond’ and Human, All Too Human, in terms of what they 
signify in the respective trajectories of each philosophers’ writing. Like Human, All Too 
Human, the ‘Apology’ is not just an incisive attack on human presumption; it is also an 
astonishing ‘declaration of independence’.
28
 Montaigne both abandons and satirizes the 
core beliefs and assumptions of Stoical humanism, assumptions to the fore in preceding 
essays, if occasionally tacitly rejected. According to Stoical humanism, rationality is the 
defining characteristic of humankind, the capacity to subdue, through the application of 
reason, the appetitive side of life our unique feature and beyond the ken of other 
species. In Book I of the Essays, Cato’s stoicism is held up as the pinnacle of human 
achievement: Cato ‘was truly a model which Nature chose to show how far human 
nature and fortitude can reach’ (I.37; T227, S260 [171]). But like Nietzsche, Montaigne 
ultimately comes to reject the philosophy of his earliest exemplar. In the ‘Apology’, in 
the context of Montaigne’s focus on human irrationality, Cato’s stoic composure is 
mocked: ‘Cato could wring the neck of Death and Destiny, but if ever he had been 
bitten by a mad dog … he would have been overcome by fear and terror’ (II.12; T532, 
S619 [412]). The ‘Apology’ also marks, as well as a break with Stoical humanism, a 
repudiation of the scholasticism of medieval academic philosophy. Having gone 
through a critique of Aristotle, ‘the god of scholastic science’, Montaigne concludes that 
‘like any other doctrine it may be false’ (ibid. T521, S606 [403]). By the end of the 
‘Apology’, Montaigne has thus achieved a thoroughgoing independence, which gives 
him the intellectual space to pursue self-knowledge in the remainder of the Essays. 
                                                             
28 Frame, Montaigne, p. 180. 
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From now on, Montaigne will eschew the philosophies of the past as the basis of his 






























Section II: Experimental Philosophy and the 
Removal of Bad Conscience 
 
Experience and experiment 
For both Montaigne and Nietzsche, it is primarily through lived experience, and not 
reason, that the most important philosophical questions must be approached and probed. 
The Essays explore an astonishingly diverse range of human experience, from the 
apparently banal (‘On smells’) to the most consequential (‘To philosophize is to learn 
how to die’). Every conceivable avenue of study is considered a legitimate path to self-
knowledge: ‘All topics of discussion are equally productive to me. I could write about a 
fly’ (III.5; T854, S990 [668]). Montaigne views his response to any subject as 
potentially self-revealing, as possibly contributing a new detail or shade of colour to his 
continuously developing, if ever provisional, self-portrait. However, the determination 
to ground the Essays in concrete experience also follows naturally from his Hellenistic 
understanding of philosophy as a practice rooted in the life of the philosopher: ‘I 
examine nothing, I study nothing, but me; and if I do study anything else, it is so as to 
apply it to myself at once, or more correctly, within myself’ (II.6; T358, S424 [273]). 
To live philosophically is to use the raw material of experience to cultivate the self and 
transform one’s character. 
In the ‘Apology’, in the course of Montaigne’s sceptical attack on human 
rationality, he denounces reason as a font of error and confusion, brushing the 
assumptions and commonplaces of Stoical humanism aside. With reason no longer 
taken as authoritative, Montaigne begins to place his trust in experiential knowledge. 
Later in Book II, he makes what is perhaps the most famous—and controversial—claim 
of the Essays: ‘I have not made my book any more than it has made me’; it is ‘a book of 
one substance with its author [livre consubstantiel à son auteur]’ (II.18; T648, S755 
[504]). Such is the faithfulness with which his writing documents life as he experiences 
it, Montaigne suggests that the Essays may be understood as disclosing the living man. 
As we move to Book III, he no longer looks to the philosophers of the past to direct his 
thinking—be they of a Stoical, Epicurean or Sceptical bent. But rather, with greater and 
greater confidence, he considers matters before the tribunal of his own experience. 
Thus, when discussing an argument put forward by Plutarch, in an instance where, 
uncharacteristically, Montaigne refuses his exemplar’s wisdom, he declares: ‘I know it 
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not by argument but by compelling experience’ (III.6; T876, S1018 [685]). Fittingly, 
given the tenor of what has gone before, Montaigne ends his work with an essay entitled 
‘On experience’, which offers a distillation of his philosophical outlook. In its opening 
lines, he adumbrates the epistemological method that has guided his self-study from the 
end of the ‘Apology’: ‘No desire is more natural than the desire for knowledge. We 
assay all the means that can lead us to it. When reason fails us we make use of 
experience’ (III.13; T1041, S1207 [815]). Montaigne’s philosophy represents a 
thoroughgoing art of living, a way of life in which everything one does is integrated into 
a constantly evolving, never-to-completed, personally tailored practice: ‘Were I a good 
pupil there is enough, I find, in my own experience to make me wise’ (ibid. T1051, 
S1218 [822]).  
How appropriate, then, that Montaigne should be Nietzsche’s model as he 
outlines his conception of the philosopher in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’. Nietzsche 
could well be describing Montaigne when he states that the philosopher is a person for 
whom ‘most of the instruction he receives he has to acquire out of himself’ (SE 7). As 
we have seen, much of what Nietzsche has to say in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ 
constitutes a re-articulation of ideas already expressed in the Essays. Hence, when 
Nietzsche informs us that ‘no one can construct for you the bridge upon which precisely 
you must cross the stream of life, no one but yourself alone’ (SE 1), this echoes 
Montaigne’s more provocatively phrased admonition in ‘On experience’: ‘Even the life 
of Caesar is less exemplary for us than our own. … We tell ourselves all that we chiefly 
need: let us listen to it’ (III.13; T1051, S1218 [822]). Following the Untimely 
Mediations, as Nietzsche proceeds to flesh out his understanding of the philosopher, the 
picture he paints of the exemplary philosophical life retains a distinctly Montaignean 
colouration. In Human, All Too Human, he instructs us as follows: ‘serve yourself as 
your own source of experience’ and thereby your own life ‘will acquire the value of an 
instrument and means of knowledge’ (HAH 292). And later in the same work, he 
praises those rare individuals or ‘free spirits’—good pupils, in the Montaignean sense—
who ‘know how to manage their experiences … so that these become an arable soil that 
bears fruit three times a year’ (HAH 627).  
Montaigne’s imprint continues to be discernible even as Nietzsche concludes the 
free spirit trilogy. In The Gay Science, he sums up the philosophical outlook of the free 
spirit thus: ‘“Life as a means to knowledge”—with this principle in one’s heart one 
cannot only live bravely but also live gaily and laugh gaily’ (GS 324). However, what is 
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most striking is the extent to which Nietzsche learns from Montaigne ‘a technique that 
would become a primary feature of his psychology—and of his philosophy in general: 
the experimental method’.
29
 Throughout the works of Nietzsche’s middle period, he 
repeatedly refers to the free spirit as an ‘experimenter’, and their mode of thought as 
‘experimental’ philosophizing. In the section just quoted, he explains that the free 
spirits’ liberation consists in the realization ‘that life could be an experiment for the 
knowledge-seeker’. But of course, famously, this is precisely the manner in which 
Montaigne frames his entire philosophical project—and he invented the ‘essai’ form, 
that is, the form of the ‘trial’, ‘attempt’ or ‘test’, as the most suitable means for its 
presentation. Montaigne frequently describes his self-study as a kind of ‘assaying’, and 
in Book II, explains the purpose of his writing as ‘purely an assay of my natural … 
abilities’ (II.10; T387, S457 [296]). Montaigne views self-knowledge as growing out of 
a shrewd engagement with the experiences of one’s own life, but this is experience 
enriched and expanded by a willingness to seek out opportunities for bold self-testing 
and sustained self-experimentation. As regards Montaigne’s understanding of the 
‘essay’ and what his stylistic innovation entails, ‘the twin senses of trial or testing and 
experience or experiment run through the whole fabric’ of his work.
30
 It is telling that, 
having signalled Montaigne out as a major influence in the Untimely Meditations, 
Nietzsche launches his own, singular philosophical style in Human, All Too Human, a 
hybrid form of essay and aphorism, the idiosyncratic style of the free spirit, who 
possesses ‘the dangerous privilege of living experimentally and of being allowed to 
offer itself to adventure’ (HAH P4).
31
 
It may be objected, however, that the free spirits’ experimentalism owes more to 
Nietzsche’s growing respect for the merits of the scientific enterprise than to the life and 
writings of a 16
th
 century French essayist. There is no doubt that much of what 
Nietzsche has to say on the free spirit is shaped by the positivism of his middle works. 
But what Nietzsche means by science (Wissenschaft) is human enquiry understood in 
the widest sense and including the psychological and moral sciences—as a matter of 
                                                             
29 Parkes, Composing the Soul, p. 4. 
30 Sayce, The Essays of Montaigne, p. 22. 
31 In his examination of Montaigne’s aphoristic style, Donnellan suggests that the Essays ‘anticipate 
Nietzsche’s own decision to eschew the pretentions of the systematic philosophers for the sake of 
individualized reactions to various problems’. In addition, the ‘open form of the essay’ offered 
Montaigne ‘the most appropriate means to explore his own nature in general … [granting him] the 
freedom to take random samples from the Heraclitean flux of existence in open-ended 
experimentalism’ (Nietzsche and the French Moralists, p. 134-6).   
63 
 
fact, for him, the latter are primary. After all, in Human, All Too Human, the free spirit 
is especially to be welcomed because of the dearth of true psychologists, and in terms of 
experimentation, they are, in essence, ‘adventurers and circumnavigators of that inner 
world called man’ (HAH P7). What Montaigne represents for Nietzsche is a 
prefiguration of these ‘aeronauts of the spirit’, who are intent on conducting ‘numerous 
novel experiments … in ways of life’ (D 575, 164). In the Essays, Montaigne examines 
and criticizes the various doctrines and practices of the schools of Greco-Roman 
thought, and tests them in the only way worth considering, as far as Nietzsche is 
concerned: ‘with all evaluations of the past … one has voluntarily to live through them 
once again … if one is at last to possess the right to pass them through the sieve’ (D 
61). For this reason, among others, Nietzsche claims that reading a philosopher of 
Montaigne’s ilk moves us closer to the ‘spirit’ of the sages of antiquity (WS 214).
32
 
No less than Montaigne, Nietzsche understands the substance of his philosophy 
as intimately related to the circumstances of his life. In the preface to the second volume 
of Human, All Too Human, he reveals: ‘My writings speak only of my overcomings: “I” 
am in them, together with everything that was inimical to me’ (HAH II P1). If 
Nietzsche’s middle works document a ‘victory’ over romantic pessimism and its 
metaphysical foundations, Montaigne’s third book of the Essays represents a complete 
emancipation from the value system of Stoical humanism. Again, ‘On experience’ 
brings this home most forcefully. An early essay, ‘To philosophize is to learn how to 
die’ (I.20), treats with some respect the Stoic notion that one’s life is defined by the 
manner of one’s death, that supreme honour is to be found in meeting death with 
calmness and composure. In other words, for the Stoic, a good death should be the 
ultimate objective of one’s life. However, in ‘On experience’ Montaigne rejects this 
Stoic ideal and strikes an altogether different note: ‘death is indeed the ending of life, 
but not therefore its End. … Life must be its own objective, its own purpose’ (III.12; 
T1028, S1191 [805]). The view espoused here is informed by nearly twenty years more 
experience and written with the torments of advancing old age as a backdrop. As the 
                                                             
32 We continue to see Nietzsche’s preferred mode of philosophizing characterized as experimental 
even into his mature works. Here, for instance, is the famous announcement in Beyond Good and 
Evil: ‘A new species of philosophers is coming up: I venture to baptize them … attempters 
[Versucher]’ (BGE 42). Lampert explains the significance of this aphorism as follows: ‘The new 
philosophers are essayists whose natural mode of expression is the essay or aphorism, the mode 
mastered not only by Montaigne but by his great essayist followers, Bacon and Descartes, and by 
Emerson, whose essays Nietzsche studied in the German version entitled Versuche and which trace 
their experimental method to Montaigne’ (Nietzsche’s Task, pp. 95-6). 
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Essays progress and his health declines, Montaigne comes to value and savour life more 
and more. But even his sufferings are approached experimentally and mined for 
wisdom: ‘At the darkest moments of paroxysm I explore myself’ (II.37; T740, S862 
[577]). For Montaigne, his self-portrait must take into consideration all aspects of his 
life, whether good or bad, pleasurable or painful. Nietzsche has Montaigne in mind 
when he writes: ‘The fairest virtue of the great thinker is the magnanimity with which, 
as a man of knowledge, he intrepidly … often with sublime mockery and smiling … 
offers himself and his life as a sacrifice’ (D 459). 
The free spirits’ experimental philosophizing goes hand in hand with a 
Dionysian attitude to life. Nietzsche advocates the affirmation of the totality of one’s 
being. No part of the self is to be denied or suppressed, but has to be faced and 
scrutinized. The free spirit is willing to experiment with the most threatening materials: 
‘we … expose ourselves to our own deserts, swamps and icy mountains’ (D 343). What 
the free spirit fears most is narrowness, the refusal of the diverse and difficult paths that 
lead to self-knowledge. Instead, the free spirit seeks ‘that inner spaciousness and 
indulgence of superabundance which excludes the danger that the spirit may even on its 
own road perhaps lose itself … and remain seated intoxicated in some corner or other’ 
(HAH P4). For Nietzsche, Schopenhauer became lost in his own suffering and despair 
at life. In consequence, Schopenhauerian philosophy is limited and constrained to the 
extent that it does ‘not constitute the passionate history of a soul’, but merely ‘the 
description of a character’ (D 481). With respect to Montaigne, however, that 
‘mightiest of souls’, the Essays present us with the passionate biography of a whole 
person. Montaigne aims to ‘reveal’ not a philosophical theory or system but his ‘own 
self’ (I.26; T147, S167 [109]). He strives to make every side of himself known, 
however shameful or morally suspect: ‘I hardly dare tell of the vanity and the weakness 
which I find in myself’ (II.12; T548, S637 [425]). Montaigne is often taken to be a Stoic 
or Sceptic or Epicurean, or an amalgam of each. But perhaps it is more illuminating to 
understand him as Nietzsche did, as a free spirit who possesses ‘a careful spirit of 








Morality of custom 
Montaigne regards self-knowledge as the foundation of the ethical life; self-study and 
self-testing have significance only insofar as they offer guidance on moral action. He 
bemoans that fact that, all too often, our ethical ideals are constructed on ‘high 
philosophical peaks on which no human being can settle’ (III.9; T967, S1118 [756]). 
Therefore Montaigne’s war on human vanity and presumption, his rejection of 
metaphysics and his denial of our claims to pure rationality all reflect different aspects 
of his endeavour to bring ethics back down to ground level: ‘my conscience is happy 
with itself—not as the conscience of an angel … but as behoves the conscience of a 
man’ (III.2; T784, S909 [612]). Much of Montaigne’s writing thus involves a 
penetrating investigation of the basis of our moral sensibilities. Rather as Montaigne’s 
self-portraiture progresses to a study of ‘our manners and motives’, Nietzsche’s art of 
psychological dissection moves from a concern with his own ‘overcomings’ to ‘an 
investigation and digging out of … our faith in morality’ (D P2). It is evident that 
Montaigne’s psychological analysis of classical ethical intuitions exerted an enormous 
influence on Nietzsche; indeed, in The Wanderer and His Shadow, he looks forward to 
a time when Montaigne will be regarded as a forerunner and signpost to a higher form 
of ethical ideal—an ideal more indebted to Socrates than the Bible (WS 86). What both 
Nietzsche and Montaigne seek is an appropriately human morality, tailored to our 
specific endowment. To this end, the ‘free spirit’ will conduct ‘numerous novel 
experiments … in ways of life’, with the hoped for result that ‘a tremendous burden of 
bad conscience shall be expelled from the world’ (D 164).  
A close reading of Nietzsche’s writing from Human, All Too Human to The Gay 
Science leaves one in little doubt as to why he would propose Montaigne as a forerunner 
to more enlightened moralists of the future: throughout these works Nietzsche’s more 
psychologically acute observations on the vexed question of the origin of our moral 
sensations are, very often, expansions or refinements of views expressed in the Essays. 
Looking back over his works of the previous ten years, when they were reissued in 
1886, Nietzsche claims that what most readers found distinctive in his writings of that 
time was an alarming ‘mistrust’ toward ‘morality’ (HAH P1). Although less blatantly 
and boldly subversive, the Essays also direct a deeply suspicious gaze over the moral 
realm and attempt to explode any notion of an absolute morality, metaphysically 
grounded. For both thinkers, morality owes its origin to the all-too-human—to cultural 
habits, ingrained practices and unquestioned traditions. But as a result of the power of 
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custom, Montaigne claims, our moral intuitions appear ‘to belong to our genus, to be 
natural’ (I.23; T114, S130 [83]). The values we hold in ‘high esteem’, however, are 
neither natural nor necessary: they were ‘planted in our souls by our forefathers’ (ibid.). 
This is a view Nietzsche often voices in his middle works. In The Wanderer and His 
Shadow, almost paraphrasing Montaigne, he proposes that ‘good-natured’, moral 
individuals inherit ‘from their forefathers the good mode of action but not the reasons 
for it’ (WS 41).  
 This last point is crucial. For both, moral laws are first respected not because 
they are reasonable or useful but because they are laws. Reverence for custom thus 
provides the basis for ethical precepts and, Montaigne insists, ‘[t]hey have no other’ 
(III.13; T1049, S1216 [821]). Similarly, in Daybreak, Nietzsche states: ‘the chief 
proposition: morality is nothing other (therefore no more!) than obedience to customs, 
of whatever kind they may be’ (D 9). (That Montaigne is very much to the fore as an 
influence on Nietzsche’s thinking at this time is evidenced by the fact that, as Williams 
notes, a few aphorisms later he quotes directly from the Essays—albeit, on a matter 
only tangentially related (D 46).
33
 Since moral attitudes are deep-rooted, ‘we suck them 
in with our mothers’ milk’, and encouraged by society, ‘we think that it is reason which 
is unhinged whenever custom is’ (I.23; T114, S130 [83]).
34
 More than this even, moral 
laws, Montaigne later suggests, come to be attain an almost ‘mystical’ status (III.13; 
T1049, S1216 [821]). On this point, Nietzsche again follows the essayist’s lead. Our 
veneration of custom, he argues, is fuelled by a ‘superstitious’ fear, a fear of an 
‘incomprehensible, indefinite power, of something more than personal’, and the ‘good 
mood’ typically induced by acting in accordance with tradition we interpret as ‘the 
effect of a god who promises success’ (D 9, 28).  
As customs are passed down from generation to generation, the mode of action 
enjoined is not adopted through mere obedience but becomes habitual. As a 
consequence, shrouded in superstition, ‘merely human opinions become accepted … 
and take on authority and trust like religion’ (II.12; T520, S605 [403]). In this way, 
tradition becomes inner compulsion, and compulsion unrelated to the specific 
conditions that gave rise to the tradition in the first place, now long forgotten. But 
gradually, ex post facto rationalizations and justifications are constructed and reason is 
                                                             
33 Williams, Nietzsche and the French, p. 71.  
34 Vivarelli draws our attention to a note from September 1876 where Nietzsche adopts this 
metaphor to specifically capture the habituation of religious belief: from our earliest years, we 
drink in ‘the milk of faith’ (KSA 8: 18 [11]) (“Montaigne und der ‘Freie Geist’”, p. 89). 
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invoked to explicate prevailing behaviour. Montaigne explains: ‘We parrot the 
paraphernalia of supporting arguments … everybody vies with each other to … prop up 
received belief with all the powers of reason’ (ibid.). Accordingly, Montaigne is of the 
opinion that to penetrate the accretions of dubious reasoning and the follies of 
superstition and return to the true source of our moral values is a near impossible task, 
particularly when we are inclined to mistake what we are looking for: ‘laws, like our 
rivers, get greater and nobler as they roll along: follow them back upstream to their 
sources and all you find is a tiny spring, hardly recognisable’ (ibid. T567, S658 [440]). 
It is thus, he warns, ‘perilous to go back to their origins’, as we must be willing to 
recognize the distressing fact that laws are ‘always’ made ‘by men’ and ‘often made by 
fools’ (III.13; T1049, S1216 [821]). Few, however, are ready to accept such ‘vain 
beginnings’. Most are content to apply their intellectual ingenuity to the task of 
providing the most rational (and therefore the most pleasing) account of existing 
societal norms. The upshot being that ‘nobody tries to shake them’ and determine 
‘whether the roots are sound’ (II.12; T520-1, S605 [403]). But the roots of morality 
interest Nietzsche, and in order to conduct his examination he takes up and develops 
much of what Montaigne has to say on the topic. 
 Although Nietzsche’s determination to examine moral sensations is announced 
in Human, All Too Human, it is in Daybreak, he claims, that the ‘campaign against 
morality’ truly begins (EH, ‘D’ 1). This campaign constitutes not so much a critique of 
various moral systems as an attack on the very notion of morality itself. In contrast to 
those who would wish to render our moral obligations ‘unassailable’, Nietzsche is 
‘pessimistic even into the realm of morality, even to the point of going beyond faith in 
morality’ (D P4). For moral optimists like Kant, who understand moral claims as 
categorical, unconditional and absolute, the idea that morality in its original form is 
merely obedience to custom—and in that case relative, conditional, and 
circumscribed—represents a most egregious ‘slander’. Such a notion deprives morality 
of much of its ‘grandeur’ (ibid.). Since, if laws are often made by fools—Nietzsche 
draws out the necessary implication of Montaigne’s thought—a ‘sting of conscience’ 
frequently amounts to nothing more than ‘a piece of stupidity’ (WS 38). When we 
follow our conscience, we may well be guided by the errors, prejudices and fantasies of 
previous generations, but as a result of habituation, we feel our actions to be right. As 
Nietzsche says in Daybreak: ‘The inspiration born of a feeling is the grandchild of a 
judgement—and often a false judgement!—and in any event not a child of your own’ 
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(D 35). Like Montaigne, Nietzsche wants to force home the unsettling notion that our 
conscience is ‘not the voice of God in the heart of man but the voice of some men in 
man’ (WS 52). Hence, when we attempt the difficult journey back upstream to the 
source of our moral feelings, we find that the more progress we make ‘the less 
significant does the origin appear’ (D 44).  
For Nietzsche, in order to understand our ethical attitudes and behaviours, we 
must recognize the crucial distinction between moral feelings and moral concepts. This 
is so because, as argued in Daybreak, ‘the history of our moral feelings is quite different 
from that of our moral concepts’ (D 34). The essence of the distinction is that the 
‘former are powerful before the action, the latter especially after the action in face of the 
need to pronounce upon it’ (ibid.). Although the positing of such a difference represents 
an advance on the Essays, much of Nietzsche’s exposition of the matter is continuous 
with Montaigne’s understanding of how moral thinking progresses. Indeed, it could be 
said that Nietzsche’s analysis brings to light a distinction latent to the Essays. For 
Montaigne, our moral feelings develop from an early age as we begin to follow ‘the 
manners approved and received’ about us, growing stronger until such time as we 
‘cannot without remorse’ free ourselves to disregard or flout such behaviour (I.23; 
T114, S130 [83]).
35
 Montaigne holds that only then, once our moral feelings have 
become so powerful as to seem inevitable, do we endeavour to use ‘all the powers of 
reason’—in other words, construct moral concepts—to account for those feelings. 
Similarly, Nietzsche states that moral feelings are ‘clearly … transmitted in this way: 
children observe in adults inclinations and aversions to certain actions’, so that ‘later in 
life they find themselves full of these acquired and well-exercised affects’ (D 34). This 
leads to the situation where, out of ‘decency’, we then try and justify these affects not 
because of the degree of their intensity but because, ‘as a rational being, one has to have 
reasons for one’s For and Against’ (ibid.). Therefore, both Montaigne and Nietzsche 
imply that our moral concepts are destined to be in error, in the sense that they are 
unrelated to the true roots of moral emotion; our moral concepts account for our moral 
feelings certainly, but only by mistaking them. For, Nietzsche explains, moral feelings 
are not the ‘unities’ moral concepts would suggest, but are—appropriating Montaigne’s 
analogy—‘rivers with a hundred tributaries and sources’ (HAH 14). 
 
                                                             
35 Nietzsche quotes this passage directly in a note penned in 1884 (KSA 11: 26[291]). 
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Cruelty and conscience 
In his middle period, Nietzsche strives to get behind or ‘tunnel’ underneath traditional 
moral concepts, so as to reveal the real basis of moral action. The fundamental 
importance of such an investigation, he claims, stems from the fact that ‘the errors of 
the greatest philosophers usually have their point of departure in a false explanation of 
certain human actions and sensations’ (HAH 37). And for Nietzsche it is beyond 
question that the most significant of those errors has been ‘an erroneous analysis … of 
the so-called unegoistic actions’ (ibid.). An almost unwavering conviction in the history 
of moral philosophy has been the notion that, to be considered moral, an action must be 
undertaken for non-egoistic motives. Morality is thus understood to have its origin in 
the compassionate, altruistic side of human nature. However, if one believes, as 
Nietzsche does, that morality has its beginnings in obedience to the customs of one’s 
time and place, then being moral, in the most primitive sense, has little to do with the 
‘antithesis’ between the ‘egoistic and unegoistic’ and much more to do with the 
difference between ‘“in accordance with custom” and “in defiance of custom”’ (HAH 
96). Consequently, when we take moral feelings as being sourced in the non-egoistic, 
Nietzsche deems it a misunderstanding of the way in which fear of authority originally 
shaped human behaviour. In fact, not only does he not see selflessness as the driver of 
moral action, he finds the very idea of the non-egoistic incomprehensible. 
Hence, Nietzsche’s pessimism regarding morality reflects not so much the 
rejection of the possibility of moral action as it does the denial of the presuppositions of 
traditional moral theorizing. As he says in Daybreak: ‘I deny morality as I deny 
alchemy, that is, I deny their premises: but I do not deny that there have been alchemists 
who believed in these premises’ (D 103). In a sense, Nietzsche’s ultimate aim is to show 
the egoistic (and therefore, according to how morality is typically understood, non-
moral) basis of morality and explode the pleasing fiction of selfless behaviour: ‘if only 
those actions are moral which are performed for the sake of another and only for his 
sake … then there are no moral actions’ (D 148). Although Montaigne’s exploration 
and critique of the classical conception of virtue leads him to endorse far less 
devastating conclusions—unlike Nietzsche, he does not explicitly question the 
coherence of free will and thus of moral responsibility—nonetheless, his analysis 
foregoes the association of moral worth with altruistic motives. Montaigne overturns the 
values of Stoicism by proposing that ‘voluptuous pleasure’ is the true end of virtue. The 
Essays thus prepare the ground for Nietzsche’s re-evaluation of ‘egoistic’ actions, a 
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‘counter-reckoning’ that will restore ‘goodwill’ towards such actions and, thereby, 
deprive individuals of ‘their bad conscience’ (ibid.). To be serious and tenable, 
Nietzsche argues, moral philosophy of the future must recognize that there is no 
‘profound and intrinsic difference’ between those actions ‘decried as egoistic’ and those 
praised as selfless (ibid.). When probed carefully, he maintains, so-called selfless 
actions turn out to be inherently and inescapably self-regarding.  
It is Montaigne’s bold questioning of some of our most cherished moral beliefs 
that has Nietzsche deem him a forerunner to the free spirit. In the preface to Daybreak, 
he claims that, hitherto, the seemingly irrefutable legitimacy of deep-seated moral 
assumptions has tended to ‘frighten off critical hands’ (D P3). The consequence has 
been that, very often, when developing their moral systems, ‘philosophers were building 
under the seduction of morality’, aiming not at ‘truth’ but at ‘majestic moral structures’ 
(ibid.). Not Montaigne, however. When Montaigne looks to human nature, what he 
finds as its most defining characteristic is not selflessness or compassion but cruelty. If 
‘each of us were to sound our inner depths’, he claims, not only would we discover ‘that 
most of our desires are nurtured at other people’s expense’ but, worse still, we would 
also be obliged to concede that even ‘in the midst of compassion we feel deep down 
some … pricking of malicious pleasure at seeing others suffer’ (I.22; T106, S121 [77]; 
III.1; T768, S892 [599]). For Montaigne, cruelty is at the centre of our psychological 
makeup, undeniable and ineradicable. The atrocities of the civil wars, in which both 
sides exhaust all their powers of ingenuity in thinking up ‘unusual tortures and new 
forms of murder’, make plain to him the immense satisfaction we derive from inflicting 
pain on others. In view of this, he is forced to conclude: ‘Nature herself has attached to 
Man something which goads him on towards inhumanity’ (II.11; T412, S485 [316]).  
 Considering the fundamental—though seldom acknowledged—role that 
Montaigne believes cruelty plays in our lives, a major theme of the Essays is the extent 
to which delight in suffering and brutality animates our moral behaviour. First off, the 
process of internalizing the rules and precepts of society is painful, with the conscience 
often functioning as an instrument of psychological self-torture: ‘It makes us betray, 
accuse and fight against ourselves. … [I]t leads us to witness against ourselves’ (II.5; 
T346, S412 [264]). Only by way of the torments of guilt does a morality of custom take 
hold and become authoritative. And cruelty is involved not only in the demands that 
society places on its members but also in the excessive self-discipline individuals are 
prepared, in the service of virtue, to practice on themselves. Time and again, he stresses 
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the harshness of the various moral frameworks of Greco-Roman philosophy, Stoicism 
in particular. Speaking of the supreme practitioners of the latter, he advises: ‘Let us not 
attempt to follow such examples … there is too much strain, too much savagery’ (III.10; 
T993, S1148 [777]). Self-knowledge has taught him that the Stoic ideal of virtue is 
based on a false picture of humanity, as approaching the divine rather than at one with 
animals, that achieving the state of imperturbability required for living strictly in 
accordance with reason is possible only by denying one’s humanity. Beneath the austere 
doctrines of the Stoics and their obsession with virtue, Montaigne detects an 
unwholesome pleasure in self-cruelty. Virtue has definite limits, he insists, and all 
actions that exceed those limits ‘are open to sinister interpretations’ (II.2; T329, S389 
[250]).  
Nietzsche brings a suspicious and cynical eye to bear on those interpretations 
that would appeal to notions of compassion or selflessness to explain moral behaviour, 
and in this he is clearly informed by the Essays exploration of morality’s origins in the 
more disquieting aspects of human nature. Nietzsche builds on Montaigne’s insights 
and ‘is positively obsessed with revealing the primal cruelty that is masked in 
morality’.
36
 In Daybreak, he describes cruelty as ‘one of the oldest festive joys of 
mankind’, and proposes that ‘those tremendous eras of “morality of custom”’ were 
periods ‘in which suffering counted as virtue, cruelty counted as virtue’ (D 18). While 
Montaigne is content to point out the masochistic nature of the individual conscience, 
Nietzsche goes deeper to explain that conscience originally developed as a means to 
preserve the interests of the community, which is to say that the conscience in no way is 
aimed at promoting the happiness of the individual. That our conscience often betrays 
us reflects the historical reality that the most powerful moral intuitions can be traced 
back to a custom, under which ‘the enduring advantage of the community is to take 
unconditional precedence over the advantage of the individual … even over his 
survival’ (AOM 89). Thus, for Nietzsche, individual suffering is not only the evitable 
consequence of the establishment of laws and traditions but also the implicit end of our 
most sophisticated moral theories: ‘the “proud sufferer” is still the highest type of man’ 
(D 425). This calls to mind the following comment of Montaigne’s, regarding the sages 
of Greco-Roman philosophy: ‘those physicians of the soul … as though plotting 
together, can find no other way to cure us … than by torment, pain and tribulation’. 
                                                             
36 Safranski, Nietzsche, p. 187. 
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And—stressing the necessary connection between virtue and suffering—he goes on to 
venture that ‘if a man’s health and happiness were made keener by fasting … it would 
cease to be a salutary prescription’ (I.30; T198, S226 [148]).  
Nietzsche traces the progress of morality through many stages, from obedience 
to custom to morality as social utility to, higher still, morality as the command of an 
unconditional duty. And he argues that as morality develops, far from being eliminated, 
the cruelty involved becomes more civilised and refined, moving steadily away from the 
physical register and deeper into the psychological. The Stoic ideal of virtue reflects a 
clear instance of pleasure taken in a subtle form of cruelty: ‘There is a cheerfulness 
peculiar to the Stoic … he feels hemmed in by the formalities he himself had prescribed 
for his conduct; he then enjoys the sensation of himself as dominator’ (D 251). As 
opposed to a barbarous cruelty inflicted by a community on its members, this is cruelty 
directed against oneself, a pleasure in one’s own self-denial, an enjoyment of one’s own 
suffering. In the figure of the saint or ascetic, such psychological self-cruelty attains its 
apotheosis. With an ‘unspeakable happiness at the sight of torment’, the ascetic ‘gazes 
out into the outer world only in order to gather as it were wood for his own pyre … one 
character burning and consuming himself’ (D 113). Both Montaigne and Nietzsche 
associate these extreme drives towards virtue with forms of madness. Nietzsche 
observes that, in early Christianity, ‘deliriums and convulsions’ were sought out by 
‘desert solitaries’ as proof of their saintliness (D 14). While Montaigne claims that the 
‘divisions separating madness from the spiritual alacrity of a soul … arising from 
supreme and extraordinary virtue’ are ‘imperceptible’ (II.12; T471-2, S548 [363]). 
Unlike Nietzsche, however, Montaigne is unable to provide a convincing psychological 
account of how the dynamic of pleasure and pain is at work within such individuals. To 
explain the refined self-cruelty of the Stoic or saint, Nietzsche invokes the idea of self-
dividing or self-splitting: ‘Is it not clear that in all these instances man loves something 
of himself … more than something else of himself; that he thus divides his nature and 
sacrifices one part of it to the other?’ (HAH 57) On this account, the ascetic may be 
understood as an individual ‘split asunder’, part tyrant, part slave.   
 
 
Virtue, pleasure and voluptuousness 
Although Nietzsche’s psychological analysis of asceticism goes far beyond anything the 
Essays has to offer, Montaigne well recognized that, even—or especially—in the most 
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exalted virtue, self-cruelty is leavened by self-pleasure. To read the Essays is to be left 
in no doubt that our moral strivings have an essential basis in self-interest: inherent to 
virtue is a certain enjoyment, delight or gratification. Montaigne is fully aware that such 
a view goes against the grain of Greco-Roman moral thought and advances it with great 
satisfaction for that reason: ‘Even in virtue our ultimate aim—no matter what they 
say—is pleasure. I enjoy bashing people’s ears with that word which runs so strongly 
counter to their minds’ (I.20; T80, S90 [56]). He assuredly does: his declarations on the 
association of virtue and pleasure become louder and more persistent as the Essays 
develop. The Stoic conceives morality in terms of a difficult and demanding duty, a 
constant, unrelenting struggle: the more obstacles that an individual has to overcome in 
order that his or her life may conform to rational law the greater the virtue. But 
Montaigne rejects this notion completely. For him, not only is the value of virtuous 
behaviour unrelated to the ‘price she exacts’ but, he argues, as much pleasure is to 
found in the pursuit of virtue as in its attainment (ibid. T80-1, S90-1 [56-7]). For, when 
Montaigne looks to the triumphant virtue of paragons like Cato and Socrates, what he 
finds is that their moral lives seemingly ‘glide along with … easy natural progress’ 
(I.26; T161, S182 [120]).   
 Montaigne’s break with traditional understandings of virtue has him link ‘virtue, 
pleasure and voluptuousness in a completely new way’.
37
 Arguably, it is his 
characterization of Cato’s suicide that represents the most innovative passage of the 
Essays, a passage whose psychological acuteness raises him above the moral outlook of 
the Stoics. In the act of taking his own life, following the victory of Caesar and the end 
of the Roman Republic, Cato, Montaigne is ‘convinced’, ‘felt voluptuous pleasure in so 
noble a deed and … delighted in it more than anything else in his life’ (II.11; T403, 
S475 [309]). What is striking here is not only the clear departure from Stoic doctrine but 
also the tension that inevitably arises when this statement is placed beside Montaigne’s 
other comments on Stoicism—where he repeatedly stresses its uncompromising 
severity. In other words, what we have in Cato is the apparent paradox of an individual 
practicing the most savage self-cruelty (tearing out his own entrails to bring on death) 
experiencing the highest form of pleasure. Montaigne insists that Cato, in his final act, 
felt ‘some unutterable joy … an access of pleasure beyond the usual order’ (ibid.). Of 
course, as outlined, Nietzsche would resolve the quandary of Cato’s psychology by 
                                                             
37 Coleman, Montaigne’s Essais, p. 46. 
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suggesting that one side of him, his love of Republican ideals, had achieved such 
ruthless sway over his soul that the ultimate sacrifice became for him an inevitable but 
delightful occasion. Hence, Nietzsche would share Montaigne’s suspicion concerning 
whether Cato ‘would have wished the opportunity for so fine an exploit to be taken 
from him’ (ibid.). Nietzsche follows Montaigne in holding that ‘it is at bottom a rare 
form of voluptuousness’ that an individual such as Cato desires (HAH 142). And 
through the words of Novalis he claims: ‘It is sufficiently marvellous that not long ago 
the association of voluptuousness … and cruelty called the attention of men to their 
inner relatedness and common tendency’ (ibid.).  
Nietzsche thus owes a clear debt to the Essays as regards the insight it provides 
into the psychology of extreme virtue, and the theme of the intimate relationship 
between cruelty and voluptuousness is one to which he returns frequently. In Daybreak, 
for example, he considers the possibility that ‘Dante, Paul, Calvin and their like’, as 
they pondered the Christian imaginings of sin and eternal damnation, may have come to 
appreciate ‘the gruesome secrets’ of the ‘voluptuousness of power’ (D 113).
38
 However, 
an even more significant influence on Nietzsche may be Montaigne’s recognition of a 
glaring contradiction at the heart of Stoic moral philosophy, again to do with the 
essential role that pleasure plays in moral motivation. The central question is this: if, as 
the Stoic would argue, virtue is a ‘rugged and wearisome’ duty, what becomes of the 
virtue of Socrates, who displayed ‘some new joy and a playful rapture in his last words 
and ways’ (II.11; T404, S476 [310]). That is, according to Stoicism’s own moral 
                                                             
38 This last word draws our attention to an obvious way in which Nietzsche, more and more as his 
philosophy develops, diverges from a strictly Montaignean analysis of the psychology of virtuous 
behaviour. In Book I of the Essays, Montaigne states: ‘All the opinions in the world reach the same 
point, that pleasure is our target, even though they may get there by different means’ (I.20; T80, 
S89 [56]). Many passages from Human, All Too Human are very much in line with this kind of 
thinking, for instance: ‘the struggle for pleasure is the struggle for life. Whether the individual 
pursues this struggle in such a way that people call him good, or in such a way that they call him 
evil, is determined by the degree and quality of his intellect’ (HAH 104). As we shall see, this 
attitude pretty well captures the essence of what Montaigne has to say about virtue in Book II of the 
Essays. However, from Daybreak onwards, Nietzsche comes to believe that the pleasure principle is 
a superficial and overly simplistic way of explaining what actuates moral behaviour. For Nietzsche, 
when scrutinized thoroughly, pleasure is actually a second-order (or even third-order) mental 
phenomenon: pleasure is not really operative at a motivational level, but is derivative of a more 
basic striving: a ‘lust for power’. Pleasure, in fact, may be more appropriately understood as ‘a 
feeling of power’ and so is merely a consequence or accompaniment of deeper motives. Thus, in The 
Gay Science, Nietzsche offers a revision of the statement he had made in Human, All Too Human: 
‘Whether in benefiting or hurting others we make sacrifices does not affect the ultimate value of our 
actions … it is a sacrifice made for our desire for power or for the preservation of our feeling of 
power’ (GS 13). Nevertheless, the fact that Nietzsche strides past Montaigne in terms of the insight 
he provides into the more subtle impulses underlying moral action should not blind us to the extent 
to which Montaigne cleared his path. 
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assumptions, Cato and Socrates, two individuals commonly accepted as representing the 
pinnacle of virtue, should have little to commend them—feelings of rapture and 
voluptuous pleasure are very far from the Stoic ideal. To put it succinctly, virtue ceases 
to be virtuous when the struggle of duty turns to easy pleasure. And as Nietzsche never 
tires of stressing, through long practice and habituation even the harshest demands may 
come to be accompanied by feelings of delight. David Schaefer thus proposes that what 
the Essays imply is that ‘those who forsake physical pleasure or even life in the name of 
incorporeal goals are driven just as much by selfish pleasure and passion as professed 
hedonists’, that there is ‘no real moral difference’ to be found between them.
39
 
 However, Montaigne is certainly not suggesting that the pleasure both Cato and 
Socrates derived from the thought of dying for their principles somehow tarnishes their 
moral stature. He remains in no doubt that both were exceedingly virtuous men. 
Following his description of Cato’s death, Montaigne moves quickly to squash any 
notion that his words should be construed as an attempt to ‘dim the splendour’ of Cato’s 
virtue (II.11; T404, S476 [309]). What he is suggesting, rather, is that there can be no 
basis for a moral distinction between Cato and the hedonist if—and this is the pivotal 
point—one accepts Stoic moral assumptions. Hence, Schaeffer’s contention is only 
partly true: by rejecting the notion that virtue presupposes difficulty and opposition, one 
is free to develop an alternative conception of moral excellence where the line between 
Cato and the hedonist can be more clearly drawn. Similar to the way in which Nietzsche 
will later claim that, judged by the standard of selflessness, there are no moral actions, 
Montaigne is implying that there never has been truly virtuous behaviour without 
pleasure. Of course, Montaigne’s critique of the idea of acting purely out of a sense of 
duty to the rational moral law applies with even greater force to more strongly 
deontological ethical systems. In Daybreak, Nietzsche thus deploys more or less the 
same argument against Kantianism as Montaigne does against Stoicism: ‘When duty 
ceases to be a burden but, after long practice, becomes a joyful inclination … our 
inclinations … become … occasions of pleasant sensations. …We are now seeking 
pleasure’ (D 339). Nietzsche therefore concludes that to ‘demand that duty must always 
be something of a burden—as Kant does—means to demand that it should never 
become habit and custom: in this demand there is concealed a remnant of ascetic 
cruelty’ (ibid.).  
                                                             
39 Schaefer, “Montaigne’s Political Skepticism”, p. 533.  
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 For Montaigne as well as Nietzsche, the notion that the highest moral actions are 
guided by wholly selfless motives represents a misunderstanding of human motivation. 
Both recognize that the virtuous and wicked alike draw pleasure from their behaviour. 
Moreover, they agree that the extremely moral individual feels pleasure of perhaps a 
more exquisite kind. Nietzsche proposes that there are two ways of denying morality. 
The first is exemplified La Rochefoucauld, who would deny that ‘the moral motives 
which men claim to have inspired their actions really have done so—it is thus the 
assertion that morality consists of words and is among the coarser or more subtle 
deceptions’ (D 103). As mentioned earlier, this is not Nietzsche’s position nor, as is 
now clear, is it Montaigne’s—although, to be sure, both would urge us to be suspicious 
of professed motives. In the case of Cato, Montaigne is at pains to stress that this moral 
exemplar is not deceiving us about what drives him to take his own life. Where La 
Rochefoucauld would doubtless see the ulterior motive of desire for posthumous fame, 
Montaigne does not: he ‘was not pricked by any hope of glory … for such a 
consideration is too low to touch so generous a mind … he did it for the beauty of the 
thing itself’ (II.11; T403, S475 [309]). Nietzsche and Montaigne, contra La 
Rochefoucauld, both eschew the tactic of reducing all moral behaviour to hypocrisy or 
insincerity; instead, what they deny is the validity of the traditional assumptions on 
which moral judgements are based. So, while it may be true that La Rochefoucauld is an 
important influence on Nietzsche’s thinking in Human, All Too Human, the stamp of 
Montaigne’s more nuanced and incisive psychological analysis is apparent in Daybreak. 
Nietzsche agrees with Montaigne that many so-called virtuous actions spring from 
admirable motives yet are based on ‘errors’: Cato is worthy of praise, but not for 
selflessness. Nietzsche sums up his position (and Montaigne’s) thus: ‘I do not deny … 
that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided … or that many called moral 
ought to be … encouraged—but I think the one should be encouraged and the other 
avoided for other reasons than hitherto’ (D 103). 
 Montaigne, like Nietzsche, seeks a re-evaluation of the core presuppositions of 
traditional morality. He insists that pleasure, ordinarily understood as a foe of virtue and 
the mainspring of immorality, is, in fact, virtue’s essential ‘companion’ (I.20; T80, S90 
[56]). Based on his examination of the psychology of virtuous behaviour, Montaigne is 
firmly persuaded that Greco-Roman philosophy thoroughly misjudges not only the roots 
of morality but also the dynamics of moral motivation. As Regosin explains, against the 
main current of Greco-Roman thought Montaigne ‘gives pleasure a moral dimension 
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and justifies its centrality’.
40
 Similarly, Nietzsche contends that, by dint of a false 
interpretation of certain psychological states—deeming ourselves capable of so-called 
selfless actions—we have defamed ‘egoistic’ motives and deprived self-regarding 
actions of moral legitimacy. For Nietzsche, a major goal of the free spirit is thus to 
reveal ‘the worm-holes of errors of every kind, so as to be able to reach many hidden 
souls on their secret paths’ (D 449). Through experience and experiment and a more 
honest appraisal of the origins of our moral feelings, the free spirit will strive to 
eliminate all sources of bad conscience. In this way, the free spirit looks toward a 
distinctly Montaignean ideal: an individual devoid of presumption, cognisant of their 
natural limitations, aware of their capacity for cruelty (especially self-directed), and 





















                                                             
40 Regosin, The Matter of My Book, p. 241. 
78 
 
Section III: The Soul as Subjective Multiplicity 
 
New understanding of the soul 
Both Montaigne and Nietzsche reject any notion of being. Indeed, as he later admits, 
Nietzsche sees the strain of romantic pessimism evident in his first published work, The 
Birth of Tragedy, as indicative of decadence, of weakness, of a mistrust of becoming 
and a failure to fully accept that change and destruction are the central features of 
existence (EH 1.1-2). His subsequent break with Wagner’s romanticism, and friendship, 
as well as his rejection of Schopenhauerian pessimism, precipitates a period of 
‘convalescence’ that is documented in his middle works. These writings detail how, in 
order to develop an ‘anti-romantic’ therapy, Nietzsche engages in the demanding task of 
psychological self-observation (HAH II P2). An inspiration in this regard is Montaigne, 
who Nietzsche not only cites as an exemplar as he begins to distance himself from 
Schopenhauer and Wagner but whose Essays also provide a virtual blueprint in the art 
of self-study. What Montaigne finds when he begins to fashion his literary self-portrait 
is that the Heraclitean flux of the world, which he had sought to escape in the privacy of 
his estate, is reproduced in the self he endeavours to explore. In the course of the 
Essays, the portrait’s sitter, far from coming into sharper focus, dissolves into a 
multiplicity of faces, features and aspects. This undermining of the traditional 
conception of the human self or soul is of profound importance for Nietzsche, who takes 
up Montaigne’s repudiation of the idea of a unitary, unchanging self, in his middle and 
late works, and develops it in more radical directions. 
 The Essays commence with an attack on the traditional understanding of the 
soul as a fixed entity—even if indirectly. The opening essay, ‘We reach the same end by 
discrepant means’, examines the fickleness of human motivation and behaviour. 
Considering we now know that, in terms of chronological order, this was not 
Montaigne’s first essay, but was specifically chosen by him to lead the more than one 
hundred essays of the collection, we may conclude that ‘the idea of the inconstancy of 
man’ was for him of paramount importance.
41
 Montaigne drives this point home by 
having the opening essay of Book II tackle the same topic, with an essay entitled ‘On 
the inconstancy of our actions’. These two essays set the tone for what follows, as 
Montaigne never tires of stressing the ‘mutability’, ‘changeability’ and ‘diversity’ of the 
                                                             
41 Hartle, Michel de Montaigne, p. 93. 
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soul. He is determined to show that the Stoic ideal of constancy, based, as it is, on a 
conception of the soul as a kind of immortal Platonic essence, is an unattainable one. 
Thus, at every turn, the Essays alert the reader to be suspicious of any view that would 
represent the self as a permanent substance: ‘anyone who turns his prime attention on to 
himself will hardly find himself in the same state twice’ (II.1; T319, S377 [242]). 
 Montaigne, however, is not content to challenge the Platonic conception of the 
soul indirectly. Often, he goes much further and explicitly questions the coherence of 
the notion of a unified self: ‘Given the natural inconstancy of our behaviour … it has 
often occurred to me that even sound authors are wrong in stubbornly trying to weave 
us into one invariable and solid fabric’ (ibid. T315, S373 [239]). His most sustained and 
thoroughgoing rejection comes in the concluding paragraphs of ‘An apology for 
Raymond Sebond’, in which, borrowing heavily from Plutarch, he gives full expression 
to his philosophy of becoming: ‘there is no permanent existence either in our being or in 
that of objects. … If you should determine to try and grasp what Man’s being is, it 
would be exactly like trying to hold a fistful of water’ (II.12; T586, S680 [455]). For 
Montaigne, we simply do not possess anything like a stable character, and what we take 
to be a secure personality is in fact a continuous succession of differing personalities. 
Consequently, he argues that the soul corresponds not to a single ‘I’, but to a multitude 
of ‘I’’s. When comparing the author of first edition of the Essays to a later edition, he 
concludes: ‘“I” now and “I” then are certainly twain’ (III.9; T941, S1091 [736]). 
Therefore, what the Essays offer is a whole gallery of portraits, many of which bear 
only a passing resemblance to others. Some, Montaigne goes so far as to suggest, may 
even seem to present the visage of another person entirely: ‘there is as much difference 
between us and ourselves as there is between us and other people’ (II.1; T321, S380 
[244]). In this way, the Essays conceive the soul not as a thing or substance that may be 




Nietzsche absorbs what Montaigne’s has to say about the nature of self and 
launches an even deeper critique of what he calls ‘soul atomism’: ‘the belief which 
regards the soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad’ (BGE 12). 
Many of the ways in which Montaigne attempts to shake this belief are also deployed by 
Nietzsche. For instance, he repeatedly draws attention to the instability and mobility of 
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the self: ‘all our doing and knowing is not a succession of facts and empty spaces but a 
continuous flux. … [I]dentical characters, identical facts … neither exists’ (WS 11). In 
an unpublished note penned a few years later, he suggests that, instead of seeing the 
human being as an eternal ‘subject’, we would do better to understand ourselves in 
terms of ‘living unities’ that ‘continually arise and die’ (KSA 11: 40[21]). Hence, 
Nietzsche dismisses the notion of fixed personality, describing the ‘doctrine of the 
unchangeability of character’ as a ‘prejudice’ (D 560). As with Montaigne, this view 
leads him naturally to the claim that the soul is constituted of a plurality of ‘I’’s or 
persons, that the core of the human being is not ‘“an immortal soul”, but many mortal 
souls’ (AOM 17). Nietzsche holds that the self is forever changing, developing and, in 
the best case, growing and expanding: ‘Something you formerly loved as a truth … now 
strikes you as an error. … But maybe that error was as necessary for you then, when 
you were still another person—you are always another person’ (GS 307). In the same 
work, he goes on to outline the aim of his way of life and that of his fellow free spirits 
as follows: ‘Wir … wollen Die werden, die wir sind’ (GS 335). This phrase has, more 
often than not, been translated as ‘We want to become who we are’, but it would be 
better rendered as ‘We want to become those we are’. 
Following Montaigne, Nietzsche maintains that one comes closest to capturing 
the essence of the soul only by portraying a continuous process of becoming. For Alan 
D. Schrift, Nietzsche undertakes to ‘reformulate the notion of the subject’ so that it is 
conceived ‘not as a fixed and full substance or completed project, but always as a work 
in progress’.
43
 Prior to the writing of Beyond Good and Evil, where he declares ‘war, 
relentless war’ against soul atomism, Nietzsche became aware of the work of Roger 
Boscovich, an 18
th
 century Croatian philosopher and physicist (BGE 12). Boscovich 
rejects the idea of matter, preferring to explain hard bodies in terms of an energy field 
model. Nietzsche takes inspiration from what he sees as the defeat of atomism in 
physics and proposes that the way is open ‘for new versions and refinements of the 
soul-hypothesis’ in the realm of psychology also (ibid.). Free of the old soul 
‘superstition’, the ‘new psychologist’ will be in a position to experiment with ‘such 
conceptions as “mortal soul” and “soul as subjective multiplicity [Seele als Subjekts-
Vielheit]” and “soul as social structure of the drives and effects”’ (ibid.).
44
 In an 
                                                             
43 Schrift, “Rethinking the Subject”, p. 58. 
44 Although we find the idea of ‘psychical multiplicity’ and the ‘instability of the self … treated with 
limpid clarity by Montaigne’, Nietzsche makes no explicit mention of the Essays in relation to his 
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unpublished note written a year later, he offers a conception that is a variant of the 
above, but still very much in the Boscovichian vein: ‘No subject “atoms”. The sphere of 
the subject constantly growing or decreasing, the center of the system constantly 
shifting’ (KSA 12: 9[98]). Such a view brings to mind the Montaignean presentation of 
a soul that is ‘flowing and rolling ceaselessly’ (II.12; T586, S680 [455]). That the idea 
of the soul as a process of becoming, field of energy or system goes to the very core of 
Nietzsche’s thought is clear from the subtitle of his philosophical autobiography, Ecce 
Homo, which reads ‘How to Become What you Are’. As Schrift points out, it is very 






Complexity of the psyche 
For Montaigne as well as for Nietzsche, the ‘I’ represents not a single, unified will, but 
a plurality of often conflicting wills. Montaigne proposes that we ‘float along among 
many diverse counsels: our willing of anything is never free, final or constant’ (II.1; 
T317, S375 [240]). In Beyond Good and Evil, soon after introducing his conception of 
the soul as a subjective multiplicity, Nietzsche claims that willing ‘is a unit only as a 
word’, a word that masks a ‘manifold’ phenomenon of ‘commanding and … obeying 
parties’. From this perspective, willing is a matter of a strong voice, or group of voices, 
within the soul ruling over the weaker. And though unheeded, these defeated voices 
continue to whisper their demands. In this way, the soul may be understood as a 
‘commonwealth’ composed of a dominating will at the head of a populace of ‘under-
wills’ (BGE 19). To capture the diverse nature of the will, Montaigne also reaches for a 
political analogy. He argues against the notion of a unitary will by emphasizing its 
capacity for internal discord, and points to the frequency with which the will may be 
charged with ‘sedition and rebellion’. He asks rhetorically: ‘Does [the will] always want 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
‘refinements’ of the soul hypothesis (Parkes, Composing the Soul, pp. 320-1). However, the 
substantial influence of Montaigne on Nietzsche in the period in which these refinements were 
taking shape is undeniable. Brobjer observes that, while there ‘is no single obvious major positive 
influence on Nietzsche in the period 1883-5’, he ‘seems to have read and re-read Emerson and 
Montaigne with much enthusiasm’ (Nietzsche’s Philosophical Context, p. 90). In fact, there are no 
less than 16 references to Montaigne in his unpublished notes during this time. And in a letter to his 
mother and sister in March 1885, he writes: ‘there’s no one living now whom I care much about; the 
people I really like are long dead e.g. Abbé Galiani or Henri Beyle or Montaigne’ (KSB 7, 581) (Fuss 
and Shapiro, Nietzsche: A Self-Portrait from His Letters, p. 85). 
45 Schrift, “Rethinking the Subject”, p. 59. 
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what we want it to?’ (I.21; T101, S116 [73]) What particularly interests Montaigne is 
the way in which parts of the body seem to possess an unbending will of their own, at 
times refusing even to acknowledge orders from another source: ‘Our hands often go 
where we do not tell them; our tongues can fail, our voices congeal, when they want to’ 
(I.21; T100, S115 [72]). Graham Parkes therefore argues that the Montaignean 
understanding of the will in many ways anticipates the Nietzschean view that ‘our body 
is but a social structure composed of many souls’ (BGE 19).
46
 
Nietzsche’s conception of the soul as a subjective multiplicity amounts not 
merely to the claim that our character changes as we develop and that we are different 
people at various points in our lives, although this is part of what he has in mind. 
Rather, the truly innovative feature of his new soul hypothesis is the contention that the 
soul is populated by a multiplicity of persons at any given time—or at least, by ‘the 
embryos’ of many persons (KSA 13: 14[151] (WP 394)). For Nietzsche, multiple 
voices, representing different, and often contradictory, aspects of the self, continuously 
interact and contend within the soul, the soul embracing not only a plurality of wills but 
also a plurality of persons. His conception of subjective multiplicity thus entails 
understanding the psyche in terms of ‘a polycentric field of persons’.
47
 According to 
this view, the means by which one attains self-knowledge must be inherently dialogical, 
in the sense that one must be willing to accept, listen to and converse with the many 
residents of the soul: ‘for the enrichment of knowledge it may be of more value not to 
reduce oneself to a uniformity. … Through thus ceasing to treat oneself as [an] … 
individuum … one takes an intelligent interest in the life and being of many others’ 
(HAH 618). Furthermore, Nietzsche extends this notion of dialogue to include the 
internalized voices of exemplars.
48
 We have already noted his reference to a group of 
past philosophers who speak to him when he wanders alone: ‘upon these eight I fix my 
eyes and see theirs fixed upon me’ (AOM 408). Unsurprisingly, this group includes 
Montaigne, whose own work offers unparalleled access to the voices to the ancients.  
Of course, Montaigne also advocates on-going conversation with the great souls 
of former times: ‘always imagine that you are with Cato, Phocion and Aristides … 
make them recorders of your inmost thoughts’ (I.39; T242, S278 [183]). Montaigne’s 
                                                             
46 Parkes, Composing the Soul, p. 322. 
47 Ibid., p. 346. 
48 Ruth Abbey suggests that Nietzsche’s middle works could well be considered ‘dialogues with the 
dead’, given the extent to which they present him as ‘developing his thoughts through imagined 
exchanges with earlier thinkers’ (Nietzsche’s Middle Period, p. 147). 
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writing, therefore, like Nietzsche’s, is fundamentally a prolonged and in-depth dialogue 
with the different voices of his own soul. In his final essay, he states that the entire aim 
of the project was ‘but getting to know myself’ (III.13; T1052, S1220 [823]). We can 
thus understand the Essays as an amazing feat of ventriloquism.
49
 However faithfully he 
may seem to describe the characters of Alexander, Socrates, Cato and others, the many 
voices present are essentially expressions of the persons of Montaigne’s psyche: he 
speaks through the ancients only in order to better understand and reveal himself. By 
way of the mouths of diverse speakers, Montaigne portrays the multiplicity of his own 
soul: ‘I give my soul this face or that depending on which side I lay it down on. … 
Every sort of contradiction can be found in me’ (II.1; T319, S377 [242]). In 
consequence, the Essays eschew harmony and consistency in favour of an endless 
variety and diversity in argument and perspective. Montaigne never fully resolves his 
main themes and ideas: ‘There is nothing I can say about myself as a whole simply and 
completely, without intermingling and admixture’ (ibid.). Hence, in the course of 
reading the Essays what we find is ‘the formation of a criss-cross pattern of multiple 
oppositions and identities’, an ‘endless circularity of contradictions’.
50
 
To see the soul in terms of many wills, under-wills and persons is to invest our 
mental lives with tremendous richness. Accordingly, the Essays show the human mind 
to be labyrinthine in its motivational pathways. For Montaigne, the sources of human 
behaviour are endlessly diverse, character is many-sided and temperament never simple. 
Although he leans heavily on Greco-Roman thought, the psychology represented in the 
Essays is far more complex than anything to be found in the philosophical works of 
antiquity. Montaigne signals his determination to complicate our psychological lives 
almost immediately in the Essays, with his discussion of Alexander the Great’s harsh 
treatment of Betis, a warrior who displayed superhuman bravery when Alexander laid 
siege to the city of Gaza. Montaigne speculates as to Alexander’s motives, offering a 
number of possibilities, each stated tentatively in the form of a question:  
 
Was it because bravery was so usual for him that he … respected it less? Or 
was it because he thought it to be so properly his own that he could not bear 
to see it at such a height in someone else without … envy; or did the natural 
violence of his anger allow of no opposition? (I.1; T14, S6 [5]) 
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Montaigne fails to reach a conclusion on Alexander’s actions. However, by beginning 
his examination with ‘Was it because’, he seems to imply that any number of alternative 
explanations could plausibly be put forward, none of which would provide a complete 
account of the impulses that drove Alexander’s behaviour. If one also considers that 
Montaigne introduces the episode with a description of Alexander as ‘the staunchest of 
men and the most generous towards the vanquished’, the subsequent sketch of 
Alexander’s psychology becomes more torturous still (Ibid. T13, S5 [4]).  
Montaigne not only strives to show the diversity of character traits possible within 
a single human soul: he also probes the intricacies of individual traits. In ‘On the 
inconstancy of our actions’, with Alexander again centre stage, Montaigne directs his 
attention to the question of valour. Although he concedes that there ‘is no valour greater 
in its kind than Alexander’s, he goes on to state: ‘but it has its blemishes … we see him 
worried to distraction over the slightest suspicion he may have had that his men were 
plotting against him’ (II.1; T320, S378 [243]). Thus, here as elsewhere, Montaigne 
forgoes a simplistic approach in favour of a more nuanced and penetrating analysis: 
valour, however apparently superhuman, is always limited, and shot through with the 
particular idiosyncrasies of the possessor.  
In line with his conception of the self as a succession of altered personalities, 
Montaigne never stopped editing, revising and expanding the Essays. Later editions 
show subtle additions that refine his psychological insights and enrich his self-portrait, 
by allowing the more soft-spoken voices in his psyche the chance to be heard. 
Nonetheless, despite the numerous emendations he made to the Essays over the period 
of twenty years, Montaigne concludes his project by admitting that: 
 
I find it hard to link our actions one to another, but I also find it hard to give 
each one of them, separately, their proper designation from some dominant 
quality; they are so ambiguous with colours interpenetrating each other in 
various lights (III.13; T1054, S1222 [824-5]). 
 
All this is to be found in Nietzsche. In The Wanderer and His Shadow, he associates 
himself with those moralists who ‘seek to discover the complexity in the apparent 
simplicity’ and direct their ‘eye to the interlacing of motives’ (WS 20). While he 
doesn’t name any moralist directly, we may assume that, given their prominence in his 
writing at this time, he is referring to the moralists of the French tradition—La Bruyère, 
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Chamfort, Rochefoucauld—and particularly Montaigne, the originator of that tradition. 
What Nietzsche admires is a thinker who ‘can circle around a thing ten times’, but who 
in the end resumes ‘their rigorous path’ (D 530). This is something we see him do 
repeatedly in his middle and late works. Like Montaigne’s essay style, Nietzsche’s 
aphoristic style allows for a topic such as pity, selflessness or vanity to be discussed in 
various contexts and from a multitude of perspectives, thereby enabling him to uncover 
‘myriad motivations and driving forces’.
51
 Little wonder, then, that we see him 
comment favourably on what he refers to as Montaigne’s ‘garrulousness’: his ‘delight in 
ever-new twists of the same thing’ (GS 97). No doubt, the vastness of the psychological 
landscape mapped in Nietzsche’s work greatly exceeds that of the Essays, but 
Nietzsche’s writing is often distinctly Montaignean in the way that he relentlessly aims 
to reveal ‘the several paths and motives’ that ‘can lead to the same action’ (HAH 58). 
And he also follows Montaigne in his conviction that behind the illusion of unified traits 
and emotions hide a multiplicity of characteristics: 
 
[W]e never do anything … out of one motive … pleasure arises at the sight 
of a contrast to the condition we ourselves are in … at the thought of praise 
and recognition we will receive; at the activity of helping itself. … All of 





The Nietzschean psyche envelops not only the different voices that speak for ‘many 
mortal souls’ and the voices of exemplars but also the ceaseless chattering of ‘idea-
persons’: we traffic ‘with ideas … as if they were individuals with whom one has to 
struggle, to whom one was to ally oneself, whom one has to tend, protect and nourish’ 
(AOM 26). For Nietzsche, in our thinking, even the most abstract, we are simply 
incapable of apprehending ‘a thing impersonally’; the thinker is forever ‘person-
constructing, person-inventing’ (ibid.). Of course, there is no better exemplification of 
these kinds of psychological processes than the Essays, where we find arguments 
developed by way of an extraordinary range of interlocutors, a new voice (and a new 
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face)—either through a direct quotation or an anecdote—introducing each new 
perspective. Nonetheless, Nietzsche offers a still more radical account of the psyche than 
the essayist, for while Montaigne dissolves the ‘I’ into a plurality of personalities, 
Nietzsche goes further and dissolves this plurality into innumerable instincts or ‘drives’. 
With the publication of Daybreak, as Parkes explains, Nietzsche’s conception of the 
psyche undergoes significant development: ‘the discourse concerning psychological 
persons dips … into the realm of impulse and instinct. … [T]he second book of that text 
reveals a remarkable revisioning of the I in terms of drives’.
52
 Hence, in a section 
entitled ‘Experience and invention’, we find Nietzsche claiming the following: 
 
However far a man may go in self-knowledge, nothing however can be 
more incomplete than his image of the totality of drives which constitute 
his being. He can scarcely name even the cruder ones: their ebb and flood 
… their play and counterplay among one another … remain wholly 
unknown to him (D 119).  
 
What is most revolutionary here is the contention that our behaviour is determined by 
motive forces that remain below the level of conscious thought. In opening up the vast 
domain of the unconscious, Nietzsche thus achieves a remarkable deepening and 
expansion of the soul: on this view, the conscious aspects of the soul constitute only a 
tiny fraction of its range of activity. But here again we can see the influence of 
Montaigne, who fully recognized the extent to which non-conscious impulses prompt 
our thoughts and propel our actions: ‘in the natures of men, there are hidden parts which 
are never revealed and which are sometimes unknown even to the one who has them’ 
(III.2; T792, S917 [618]). 
Dorothy Coleman suggests that Montaigne’s essay ‘On practice’ offers perhaps 
the first discussion of the ‘sub-conscious’ in the history of Western thought.
53
 Here, as 
mentioned previously, Montaigne describes in detail the reactions of his body and mind 
to a serious fall he suffered while out riding. Having lost full consciousness, he 
continues to speak a little and even replies to a few questions put to him, but as for these 
doings he insists: ‘I played no part in them: they were empty acts of apparent thinking. 
… Any contribution from my soul … came only as in a dream’ (II.6; T356, S422 [271]). 
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Some commentators refer briefly to the ways in which Freudian ideas are prefigured in 
the Essays.
54
 Craig Brush acknowledges the originality of Montaigne’s thought in this 
regard, but suggests that he failed to delve into the unconscious, favouring instead to 
depict the conscious processes of the mind.
55
 However, this is to underplay the extent to 
which Montaigne understands conscious motivation as utterly superficial. He is at pains 
to stress that what seem to be the most important and consciously directed aspects of our 
mental lives—our reasoning and judgment—are in fact determined by unknown internal 
dynamic forces. Sayce thus emphasizes the ‘boldness of Montaigne’s psychological 
thought’, the many respects in which it points toward ‘psycho-analysis and modern 
psychiatry’.
56
 Compare the following to the quote from Nietzsche above: ‘A thousand 
chance emotions [agitations indiscretes et casuelles], unbidden, are in turmoil within 
me; sometimes a melancholic humour gets hold of me; at others, a choleric one; 
sometimes grief or joy dominate me, for reasons of their own [emphasis added]’ (II.12; 
T549, S637 [425]). For both Montaigne and Nietzsche, the most decisive operations of 
the soul are opaque and essentially unknowable. To look at the Essays through the prism 
of a strictly Freudian conception of the unconscious may very well reveal Montaigne as 
having little awareness as to its power and significance. However, if instead one reads 
the Essays with an eye toward Nietzsche, who not only probed the unconscious mind but 
was also himself profoundly influenced by Montaigne, we gain a truer picture of the 
depth of Montaigne’s understanding. 
Nietzsche’s intensive study of Montaigne clearly stimulated his own exploration 
of the unconscious, as his examination of drives and instincts often bears an 
unmistakable Montaignean cast: by having the discussion centre around remarks to do 
with the random movements of the mind and the concealed roots of our actions, 
Nietzsche’s treatment evokes countless passages from the Essays. Montaigne constantly 
stresses the ‘chance’ nature of our conscious thinking, the fact that we are not free to 
think as we please, but are carried along by thoughts whose origins elude us: ‘I cannot 
remain fixed within my disposition and endowments. Chance plays a greater part in all 
this than I do’ (I.10; T41, S39 [26]). In Daybreak, Nietzsche describes how, before 
performing any action, ‘there step into our reflective consciousness one after another the 
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consequences of various acts’ (D 129). We then determine the best way to proceed 
based on an analysis of these various consequences. However, by doing so, we are 
‘accustomed to exclude’ all the ‘unconscious processes’ that so arranged this picture of 
consequences in the first place (ibid.). Hence, he proposes that the actual conflict of 
motives that prompts us to behave one way or another is ‘invisible to us’, and whenever 
we act: ‘caprice and waywardness come into play, some motion or other happens quite 
by chance to leap forth: in short, there come into play motives … unknown to us … 
which we can never take account of beforehand’ (ibid.).
57
 Montaigne, in ‘On the art of 
conversation’, digressing, as usual, from the main theme, engages in a discussion of the 
role that ‘Fortune’ plays in the workings of the mind:  
 
I will go on to say that our very wisdom and mature reflections are for the 
most part led by chance [hasard]. My will and my reasoning are stirred 
this way and that. And many of their movements govern themselves 
without me. My reason is daily subject to incitements and agitations 
which are due to chance (III.8; T912-3, S1058 [713]). 
 
As a result, for both thinkers, a person only ever possesses a partial understanding of 
their behaviour, and the causes of even the most trivial actions are more complex than 
would first appear. Nietzsche thus mocks those who still hold to the ‘primeval delusion 
… that one knows, and knows quite precisely … how human action is brought about. 
… [E]veryone else too is in no doubt that he understands what is essentially involved in 
the process of action of every other person’ (D 116). And Montaigne ridicules those 
philosophers who aim to comprehend the workings of the heavens while being 
completely unaware of the non-conscious forces that guide their every move: ‘No 
philosopher understands his neighbour’s actions nor even his own. … These people … 
have … never, among all their books, plumbed the difficulties which confront them in 
understanding their own being’ (II.12; T520, S604-5 [402]). 
 Montaigne is insightful also about the soul’s capacity for unconscious 
repression, the way we actively keep hidden from consciousness certain emotions and 
desires that would cause us too much pain to face directly. An especially illuminating 
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passage from ‘On some lines of Virgil’ draws together a number of observations on this 
topic and is worth quoting in full: 
 
Why does nobody profess his faults? Because even now he remains within 
them. … [A]s the soul’s ills grow in strength they are wrapped in greater 
obscurity: the more ill a man is, the less he realizes it. That is why the 
maladies of the soul need to be often probed in daylight, cut and torn from 
our hollow breasts by a pitiless hand (III.5; T823, S953-4 [642]). 
 
The many ideas that come together here anticipate more detailed examinations in 
Nietzsche work. Nietzsche follows Montaigne in understanding the phenomenon of 
repression primarily in terms of a self-deception that functions as a highly sophisticated 
self-defence mechanism. Self-deception is possible, he argues, because we rarely 
achieve the sufficient distance to view ourselves clearly, we are always standing ‘a few 
paces too close’ to see anything other than a minor detail or ‘insignificant trait’ (AOM 
387). Thus concealed, we fall prey to endless self-deception: in order to ensure that a 
flattering self-image perpetually ‘shines upon us’, we often attribute ‘false motives’ to 
ourselves and ‘deliberately banish’ disturbing parts of our past from our minds (HAH 
68; AOM 37). Given the extent—and success—of the soul’s protective measures, 
Nietzsche imagines the self as a ‘fortress’ defended against itself, accessible only by 
indirect attack via ‘a secret path’. And the pitiless hands that conduct such an attack are 
those of ‘friends and enemies’ who ‘play the traitor’ (HAH 491). In Beyond Good and 
Evil, he proposes that the ‘basic will of the spirit’ is composed of many conflicting 
drives, one of which involves ‘a refusal to let things approach, a kind of state of defence 
against much that is knowable, a satisfaction with the dark’ (BGE 230). For as 
Montaigne explains, ‘[t]ruth has its difficulties, its awkwarknesses and its 




Nietzsche’s most devastating attack on soul atomism comes in the form of an outright 
rejection of the traditional understanding of agency. He argues that there is neither a 
thinker behind thought nor an actor behind action, dismissing the idea of an ‘I’ who 
performs a causal role as a metaphysical superstition. Rather than directing our 
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behaviour, any ‘I’, as a feature of consciousness, would itself merely be the 
consequence of the interaction of unconscious drives. As a result, in Nietzsche’s view, 
the innumerable persons of the psyche function not as the most primary causal factors 
but are expressive of more fundamental impulses that are the real determinants of 
behaviour. In this way, his ‘new version’ of the soul hypothesis constitutes a complete 
abandonment of the main features of the old, involving a move away from the idea of a 
soul monad harbouring a single agent toward a conception that understands the soul as 
‘a field of forces devoid of agency’.
58
 He further suggests that ‘it is only through the 
seduction of language (and through the fundamental errors of reason petrified in it)’—
for instance, the belief in stable unities—that we are led to posit the existence of an ‘I’ 
who thinks, wills and acts: ‘But no such substratum exists; there is no “being” behind 
doing, acting, becoming; “the doer” is merely a fiction imposed on the doing—the 
doing itself is everything’ (GM 1.13). He therefore concludes that we turn reality on its 
head when we believe a subject or ‘I’ to be the cause of thinking (BGE 54). For 
Nietzsche, it is a given of our phenomenological experience that we do not will the vast 
majority of our thoughts into existence, they simply emerge into consciousness: ‘a 
thought comes when “it” wishes’, and not when “I” wish, so that it is a falsification of 
the facts to say that the subject “I” is the condition of the predicate “think”’ (BGE 17). 
 Unlike Nietzsche, Montaigne never explicitly gives up on the idea of agency, 
despite the fact that his understanding of the soul coincides in its essentials with the 
picture just described. He, too, repudiates the notion of a ‘substratum’ underlying our 
thoughts: ‘Reason is baffled when it looks for … substantial existence’ (II.12; T586, 
S680 [455]). Moreover, the view that thoughts happen, but are not caused, represents 
one of his deepest convictions. At times, he does seem to want to refuse responsibility 
for his actions and intimates doubt concerning his own agency: ‘My activities would tell 
you more about Fortune than about me. They bear witness to their own rule not to mine’ 
(II.6; T359, S426 [274]). However, he is reluctant to probe the clearly subversive 
implications of his understanding of the soul. For, if we can be as different from 
ourselves as from other people, if non-conscious forces guide our thoughts and actions, 
if we don’t understand the motives for which we act, and if our reason and judgement 
are under the dictates of chance, what is to become of moral accountability? Montaigne 
never explicitly recognizes a problem in this regard. 
                                                             
58 Parkes, Composing the Soul, p. 380. 
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By contrast, Nietzsche follows the course of his argument through to its 
disquieting yet inevitable conclusion: we cannot be held morally responsible for our 
actions. The traditional conception of moral responsibility assumes that actions have 
their origin in conscious intent and thus are clearly understood by the moral agent. 
However, once this assumption is shown to be nothing more than a ‘primeval delusion’, 
the edifice of moral responsibility crumbles and we are forced to confront the reality 
that: ‘our moral judgements and evaluations too are only images and fantasies based on 
a … process unknown to us’ (D 119). For Nietzsche, judgements of praise and blame 
are rendered incoherent, if the realm of human behaviour is one of misunderstood 
actions based on unknown motives. Accordingly, in Beyond and Evil, he announces the 
coming of a new period in the history of moral thought, what he calls the ‘extra-moral’. 
This era will involve a ‘reversal and fundamental shift in values’, an ‘overcoming’ of 
traditional morality, such that ‘the decisive value of an action’ will be understood to lie 
‘precisely in what is unintentional in it’, and the former ‘morality of intentions’ will be 
looked back on as ‘a prejudice, precipitate and perhaps provisional’ (BGE 32).  
We have every reason to believe that Montaigne, despite his unwillingness to say 
so openly, was fully cognizant of the dire implications the Essays pose for the 
traditional understanding of agency. Lampert argues persuasively for a reading of 
Montaigne that sees him following in the footsteps of Plato as a practitioner of the noble 
lie: he ‘writes obliquely and does not draw the conclusions of his thoughts, leaving it to 
the resourcefulness of the reader to discover the richer and bolder matter’.
59
 Lampert 
points to Montaigne’s acceptance of the fact that philosophers are often forced to don a 
mask in order to conceal unwholesome truths from segments of their audience. In ‘An 
apology for Raymond Sebond’, he admits the suspicion that philosophers such as 
Epicurus, Plato and Pythagoras never actually believed many of the doctrines they 
endorsed. He suggests, rather, that ‘[p]art of what they wrote was simply designed to 
meet the social need of the general public’ (II.12; T492, S571-2 [379-80]). Montaigne 
goes on to highlight the danger of promulgating ideas that help to ‘disturb people’s 
obedience to the law’ and concludes that many of the schools of philosophy are 
concerned not with truth but with ‘moral usefulness’ (ibid.). Given the intrinsic role that 
the traditional conception of moral responsibility plays in the functioning of society at 
large—perhaps the acceptance or rejection of no other idea has greater ramifications and 
                                                             
59 Lampert, Nietzsche and Modern Times, p. 221. 
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thus must be approached with extreme sensitivity—Montaigne refrains from exposing 
his reservations directly, preferring a noble lie of omission to the acknowledgment of an 
explosive truth. Indeed, Nietzsche proposes that hitherto the ‘only kind of proof … 
deemed necessary for demonstrating the truth of’ our accountability as moral agents has 
been the fear that ‘it would be terrible … crazy and unthinkable’ if the opposite were 
the case (D 116). He, however, rejects the argument from moral usefulness and the ‘pia 
fraus’ of the ‘improvers’ of humanity (TI 7.5). And so Nietzsche brings into the light 
what Montaigne attempts to veil in darkness. Yet Nietzsche praises Montaigne as the 
most honest of philosophers for good reason:  
 
If you look into these memoirs of mine you will find that I have said 
everything or intimated everything. What I have been unable to express in 
words I point towards with my finger. Those slight traces [quoting 
Lucretius] are enough for a keen-scented mind and will safely lead you to 




CHAPTER 3: HUMAN AND   
NATURE 
 




To translate man back into nature; to become master over the many vain 
and overly enthusiastic interpretations and connotations that have so far 
been scrawled and painted over that eternal basic text of homo natura. … 
[T]hat may be a strange and insane task, but it is a task—who would deny 
that? (BGE 230) 
 
Following the Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche’s determination to naturalize humanity 
becomes ever more pronounced. Deploying subtle psychological and historical analyses, 
he strives to develop wholly naturalistic accounts of metaphysics, religion, and morality, 
undermining their supposedly transcendent origins. For Nietzsche, our religious and 
metaphysical impulses are nourished by psychological ‘errors’, and our most deeply felt 
moral intuitions, despite their apparently categorical validity, are historically contingent 
and socially conditioned. His rejection of the traditional understanding of the soul in 
Beyond Good and Evil represents a central move in this naturalizing programme, for it is 
only when soul atomism is defeated and the soul is reconceived as mortal, unstable, as a 
play a drives, instincts, or affects that the ‘basic text of homo natura’ can begin to be 
deciphered. Thus, in On the Genealogy of Morals, his next work, he engages in a 
genealogical investigation of the soul, a study of how primitive humanity has been 
shaped by the civilising forces of community and culture.  
Despite Nietzsche’s frequent claim that his philosophy takes up the task of 
naturalizing humanity, it is only in the past two decades or so that scholars have begun 
to consider seriously the idea of Nietzsche as naturalist.
1
 One of the most influential 
works to emerge from this recent trend is Brian Leiter’s Nietzsche on Morality. Leiter 
                                                             
1 The quote above from Beyond Good and Evil echoes a passage written four years earlier in The Gay 
Science: ‘When will all these shadows of god no longer darken us? When will we have completely 
de-deified nature? When may we begin to naturalize humanity with a pure, newly discovered, 
newly redeemed nature?’ (GS 109) 
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argues that Nietzsche may be best understood as ‘methodological naturalist’, insofar as 
he believes that philosophical investigation should be ‘continuous with the sciences 
either in virtue of their dependence upon the actual results of scientific method in 
different domains or in virtue of their employment and emulation of distinctively 
scientific ways of looking at and explaining things’.
2
 However, as many commentators 
have noted, such a reading seems to offer little promise of capturing the full import of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, indeed even seems at odds with it, bearing in mind his many 
statements on the limitations, the ‘crudity and naivety’, of an entirely causal-
deterministic study of reality (GS 373). In The Gay Science, he writes that the scientific 
interpretation of the world may yet prove to be ‘the stupidest of all possible 
interpretations’, since ‘an essentially mechanistic world would be an essentially 
meaningless world’ (ibid.). What insight, Nietzsche asks, could scientific formulas 
possibly provide regarding the ‘value’ of a piece of music—the obvious implication 
being that science is mute on all questions of value (ibid.). Maudemarie Clark and 
David Dudrick thus propose that what Leiter’s account ignores is ‘the distinction 
between the physical order … and the normative order’, that Nietzsche sees the human 
being as existing not only in a ‘space of causes’ but also, and more importantly, in a 
‘space of ‘reasons’.
3
 Largely agreeing with this analysis, Richard Schacht suggests that 
Nietzsche’s naturalism could perhaps be characterized as ‘scientian’, by which he 
means a kind of naturalism that is ‘scientifically informed and sophisticated’, but which 
finds causal-deterministic thinking problematic in many ways and certainly not 
‘paradigmatic methodologically’ or ‘all-encompassing in its scope’.
4
 
 For Schacht, Nietzsche’s kind of naturalism is thus ‘more expansive … both 
substantively … and methodologically’ than Leiter credits.
5
 Substantively speaking, 
                                                             
2 Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, p. 5. 
3 Clark and Dudrick, “The Naturalisms of Beyond Good and Evil”, p. 160. Clarke and Dudrick argue 
that, on the Nietzschean view, ‘claims to knowledge … cannot be understood from an empirical 
perspective’, because the judgements of any agent presuppose the existence of a ‘network’ of ‘value 
commitments’ (p. 163).  
4 Schacht, “Nietzsche’s Naturalism”, p. 187. Schacht claims that Leiter is mistaken when he 
represents Nietzsche as a ‘scientistic naturalist’, that is, as a naturalist who considers the natural-
scientific mode of enquiry to be above all others and ‘decisive in its authority’ (ibid.).  
5 Schacht, “Nietzsche’s Naturalism”, p. 197. In terms of methodology, Schacht proposes that 
Nietzsche’s naturalism engages a multiplicity of perspectives, only some of which are based on 
natural-scientific modes of explanation. In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche describes his new 
approach to philosophy as ‘historical philosophizing’ (HAH 2). Central to this method of 
philosophizing, Schacht suggests, are ‘developmental explanations’ that focus on social and cultural 
transformations and seek to comprehend ‘the qualitative respects in which human reality has 
become something significantly different from a merely biological affair’ (p. 200). For Nietzsche, 
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Nietzsche’s naturalism commits him to the view that neither our religious feelings, nor 
our moral intuitions, nor our metaphysical speculations put us in touch with a reality 
beyond the ordinary, empirical, everyday world. Schacht proposes that Christopher 
Janaway has it right, when he represents Nietzsche’s naturalism as follows: 
 
[Nietzsche] opposes transcendent metaphysics. … He rejects notions of the 
immaterial soul, the absolutely free controlling will, or the self-transparent 
pure intellect, instead emphasizing the body, talking of the animal nature of 
human beings, and attempting to explain numerous phenomena by invoking 





For our purposes, what is most conspicuous here is the degree to which the foregoing 
reads like a summary of the main themes of the Essays. A close look at Nietzsche’s 
naturalism thus serves to show the very real sense in which he fulfils his desire to make 
himself ‘at home in this world’ with Montaigne in his middle and late works. 
Montaigne’s examination of the ‘base and earthbound’ motives that lie behind 
metaphysical speculation, his subversive claim that morality has no other basis than 
custom, his repudiation of the Platonic conception of the soul, and his focus on the 
importance of the body all prefigure central motifs in the naturalism of Nietzsche’s 
mature philosophy. Moreover, the ‘insane task’ that Nietzsche sets himself, of 
translating humanity back into nature, is essentially continuous with Montaigne’s 
mission to deflate vanity and ‘presumption’ and situate the human being back within the 
natural world. Whereas Montaigne laments that humanity has ‘adulterated’ nature with 
‘many arguments and extraneous reasonings’, Nietzsche seeks to overcome the ‘overly 
enthusiastic interpretations’ that have been painted over homo natura (III.12; T1026, 
S1188 [803]). Furthermore, the claim that human nature is something that has been 
obscured and corrupted, and hence must be uncovered and purified, is voiced time and 
again in the Essays. For instance, in ‘On the Cannibals’, Montaigne writes that we ‘have 
so overloaded the richness and beauty of [Nature’s] products by our own ingenuity that 
we have smothered her entirely’ (I.31; T203, S232 [152]). A few essays later, again 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
such transformations are not amenable to causal-deterministic analysis, but may be probed to 
uncover the various constituent elements and types of influence. 
6 Janaway, Beyond Selflessness, p. 34. 
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expressing his concern over humanity’s unhealthy separation from nature, he suggests: 
‘like those who drown the light of day with artificial light, we have drowned our natural 
means with borrowed ones’ (I.36; T222, S254 [167]). Therefore, in many ways, 
Nietzsche’s mature philosophy represents the carrying forward, post-Darwin, and with 
the benefit of two hundred years of scientific advance, of a project of re-translation 
initiated by Montaigne.  
 Montaigne also presents himself as a naturalist. In ‘On physiognomy’, defending 
himself against the charge that his self-portrait amounts to nothing more than a 
collection of ‘borrowings’ from others, he writes: ‘Followers of Nature like me realize 
that, in honour, invention takes incomparably higher precedence over quotation’ (III.12; 
T1034, S1197 [809]). Within the context of 16
th
 French century intellectual life, by 
characterising himself in this manner, Montaigne seeks to convey that his philosophy 
represents ‘the attempt to explain phenomena without recourse to divine causation, or 
“first causes”’.
7
 Indeed, his contempt for the supernatural and the superstitious couldn’t 
be more apparent. Heaping scorn on alchemy, astrology and chiromancy, Montaigne 
describes prognostication as a form of ‘deception’, and as symptomatic of ‘delusion’ 
(I.32; T213-5, S242-4 [159-61]). He also dismisses the notion that there is anything 
unearthly about the alleged occurrence of miracles, preferring to explain the claims of 
believers by invoking mundane, all-too human considerations: ‘It is likely that the credit 
given to miracles … and such extraordinary events chiefly derives from the power of 
the imagination acting mainly on the more impressionable souls’ (I.21; T97, S111-12 
[70]). Added to this focus on natural causes, Montaigne, particularly his late essays, 
accepts the importance and prerogative of first-hand, direct experience and experiment, 
of knowledge derived from the senses. Hence, although he is writing at a time before 
the main intellectual advances of the scientific revolution, carried forward by Descartes 
and Bacon, Montaigne’s preference for causal reasoning over the teleological 
explanations of Medieval Scholasticism, as well as his enthusiastic empiricism, leads us 
to detect in his philosophy ‘the expression of a genuinely scientific frame of mind’.
8
  
 Even so, Montaigne’s stance toward the causal-deterministic mode of enquiry is 
far from uncritical. While considering himself a naturalist, he also proudly admits: ‘I am 
not much of a “natural philosopher”. … I have hardly any idea of the mechanisms by 
which fear operates in us’ (I.18; T74, S81 [52]). Montaigne, no less than Nietzsche, 
                                                             
7 Hoffman, “The investigation of nature”, p. 163. 
8 Sayce, The Essays of Montaigne, p. 184. 
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harbours great reservations about the wholesale applicability of causal reasoning to 
human affairs. In ‘On the lame’, he comes close to the Nietzschean view that a purely 
natural-scientific account of our experiences fails to address the most important 
question, that of the value of those experiences, what they mean to us. For Montaigne, 
those who search for causes ‘ignore the whats and expatiate on the whys’, and thereby 
leave behind that which is truly of concern, the distinctively human significance of our 
experiences (III.11; T1003, S1161 [785]). Stressing the barren nature of such thinking, 
he states: ‘Wine is no more delightful to the man who knows its primary qualities’—a 
remark not too dissimilar to that of Nietzsche’s on music (ibid.). Such comments have 
led some scholars to argue that’s Montaigne’s understanding of ‘experience’ has 
‘nothing in common with the experiments of the natural sciences’.
9
 Hoffmann points to 
a passage in ‘On experience’ where Montaigne appears to deny the benefits of a 
scientific mode of reasoning: ‘The induction which we wish to draw from the likenesses 
between events is unsure since they all show unlikenesses. When collating objects no 
quality is so universal as diversity’ (III.13; T1041, S1207 [815]).
10
 
 Like Nietzsche, Montaigne sees no escape from the ‘errors’ of reason and the 
simplifications of language. We do not discover laws in nature but merely project our 
limited human perspective onto the world. Yet, even if empiricism offers no 
metaphysical knowledge, no access to the true ‘essence’ of things, for Montaigne a form 
of positive knowledge is still available: ‘every example limps and any correspondence 
which we draw from experience is always feeble and imperfect; we can nevertheless 
find some corner or other by which to link our comparisons [emphasis added]’ (ibid. 
T1047, S1213 [819]). As Sayce observes, there is here some advance beyond 
scepticism’, and a gesture toward the idea of scientific progress; it is within our power 
to develop hypotheses and offer plausible interpretations of the world.
11
 Indeed, 
Montaigne has earlier made plain ‘the possibility of infinite advance in the arts and 
sciences’:
12
 ‘[quoting Agrippa] The assays of experience have taught me that … what is 
known to one century is clarified by the next … the arts and sciences are not just cast in 
a mould all at once, but have to be gradually shaped by repeated handling and 
polishing’ (II.12; T543, S631 [421]). Therefore, what becomes clear is that much in the 
Essays presages Nietzsche’s distinctive brand of naturalism, and that Montaigne, a true 
                                                             
9 Friedrich, Montaigne, p. 140. 
10 Hoffmann, “The investigation of nature”, p. 160. 
11 Sayce, The Essays of Montaigne, p. 179. 
12 Schaefer, The Political Philosophy of Montaigne, p. 115. 
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predecessor of his thought, could perhaps be described as a proto-scientian naturalist. 
Montaigne rejects scientific thinking only to the extent that it claims to provide anything 
other than a partial perspective on the world. On this issue as in most others, his 
comments reflect a desire to deflate human presumption, the belief that we can ever 
attain absolute knowledge. And though it would be an exaggeration to say that 
Nietzsche’s criticisms of science take their cue from Montaigne, considering that the 
Essays display only a tentative understanding of the possibilities for scientific progress, 
it would certainly be legitimate to claim that Nietzsche found considerable support for 
such criticisms in the Essays. We can thus see that both Montaigne and Nietzsche, even 
if framing their own philosophies naturalistically, seek to undermine confidence in a 
certain kind of naturalism, one for which everything that is worth knowing about human 
life can be captured in terms of mechanistic general laws and causal-deterministic 
reasoning.  
The substantive, as opposed to the methodological, dimension of Montaigne’s 
naturalism is most obviously revealed by his eagerness to construe human existence as 
just another form of animal life. In order to rediscover our natural means and free 
ourselves from corruption, Montaigne recommends that we look to the freedom and 
simplicity of the animals, who exhibit a form of life untainted by vanity and artifice. He 
argues that a study of animal behaviour has much to teach us because, ‘beneath the 
countenance of Nature’, animals and humans are ‘one and the same’ (II.12; T436, S513 
[336]). This radical claim goes to the core of Montaigne’s thoroughgoing naturalism. In 
complete opposition to both the Greco-Roman and Christian traditions, which agree in 
seeing humanity as a distinct and higher form of existence, Montaigne continually 
subverts the notion of a stark separation between human beings and the rest of nature. 
As regards our relationship to the animals, he insists that we ‘are neither above nor 
below them’, but on the same level, and ‘subject to the same restraints’ (ibid. T437, 
S514 [336]). Hence, Montaigne is committed to the view that humanity possesses ‘no 
true privilege or pre-eminence’ (ibid.). More revolutionary still, he proposes not only 
that human and animal are of the same ‘genus’ but also human and vegetation:  
 
I am led to abase our presumption … and … lay aside that imaginary 
kingship over other creatures which is attributed to us. … [T]here is a kind 
of respect and a duty in man as a genus which link us not merely to the 
beasts … but even to trees and plants (II.11; T414, S487-8 [317-8]). 
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Montaigne thus advances an understanding of human existence that sees us as 
inescapably part of the natural world, one animal among others, and related to all living 
things.  
 At the time of his writing the Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche seems reluctant 
to embrace such a determinedly naturalistic position, despite his acceptance of the 
central claim of the Darwinian thesis, that of universal common descent through an 
evolutionary process. In ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’, he 
articulates this unease by describing the ‘doctrine’ of the ‘fluidity of all … types and 
species … the lack of any cardinal distinction between man and animal’ as ‘true but 
deadly’, deadly because, if generally accepted, such a doctrine could serve as an 
impediment to any strivings toward a higher culture (HL 9). Montaigne is free from any 
such anxiety. On the contrary, he proclaims openly—and sometimes gleefully—what 
Nietzsche finds deadly, exhausting all his powers of ingenuity in detailing the close 
affinities between animals and humans (II.12; T429-465, S505-41 [330-58]). In fact, 
Montaigne’s stated aim is to bring humanity ‘into conformity with the majority of 
creatures’ (ibid. T436, S513 [336]). But even in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, where 
Nietzsche singles Montaigne out for exceptional praise, he continues to resist the idea 
that humanity as a whole should be understood in comparable terms to other creatures, 
maintaining that exceptional human beings have the potential to transcend animality and 
confer a metaphysical importance to existence: ‘They are those true men, those who are 
no longer animal, the philosophers, artists and saints; nature … has made its one leap 
in creating them … nature then feels for the first time it has reached its goal’ (SE 5). 
Human, All Too Human, however, testifies to a marked change in Nietzsche’s 
stance and appears very much under the sway of Montaignean thinking. No longer wary 
of the deadly truth, he is keen to dismiss any suggestion that humanity can somehow 
leave behind its animal past. In the first section, ‘Of First and Last Things’, sounding a 
distinctly Montaignean note, he ridicules the ‘pride’ through which humanity has 
‘raised [itself] above the animals’ and firmly rejects the idea that our ‘tender’ feelings in 
any way elevates us above them (HAH 11, 29). Later in the same work, he bemoans the 
power and influence of a Christian church that has placed the animals ‘too far below 
man’ (HAH 101). Leiter suggests that, as regards this transformation in Nietzsche’s 
outlook, ‘the crucial moment … was his discovery in 1866 of Friedrich Lange’s … 





 No doubt, the German materialist movement of the 
1850’s, and Lange’s writing in particular, was extremely significant for the 
development of Nietzsche’s thought. However, a legitimate objection to this line of 
argument would be that it seems difficult to understand how Nietzsche’s study of Lange 
could be considered decisive for the naturalism that is central to Human, All Too 
Human, since the earliest part of this work was published in 1878. The question is this: 
if it was Nietzsche’s discovery of History of Materialism that was crucial in turning him 
toward naturalism, why did it take more than a decade for its influence to surface in his 
philosophy?  
The evolution in Nietzsche thought that is manifest in Human, All Too Human 
stems from his rejection of the metaphysics and values of romantic pessimism. 
Montaigne is pivotal in this regard, providing a counter ideal to Schopenhauerian 
pessimism, highlighting the fundamental importance of the art of psychological 
dissection and what it uncovers about our most strongly felt moral and metaphysical 
intuitions. What is more, we are now in a position to recognize that Montaigne’s 
influence on Nietzsche’s mature philosophy is every bit as profound, in the sense that he 
points Nietzsche in the direction of the philosophical naturalism that orients his thinking 
from Human, All Too Human onward. Montaigne’s willingness not only to confront but 
celebrate humanity’s continuity with the rest of nature inspires Nietzsche to overcome 
his fear of a reality made undeniable by Darwin. Berry is thus right to argue that 
Nietzsche’s intensive reading of the Essays during the 1870’s made a ‘significant 
contribution’ to Human, All Too Human by ‘giving impetus to the naturalism’ he begins 
to develop there.
14
 But this is a very distinctive kind of naturalism, a scientian 
naturalism. 
For Leiter, Nietzsche’s embrace of a methodological naturalism is responsible 
for the admiring attitude toward science discernible in his middle works. However, even 
in Human, All Too Human, often seen as his most positivistic work, Nietzsche’s attitude 
to the scientific worldview is ambivalent, his recognition of its limitations explicit: ‘a 
higher culture must give to man a double-brain, as it were two brain-ventricles, one for 
the perceptions of science, the other for those of non-science … this is a demand of 
                                                             
13 Leiter, “Nietzsche’s Naturalism Reconsidered”, p. 579. 
14 Berry, “The Pyrrhonian Revival in Montaigne and Nietzsche”, p. 498. Berry follows Leiter in 
seeing Nietzsche as a methodological naturalist, and proposes that Pyrrhonism, as a form of 
‘naturalistic skepticism’, ‘solves the problem of how a certain sort of skeptic could be described 




health’ (HAH 251). Throughout his writing, Nietzsche’s position on the methods of 
science remains consistent: he accepts their power and usefulness, but rejects their 
applicability to all spheres of human life. This is certainly not to deny that the tone with 
which he speaks of these methods alters dramatically, from one of contempt to one of 
qualified respect. But this change of tone has less to do with a revolution in Nietzsche’s 
thinking on the methods of science than with his growing acceptance of a robust 
substantive naturalism. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche denounces the scientific 
drive to knowledge for destroying the basis of mythopoetic illusions and the 
‘metaphysical solace’ they provide. By the time of his writing Human, All Too Human, 
as a consequence of his repudiation of the ‘metaphysical need’ and any notion of 
transcendence—whether through music or religion or metaphysics—such an argument 
has lost all force for Nietzsche. This is the decisive change in his outlook. Nietzsche’s 
eventual abandonment of the notion that the artist, philosopher or saint represents a 
form of existence beyond the animal enables him to speak more sympathetically of the 
natural-scientific framework. To fully comprehend the Nietzsche of Human, All Too 
Human, it is thus necessary to realize that his main difficulty with this framework, in 
earlier works, has little to do with methodology per se; his concern, rather, is with what 
the findings of science signify for the status of humanity, and the possibility of a higher 
culture. Nietzsche, however, comes to accept the deadly truth and to affirm a naturalism 
that reflects his concerns about the ‘crudity and naivety’ of scientific thinking.  
 Such a reading is better placed to make sense of the way Nietzsche’s philosophy 
progresses after the Untimely Meditations. In setting Montaigne up as an exemplar, he 
begins to appreciate that the future of his thought, beyond Schopenhauerian pessimism, 
lies in a cheerful naturalism. Consequently, as Nietzsche’s thought develops in his 
middle works, he finds that he must distance himself from remarks in ‘Schopenhauer as 
Educator’. In The Wanderer and His Shadow, he urges us to ‘always … bear in mind 
the fundamental principle that nature never makes a leap’ (WS 198).
15
 Indeed, he comes 
to deride his earlier view, when he depicts humanity as ‘the comedian of the world’, 
owing to the hubris of believing itself to be ‘the goal and purpose of … the whole 
universe’ (WS 14). This is almost a paraphrase of Montaigne’s mocking criticism of 
humanity’s presumption in ‘An apology for Raymond Sebond’: ‘Is it possible to 
                                                             
15 Nietzsche reaffirms this position in Daybreak: ‘However high mankind may have evolved … it 
cannot pass over into a higher order, as little as the ant and the earwig can at the end of its “earthly 
course” rise up to kinship with God. … Away with such sentimentalities!’ (D 49) 
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imagine anything more laughable that that this pitiful, wretched creature should call 
[itself] Master and Emperor of a universe’ (II.12; T427, S502 [329]). Moreover, the task 
of translating humanity back into nature, which Nietzsche comes to see as fundamental 
to his philosophy, demands that we stand ‘before the rest of nature … deaf to the siren 
songs of old metaphysical bird catchers who have been piping all too long, “you are 
more, you are higher, you are of a different origin”’ (BGE 230).  
Attempting to undermine our ‘faith’ in morality, in Daybreak Nietzsche not only 
appropriates the Essays’ examination of morality as custom but he also borrows a 
typical Montaignean strategy. Montaigne’s preferred mode of attack on human 
presumption is to demonstrate that so-called higher human faculties, commonly cited in 
support of the argument for humanity’s uniqueness, are also enjoyed by forms of animal 
life. Particularly in ‘An apology for Raymond Sebond’, he catalogues the many ways in 
which animals display significant powers of reasoning, imagination and 
communication. Having offered numerous examples of the ‘natural intelligence’ of 
various animals, Montaigne asks: ‘What aspects of our human competence cannot be 
found in the activities of animals?’ (II.12; T432, S508 [332]) Nietzsche adopts this 
approach, but takes it in a direction not pursued by Montaigne, into the domain of 
morality. He proposes that there are ‘easily discoverable parallels’ between behavior in 
the ‘animal world’ and the ‘social morality’ demanded by human society, going on to 
suggest that: 
 
The beginnings of justice, as of prudence, moderation, bravery … are 
animal: a consequence of the drive which teaches us to seek food and elude 
enemies. Now if we consider that even the highest human being has only 
become more elevated … in the nature of his food and in his conception of 
what is inimical to him, it is not improper to describe the entire phenomenon 
as animal (D 26). 
 
Like Montaigne, in using this line of argument Nietzsche intends to explode the 
pretensions of traditional philosophy, as well as to naturalize the way in which we think 
about such issues, and more specifically in this case, to overcome ‘the many vain and 
overly enthusiastic interpretations’ that have sought to construct a metaphysical basis for 




Sickness in humanity 
To the extent that we have abandoned our natural means and conceived ourselves above 
and apart from nature, Montaigne diagnoses an illness in humanity. He points to the way 
in which animals live comfortably in accordance with natural law and in harmony with 
their environment, yet humans seem endlessly at war within themselves, fearful of their 
most basic instincts, ashamed of their bodies. Montaigne thus proposes that animals are 
our superiors in important respects, having much to teach us as regards ‘the most 
necessary aspects’ of our lives (III.12; T1026, S1188 [803]). And he suggests that, given 
the numerous respects in which the highest human ‘wisdom must learn from the very 
beasts’, it is obvious that ‘humanity is sick and … our reason leaves behind no manifest 
trace in nature’ (ibid.). Hence the urgency and necessity of defeating human 
presumption, as only when this sickness is acknowledged can a treatment be found. 
Nietzsche, construing the problems that face humanity in remarkably similar terms, 
places the question of humanity’s ‘health’ at the forefront of his mature works. In the 
Genealogy, echoing Montaigne, he states that human beings are ‘the most chronically 
and deeply sick of all the sick animals’ (GM 3.13). This is a claim he reiterates in The 
Anti-Christ, where, having alerted the reader to beware of the ‘vanity’ of believing that 
we are ‘the crown of creation’ and having made clear that all creatures stand beside 
humanity ‘at the same level of perfection’, Nietzsche describes human beings as the 
‘sickliest’ animal (A 14). 
For both Montaigne and Nietzsche, humanity’s ill health is due to a complex of 
causes, the symptoms observable on a variety of levels: instinctual, physiological, 
axiological, and cultural. Most crucially, humanity is sick because we have, as 
Montaigne phrases it, ‘unslaved ourselves [nous nous sommes émancipez] from Nature’s 
law’ (I.14; T58, S61 [39]). Whereas other creatures are guided by the certainty of 
instinct, human beings are burdened by the confusion and unreliability of reason, with 
the result that human action is seldom free and easy, but more often hesitant and forced, 
tainted by doubt. We have ‘lost’ our connection to ‘natural laws’, Montaigne explains, 
and ‘that fine human reason is always interfering … distorting and confounding the face 
of everything’ (II.12; T564-5, S655 [438]). Comparatively, then, humanity experiences 
suffering in a way that animals do not, suffering that, rooted in estrangement from the 
natural world, may be understood as a kind of sickness. Therefore, Nietzsche argues that 
when we say that human and animal exist on the ‘same level of perfection’, ‘we assert 
too much’, for human beings are ‘comparatively speaking … the biggest failures … the 
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… animals who have strayed the most dangerously far from their instincts’ (A 14). Both 
thinkers seem to be of one mind that this instinctual sickness is the inevitable outcome 
of the development of sophisticated forms of social organization. Montaigne implies as 
much when he states: ‘Bear-cubs and puppies manifest their natural inclinations but 
humans immediately acquire habits, laws and opinions; they easily change or adopt 
disguises’ (I.26; T148, S167 [109]). Advancing well beyond the Essays, Nietzsche, in 
the Genealogy, provides a compelling account of the process whereby the human soul 
separated from its animal past and began to suffer from ‘bad conscience’. 
Nietzsche proposes that the human being was compelled to quit nature’s law 
‘under the pressure of that most fundamental of all changes—when he found himself 
definitively locked in the spell of society and peace’ (GM 2.16). For any such society to 
be possible, the ‘human animal’ had to be bred out of forgetfulness, since only a being 
with a well-developed memory, capable of making and keeping promises, is in a 
position to recognize the claims of responsibility. Through acts of violence and 
immense cruelty, the earliest societies enforced rigid adherence to moralities of custom, 
shaping the human animal into a social human being (GM 2.1-2). From then on, all the 
pre-social animal instincts were ‘devalued and “suspended”’. Montaigne suggests that 
in humanity natural laws are obscured by the untrustworthy workings of reason. 
Nietzsche concurs to an extent, but understands the issue more broadly, as a problem to 
do with the development of consciousness: ‘they were reduced, these unfortunate 
creatures, to thinking, drawing conclusions, calculating, combining causes and effects, 
to their “consciousness”, their most meagre and unreliable organ!’ (GM 2.16) Also, 
while Montaigne acknowledges the centrality of cruelty in our psychological lives and 
is well aware of the important role that custom plays in the formation of conscience, he 
fails to explicitly link these ideas to the question of humanity’s sickness and separation 
from nature. Nietzsche, on the other hand, offers a detailed analysis of the origins of 
self-cruelty and humanity’s betrayal of its own instincts: 
 
Every instinct which does not vent itself externally turns inwards—this is 
what I call the internalization [Verinnerlichung] of man: it is at this point 
that what is later called the “soul” first develops. … Those fearful 
bulwarks by means of which the state organization protected itself against 
the old instincts of freedom … caused all the instincts of the wild, free, 
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With his account of internalization, Nietzsche reveals the intimate relationship between 
custom, cruelty and conscience, completing a picture only sketched in the Essays.  
  That instincts may no longer discharge themselves outwardly, however, is not 
the proximate cause of what he terms ‘active’ bad conscience. For Nietzsche, 
internalization is to be considered the ‘origin’ of bad conscience merely in so far as it 
created the essential conditions in which such a ‘weed’ could take root, but the growth 
of bad conscience was not by any means a necessary feature of internalization. Active 
bad conscience arises only when internalization is accompanied by another form of 
‘sickness’, more pernicious and menacing than the first, an axiological sickness, where 
the basic, animal instincts are not just ‘suspended’ but also despised and denigrated. The 
central thesis of the Genealogy is that for ‘thousands of years, a fearful struggle has 
raged on earth between the two opposed value-judgments, “good and bad” and “good 
and evil”’, master morality and slave morality, and that ‘the second value-judgment has 
long been in the ascendant’ (GM 1.16). On the Nietzschean view, it is primarily to the 
victory and rule of slave morality that we owe the existence of the phenomenon of bad 
conscience.  
Based on his genealogical analysis of the conditions underlying the development 
of morality, Nietzsche proposes that designations of ‘good’ can be traced back to the 
more fundamental concept of ‘refined’ or ‘noble’, that is, to the value judgements of 
aristocratic societies (GM 1.4). Noble individuals know nothing of the self-torture of 
bad conscience. Trusting in their instincts, they live freely and spontaneously, their 
morality one of self-affirmation. Indeed, Nietzsche claims that lurking beneath the 
surface of ‘the noble races’ are clear signs of ‘the energy’, the ‘core needs’, of ‘the 
animal’ (GM 1.11). The Genealogy details the historical process whereby the healthy 
value system of aristocratic societies has been overturned by ‘the slave revolt’ of 
‘priestly castes’ (GM 1.7). Finding its beginning in Judaism and its culmination in 
                                                             
16 At the same time, it should also be observed that, even if Nietzsche goes on to describe bad 
conscience as ‘the greatest and most sinister sickness’, his overall assessment of this phenomenon 
is not entirely negative: ‘On the other hand, let us immediately add that with the emergence of an 
animal soul turned against itself … , something so new, so deep … so enigmatic and pregnant with 
the future came into existence that the earth’s aspect was essentially altered’ (GM 2.16). In other 
words, for Nietzsche, bad conscience has paved the way for all higher human development (see 
discussion Chapter 3, Section II). 
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Christianity, this is a revolt of the weak and oppressed against the strong and successful. 
Powerless to inflict physical harm on the noble individual, and thus motivated by a 
‘sickly’ ressentiment, the slave instead, through a ‘radical transvaluation of values’, 
achieves a spiritual victory, reinterpreting everything low and impotent as ‘good’ and 
everything ‘strong, free, high-spirited’ as ‘evil’, thereby slandering the aristocratic mode 
of evaluation, infecting spontaneity and freedom with the virus of guilt (GM 1.7-11). 
For this reason, Nietzsche condemns the slave revolt in morals as a reversal that has led 
eventually to ‘the sickly softening and moralising by means of which the animal “man” 
finally learns to feel ashamed of all his instincts’ (GM 2.7).  
Together with his ideas on internalization, Nietzsche’s examination of 
ressentiment is one of the central innovations of his mature thought, revealing how 
thwarted revenge may ‘become creative and ordain values’ (GM 1.10). Donnellan 
suggests that, with his genealogical analysis of morality, Nietzsche sees himself as 
having greatly surpassed the psychological insights of the French moralists.
17
 
Nonetheless, Montaigne is acutely aware of the axiological sickness that Nietzsche 
seeks both to expose and explain. Throughout the Essays, Montaigne urges us to 
confront the issue of our unhealthy and disastrous drive to self-punishment: ‘What a 
monstrosity of an animal, who strikes terror in himself, whose pleasures are a burden to 
him and who thinks himself a curse. … We show our ingenuity only by ill-treating 
ourselves’ (III.5; T857, S994 [670]). This passage captures the essence of what 
Nietzsche understands by active bad conscience: ‘This secret self-violation … to brand 
oneself with … a contradiction, a contempt, a No, this sinister labour’ (GM 2.18). 
Furthermore, Montaigne, like Nietzsche, abhors the extent to which our basic 
inclinations, thoroughly maligned, have been ‘chased away’, such that we strive to 
escape from natural freedom into a prison of our own making (III.9; T950, S1101 
[743]).  
For Montaigne, we carry such madness of self-torture to the most extreme 
intensity when we promote values and prescribe duties that we cannot—indeed, should 
not—live up to. Sentencing ourselves to be ‘necessarily at fault’, we aspire ‘to the 
standards of a different type of being’, inevitable failure supplying an endless source of 
shame (ibid. T969, S1121 [758]). Montaigne points to the perversity of holding 
ourselves in contempt for not doing what is simply impossible for us to do. More 
                                                             
17 Donnellan. Nietzsche and the French Moralists, p. 167. 
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perverse still, he adds, is that the ‘very laws which condemn us to be unable blame us 
for being so’ (ibid.). In the Essays, Montaigne avoids discussion of Christian doctrine, 
and never criticizes religious dogma explicitly. But here we may discern a tacit critique 
of Judaeo-Christian values, the Christian understanding of sin in particular, according to 
which human beings are held culpable for ‘original sin’, as well all the sins that 
inexorably flow from inherent wickedness. Nietzsche views the notion of sin as the 
culmination of slave values and the most sinister form of bad conscience: ‘psychic 
cruelty which simply knows no equal: the will of man to find himself guilty and 
reprehensible to a point beyond the possibility of atonement’ (GM 2.22). In fact, he 
interprets the concept ‘God’ as ‘the ultimate opposing principle, representing everything 
that humanity cannot hope to be, against which we are made certain of our absolute 
unworthiness’ (ibid.). What both Montaigne and Nietzsche seek vehemently to destroy 
is the notion that humanity is intrinsically irredeemable, that we should be ashamed of 




Montaigne’s discussion of the ‘primitives’ of the new world reveals most tellingly his 
rejection of the core values—Judaeo-Christian as well as Greco-Roman—that underlie 
the European culture of his day.
18
 Thoroughly admiring, his account of the customs, 
practices and values of these peoples paints a picture that contrasts starkly, and most 
unfavourably, with the artificiality and corruption of his contemporaries. Montaigne 
views the so-called ‘savages’ as paragons of health, envying their ‘true, vigorous’ 
living, their ‘most natural and most useful properties and virtues’ (I.31; T204, S232 
[153]). The antithesis of the affectation and pretension characteristic of Europeans, at 
one with their ‘natural means’, they remain ‘close neighbours to the original state of 
nature’ (ibid.). Such primitive societies, not by any means ‘barbarous’, cultivate desires 
that are natural and necessary, disciplined by moderation. In consequence, the 
inhabitants of the New World, Montaigne implies, know nothing of the axiological 
sickness that grips their European conquerors, nothing of the self-cruelty of shame, guilt 
and sin, the bad conscience that poisons basic human instincts. On the contrary, they 
                                                             
18 In ‘On the Cannibals’, ‘the coupling of the cannibal and humanism is intended to bring to light the 
normative presuppositions and ideological underpinnings of Renaissance thought in general’ 
(Zalloua, Montaigne and the Ethics of Skepticism, p. 112). 
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establish sensible laws and impose modest duties on themselves, appropriate to their 
capacities and natural endowment. And far from seeing their lives as a ‘curse’, the 
savages celebrate and affirm their simple but rather noble existence (ibid. p. T209, S237 
[156]).  
In the Genealogy, Nietzsche writes with similar reverence of the primitive Goths 
and Vandals, from whom, he claims, the noble races of Europe are descended. Like 
Montaigne, it is the vitality and forceful spirit of these ‘barbarians’ that he praises. Both 
thinkers associate a love of war and conquest, and extraordinary bravery, with the 
barbarian way of life. Montaigne describes the savages as astonishingly ‘steadfast’ in 
battle and ready for bloodshed, as warriors who ‘do not even know the meaning of fear 
and flight’ (ibid. T207, S235 [155]). Nietzsche offers a comparable but more vivid 
portrait: ‘their indifference and contempt for safety, life and limb, comfort, their horrific 
serenity and deep pleasure in all destruction, in the sensuality of victory and cruelty’ 
(GM 1.11). For him, the ‘tame’, civilised modern European, dominated by slave values, 
stands in pale and unfortunate contrast to the vigour of the ‘predator’ human, the 
‘magnificent blond beast’ (ibid.). Nietzsche thus argues that in quite fundamental ways 
civilised humanity could be said to constitute a ‘regression’ in the species, not an 
advance. More disquieting still, he suggests that the ‘disgusting sight’ of a ‘failed’, sick 
humanity may even serve as ‘an argument against “culture” as a whole’ (ibid.). This is 
precisely the lesson that Montaigne draws from his study of the peoples of the New 
World. He finds degeneracy not in the savages but rather in the dissimulation and 
corruption of supremely civilised French culture, proposing that it is more appropriate 
to designate as ‘savage’ that which has been ‘artificially perverted’ (I.31; T203, S231 
[152]). On the question of who are the real savages, the primitives or the Europeans, 
Montaigne seems to reach no firm conclusion, but the implication is clear: ‘for either 
they must be or we must be: there is an amazing gulf between their souls and ours’ 









Section II: The Re-Naturalization of Values 
 
Axiological sickness 
It is evident from Montaigne’s account of the inhabitants of the New World that, 
notwithstanding his remarks on the many ways in which the animals surpass us, he 
certainly does not think that humanity suffers from some kind of constitutional sickness, 
forever doomed to an unfulfilled way of life. Nor does he discount the possibility of a 
uniquely human dignity, naturalistically grounded and appropriate to the beings that we 
are. For Montaigne, the return of humanity to an animal-like existence, guided by brute 
instinct, is neither possible nor desirable. As he emphasizes, the primitives are to be 
admired precisely because of the nobility of their customs and social practices, moral 
and religious as well as martial. Consequently, Montaigne finds such peoples exemplary 
not insofar as they lack all manner of civilization, but rather to the extent that they 
remain untouched by the kinds of corruption and dissimulation characteristic of his 
European contemporaries. Hence, as regards his denunciation of human presumption, 
Montaigne restricts his attack to certain forms of civilization and particular uses of 
rationality; and if he describes our alienation from natural instinct as a sickness, he also 
recognises the enormous opportunities that our higher cognitive capacities provide. 
Human reason, though limited, offers the chance to move beyond the basic liberty of 
inclination enjoyed by the animals, to a more substantial freedom: ‘[I]t has pleased God 
to bestow some slight capacity for discursive reasoning on us so that we should not be 
slavishly subject to the laws of Nature as the beasts are but should conform to them by 
our free-will and judgement’ (II.8; T366, S434 [279]).  
 Montaigne’s verdict on the human predicament is thus more positive than the 
diagnosis of sickness would suggest. Indeed, at the very same time as he stresses human 
vanity and weakness, he also urges us to realize that ‘[w]e are richer than we think, each 
of us’ (III.12; T1015, S1175 [794]). A marked feature of the Essays is the way in which 
Montaigne’s comments on human nature, often critical and contemptuous in Books I 
and II, become ever more approving in Book III, so much so, in fact, that the 
culminating essays of the volume reveal a total embrace of the human condition. As 
Frame notes, over time, Montaigne’s use of the word ‘human’ changes considerably, 
progressing from a term of mild insult to ‘an expression of his highest praise’.
19
 In this 
                                                             
19 Frame, Montaigne, p. 221. 
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regard, however, two points are worth noting. Firstly, we do well to recognize that 
Montaigne’s apparent misanthropy, especially evident in his early writing, has less to do 
with a genuine scorn for humanity than with a strategic pose adopted to further his aim 
of deflating human presumption. Consequently, in Book III of the Essays, with that aim 
achieved, Montaigne shifts focus and begins to concentrate on human strength rather 
than weakness, thereby allowing his admiration for humanity, his love of life, to come 
to the fore. Secondly, even in the midst of his most savage criticism of human folly, 
Montaigne’s monumental engagement with the historical never dims: he continues to 
insist that individual greatness is possible. Montaigne takes pride in the fact that, for all 
its absurdity, humanity, owing to its ‘slight capacity for discursive reason’, can still 
boast the emergence of an Alexander, a Cato and a Socrates from among its ranks. 
If anything, Nietzsche is even more convinced than Montaigne of the enormous 
potential for human greatness, while being no less certain of human sickness. For both 
thinkers, the processes that led to human socialization and civilization represent an 
opportunity as well as a danger. Nietzsche follows Montaigne not only in seeing our 
separation from natural instinct as regrettable in many respects but also in 
understanding that separation as a situation out of which a new, more profound kind of 
health may develop. In the Genealogy, having described internalization and the 
phenomenon of bad conscience as ‘the greatest and most sinister sickness’, he goes on 
to write: 
 
On the other hand, let us immediately add that with the emergence of an 
animal soul turned against itself …, something so new, so deep, so 
unprecedented, so enigmatic and pregnant with the future came into 
existence that the earth’s aspect was essentially altered (GM 2.16). 
 
Essentially altered in the sense that, through the internalization of instinct, the ‘whole 
inner world’ became ‘extended and expanded’, acquired depth and breadth (ibid.). What 
later became known as the human ‘soul’ began to evolve, creating new possibilities for 
existence. In addition, this deeper, broader soul boasted unique powers of cognition, 
since an animal capable of making promises had to possess, besides memory, advanced 
reasoning capacities, the ability to reflect and draw conclusions, or to use Nietzsche’s 
phrasing, the human animal had to become ‘calculable, regular, necessary’ (GM 2.1). 
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Hence, he states that humanity, despite the sickness of bad conscience, arouses ‘hope’ 
and represents ‘a great promise’ (GM 2.16).  
 Undoubtedly, then, in the Genealogy, as in the Essays, the ascription of sickness 
to humanity belies a more sanguine assessment. Such a reading is confirmed by a 
restatement of Nietzsche’s position in The Anti-Christ. Here, after making the case that 
humans are ‘the sickliest animals’, he again immediately qualifies his remarks, adding: 
‘but of course and in spite of everything the most interesting animal as well!’ (AC 14) 
In this way, Nietzsche’s comments on humanity’s sickness, like Montaigne’s, may be 
understood as partly rhetorical, designed to ridicule the vain idea, central to both Greco-
Roman and Christian thought, that human beings are the goal of creation, possessing 
unparalleled advantages over other creatures. But such comments are no mere 
provocation, as Nietzsche insists that what humanity has gained through internalization 
and the development of higher cognition has not come without great loss. Echoing 
Montaigne’s envious comments on the ease and freedom of the animals, he laments that 
‘a vast quantity of freedom’ has been ‘expelled from the world, or at least removed from 
visibility and, as it were, forcibly made latent’ (GM 2.17). However, as is obvious from 
his hope in the great promise of humanity, Nietzsche deems the cost of bad conscience a 
price worth paying, because at the end of the internalization process, as its culmination 
and final outcome, there stands what he calls the ‘sovereign individual’, a being who 
enjoys ‘a special consciousness of freedom and power’ and the true liberation of self-
mastery (GM 2.2). Without bad conscience and the sickness of self-cruelty no such 
individual would be possible, nor, for that matter, would the free spirit or the 
overhuman, or any kind of human nobility. For Nietzsche, bad conscience is the 
precondition for all higher human development: ‘Bad conscience is an illness, there is 
no doubt, but an illness in the same way that pregnancy is an illness’ (GM 2.19). 
Therefore, both Nietzsche and Montaigne, though they write often of the 
mistake of raising humanity too high above the animals, attach great significance to the 
distinctive character and special potential of humanity. In fact, both stress the immense 
value of an individual in whom this potential has been realized. For Montaigne, the sage 
who is ‘lord of himself’ and ‘entirely self-sufficient’ is to be reckoned ‘above kingdoms 
and dukedoms’ (I.42; T252, S290 [190]). Nietzsche goes even further: ‘I teach … that a 
single individual can under certain circumstances justify the existence of whole 
millennia’ (KSA 11: 27[16] (WP 997)). In consequence, as regards the task of 
translating humanity back into nature, the core issue for both thinkers is not our divorce 
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from the instinctual life of the animal, but rather the ways in which we squander the 
possibility of human greatness through the perverse values and ideals that have come to 
direct human life. What most concerns Montaigne and Nietzsche is the diagnosis, 
treatment and cure of an axiological sickness, the removal of humanity’s self-hatred and 
shame. Accordingly, in ‘On the Cannibals’, Montaigne leaves no doubt that his praise 
of the primitives, while indirectly a critique of his contemporary culture, is 
fundamentally an attack on the values of Platonism, which inform so much of Greco-
Roman thought. And Nietzsche, in the preface to the Genealogy, asserts that a value 
sickness at the heart of European culture represents ‘the danger of dangers’, and 
furthermore, that this sickness would be to blame ‘if the highest power and splendour of 




With his Heraclitean worldview, his rejection of pure rationality, metaphysical 
speculation and the unity of the soul, his immersion in the sensations and pleasures of 
the physical world, his understanding of humanity as closer to the animal than to the 
divine, Montaigne offers a philosophy that is fundamentally opposed to the outlook of 
Platonic idealism. No clearer indication of this antagonism can be found than in his 
discussion of the Republic in ‘On the Cannibals’. Montaigne feigns regret that Plato had 
no knowledge of primitive cultures such as those of the New World, and then goes on to 
ridicule Plato’s accounts of the earliest human societies, which he describes as 
‘ingenious fictions’ (I.31; T204, S232 [153]).  What is more, he claims that the natural, 
vigorous existence of the ‘savages’, so free from ‘artifice’, displaying ‘no acquaintance 
with writing, no knowledge of numbers’, greatly surpasses anything Plato could ever 
have imagined (ibid. T204, S233 [153]). Montaigne’s criticism of the Republic, 
however, goes much deeper than simply highlighting its naive anthropological 
speculations. More importantly, he argues that what is known of the peoples of the 
Americas must lead us to question ‘the very conceptions and yearnings of philosophy’ 
(ibid.). Montaigne forces us to consider the stark contrast between what he later calls 
‘humours soaring to transcendency [humeurs transcendantes]’ and the raw, physical, 
unadorned existence of the primitives (III.13; T1096, S1268 [856]). He implies that, 
when looked at beside the Republic, the unashamedly earthly orientation of these 
peoples throws the absurdities of Platonic metaphysics into the sharpest possible relief. 
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For Montaigne, there is a great deal more wisdom to be discerned in lives lived 
according to our natural condition than in the Platonic ideal of a disembodied existence, 
disengaged from the sensual and the earthly, solely devoted to intellectual 
contemplation. 
 Montaigne evinces nothing but contempt for any view that would see the 
journey to truth and goodness as passing through self-denial and detachment from the 
material world. Although he often offers Socrates as a philosophical exemplar, chiefly 
in Book III of the Essays, Montaigne ultimately rejects the Socratic understanding of 
the philosophical life, expressed most famously in the Phaedo: ‘the soul of the 
philosopher most disdains the body, flees from it and seeks to be by itself’ (65d). 
Whereas Socrates would have us purify the soul from any taint of the body, Montaigne 
recommends that we ‘go to the very boundaries of pleasure’ (I.39; T240, S276 [181]). 
The Essays represent nothing less than an anti-ascetic manifesto. As Quint puts it, 
Montaigne ‘refuses categorically … to suppress any passion’.
20
 Also, whether 
discussing Greco-Roman or Christian practices, he strives to show asceticism in an 
absurd light. Montaigne repeatedly ridicules Stoic techniques of self-cultivation, 
whereby the individual anticipates misfortune and, for a period of time, in order to 
become accustomed to hardship, voluntarily lives a life or extreme discomfort—an 
approach he mockingly describes as akin to donning ‘your fur coat on Midsummer’s 
Day, because you will need it at Christmas’ (III.12; T1027, S1189 [803]). Equally 
opposed to ascetic strains of thought within the Christian tradition, he advises the reader 
to stay clear of ‘contemplative and non-material’ exercises of worship (III.8; T909, 
S1054 [710]). Hence, as the Essays develop, Montaigne seeks to overturn the values of 
asceticism, to repudiate the notion that the highest human ideal is that which takes us 
away from the body and the earthly. Anything but exemplary, asceticism represents the 
vain and unnatural desire to transcend the human, the most sinister form of 
presumption: ‘A man can be as wise as he likes: he is still a man. … Wisdom cannot 
force our natural properties’ (II.2; T328, S388 [249]). 
 Determined to place humanity back within the natural world, Montaigne’s anti-
idealism and anti-asceticism are central elements in his naturalizing project, and go 
hand in hand with his denunciation of our perverse capacity for guilt and bad 
conscience. He aims to replace unnatural, impossible ideals—which necessarily cannot 
                                                             
20 Quint, “Letting Oneself Go”, p. 126. 
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be followed and thus become engines of self-loathing—with naturalistic ideals that, free 
of any notion of transcendence, honour earthly life. Nietzsche follows Montaigne in 
rejecting the kind of otherworldly ideals that have come to dominate the Western 
philosophical and religious traditions. In Ecce Homo, he states that, if we are to move 
onto ‘the correct path’, we must recognize that, hitherto, humanity has been ‘in the 
worst hands’, guided by ‘slanderers of the world and desecrators of humanity’ (EH, ‘D’ 
2). Furthermore, Montaigne and Nietzsche not only diagnose the same axiological 
sickness but they also agree on its primary cause: Platonism in all its various forms and 
guises. Nietzsche consistently frames his thought as directly opposed to philosophies 
that take us away from the real, the actual, and the present. In The Gay Science, he 
insists that the ‘philosophers of the future’ must be ‘sensualists’, not idealists (GS 372). 
Beyond Good and Evil opens with the claim that the fate of European culture will be 
determined by the outcome of a centuries long ‘fight against Plato’ (BGE P). But the 
most succinct expression of Nietzsche’s anti-Platonism comes in the Genealogy: ‘Plato 
versus Homer: that is the complete, the real, antagonism—on the one side, the sincerest 
“man of the beyond”, the philosopher who most defames life; on the other, the poet who 
involuntarily deifies it’ (GM 3.25). 
 If Nietzsche judges Homer the poet who most deifies life, he considers 
Montaigne the most exemplary this-worldly philosopher—as his remarks in 
‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ make plain. An exception among the great thinkers of the 
past, Montaigne finds his true ‘home’ in the bodily existence of earthly life. He rejects 
the ‘melancholy’ conclusion about life reached by Socrates and the ‘wisest men in every 
age’: that ‘it’s no good’ (TI 2.1). On the contrary, Montaigne assigns ultimate value to 
earthly existence. Commenting on the practice of condemning so-called ‘witches’ to 
death based on dubious testimony, he states: ‘To kill people, there must be sharp and 
brilliant clarity; this life of ours is too real, too fundamental, to be used to guarantee 
these supernatural and imagined events’ (III.11; T1009, S1167 [789]). Both Nietzsche 
and Montaigne deplore the extent to which humanity has come to question the 
fundamental nature of earthly life, to devalue the reality of human life as a merely 
apparent existence, inventing ascetic ideals through which we believe the transcendence 
of human limitations is possible, and the attainment of a higher truth beyond illusion. 
The prevalence of such ideals in humanity’s history prompts the following outburst 




[Y]ou can find many men who, to rise above their fellows, never allow 
themselves to be seen eating a meal … ; they slash and disfigure their faces 
and limbs and never talk to anyone—fanatics all—folks who believe they 
are honouring their nature by defacing it; … who seek to make themselves 
better by making themselves worse. … [T]hey shun health and happiness as 
harmful and inimical qualities. … There are not merely several sects but 
whole peoples for whom birth is a curse, death a blessing (III.5; T857, S994 
[670]). 
 
And here is Nietzsche in the Genealogy summing up what ascetic ideals express: ‘this 
hatred of the human, and even more of the animal, of the material, this revulsion from 
the senses … this fear of happiness and beauty, this yearning to pass beyond all 
appearance, change, becoming’ (GM 3.28). 
 While Montaigne remains content to denounce the unnatural ideals that 
humanity has set on high, Nietzsche goes further and probes the ‘meaning’ of such 
ideals. On the Nietzschean account, the supremacy of ascetic ideals has everything to do 
with the victory of Christian slave values. After all, slave values promote shame and the 
self-torture of bad conscience, and decry all that is powerful, healthy, and successful. 
Such values find their culmination in the self-denial and the fear of pleasure and 
happiness that are constitutive of ascetic ideals. Ascetic ideals, in other words, are the 
natural outgrowth of slave values. And as regards the predominance of such values, 
Platonism is again the crucial factor. Through the early Church Fathers, Augustine in 
particular, Christianity appropriated much of Plato’s idealist philosophy. Therefore, in 
Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche states that in ‘the great disaster of Christianity, Plato 
represents that ambiguity … that made it possible for the nobler natures of antiquity to 
misunderstand themselves and step out onto the bridge that leads to the “cross”’ (TI 
10.2). Indeed, in Beyond good and Evil he suggests that Christianity may be best 
understood as a plebeian form of idealist philosophy, as a ‘Platonism for the “the 
people”’ (BGE P). At any rate, in terms of the relationship between slave values and 
ascetic ideals, what ‘ultimately explains the triumph of slave morality is the same thing 
that explains the triumph of the ascetic ideal—the ability to give meaning to 
suffering’.
21
 For the slave, impotence and weakness are good because they guarantee 
                                                             
21 Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, p. 268.  
116 
 
reward in a heavenly beyond; for the ascetic, self-denial and renunciation of earthly life 
are good because they pave the way to the highest truth. But as Nietzsche stresses, the 
meaning that ascetic ideals offer humanity amounts to little more than a pyrrhic victory 
over suffering, since such ideals explain suffering through the creation of even greater 
suffering. Ascetic ideals save humanity from meaninglessness only by ‘bringing all 
suffering under the perspective of guilt’ and, through a grave mistrust of the instincts, 






For Nietzsche, the success of this rebellion has led to the denigration of the central 
features of earthly life, a complete denaturalization of values. Everything human has 
been deemed worthy of contempt, shameful: the senses as corrupt, the body as 
repulsive, sexuality as wicked. Our highest ideals, with their focus on the otherworldly, 
on the overcoming of the human in favour of the divine, force us to despair of the real 
and the actual, to condemn the earth according to unnatural standards: ‘If one detaches 
an ideal from reality one debases the real, one impoverishes it, one slanders it’ (KSA 
12: 10[194] (WP 298)). Locating worth solely in the transcendent, and so a testament to 
human vanity, ascetic ideals take us away from the immanent beauty of life, draining 
the world of value. They cause us to mistake ourselves, to imagine humanity as apart 
from nature, obscuring beyond recognition ‘the basic text of homo natura’. 
Furthermore, such ideals, Nietzsche says, promote the ‘art of alchemy in reverse, the 
devaluation of what is most valuable’—the devaluation of instinct, desire, pleasure, 
beauty (GS 292). In this way, the values that have risen to highest importance for 
humanity betray a total opposition to all that binds us to the physical world, a 
circumstance Montaigne well-appreciated: ‘False opinions and ignorance of the good 
have poured so many strange desires into us that they have chased away almost all the 
natural ones’ (II.12; T450, S526 [346]).  
                                                             
22 While both thinkers reject asceticism as an end in itself, as the supreme ideal, they are far from 
denying the importance of asceticism as a means: both Montaigne and Nietzsche see self-control, 
self-discipline and self-mastery as essential to the highest form of human existence. For the return 
to nature they have in mind ‘is not really a going-back as much as a [coming-up—up into] a high, 
free, even terrible nature and naturalness [translation altered]’ (TI 9.48). And this ‘higher’ 
naturalness involves moving beyond the self-tyranny characteristic of traditional, ascetic models of 
virtue to a form of self-mastery that aspires to suppleness and spontaneity in thought and action 




Through their respective projects of re-naturalization, both thinkers aim to 
counteract unhealthy desires of transcendence and destroy the notion that the best 
human life is one that strives for emancipation from the earthly. Nietzsche’s Dionysian 
attitude represents ‘the highest affirmation’ of life, a ‘saying yes to reality’, and directly 
opposes ‘the degenerate instinct that turns against life with subterranean vindictiveness 
(—Christianity, Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and … Plato’s philosophy, the whole of 
idealism as typical forms)’ (EH, ‘BT’ 2). The Dionysian way of life rejects the principal 
teaching of these various idealisms: earthly life must be redeemed. Time and again, 
Nietzsche casts his move away from Wagner and Schopenhauer, his ‘recovery’ from 
romantic pessimism, as an overcoming of the need for redemption. Consequently, in 
The Case of Wagner, he claims that there ‘is nothing Wagner has thought more deeply 
about than redemption: his operas are the operas of redemption’ (CW 3). And in 
Twilight of the Idols, he proposes that Schopenhauer is ‘heir to the Christian 
interpretation’, in his understanding of ‘the great cultural facts of humanity … as paths 
to “redemption”, as preliminary versions of “redemption”, as ways of stimulating the 
need for “redemption”’ (TI 9.21). But Schopenhauerian pessimism, the view that we 
can be saved from suffering only by a negation of the will to life, has its basis in a 
completely de-naturalized mode of evaluation. Schopenhauer’s pessimistic conclusions 
retain their force only for so long as one accepts his core assumption that the senses and 
the body merely grant us access to a ‘repudiated world’.  
 No pessimist, Montaigne affirms and celebrates all aspects of human life. No 
ascetic, he situates the demands of the body at the very centre of his philosophy: 
pleasure and sensuality are natural goods to be enjoyed, not evil temptations to be 
conquered. Nietzsche raises Montaigne above Schopenhauer as a philosophical 
exemplar not just because the Essays represent the antithesis to any kind of pessimistic 
asceticism. Nietzsche also sees in Montaigne’s thought the signal feature of the 
Dionysian attitude: a disavowal of the language of redemption. Thoroughly at home in 
this world, Montaigne, in contrast to Schopenhauer and Wagner, refuses to see everyday 
human existence as a means to the end of something higher, as devoid of intrinsic value 
in its own right. From the perspective of Montaigne’s re-naturalized conception of 
humanity, it is simply ‘unbelievable’ that, among all living things, ‘we alone should 
have been brought forth in a deficient and necessitous state’ (I.36; T222, S253 [166]). 
Through his reading of the Essays, Nietzsche comes to understand that our craving for 
escape from the human, our dissatisfaction with the earthly, is fuelled by a de-
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naturalized, de-humanized measure of valuation. The duties we prescribe for ourselves 
and the values we attempt to live by simply bear no relation to the reality of our natural 
capacities, and so we end up tailoring our ‘obligations to the standards of a different 
kind of being’ (III.9; T969, S1121 [758]). Our inevitable inability to live up to these 
unnatural obligations ultimately prompts the invention of absurd ideas of transcendence. 
We thus find Seneca exclaiming: ‘Oh what a vile and abject thing is Man, if he does not 
rise above humanity’ (II.12; T588, S683 [457]). Montaigne deems such a demand not 
only ‘impossible’ but ‘monstrous’ (ibid.). Accordingly, in his final essay, ‘On 
experience’, he urges us to ‘embrace’ philosophical positions that are ‘most human, 
most ours’ (III.13; T1094, S1265 [855]). If we are to lead ourselves back to conformity 
with the rest of nature and develop a healthy acceptance of our bodily existence, 
Montaigne suggests that we must learn to leave behind the depraved notion that this life 
should be lived for the sake of redemption from the earthly: ‘Life must be its own 
objective, its own purpose. Its right concern is to rule itself’ (III.12; T1028, S1191 
[805]). 
 Montaigne seeks a complete revaluation of values, the re-naturalization of the 
human, and this ‘enormous project’ involves ‘redirecting human concerns from 
transcendent goods to earthly ones’.
23
 The Essays call for a reorientation in our 
perspective: away from life-denying, otherworldly ideals, ideals that dishonour earthly 
life by promoting the false promise of redemption, and towards the unconditional 
affirmation both of the natural world and humanity’s place within it: ‘The more simply 
we entrust ourselves to Nature the more wisely we do so’ (III.13; T1050, S1218 [822]). 
In this way, Montaigne overturns the key presuppositions of the Greco-Roman 
philosophical tradition—the supremacy of the soul over the body, self-denial over 
pleasure, reason over passion and instinct. We can thus see that, as regards his critical 
engagement with the historical, Montaigne deploys naturalism as his most powerful 
weapon. Invariably, his attacks on Stoicism and Platonism reveal their anti-natural 
foundations, the way in which they misconceive the human as a supremely rational, 
semi-divine being above the rest of creation. By contrast, if he were to have founded a 
school of philosophy, Montaigne says he would have taken another route, ‘a more 
natural one, that is to say, a more convenient and inviolate one’ (I.30; T198, S226 
[148]). A constant refrain of the Essays is that we must submit to ‘Nature’ as our guide, 
                                                             
23 Schaefer, The Political Philosophy of Montaigne, p. 308. 
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that any legitimate philosophy must conform to nature’s wisdom, since its authority is 
absolute, surpassing the dictates of  ‘reason or Stoic virtue’ (II.2; T328, S388 [250]). 
Therefore, as opposed to idealist philosophies that denounce the body and strive to 
weaken our relationship to the natural world, Montaigne’s naturalized philosophy 
represents an attempt to affirm and strengthen our bonds to the earth. In fact, it 
represents much more than that, for at times in the Essays we find nature deified, 
described as a goddess: ‘our great and powerful Mother’ (I.31; T203, S232 [152]). 
Concluding his writing project, Montaigne seems almost to be engaged in an act of 
worship, exhorting the reader to return to ‘Nature’ and ‘readily follow’ her commands, 
giving thanks for all that she has done for him: ‘I accept wholeheartedly and thankfully 
what Nature has done for me’ (III.13; T1093-4, S1265 [855]).  
 The extent to which these Montaignean themes come to the fore in Nietzsche’s 
mature thought is striking. Often it seems as though the Nietzschean task of translating 
humanity back into nature begins where the Montaignean revaluation leaves off. While 
Montaigne advises that we entrust ourselves to nature, Nietzsche, through the mouth of 
Zarathustra, states: ‘I beseech you, my brothers, stay true to the earth’ (Z P3).
24
 Counter 
to ascetic ideals that denigrate earthly life by promoting dreams of escape and 
transcendence, Zarathustra calls for a ‘new pride’ that will create ‘a sense for the earth’ 
(Z 1.3). Like Montaigne, Nietzsche aims to overturn feelings of shame toward the 
human and the natural, to foster esteem toward all the things of this world. He aims to 
replace slave values that moralize and condemn natural instincts with ‘naturalistic 
values’ that help to alleviate bad conscience (KSA 12: 9[8] (WP 462)). Nietzsche also 
follows Montaigne in deifying the natural world, in seeing the earth as the ultimate 
source of meaning, as sacred: ‘Sacrilege against the earth is now the most terrible thing, 
and to revere the entrails of the unfathomable more than a sense of the earth’ (Z P3). For 
when hopes of otherworldly redemption are left behind, ‘the earth and nature become 
the proper locus of the sacred’.
25
 An unqualified affirmation of the natural world—
including humanity, as a part of nature—thus forms the basis of Nietzsche’s mature 
philosophy. More significant still, Part Three of Zarathustra ends, like the Essays, on a 
religious note of worship. On Lampert’s reading, in ‘The Other Dance-Song’, 
Zarathustra intimates the reappearance of Dionysus, a god of earthly joy and 
                                                             
24 ‘The term “earth” or “the earthly” [Erde oder das Irdische] is to be found everywhere in 
Zarathustra’ (De Bleeckere, “‘Also sprach Zarathustra’: Die Neugestaltung der ‘Geburt der 
Tragödie’”, p. 282). 
25 Parkes, “Nature and the Human ‘Redivinised’”, p. 184. 
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celebration. At the centre of Nietzsche’s late works is a call for the end of otherworldly 
forms of spirituality and the ‘return of the earthly religion of Dionysus’.
26
 
 The re-deification of nature and restoration of sacredness to earthly life 
constitutes a complete revaluation of the ideals that have dominated post-Socratic 
Western philosophy. Therefore, in The Gay Science, Nietzsche writes: ‘What do you 
believe in—In this: that the weight of all things must be determined anew’ (GS 269). 
Once humanity re-naturalizes and invests all value in the here and now of this world, a 
new attitude to the earth becomes appropriate: gratitude. Nietzsche would see in 
Montaigne’s wholehearted thanks to nature the essence of a noble religious disposition: 
‘What is amazing about the religiosity of the ancient Greeks is the enormous abundance 
of gratitude it exudes: it is a very noble type of man that confronts nature and life in this 
way’ (BGE 49). For both thinkers, strivings for the beyond must give way to the 
honouring of the near, resulting in an entirely altered understanding of the meaning of 
redemption. In The Wanderer and His Shadow, Nietzsche describes the many ‘chains’ 
that ‘have been laid upon man … those heavy and pregnant errors contained in the 
conceptions of morality, religion and metaphysics’ (WS 350). From this perspective, 
Platonist doctrines, far from pointing the way to transcendence, drag us down into 
greater suffering, leading us away from the earth, the true and only source of meaning. 
But when these chains are broken and a religion of earthly gratitude takes hold, we 
come to realize that, although human existence may not have the value we once thought 
it had, in the sense of partaking of the divine, it is certainly not ‘worth less’ (GS 346). 
Consequently, we find Montaigne rejecting Plato’s world of Forms in favour of the 
earthly ‘perfection’ of the primitives. Redeemed from the need for redemption, they 
have achieved ‘that great accomplishment of knowing how to enjoy their mode-of-being 
in happiness and to be content with it [de savoir heureusement jouir de leur condition et 
s'en contenter]’ (I.31; T209, S237 [156]). On this view, the real and fundamental joys 
and pleasures of this life, when valued from a completely naturalized perspective, 





                                                             
26 Lampert, Nietzsche’s Teaching, p. 256. 
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Naturalism and scepticism 
Having discussed our thinkers’ experimentalism, scientian naturalism and 
condemnation of denaturalized values, I now return to the matter of their scepticism. 
Berry argues that we may understand Pyrrhonian scepticism as ‘motivating’ 
Montaigne’s naturalism, and that this Pyrrhonian-inspired naturalism is a major 
influence behind the ‘naturalistic turn’ in Nietzsche’s middle works.
27
 There are a 
number of problems with this account. The first and most obvious difficulty is that 
‘Pyrrhonian scepticism is hardly ever found in Nietzsche’s early and middle works’.
28
 
Secondly, it glosses over everything Nietzsche has to say on Pyrrhonism, both in his 
middle and late works. As discussed earlier, he regards a complete suspension of 
judgement and the goal of ataraxia as fundamentally life-denying. Thirdly, Nietzsche, 
clearly, does not see Montaigne as a Pyrrhonist, never portraying him as a decadent or 
as anything like a ‘fanatic of mistrust’. Finally, it ignores not only Montaigne’s quest 
for self-knowledge and the many contra-sceptical passages of the Essays but also his 
explicit statements on Pyrrhonism.  
 To come to terms with Montaigne’s scepticism, Berry proposes that we look to 
the ‘Apology’ as ‘a representative essay’.
29
 But this we certainly should not do, since 
the ‘Apology’ shows Montaigne at his most hyperbolic and rhetorical; here he uses 
every means at his disposal to attack human presumption. To take Montaigne’s 
comments on Pyrrhonism in the ‘Apology’ as a serious statement of his own view ‘is to 
mistake his means for his … polemical ends’.
30
 What we find in the ‘Apology’ is ‘not 
an affirmation of Pyrrhonism but a repudiation of dogmatism’: Montaigne is merely 
‘playing Pyrrhonist’.
31
 This becomes clear when one looks to his explanation of the 
central Pyrrhonian doctrine, an explanation which, as Schaefer points out, ‘contains 
more than a hint of ridicule’:
32
 ‘If you can picture an endless confession of ignorance … 
then you can conceive what Pyrrhonism is. … I have tried to explain this notion as 
clearly as I can, because many find it hard to grasp, and its very authors present it … 
rather obscurely’ (II.12; T485, S563 [374]). Further on in the ‘Apology’, Montaigne all 
but admits that his use of Pyrrhonism is merely strategic, when he describes the most 
extreme arguments of the essay as ‘the ultimate rapier-stroke … employed as a remedy 
                                                             
27 Berry, Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition, p. 84. 
28 Urs Sommer, “Nihilism and Skepticism in Nietzsche”, p. 260. 
29 Berry, Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition, p. 81. 
30 Regosin, The Matter of My Book, p. 56. 
31 Frame, Montaigne, p. 175. 
32 Schaefer, The Political Philosophy of Montaigne, p. 83. 
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of last resort, in which you must surrender your own arms to force your opponent to 
lose his’ (ibid. T540, S628 [419]). And once Pyrrhonism has served his polemical ends 
and human presumption has been thoroughly destroyed, Montaigne quickly abandons 
its teaching of ‘ignorance’. In a later essay, ‘On freedom of conscience’, Pyrrhonism, 
and more especially the life of Pyrrho, become a subject of mockery, with Montaigne 
providing details of Pyrrho’s ‘incredible’ doubt, the way his friends would have to 
prevent him from walking off cliffs and bumping into objects, owing to his conviction 
that ‘the feebleness of human judgement [is] so extreme as to be unable to incline 
towards any decision or persuasion’ (II.29; T683-4, S800 [533]). 
 While neither Montaigne nor Nietzsche adopts the doctrines of Pyrrhonism 
wholesale, they do follow that school of thought in two important respects. The first has 
to do with a refusal of dogmatism and a fear of ‘convictions’—with the freedom to 
doubt all things. For Schaefer, this is the ‘key point’ of Montaigne’s examination of 
ancient scepticism.
33
 And there can be no better presentation of this sceptical attitude 
than in Nietzsche’s Anti-Christ: ‘Make no mistake about it: great spirits are sceptics. … 
[T]he freedom that comes from strength … of spirit proves itself through scepticism. … 
The freedom from every sort of conviction, being able to see freely is part of strength’  
(AC 54). Such freedom leads to a second sceptical quality: a certain ‘caution’ in 
inferring, a suspicion of the unconditional.
34
 But this is not the severe caution of the 
Pyrrhonist, where belief can rise to no higher level than that of opinion. With 
Montaigne and Nietzsche we have a new form of scepticism, one that could be 
described as ‘experimental’ rather than Pyrrhonian.
35
 Experimental in the sense that, 
even if both reject the idea of absolute knowledge or ultimate truth, they see a legitimate 
role for experiential knowledge and a route out of scepticism via experience and 
empiricism.
36
 Experimental scepticism allows for the pursuit of a qualified, always 
                                                             
33 Ibid. 
34 Bett, “Nietzsche on the Skeptics and Nietzsche as Skeptic”, p. 77. 
35 Urs Sommer, “Nihilism and Skepticism in Nietzsche”, p. 262. John O’ Brien argues that ‘skepticism 
in Montaigne’s hands is not a means for casting indiscriminate doubt upon everything … but a 
method of enquiry, a way of judging and weighing dogmatic assertions of many kinds’ (“Montaigne 
and antiquity”, p. 61). Given Montaigne’s clear repudiation of Pyrrhonism, some scholars claim that 
‘his epistemological position most closely resembles that of the Academic Sceptics’ (Levine, Sensual 
Philosophy, p. 38). The Academic Sceptics, while ruling out the possibility of certain knowledge, still 
hold that some things may be held to be more probable than others. But this form of scepticism is 
no better placed to capture Montaigne’s position, since here also a complete suspension of 
judgment is sought, leading to ataraxia.  
36 Unlike the Pyrronhists, Montaigne does not seriously question the ‘apparent facts of experience’: 
‘For us there is absolutely nothing more absurd than to say that fire is not hot; that light does not 
illuminate. … Those are notions conveyed to us by our senses. There is no belief in man of 
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provisional form of knowledge. Consequently, just as Montaigne is forever ‘assaying’ 
himself, testing his natural faculties and learning the lessons of experience, we find 
Nietzsche declaring: ‘I approve of any form of scepticism to which I can reply “Let’s 
try it!” But I want to hear nothing more about all the things and questions that don’t 
admit of experiment’ (GS 51). Such a scepticism—denying dogmatic certainty but 
always welcoming a new approach—opens up the possibility of endless experiment and 
enquiry, an infinity of interpretations (GS 374).
37
 Indeed, on the Montaignean view, in 
the ‘hunt for knowledge’, ‘[i]t is only our individual weakness that makes us satisfied 
with what has been discovered by others or by ourselves’, for ‘[t]here is always … a 




Nietzsche envisions what he calls a ‘stronger type of scepticism’, where the 
‘conscience’ fears neither a defiant ‘No’ nor a ‘Yes that is decisive and hard’, a 
scepticism that is ‘more dangerous and harder’ than the Pyrrhonian and the Academic, 
one that ‘does not believe but does not lose itself in the process’ (BGE 208, 209). In 
other words, ‘the experimental skepticism favoured by Nietzsche is completely different 
from … retreatist Pyrrhonism, with its complete refusal to make a judgment’.
39
 In fact, 
Nietzsche claims that his ‘philosophers of the future’ could equally be called ‘critics’: 
‘they love to experiment’, but ‘these philosophers [also] admit to taking pleasure in 
saying no’ (BGE 210). Undoubtedly, Montaigne shares a great deal with the 
philosopher as sceptic and critic. A work of sustained self-testing and experimentation, 
the Essays critically engage the Greco-Roman tradition: Montaigne says ‘no’ to 
Stoicism, Platonism and Pyrrhonism, says ‘no’ decisively to ascetic ideals. Nietzsche’s 
conception of the ‘philosopher of the future’, however, is more expansive than sceptic 
and critic, embracing not just these roles, but also a third, that of value-creator. 
Philosophy for Nietzsche is much more than ‘criticism and critical science’; the critic 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
comparable certainty’ (II.12; T572, S664 [444]). Consequently, Montaigne ‘ushers in a new 
“positive” view of skepticism that is irreducible to ancient Pyrrhonian models’ (Raga Rosaleny, “The 
Current Debate about Montaigne’s Skepticism”, p. 60). 
37 While Montaigne believes that a form of progressive knowledge is possible, we find no coherent 
epistemology in the Essays. Nietzsche, by contrast, offers us an epistemological doctrine: 
perspectivism. Based on a radical critique of knowledge and thus informed by a sceptical attitude, 
perspectivism entails that all knowledge claims are conditional, partial and situational. Montaigne 
at times gestures toward, but never articulates, a perspectival account of knowledge. 
38 In this way, experimental scepticism retains the zeteticism of the Pyrrhonian ‘framework’: 
assuming ‘the contingency and uncertainty of every assertion’, experimental scepticism constitutes 
an open-ended and never-to-be-completed mode of enquiry (Tournon, “Suspense philosophique et 
ironie”, pp. 46, 51). 
39 Urs Sommer, “Nihilism and Skepticism in Nietzsche”, p. 263. 
124 
 
should be seen merely as an ‘instrument’ of the philosopher-creator (BGE 210). With 
this notion of the philosopher as ‘commander and legislator’ (BGE 211), Nietzsche 
makes a radical break from the ancient sceptics, insofar as ‘the task of creating values 
requires a psychological attitude that is anything but suspensive. It requires a kind of 
imposing oneself on the world’.
40
 And again we may see such a move prefigured in 
Montaigne, with his determination to re-naturalize humanity through the cultivation of 
earthly ideals and the creation of naturalistic values. Montaigne, it would appear, 
exemplifies this ‘stronger scepticism’.  
 Yet in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche associates Montaigne with weakness, 
depicting him as ‘a delicate creature … [who] is frightened all too easily’ (BGE 208). 
Perhaps, for Nietzsche’s taste, Montaigne’s ‘no’ to philosophies of denial is too muted, 
his ‘yes’ to life and to naturalism too indecisive. After all, Montaigne’s criticism and 
yes-saying come to us from behind a conservative mask. Unlike Nietzsche, he is simply 
not in a position to offer his readers the kind of ‘certainty of value standards’ that 
Beyond Good and Evil recommends (BGE 210). But perhaps Nietzsche overstates his 
distance from Montaigne in order to emphasize his own truly unique conception of the 
philosophical life, a conception that has value-creation as the main and distinctive task 
of the philosopher. For the judgment on Montaigne’s scepticism in Beyond Good and 
Evil is somewhat at odds with a far more positive evaluation in an unpublished note 
from the previous year (1885), where he praises Montaigne’s ‘brave and [good-natured] 
[tapfere und frohmüthige]’ scepticism (KSA 11: 36[7] (WP 367)).
41
 Furthermore, it 
seems to clash with later comments in Ecce Homo, where, after describing sceptics as 
‘the only respectable types among the philosophical tribes’, Nietzsche singles 
Montaigne out for special mention, claiming that he has some of the essayists’ 
‘mischief’ in his spirit (EH 2.3). This may well represent an admission that Montaigne, 
too, embodies a ‘scepticism of audacious manliness’ (BGE 209).  
 Finally, Berry argues that Montaigne and Nietzsche’s scepticism motivates their 
naturalism; however, the direction of influence runs in the opposite direction: it is their 
naturalism—more specifically, their view of the human being as fundamentally 
embodied, as body through and through—that informs their epistemological outlook. In 
the ‘Apology’, Montaigne’s sceptical assault on knowledge begins with the recognition 
that ‘[o]ur senses are privileged to be the ultimate frontiers of our perception: beyond 
                                                             
40 Bett, “Nietzsche on the Skeptics and Nietzsche as Skeptic”, p. 79. 
41 Translation altered. 
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this there is nothing’ (II.12; T573, S664-5 [444]). Our five senses, that is, form ‘the 
ultimate boundary of our faculty of knowledge’ (ibid.). And as regards attaining true 
knowledge of the world, this situation presents insurmountable difficulties, since, as he 
has earlier observed, ‘[h]uman eyes [like each of the other senses] can only perceive 
things in accordance with such Forms as they know’ (ibid. T516, S600 [399]). 
Montaigne goes on to speculate that there might well be other animals with additional 
‘sense-faculties’ that ‘enjoy a fuller life, a more complete life than we do’ (ibid. T574, 
S666 [445]). He concludes the ‘Apology’ by reasserting that ‘a man … can see only 
with his own eyes, grasp only with his own grasp’ (ibid. T588, S683 [457]). If we look 
now to Daybreak, the extent to which Nietzsche follows this line of thinking is 
remarkable. In a section entitled ‘In prison’, he states: 
 
My eyes … can only see a certain distance, and it is within the space 
encompassed by this distance that I live and move. … [I]t is by these horizons, 
within which each of us encloses his senses as if behind prison walls, that we 
measure the world (D 117). 
 
And later, in Book V, he has this to say: 
 
Learn to know! Yes! But always as a man! … Never to be able to see into 
things out of any other eyes but these? And what uncountable kinds of 














Section III: Body Philosophy 
 
I who am always down-to-earth in my handling of anything loathe that 
inhuman wisdom which seeks to render us disdainful and hostile toward the 
care of our bodies. I reckon that it is as injudicious to set our minds against 
natural pleasures as to allow them to dwell on them. … I … sedulously 
welcome the pleasures of this life (III.13; T1086, S1256 [849]). 
 
Inhuman wisdom 
To be considered legitimate, any religion of earthly gratitude would have to advocate a 
wholehearted embrace of our corporeal condition. Accordingly, in the philosophies of 
Montaigne and Nietzsche, we find the body consecrated, presented as the ultimate 
source of joy and happiness. The translation of humanity back into nature and re-
conception of the human as animal and mortal compel us to acknowledge the 
fundamentally embodied nature of our existence. Through our bodies, we are united not 
only with the rest of animal life but also with all the features of the natural world. 
However, thanks to the predominance of denaturalized values and ascetic ideals, the 
importance of the body has long been denied, the text of homo natura overlaid with 
interpretations that stress the wickedness of the senses and the evils of the flesh, 
promoting alienation from sensuous experience. Consequently, for both thinkers, the re-
naturalization of values centrally involves a reconsideration of the status of the body; 
they both seek a complete reappraisal of the body’s role in the search for self-
knowledge and the attainment of wisdom. For, inevitably, when the earth becomes a 
sacred domain and thoughts of transcendence are left behind, our most basic bodily 
instincts, passions and desires attain a new weight and validity.  
Montaigne’s opposition to the ‘inhuman wisdom’ of philosophies that condemn 
the body pervades the Essays. In contrast to the Socratic view, which understands the 
body as an obstacle to true knowledge, as something the soul must disregard and detach 
itself from, Montaigne repeatedly advises us to heed the wisdom of bodily needs and 
immerse ourselves in the pleasures of the senses. In ‘On solitude’, feigning mediocrity 
by referring to his ‘commonplace’ soul, he states: ‘Wiser men with a strong and 
vigorous soul can forge for themselves a tranquillity which is wholly spiritual. … I must 
help sustain myself with pleasures of the body’ (I.39; T241, S276 [182]). For 
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Montaigne, the body must not be dominated by the soul, but valued on equal terms, and 
granted the utmost significance in any philosophical way of life. As a consequence, if 
he is certain of anything, it is of the madness of striving to separate the physical and the 
mental: ‘The body is a major part of our being. … Those who wish to take our two 
principal pieces apart and to sequester one from the other are wrong. We must on the 
contrary couple and join them closely together’ (II.17; T622, S726-7 [484]). For this 
reason, from the perspective of Montaigne’s down-to-earth philosophy, achieving a 
‘harmonious’ balance between body and soul represents the very essence of wisdom 
(ibid.). And when considering those who reject such wisdom, those who, ‘from an 
uncouth sensibility, hold bodily pleasures in disgust’, he struggles to restrain his 
contempt, asking, (for the most) rhetorically: ‘Why do they not also give up breathing?’ 
(III.13; T1087, S1257 [850]) 
 The mutual interpenetration and mutual support of body and soul is a theme 
Montaigne recurs to time and again. He finds the ideal of detachment from the body not 
just unwholesome but ridiculous. Given the intimate relationship between the mental 
and the physical, the way in which, for instance, a substance like wine can confuse our 
thoughts, or the way in which mental sharpness seems to decline in line with physical 
frailty—we tend to be more alert when well than ill—he counsels that ‘the powers and 
actions of the soul must be examined not elsewhere but here, at home in our bodies’ 
(II.12; T531, S617 [411]). The intimate fusion of body and soul means that every bodily 
movement and instinct, every feeling of physical pleasure or pain, has some significance 
for our mental lives: ‘It is certain that our conceptions, our judgements and our mental 
faculties in general are all effected by the changes and alterations of the body. Those 
alterations are ceaseless’ (ibid. T547, S635 [424]). Such interdependence between body 
and soul leads him to severely question the claim that ancient Stoic practitioners were 
able to maintain constancy in the face of physical agony, that reason, performing its 
duties perfectly, enables us to prevail over the most piercing bodily experiences: ‘Are 
we to make our flesh believe that lashes from leather thongs merely tickle it. … Are we 
to force that natural universal and inherent characteristic which can be seen in every 
living creature under heaven: namely, that pain causes trembling?’ (I.14; T55, S58 [37]) 
For Montaigne, human reason, however firm and well-developed, offers little defence 
against extreme pain and sickness. For even in the case of the most rational individual 
who ever lived, Socrates, notwithstanding his life-long practice devoted to separating 
soul from body, Montaigne insists: ‘Let the saliva of some wretched dog slaver over 
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[his hand] …  that … would put a sudden end to all his wisdom’ (II.12; T532, S619 
[412]). 
 The wisdom of the Essays is a bodily wisdom. Montaigne, through his literary 
self-portrait, aims to represent the features of his body no less than his mind. Even as 
we follow the flow of his thoughts on the page, bodily concerns take centre stage: he 
continually informs us of his state of physical health and vitality, particularly in the late 
essays, when, in old age, his suffering from ‘the stone’ begins to intensify. Departing 
from traditional philosophical discourse, Montaigne invites the reader to always bear in 
mind the bodily condition of the author. Furthermore, as Ann Hartle notes, not only 
does he stress the presence of his own body but he also ridicules other philosophers ‘by 
reminding them in vivid and often comic terms of … the most base and shameful bodily 
functions’.
42
 For instance, in ‘On some lines in Virgil’, having observed of our physical 
make-up that ‘our delights and our waste matters are lodged higgledy-piggledy 
together’, Montaigne goes on to admit: ‘When I picture to myself the most reflective 
and the most wise of men in such postures, I hold it as an affront that he should claim to 
be reflective and wise’ (III.5; T855, S992 [669]). In Montaigne’s view, human 
presumption leads us to conceive the human being as non-bodily in essence, to ignore 
the so-called base pleasures and lower functions, functions that we share with the 
‘beasts’—a situation that, as a naturalist, he finds worthy of humour, not shame. So in 
direct contrast to those philosophers who tend to forget the body, Montaigne feels 
compelled to describe his ‘build’, ‘complexion’ and ‘bodily endowments’ (II.17; T623-
5, S728-30 [485-7]). Considering the extent to which the Essays capture his 
corporeality, Montaigne, as we have seen, even goes so far as to suggest that the work 
may be understood as ‘of one substance with its author’ (II.18; T648, S755 [504]).
43
 
                                                             
42 Hartle, Michel de Montaigne, p. 3. 
43 In this regard, one should also bear in mind what many commentators recognize as the most 
striking characteristic of Montaigne’s literary style or mode of expression: its concreteness. By way 
of the most vivid visual and tactile images and metaphors, he seeks to render philosophical thought 
in material terms. Sayce stresses Montaigne’s acute ‘appreciation of the corporeal substance of 
words’ (The Essays of Montaigne, p. 280), while Regosin suggests that in the Essays ‘thought 
assumes a kind of concreteness, a materiality’ (The Matter of My Book, p. 110). To give just one 
example: ‘Faults … as soon as they strike me they cling to me and will not leave me unless shaken 
off’ (III.5; T853, S990 [667]). And Hugo Friedrich observes that Montaigne’s ‘preferred images are 
those of body movement of any kind’ (Montaigne, p. 371): ‘My concepts and judgments can only 
fumble their way forward, swaying, stumbling, tripping over’ (I.26; T145, S164 [107]). Molner thus 
argues that part of what Nietzsche finds so impressive about Montaigne’s style ‘is the willingness to 




 The philosophy of the Essays constitutes an unconditional acceptance of the 
body; Montaigne’s love of live is essentially a love of bodily existence. Such a 
celebration of the body, so seemingly out of place in a work of philosophy, must have 
struck Nietzsche forcefully, as he began to engage the Essays in the early 1870s, 
particularly in view of the dominant influences on his intellectual life at the time, 
Schopenhauerian pessimism and Wagnerian romanticism. For Schopenhauer, bodily 
desires and appetites, adding fuel to the fire of the will, represent the principal source of 
human suffering. The conviction that we must redeem ourselves from the claims of the 
body—and from the scourge of sexuality especially—is central to his philosophy of 
ascetic resignation. Similarly, in Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerke we find the body and 
sexuality denigrated, or as Nietzsche will later write, Wagner ‘withdrew from the 
corrupted world with a praise to chastity’ (CW 3). Hence, when reading the Essays, 
Nietzsche encountered a voice radically at odds with his early exemplars—with the 
majority of philosophers in the history of Western philosophy, who for ‘thousands of 
years’ have striven to ‘get rid of the body, this miserable ideé fixe of the senses’ (TI 
3.1). But more than that, what Nietzsche encountered was a voice truly in harmony with 
his own, one consistent with The Birth of Tragedy and his conception of the Dionysian. 
 From the first, Nietzsche makes clear that the Dionysian wisdom of the Greeks 
couldn’t be more remote from an ‘incorporeal spirituality’, claiming that anyone who 
approaches such religiosity in search of asceticism ‘will be forced to turn his back in 
dismay and disappointment’ (BT 3). He describes the barbaric festivals that initiated the 
cult of Dionysus as events of ecstatic jubilation, given over to sexual frenzy and sensual 
excess. As regards the choral songs (Dionysian dithyrambs) that were at the centre of 
cultic practice, Nietzsche stresses that performances required ‘the symbolism of the 
entire body … the full gesture of dance with its rhythmical movements of every limb’ 
(BT 2). The body retains its primacy in later and less primitive forms of Dionysian 
expression, as in the satyr chorus that develops out of folk music and forms the basis of 
Attic tragedy. Nietzsche maintains that the spectator of tragic art saw the satyr as ‘a 
proclaimer of wisdom from the deepest heart of nature, an emblem of the sexual 
omnipotence of nature’ (BT 8). Firmly rooted in nature and the body, the Dionysian 
represents an attitude—very much in line with the Essays—that would sanctify the 
sensual and the sexual. The affinities between Montaigne’s delight in corporeal 
existence and his own Dionysian affirmation of the body thus suggests yet another 
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reason why Nietzsche comes to present Montaigne as his most admired philosophical 
exemplar in the Untimely Meditations. 
 
 
Body through and through 
Following Montaigne, Nietzsche conceives the free spirit of his middle works as an 
assayer, as a being who lives ‘experimentally’, and he goes on, in his late works, to 
‘baptize’ the ‘philosophers of the future’ with the name ‘attempters’ (HAH P4; BGE 42, 
210). Furthermore, for both thinkers, such a philosophical approach is essentially a 
matter of bodily experience and experiment; the self-knowledge they both seek is an 
understanding grounded in the body’s drives, instincts, movements, actions and 
sensations. In Montaigne’s case, no clearer indication of this can be found than in the 
final essay of his collection, ‘On experience’, which represents the culmination of his 
philosophy, after nearly two decades of writing and reflection, and the essence of his 
wisdom, based on nearly sixty years of living. Having engaged in a thoroughgoing 
examination of the workings of his own mind, and having explored the doctrines and 
practices of the various schools of Greco-Roman thought, Montaigne chooses to 
conclude his writing project not with profound insights on the nature of human 
consciousness or with a summary of the wisdom of the ancients, but rather with a 
detailed personal history of his own body. We learn about his diet and digestion, his 
sleeping habits, his fear of certain types of smells, and the state of his sight and hearing. 
For Montaigne, the Essays, while ‘exemplary enough’ as regards the health of the mind, 
really come into their own on questions to do with the health of the body, given his vast 
knowledge of many sicknesses and symptoms (III.13; T1056, S1224 [826]). But the 
attention he devotes to the body in ‘On experience’ has less to do with the ailments of 
old age than with his relentless efforts to reorient our gaze away from human 
transcendence and back to the earthiest experiences of the body. Montaigne urges us to 
accept that, for the most part, like all other creatures, our lives are defined by the most 
basic functions of the body—even if we presumptuously like to think otherwise. 
Making it ‘a part of his rhetoric to talk plainly and unapologetically about his body’, he 
completes his self-portrait with an essay that, rejoicing in every aspect of corporeality, 
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 As Book III of the Essays progresses, Montaigne’s focus on the body becomes 
ever more pronounced; ‘On experience’, merely offers a final, emphatic word on a 
much-emphasized theme of his later writing. Paradoxically, it is only as old age robs 
him of his vigour and his bodily powers begin to deteriorate that Montaigne comes to 
regard the body as the chief source of self-knowledge. To an ever greater extent, he 
looks to the body’s wisdom, and strives to heed its advice, by closely monitoring his 
declining physical condition. Therefore, while Montaigne for much of the Essays 
advocates a harmonious balance between body and mind, as his thinking develops, this 
balance ‘is increasingly tilted in favour of the body’.
45
 As a consequence, by the time of 
‘On the art of conversation’, we find him asking the reader to always bear in mind that 
the human being is a creature ‘whose nature is wondrously corporeal [merveilleusement 
corporelle]’ (III.8; T909, S1054 [710]). Moreover, in the next essay, ‘On vanity’—in 
the midst of an examination of the ridiculous ideas unconstrained intellectual reasoning 
often leads us to endorse—Montaigne suggests that we can arrive at a better 
understanding of human existence by looking at it entirely in bodily terms: ‘But life is 
material motion in the body, an activity, by its very essence, imperfect and unruly: I 
work to serve it on its own terms’ (III.9; T967, S1118 [756]). And this reading seems to 
be confirmed by a comment he makes later, in the same essay, when he describes 
himself as ‘wholly material’ (ibid. p. T978, S1130 [764]). 
 As regards discussion of the body, Nietzsche’s work follows a similar trajectory 
to that of Montaigne, in the sense that the emphasis on issues of bodily health—issues 
to do with diet, climate and physiology—steadily increases. In The Gay Science, for 
instance, he claims that ‘an immense field of work’ opens up before the experimental 
philosopher who engages in a study of morality, since numerous, long-neglected 
questions now present themselves, questions such as: ‘Do we know the moral effects of 
foods? Is there a philosophy of nutrition?’(GS 7) It is in Zarathustra, however, that we 
find Nietzsche’s boldest and most far-reaching statements on the body. If Montaigne 
                                                             
44 Levine, Sensual Philosophy, p. 161. Levine also notes that ‘Montaigne’s desire to recognize and 
accept the body in a healthy manner sometimes seems to take excessive forms’, citing a passage in 
‘On some lines in Virgil’, where he exhorts us to keep pleasures ‘warm like a broody hen … to come 
forward and welcome them’ (III, 5; T871, S1010 [681])’. For Levine, such excess can be understood 
as a reaction against the extremely negative view of the body central to the Christianity-dominated 
intellectual climate of his times (p. 160).  
45 Sayce, The Essays of Montaigne, p. 182. 
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understands himself as ‘wholly material’, Nietzsche, through the mouth of Zarathustra, 
declares: ‘Body am I through and through, and nothing besides; and soul is merely a 
word for something about the body’ (Z 1.4). Like Montaigne, he also sees the body as 
his main guide and conceives self-knowledge in terms of practical activity grounded in 
bodily movement and action: ‘The body is a great reason. … [I]t does not say I but does 
I’ (ibid.). More significant still, for Nietzsche, rationality and the faculties of the mind, 
rather than constituting the essence of what it means to be human, ultimately serve the 
needs and demands of the body, or as he puts it, ‘[a] tool of your body is your small 
reason’ (ibid.). In other words, physiology rules, and what Nietzsche calls great reason 
‘belongs to the very blueprint of the body’.
46
 Hence, in a note from 1886, a year after 
the publication of Zarathustra, he writes that, in comparison to the soul, the 
‘phenomenon of the body is the richer, clearer, more comprehensible phenomenon: to 




Unsurprisingly, then, when Nietzsche comes to write Ecce Homo, his philosophical 
autobiography, examination of the body’s cycles of health and sickness as well as 
descriptions of physiological characteristics take centre stage. Indeed, autobiographical 
passages are a marked feature of his late writing, not only in his final published works 
but also in the new prefaces he adds to many of his earlier works in 1886. Of course, if 
one, as Nietzsche does, conceives philosophy as an art of living, as a lived experience 
that transforms one’s character, and if one, furthermore, conceives the philosopher as an 
experimenter and attempter in different ways of life, as he also does, then naturally one 
must view biography and philosophy as necessarily and intimately related. But for 
Nietzsche, all philosophy is inescapably biographical, regardless of how abstract and 
seemingly unrelated to a thinker’s life. In Human, All Too Human, he writes: ‘No matter 
how far a man may extend himself with his knowledge, no matter how objectively he 
may come to view himself, in the end it can yield to him nothing but his own 
biography’ (HAH 513). In his mature thought, this view of philosophy as biography 
                                                             
46 Gerhardt, “The Body, the Self and the Ego”, p. 274. Volker Gerhardt argues that ‘the formula of the 
“great reason” of the body … stands at the undeclared centre of Nietzsche’s experimental 
philosophy’ (p. 273). He explains the formula thus: ‘since reason is only found in a certain substrate, 
namely the body, this substrate must itself be seen as capable of reason. And since the substrate is 
prior to, and more extensive than, the “rational” capacity it supports, it can indeed be said to be 
“greater”’ (p. 275). 
133 
 
takes a distinct turn in the direction of bodily instincts and ‘drives’. Thus, in Beyond 
Good and Evil, having claimed that there is ‘nothing whatever’ ‘impersonal’ in the 
thought of the philosopher, Nietzsche goes on to state that a philosopher’s morality 
‘bears decided and decisive witness to who he is—that is, in what order of rank the 
innermost drives of his nature stand in relation to each other’ (BGE 6). 
 At first glance, Ecce Homo and the Essays would seem to represent radically 
different forms of autobiographical writing. On the one hand, Montaigne, in the course 
of fashioning his self-portrait, perfects a tone of modest self-deprecation, striving to 
create a work that—if his many assurances on the matter are to be believed—faithfully 
documents every biographical detail. On the other, Nietzsche, in Ecce Homo, adopts a 
tone of extraordinary boastfulness, offering an extremely selective and often misleading 
account of his life thus far. However, such differences should not blind us to the 
undeniable similarities that remain, since looking closer one finds clear and important 
parallels between the two works, especially when one places Ecce Homo and ‘On 
experience’ side by side. As a thinker who not only acknowledges the close relationship 
between philosophy and biography but also puts considerations of the body at the 
forefront of his thought, Montaigne is uniquely placed to offer Nietzsche guidance on 
his preferred style of autobiographical writing.
47
 For both thinkers, the self-knowledge 
that informs their respective philosophies has its basis in the ‘great reason’ of the body; 
it is the ‘richer phenomenon’ of the body that they both seek to articulate. Ecce Homo 




 A remarkable passage in the ‘Apology’ brings home the extent to which 
Montaigne understands the human being primarily as a physical organism, its 
physiology determined by the characteristics of the natural environment: ‘experience 
makes it clear that the very form of our being—not only our colour, build, complexion 
and behaviour but our mental faculties as well—depend upon our native air, climate and 
soil’ (II.12; T559-60, S648-9 [433-4]). He suggests that particular climates have a 
bearing on intelligence—temperate climates fostering wisdom; tropical climates, 
dullness—and that types of terrain dictate temperament—fertile, soft plains promoting 
                                                             
47 In this case, as so often, Montaigne is free of a particular ‘prejudice’ Nietzsche ascribes to other 
philosophers: ‘Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: 
namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir’ 
(BGE 6). Fully aware that ‘there is absolutely nothing impersonal about the philosopher’, 
Montaigne’s philosophy constitutes an exceedingly conscious memoir (ibid.). 
48 Large, “Introduction”, Ecce Homo, p. xxv.  
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passivity (ibid.). In keeping with the general thrust of the ‘Apology’, Montaigne’s 
immediate aim, in making such comments, is to draw attention to human ‘weakness’, 
the limitations inherent to our natural condition, the variability and inconsistency of our 
rationality. However, when celebrating human life in ‘On experience’, he sees an 
understanding of such matters as our physiological reaction to certain foods, the effects 
of climate, and the idiosyncrasies of digestion, as constituting the essence of self-
knowledge. From the perspective of Montaigne’s body-orientated philosophy, 
knowledge of a thinker’s diet, whether they eat salted meat, like salads and fruit, are 
partial to sauces; knowledge of their dominant sense (Montaigne’s is smell); and 
knowledge of their favoured climate, whether they function better in the summer or 
winter months, must form part of any comprehensive examination of their thought 
(III.13; T1078-85, S1248-55 [843-9]). 
 That Nietzsche looks to the Essays as a model work of philosophical 
autobiography there is no doubt. Not only do many of the concerns that animate 
Montaigne’s writing in ‘On experience’ figure prominently in Ecce Homo but what 
Nietzsche has to say sometimes amounts to restatements of views already expressed in 
the Essays. So whereas Montaigne holds that the very form of our being depends on 
‘native air, climate and soil’, Nietzsche alerts us to the importance of ‘the questions of 
location and climate’:  
 
Nobody is free to live everywhere; and someone with great tasks that 
require all his strength has particularly limited options here. The influence 
of climate on metabolism, inhibiting it or speeding it up, is so significant 
that a bad choice over place and climate can not only alienate someone from 
his task but can keep him from it altogether (EH 2.2). 
 
More conspicuous still, while Montaigne, after advancing the idea of a correlation 
between temperate climates and wisdom, offers Athens as an example of a city where 
dry air has had a marked influence on intelligence, Nietzsche—pausing briefly to 
remark on the problems posed by the German climate—continues his discussion as 
follows: 
 
Just list the places where there are and have been brilliant people, where wit, 
refinement, and malice were components of happiness, where genius has, 
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almost necessarily, felt itself at home: they all have superbly dry air. Paris, 
Provence, Florence, Jerusalem, Athens—these names prove something: dry 
air and clear skies are conditions for genius (ibid.) 
 
In addition, like Montaigne, Nietzsche attaches as much weight to ‘the question of 
nutrition’ as that of place and climate—even greater weight, perhaps, considering he 
describes it as a matter that concerns the very ‘salvation of humanity’ (EH 2.1). If 
Montaigne reveals his fondness for melons, his complex relationship with radishes (‘I 
first of all found that radishes agreed with me; then they did not’), reveals that he 
lunches early, to aid digestion, that he prefers his bread unsalted (III.13; T1082-4, 
S1252-4 [846-8]), Nietzsche rails against the peculiarities of German cooking, 
ridiculing the eating of soup before meals, bemoaning the overcooking of meat. And as 
regards dietary advice, he counsels abstinence from alcohol, but recommends tea in the 
morning, and suggests that indigestion can be helped by avoiding ‘protracted meals’ 
(EH 2.1).  
 Unlike Montaigne, however, Nietzsche links questions of climate, location and 
nutrition directly to those of philosophy. For instance, when explaining why it took him 
so long to fully appreciate the significance of proper nutrition, he blames the 
‘worthlessness’ of German education, and more specifically ‘its “idealism”’, which had 
led him to ‘lose sight of reality’ from the outset  (ibid.). In ‘On experience’, Montaigne, 
as usual, leaves it to the reader to make the connection between the extensive discussion 
of his body and diet that dominates the essay and the repudiation of Platonic idealism 
that appears in its closing pages. Here, praising those opinions in philosophy that are 
‘most solid, that is to say, most human’, he admits his strong aversion to forms of 
philosophical speculation that promote ‘escape’ from our humanity (III.13; T1094-6, 
S1265-8 [855-7]). Montaigne’s approach in ‘On experience’ mirrors that of ‘On the 
Cannibals’, in the way that, in both essays, he strives to set up the severest possible 
contrast between otherworldly philosophies that advocate transcendence of the human, 
and a naturalized philosophy, orientated toward the earthly. In the earlier of the two 
essays, he achieves this by means of an opposition between descriptions of the lives of 
the primitives of the New World and Plato’s account of the earliest civilization in The 
Republic; in the latter, with Platonism again his target, he relies on first immersing the 
reader in the most vivid experiences of the body.  
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 But of course, Nietzsche adopts a similar tactic in Ecce Homo: he intends the 
humorous criticisms of German cooking and the rather playful account of his diet, as a 
mocking but defiant response to contemporary German philosophy—Hegelianism in 
particular. There is, however, much more going on, both in Ecce Homo and in ‘On 
experience’, than the attempt to ridicule idealist philosophy, of whatever stripe. For both 
Montaigne and Nietzsche, discussion of the questions of climate, place and nutrition 
serves a much deeper purpose. In a statement that could equally have come from the pen 
of Montaigne, Nietzsche explains his position thus: 
 
I will be asked why I have been talking about all these petty matters that 
people usually think are not worth worrying about. … Answer: these petty 
concerns—nourishment, location, climate … are far more important than all 
the concepts people have considered important so far. This is exactly where 




A relearning that paves the way to a revaluation, the re-naturalization of values. For it is 
only because of the triumph of a de-naturalized, de-humanized system of valuation that 
matters of nourishment, location and climate are commonly seen as ‘petty matters’, as 
‘petty concerns’. Ascetic ideals promote the notion not only that bodily needs can be 
transcended but that they should be transcended, that the highest form of human life—
redeemed from the consideration of such trivialities as diet and physiology—should 
cultivate detachment from the body. But once we abandon ascetic ideals and the Plato-
Christian values that ground them, abandon the perverse desire to transcend the human, 
we come to realize that, as essentially bodily creatures, by ignoring the questions of 
nourishment, place, and climate, we have managed to disvalue the most valuable and ‘to 
revere the entrails of the unfathomable more than a sense of the earth!’ (Z P3) 
 In ‘On experience’, Montaigne strives to communicate a form of philosophy that 
invests ultimate value in the body, to reawaken reverence for the body and the earth—
an immense task, given the predominance of ascetic ideals and the importance of Plato-
Christian values to European culture. Devoting page after page to the importance of care 
of the body and matters of diet, he attempts to gently alter the reader’s perspective, their 
bias against the appropriateness of such a discussion, by making them fully aware of 
                                                             
49 Translation altered. 
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their own bodies: he evokes certain tastes and sounds, the pleasures of sleep, the 
sufferings of various illnesses and physical symptoms. Nietzsche, employing a less 
subtle method, prefers, through overstatement, to shock his audience out of their 
conventional views: ‘All prejudices come from the intestines’ (EH 2.1). Despite this 
marked difference in style, it is conspicuous how both thinkers, in making their 
respective cases for the body, pay exceptional attention to one sense in particular: smell. 
Montaigne, in his final essay, admits to a ‘mortal fear of smells’ (III.12; T1084, S1254 
[848]), but betrays his acute sensitivity to odour much earlier in his writing, when he 
dedicates an essay, ‘On smells’, to the topic of smells in general. Here, describing how 
various odours possess the power to greatly alter his ‘spirits’, he claims the ability to 
scent noxious fumes at greater distances than any other individual (I.55; T300-1, S353 
[228-9]). Nietzsche, with typical hyperbole, goes much further, alleging to have a quite 
extraordinary nose: ‘I can physiologically perceive … the very centre, the ‘intestines’, 
of every soul—I can smell it’ (EH 1.8). In fact, so crucial is this highly developed sense 
for his philosophical task, he declares that his ‘genius’ resides in his ‘nostrils’ (EH 4.1). 
 Perhaps Nietzsche emphasizes smell because it is by far the most sensitive 
sense—capable of distinguishing between hundreds of substances, from the minutest of 
quantities—and the most immediate—in contrast to the physiological processes 
involved in other senses, the olfactory nerves connect directly to the brain. Or perhaps, 
like Montaigne, he was blessed with an unusually receptive nose. Perhaps both. 
Whatever the reason, it was certainly not lost on Nietzsche that, in championing the 
sense of smell—a sense whose importance is often overlooked, despite its potency—he 
was very much echoing the body philosophy of the Essays. Accordingly, a few sections 
earlier, having just revealed that it is to French writers he returns to ‘again and again’, 
we find him proudly announcing that he has ‘something of Montaigne’s mischief’ in his 
‘body’ (EH 2.3). Considering the seriousness with which Nietzsche writes about his 
own physiology and how much he makes of his own bodily health, the way in which he 
‘has always instinctively chosen the correct remedy for bad states’, the significance of 
such a remark cannot be overstated (EH 1.2). After all, it comes from a thinker who 
believes that his bodily health, more than anything else, distinguishes him as a 
philosopher: ‘sick thinkers are in the majority in the history of philosophy’ (GS P2). 
Believes, furthermore, that, ‘on a grand scale, philosophy has been no more than … a 
misunderstanding of the body’, in so far as metaphysical cravings for ‘some Apart, 
Beyond, Outside, Above’ were not taken for what they were: the symptoms of sick 
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bodies (ibid.). By claiming to have something of Montaigne in his body, Nietzsche 
offers no clearer indication of the extent of his admiration, no stronger endorsement of 
Montaigne’s life as a philosopher. 
 Revering Montaigne from first to last, two remarkable tributes to Montaigne 
bookend Nietzsche’s life as a philosopher, both of which associate Montaigne with 
bodily health—in ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ Nietzsche portrays Montaigne’s writing 
as a uniquely vitalizing force: ‘as soon as I glance at him I grow a leg or a wing’ (SE 2). 
On the Nietzschean account, Montaigne’s affirmation of earthly existence, his resolute 
this-worldliness, is symptomatic of a robust physiological health. Acutely aware of the 
physiological basis of philosophy, Montaigne continually implicates his own body in 
his thought (from descriptions of his physical characteristics and physiological 
idiosyncrasies to the suggestion that author and book are of one substance). Indeed, 
given the extent to which the Essays anticipate the Nietzschean understanding of 
philosophy as essentially a biography of the body, and given the stress that Nietzsche 
lays on Montaigne’s bodily health, Molner is perhaps right to suggest that it is through 
Montaigne’s example that Nietzsche comes to understand ‘philosophy as part of 
physiology’.
50
 For both thinkers, a reorientation of our attitude toward the body, the 
recognition that we are ‘wholly material’, obliges us to concede the intimate 
relationship between physiological need and philosophical thought.  
What is more, as Heitsch observes, Montaigne and Nietzsche seem to be of one 
mind that ‘language itself originates in the physical or physiological facts of human 
nature’.
51
 In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche laments the difficulty, if not the 
impossibility, of translating the ‘tempo’ of a certain literary style from one language to 
another, in view of the fact that any such style would be ‘grounded in the character of 
the race, or—to be more physiological—in the average tempo of its “metabolism”’ 
                                                             
50 Molner, “The Influence of Montaigne on Nietzsche”, p. 81. For Molner, ‘Montaigne’s balance of 
soul and body’ inspires Nietzsche’s notion of ‘philosophy as part of physiology’ (ibid.). However, 
while it is no doubt true that Nietzsche admired Montaigne greatly for this reason, Montaigne’s 
influence in this regard has much more to do with his naturalism, with his determination in the 
Essays to bring humanity back into conformity with the rest of nature. The question of the 
relationship between philosophy and physiology is thus, for both thinkers, one of fundamental 
philosophical significance. Also, considering the impact of the German Materialist movement on 
intellectual life in Germany in the 1850s and 60s, Nietzsche would have become aware of the 
philosophical significance of physiology much earlier that his initial encounter with Montaigne (in 
the early 1870’s). Most crucially, as is clear from his correspondence, Nietzsche read Albert Lange’s 
History of Materialism in the late 1860’s (Stack, Lange and Nietzsche, p. 13). Nevertheless, Molner is 
right to stress the great importance of Montaigne for Nietzsche as a thinker who puts physiological 
considerations at the very centre of his thought. 
51 Heitsch, Practicing Reform in Montaigne’s Essais, p. 69. 
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(BGE 28). Returning to this theme in Ecce Homo, his focus shifts to a discussion of 
how the relationship between style, tempo and physiology pertains to his own ‘art of 
style’. The best type of style, he declares, ‘communicate[s] a state, an inner tension of 
pathos, with signs, including the tempo of these signs’ (EH 3.4). No less than Nietzsche, 
Montaigne sees a direct and intimate connection between writing style and 
physiological make-up. Through the rendering of abstract thought in metaphor and 
image, he seeks not only to constantly engage the sensuous experience of the reader but 
also to evoke the physical presence of the author. To use Regosin’s felicitous phrasing: 
‘The language of the Essays aims at being an incarnating medium’.
52
 Like Nietzsche, 
Montaigne understands his unique style as being ‘grounded’ in his ‘physical aspects’, as 





Turning the will to life into philosophy 
To fully understand Nietzsche’s devotion to the Essays, and to gain a complete 
appreciation of his claim to have something of Montaigne in his body, it is crucial to 
observe another conspicuous feature of their philosophical-autobiographical writing: 
both grant considerable attention to the subject of their own bodily illnesses and 
sufferings. Physiologically speaking, more than a sensitivity to smells or a preference 
for dry air, what unites Montaigne and Nietzsche is their shared experience of extreme 
pain and sickness. Therefore, in Montaigne, Nietzsche found not only a kindred spirit 
intellectually but also a ‘partner in torment’ physically.
54
 And for both thinkers, this 
physical torment is of great import philosophically, fundamentally informing their 
respective attitudes to life. Consequently, whereas ‘On experience’ details Montaigne’s 
                                                             
52 Regosin, The Matter of My Book, p. 199. 
53 Heitsch, Practicing Reform in Montaigne’s Essais, p. 74. In line with this reading, Rodolphe Gasché 
argues that the text of Ecce Homo is one in which ‘the constitution of a body is gradually worked out 
… [T]he body … becomes readable through a chain of metaphors’ (“Ecce Homo or the Written Body”, 
p. 113). There is, however, a crucial difference between Montaigne and Nietzsche on the whole 
question of style, language and physiology, insofar as ‘Nietzsche’s metaphors regarding the 
founding nature of the body’ cannot be understood in terms of ‘simple metaphors of foundation’ 
(Blondel, Nietzsche: The Body and Culture, p. 206). In a way that Montaigne’s do not, ‘Nietzsche’s 
metaphors on physiology … lead … to the philological notion of interpretation’ (p. 205). This is 
because Nietzsche views will to power as fundamentally a ‘reinterpreting, restructuring and 
shaping force’ (GM 2.12): ‘all existence’ is ‘essentially an interpreting-existence’ (GS 374). 
Therefore, given that, on the Nietzschean account, it is through our bodily drives and affects that we 
interpret the world, ‘[a]sking what the body is means asking what interpretation is’ (Blondel, 
Nietzsche: The Body and Culture, p. 216). 




‘coronary palpitations and migraines’, his ‘spasms and convulsions’ (III.13; T1067-9, 
S1236-9 [835-7]), Ecce Homo recounts Nietzsche’s ‘unremitting’ headaches, his 
‘exhausting bouts of vomiting’, and his eye problems, verging ‘dangerously close to 
blindness’ (EH 1.1). Here again, there can be little question that, when making such 
comments, Nietzsche has Montaigne in mind. In fact, in The Gay Science he refers 
specifically to Montaigne’s capacity to joke ‘so agreeably’ about his afflictions (GS 22). 
Seeking to emulate his exemplar’s cheerful response to suffering, Nietzsche takes a 
similarly humorous line: ‘A doctor who treated me for a long time as a neurological 
patient finally said: “No! The problem is not your nerves, I am the one who is nervous”’ 
(EC 1.1). 
 What we discover in Ecce Homo and ‘On experience’, however, is not simply a 
catalogue of illness, or a list of debilitating symptoms; both thinkers offer a record of 
recovery as well as of sickness. And it is the joy of the former, not the pain of the latter, 
they are keen to emphasize. For Montaigne, a restoration of health, however brief, 
outweighs any preceding suffering: ‘But is there anything so delightful as that sudden 
revolution when I pass from the extreme pain of voiding my stone and recover, in a 
flash, the beauteous light of health. … Oh how much more beautiful health looks after 
illness’ (III.13; T1071-2, S1241 [838]). Here is Nietzsche describing his return to 
health, after a prolonged illness: 
 
I discovered life anew, as it were, myself included, I tasted all good and 
even small things in ways that other people cannot easily do,—I created my 
philosophy from out of my will to health, to life. … [P]ay careful attention: 
the years of my lowest vitality were the ones when I stopped being a 
pessimist (EH 1.2). 
 
This last statement holds the key to Nietzsche’s conception of true ‘health’, a health 
vigorous enough to combat the greatest suffering, yet not succumb to despair, a health 
immune to the temptation of philosophies of denial. And it is precisely his ability to 
transform bodily suffering into a philosophy of earthly affirmation that, he believes, 
gives him the right to open Ecce Homo with a section entitled ‘Why I am so wise’. But 
Montaigne also, this ‘mightiest of souls’, overcomes pain and sickness, achieving a 
higher form of health on the other side of suffering. Notwithstanding his many years of 
pain and sickness, he begins his closing remarks of the Essays by declaring: ‘As for me 
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… I love life’ (III.13; T1093, S1264 [854]). Indeed, in an unpublished note from 1885, 
Nietzsche quotes with approval the following passage from the Essays (KSA 11: 
40[59]): ‘The soul which houses philosophy must by her own sanity make for a sound 
body’ (I.26; T160, S180 [119]). There can be no more perfect embodiment of health, 
understood in the Nietzschean sense, than the philosophical example provided by the 
Essays: Montaigne’s advancing illness serves only to heighten his earthly gratitude, his 
thought becoming ever more affirmative even as his suffering increases. As Starobinski 
observes, ‘[t]o the onslaughts of disease and the threat of imminent death Montaigne 
responds with praise for our bodily condition’.
55
 In this way, Montaigne turns his will to 
life into a philosophy that eschews any kind of world-weariness or resignation. The 
body philosophy of ‘On experience’, like that of Ecce Homo, testifies to the following: 
 
A philosopher who has passed through many kinds of health … has passed 
through an equal number of philosophies; he simply cannot but translate his 
state every time into the most spiritual form and distance—this art of 
transfiguration just is philosophy. We philosophers are not free to separate 
soul from body as the common people do. … [W]e must constantly give 
birth to our thoughts out of our pain (GS P3). 
 
                                                             
55 Starobinski, Montaigne in Motion, p. 240. Or as Brush puts it, ‘the more [Montaigne] became 
acquainted with extreme pain … the more he embraced every aspect of his condition’ (From the 
Perspective of the Self, p. 189).  
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CHAPTER 4: HIGHER NATURALISM 
 
Section I: Ethical Naturalism 
 
Philosophical anthropology 
Rejecting the metaphysical oppositions of the moral absolutist, both Montaigne and 
Nietzsche undermine the notion of a cardinal distinction between good and evil. Seeing 
the human being as, fundamentally, an animal like any other—while at the same time 
not denying our capacity to move beyond mere animality through a second nature 
provided by culture—they approach moral phenomena from a determinedly naturalistic 
perspective, employing an experimental, historical method of philosophizing that would 
seek to explain conventional ethical evaluations in terms of the contingent pressures of 
socialization, and the more deep-rooted issue of physiological strength or weakness. For 
both thinkers, the advancement of an ethical naturalism is not just central to the task of 
translating humanity back into nature; it is also a prerequisite to any re-naturalization of 
values, as it is only when so-called ‘evil’ inclinations are revalued and understood as 
essential to the general economy of human life that a healthy standard of moral 
evaluation can be established. In order to develop such a standard, the ethical naturalist 
must thus take up an extra-moral position, a stance beyond good and evil. 
 One of the most striking features of the Essays is the absence of a moralistic 
mode of interpretation. Even if Montaigne spends a great deal of time discussing the 
various ethical systems of the ancients and examining a bewildering array of customs 
and moral ideas, he refrains from grounding his moral philosophy in any kind of 
ethically normative understanding of human nature. On the contrary, he observes 
‘conduct and motive without didacticism, without necessarily committing himself to the 
rights and wrongs’.
1
 Montaigne’s study of human action and motivation is, for the most 
part, descriptive rather than normative. What we find in the Essays is not so much the 
search for universal moral laws as the presentation of a kind of ‘philosophical 
anthropology’.
2
 Drawing on his intensive study of the Greek and Roman historians as 
well as contemporary accounts of the societies of the New World, Montaigne discusses 
                                                             
1 Sayce, The Essays of Montaigne, p. 140. 
2 Friedrich, Montaigne, p. 3. 
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traditional philosophical themes in the light of a vast range of ethnological information. 
We see him at his most anthropological in ‘On habit’, an essay offering cross-cultural 
comparisons of all manner of human practices (I.23). Here as elsewhere, the underlying 
assumption of investigation is that the human being is part of the natural world, a 
species to be studied like any other. Such a point of departure, of course, necessarily 
involves a radical reinterpretation of religion and morality, in the sense that religious 
dogmas and moral theories, deprived of any supernatural foundation, come into view 
simply ‘as creations that derive their nature from natural conditions, just as plants and 
animals do, turning out one way in one climate, another in a different one’.
3
 
Looking back on The Birth of Tragedy in 1886, Nietzsche stresses that in this 
work ‘a pessimism “beyond good and evil” announces itself … —a philosophy which 
desires to situate morality itself within the phenomenal world’ (BT, ‘SC’ 5). Shortly 
after the publication of The Birth of Tragedy, in a note from 1873, he writes of the need 
for the ‘veneration of an ethical naturalism [Verehrung des ethischen Naturalismus]’ 
(KSA 7: 29[230]). More significant still, a few months later, in another unpublished 
note, Nietzsche describes Montaigne as a fellow ‘ethical naturalist’, recognising his 
emancipation from traditional moral theorizing, from the notion that morality has some 
kind of metaphysical significance (KSA 7: 30[26]). Seeking to replace the metaphysical 
questing for ‘eternal facts’ and ‘absolute truths’ with ‘historical philosophizing’, the 
free spirit of Nietzsche’s middle works—an ethical naturalist—calls for the detailed 
study, classification and comparison of all known customs and moralities, as a 
necessary preliminary to a period in humanity’s future that Nietzsche will later 
designate as ‘extra moral’ (HAH 2, 23; BGE 32). Like that of the Essays, the 
philosophy of the free spirit, as we have seen, is characterized by a ‘fearless hovering 
over … customs, laws and the traditional evaluation of things’ (HAH 34). Furthermore, 
given Nietzsche’s naturalistic desire to enlist ethnology in the service of philosophy, 
and his ambition, coming to the fore in his middle works, to explain higher human 
activities—morality, religion and art—in terms of all-too-human processes—self-
delusion, egoism and self-cruelty—we can agree with Schacht in seeing a 
‘philosophical anthropology’ at the centre of Nietzsche’s thought. Admittedly, this is 
philosophical anthropology of a much more sophisticated kind than Montaigne’s, based, 
as it is, on a post-Darwinian conception of humanity; but nonetheless, it follows 
                                                             
3 Ibid., p. 110. 
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Montaigne’s in understanding the human being ‘as a creature whose existence is 
animate, bodily, material, social and historical’.
4
 
When describing himself as a philosopher, Nietzsche seldom reaches for the 
term ‘ethical naturalist’, preferring, especially in his late works, the more provocative 
title of ‘immoralist’. Both, however, could be used interchangeably, without significant 
loss of meaning, since, in essence, each signifies a deep moral scepticism, the 
conviction that moral commands lack any transcendent source of authority. In a late 
note, Nietzsche explicitly lays out the connection between ethical naturalism and 
immoralism: ‘moralistic naturalism: [translating] the apparently emancipated, 
supranatural moral value back [zurüchzuübersetzen] to its “nature”, that is, to natural 
immorality” (KSA 12: 9[86] (WP 299)).
5
 Accordingly, Heitsch argues that Montaigne 
can also be viewed as a immoralist, understood in the Nietzschean sense, his 
anthropologically orientated philosophy transforming conventional moral values ‘by 
means of an immoralistic approach’.
6
 For to see conscience as the natural outgrowth of 
socialization and habituation, and to emphasize the natural diversity and variety of 
moral codes over time and place, is to question the legitimacy of any and all established 
values. Montaigne’s naturalism, therefore, represents the other side of his immoralism, 
his complete freedom from tradition. What is clear is that both Montaigne and 
Nietzsche, through their naturalistic accounts of morality, seek to reveal the amoral 
actuality of homo natura, an actuality all too often obscured by ‘vain and overly 
enthusiastic’ moral modes of interpretation (BGE 230). 
 In Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche laments the poor contemporary state of 
the ‘art of psychological dissection’, and suggests that ‘a blind faith in the goodness of 
human nature … in an abundance of impersonal benevolence in the world’ leads current 
practitioners of such an art into ‘error’ (HAH 35, 36). By way of contrast, he looks to 
the ‘French masters of psychological examination’, who, free of any such faith, ‘like 
skilful marksmen’, hit ‘the bullseye of human nature’ time and again (ibid.). On the 
Nietzschean view, only the thoroughgoing immoralist can hope to penetrate the depths 
of human nature, only the ethical naturalist, determined to proceed without ‘moral 
prejudice’, is equipped to uncover the amoral roots of human action and motivation 
(BGE 23). Although the passage quoted above from Human, All Too Human singles out 
                                                             
4 Schacht, Nietzsche, p. 268. 
5 Translation altered. 
6 Heitsch, Practicing Reform in Montaigne’s Essais, p. 56. 
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La Rochefoucauld as an astute psychologist, Nietzsche very soon comes to reject the 
reductive egoism of La Rochefoucauld’s moral philosophy (D 103). After all, a blind 
faith in the badness of humanity displays just as much moral prejudice as a blind faith in 
its goodness. As Donnellan observes, the ‘exposure of … self-interest by La 
Rochefoucauld … becomes in Nietzsche a … more tolerant, more comprehensive’ 
examination of human psychology.
7
 But Donnellan fails to recognize the extent to 
which this ‘more objective and descriptive approach’ to moral philosophy is indebted to 
the ethical naturalism of Montaigne.
8
 Without condemnation or cynicism, and fully 
accepting of the complexity of human motivation, Montaigne reveals the 
‘voluptuousness pleasure’ in self-cruelty experienced by the highest exemplars of moral 
virtue (II.11; T403, S475 [309]).   
 
 
Good and evil intertwined  
Throughout the Essays, there is one moral prejudice in particular that Montaigne seeks 
to undermine: the idea of a fundamental opposition between good and evil. As a moral 
psychologist and ethical naturalist, he views such a belief—the basic assumption of the 
metaphysician—as contradicted not only by a glance at the variability of values evident 
in human history but also by an honest examination of the workings of human 
psychology. In Montaigne’s view, once we abandon the pleasing fiction of the inherent 
goodness of human nature, it becomes apparent that: 
 
Our being is cemented together by qualities which are diseased. Ambition, 
jealousy, envy, vengeance, superstition and despair lodge in us with such a 
natural right of possession that we recognize the likeness of them in the 
animals too … ; for in the midst of compassion we feel deep down some 
bitter-sweet pricking of malicious pleasure at seeing others suffer. Even 
children feel it. … If anyone were to remove the seeds of such qualities in 
Man he would destroy the basic qualities of our lives (III.1; T767-8, S892 
[599-600]). 
 
                                                             




‘Evil’ qualities, then, are as much a feature of human nature as those considered ‘good’, 
and are just as essential, a circumstance that unites us with other animals. Montaigne’s 
position, however, is more radical still. For he wants to argue not merely that so-called 
evil passions are an ineradicable element of human life, necessary in themselves, but 
also that such passions are also at the root of everything we value as good. In the 
‘Apology’ he states: 
 
Compassion acts as a stimulus to clemency; prudent self-preservation and 
self-control are awakened by our fear; and how many fair actions are 
awakened by ambition? And how many by arrogance? In short, not one 
eminent or dashing virtue can exist without some strong, unruly emotion 
(II.12; T550, S639 [427]). 
 
Thus, on the Montaignean account, good and evil are not opposites, but interdependent.
9
 
The traditional antithesis between vice and virtue is a false one, masking a more 
complex reality, where ‘vices have a place in the composition of virtue’.
10
 Pursuing this 
dangerous argument one step further—which Montaigne never allows himself to do—
one arrives at the unsettling judgement that much of what has formerly been condemned 
as evil should in fact be venerated on a par with the good. 
         As others commentators have noted, the extent to which Nietzsche follows what 
the Essays have to say on the mutual dependency of good and evil is striking.
11
 Even 
more than Montaigne’s, his thought is a sustained attack on the false oppositions of 
traditional philosophy. The opening aphorism of Human, All Too Human sets up a direct 
contrast between the mode of ‘historical philosophizing’ Nietzsche wishes to inaugurate 
and metaphysical philosophizing, which, through ‘mistake[s] in reasoning’, would deny 
that ‘the most glorious colours’ can be derived from ‘base’ (HAH 1). It is in Beyond 
Good and Evil, however, that we find his most thoroughgoing assault on ‘the faith in 
opposite values’ (BGE 2). And even though the discussion here, in many ways, marks a 
significant advance on that of the Essays, at its core are ideas already well expressed by 
                                                             
9 This is a point he makes repeatedly: ‘Of the pleasures and goods that we enjoy, not one is exempt 
from being compounded with some evil and injury [mal et d'incommodité]’ (II.20; T655, S764 
[510]); ‘When I scrupulously make my confession to myself I find that the best of the goodness in 
me has some vicious stain’ (ibid. T656, S766 [511]). 
10 Donnellan, Nietzsche and the French Moralists, p. 91. 





 So if Montaigne argues that ‘our being is cemented together by qualities 
which are diseased’, qualities whose ‘seeds’ we shouldn’t dare attempt to remove, 
Nietzsche advises that we ‘should regard even the effects of hatred, envy, covetousness, 
and the lust to rule as conditions of life, as factors which, fundamentally and essentially 
must be present in the general economy of life’ (BGE 23). And if Montaigne sees virtue 
as intimately related to vice, even as growing out of vice, Nietzsche writes of the 
‘reciprocal dependence’ of good and wicked drives, raising the possibility that what 
‘constitutes the value of … good and revered things is precisely that they are insidiously 
related, tied to, and involved with … wicked, seemingly opposite things’ (BGE 23, 2). 
 Sayce makes reference to the ‘far-reaching and perhaps terrifying’ implications of 
Montaigne’s moral philosophy.
13
 Yet, as so often in the Essays, it remains up to the 
diligent reader to develop those implications for themselves. Writing in a less 
conservative time and thus in a position to be more openly subversive, Nietzsche 
exhibits none of Montaigne’s hesitation, but at the same time recognizes the difficulty, 
admitting that his ideas on the interrelationship between good and evil will very likely 
                                                             
12 One of the most prominent ways in which Beyond Good and Evil marks an advance on the 
Essays—indeed, an advance on the French moral philosophy tradition as a whole—is through its 
examination of the historical development of morality. While Nietzsche stresses the importance of 
the ‘task of description’, calling for the preparation of a ‘typology of morals’, he moves beyond 
description to the task of explanation, that is, he progresses from questions of typology to those of 
genealogy (BGE 186). As examined earlier, he claims that a study of the history of morality reveals 
two ‘basic types’ of morality, what he calls ‘master morality’ and ‘slave morality’, with the former 
being chronologically prior to the latter. In the Genealogy, Nietzsche provides a much more detailed 
account of the origin and development of these two basic types of morality, showing ‘the 
relationship between good and evil’ to be ‘one of creative entwinement’ (Ansell Pearson, Nietzsche 
contra Rousseau, p.18). Primarily based on an etymological investigation of ethical terms, he argues 
that what we now call ‘good’ stands for a cluster of values that was once designated ‘bad’, on a 
noble mode of evaluation, and that, from the perspective of this same mode of evaluation, what we 
now call ‘evil’ was once designated ‘good’ (GM 1). Montaigne, it is true, seldom enquires into the 
origins of moral concepts, limiting himself to two remarks, yet both are very much in line with the 
Nietzschean thesis. In ‘On rewards for honour’, he states that ‘the first of the virtues to appear 
among men … was the one by which the stronger … made themselves master of the weaker and so 
acquired individual rank and reputation, from which we derive our terms honour and dignity’ (II.7; 
T363-4, S431 [277]). This speculation seems to be confirmed somewhat by Nietzsche’s 
etymological analysis, according to which ‘“refined” or “noble” in the sense of social standing is 
everywhere the fundamental concept from which “good” … in the sense of “superior in soul” … 
necessarily developed’ (GM 1.4). Also, Nietzsche defines the noble or ‘aristocratic value equation’ as 
‘good=noble=powerful=beautiful’ (GM 1.7). Montaigne’s second genealogical remark comes in ‘Of 
presumption’. Here, after a passage highlighting the error of separating soul from body, he offers an 
opinion that, on the face of it, seems to contradict his earlier comment: ‘The first sign of distinction 
among men and the first consideration which gave some pre-eminence over others was in all 
likelihood superior beauty’ (II.17; T623, S727 [485]). But as Schaefer points out, Montaigne actually 
‘harmonizes’ the two accounts by way of a quote from Lucretius, which makes plain that originally 
value distinctions among individuals were determined on the basis of ‘both strength and beauty’, 
‘for beauty had great power, and strength was respected’ (ibid.) (The Political Philosophy of 
Montaigne, p. 223). 
13 Sayce, The Essays of Montaigne, p. 141. 
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provoke ‘distress and aversion’ and that anyone who embraces his views completely will 
suffer ‘as from seasickness’ (BGE 23). Such seasickness would be a consequence of the 
fact that Nietzsche takes Montaigne’s argument to its ultimate conclusion: if good is 
dependent on evil and virtue originates in vice, and if evil must be present in the general 
economy of life, then evil must ‘be further enhanced if life is to be further enhanced 
[emphasis added]’ (ibid.). That evil drives and passions should be cultivated along with 
others is one of Nietzsche’s central convictions. Returning to this theme later in Beyond 
and Evil, he writes: ‘everything evil, terrible, tyrannical in man … serves the 
enhancement of the species “man” as much as its opposite does’ (BGE 44). Statements 
such as these elaborate on a figurative presentation of the idea that Nietzsche offers in 
Zarathustra, where the protagonist explains that ‘it is the same with the human as with 
the tree. The more it aspires to the height, the more strongly its roots strive earthward, 
downward, into the dark, the depths—into evil’ (Z 1.8). 
Although Montaigne, unlike Nietzsche, never explicitly calls for the furtherance 
of evil passions, he seems at times to give tacit endorsement to such a view. For 
instance, in ‘On ancient customs’, having described a variety of Greek and Roman 
practices, civilized as well as barbarous, he bemoans the inferiority of his 
contemporaries, stating:  
 
Our powers are no more capable of competing with [the Greeks and 
Romans] in vice than in virtue, both of which derive from a vigour of mind 
which was incomparably greater in them than in us: the weaker the souls, the 
less they are able to do anything really good or really bad (I.49; T287, S334 
[218]).  
 
This is a point he deems worth repeating, offering a restatement of his position later in 
the Essays: ‘The practice of … remarkable wickedness is as much a sign of vigour and 
power in the soul as of error and unruliness’ (III.9; T934, S1083 [730]). What is thus 
clear is that Montaigne not only acknowledges the necessity of evil; he also accepts its 
fundamental value for human existence, going so far as to connect it with greatness of 
soul. Perhaps owing to such moral openness, Nietzsche describes the Essays as a 
‘highpoint of honesty’ in matters moral, as compared with the ‘moral hypocrisy’ of 
German philosophy (KSA 11: 25[74]). Additionally, both thinkers are not simply 
content to free evil passions from bad conscience: to understand such passions as 
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sources of vitality and strength is very much to absolve them from shame and guilt. 
They even want to attribute a kind of beauty to such passions. Consequently, Nietzsche, 
in Daybreak, after observing that ‘we have been permitted to seek beauty only in the 
morally good’, claims that as ‘surely as the wicked enjoy a hundred kinds of happiness 
of which the virtuous have no inkling, so too they possess a hundred kinds of beauty’ (D 
468). And Montaigne, when considering a remarkable individual like Caesar, despite 
acknowledging the general’s cruelty, sexual addiction and reckless ambition, can 
recognize him as an example of a ‘beautiful and richly endowed nature’ (II.33; T711, 
S830 [554]).  
Both Montaigne and Nietzsche can be understood as ethical naturalists in two 
distinct ways. Firstly, as already stated, they are ethical naturalists in the sense of 
striving to explain morality naturalistically, with the aid of ethnological analysis, 
historical study and psychological observation. This is the ethical naturalist as 
anthropologist, describing the characteristic features of morality as a natural 
phenomenon. But they are also ethical naturalists in the sense of their commitment to 
set up ‘nature’ or ‘life’ as a normative ethical ideal. This is the ethical naturalist as 
philosopher, addressing the more fundamental question of the creation of values, the 
question of what kind of moral standard should guide behaviour. To look at the 
development of traditional moral ideals in terms of natural human processes, whether 
social, cultural or physiological, is not to suggest that such ideals are themselves 
natural. In fact, for both thinkers, once we translate humanity back into nature and begin 
to glimpse the basic outlines of homo natura, we discover the extent to which 
conventional values have become inherently anti-natural. To designate both thinkers as 
immoralists is thus to argue only that they undermine the notion that morality could 
have an absolute, transcendent foundation—the claim of traditional moralists. 
Consequently, in Daybreak, Nietzsche states: ‘in this book faith in morality is 
withdrawn—but why? Out of morality! … [A] “thou shalt” still speaks to us too’ (D 
P4). Neither Montaigne nor Nietzsche deny that morality may be grounded 
naturalistically and empirically, on the basis of a conception of human nature—ever 
evolving and expanding, but never complete—developed through an experimental 






‘Morality as Anti-Nature’ 
Montaigne becomes ever more convinced, as his thought progresses, that ‘Nature’ can 
provide the only legitimate standard of valuation: ‘As Nature has furnished us with feet 
to walk, so she has furnished us with the wisdom to guide us in our lives’ (III.13; 
T1050, S1218 [822]). But in order to heed such guidance, one must first achieve a clear 
understanding of one’s own nature. An honest appraisal of human nature, on 
Montaigne’s account, reveals the mutual dependency of good and evil passions, as well 
as the importance of wicked dispositions for ‘vigour and power of soul’. Such a view 
inevitably leads to the repudiation of a certain kind of morality, one that would seek the 
suppression, even eradication, of those dispositions typically labelled ‘evil’ or ‘wicked’. 
Firstly, given that such dispositions are at the core of what it means to be human, the 
attempt to eliminate evil or wicked dispositions is dangerously misguided. To attack 
them is, in effect, to attack one’s own nature. Secondly, even if their suppression is in 
some way possible, this would come at great cost to health and vitality. We are thus 
now in a position to fully comprehend Montaigne’s critique of the ascetic morality 
inherent to both Greco-Roman and Christian thought. Fundamentally anti-natural, 
ascetic morality, based on a mistaken picture of humanity as above and apart from the 
rest of nature, aims to destroy dispositions, passions and impulses that are indispensable 
to human life.  
 Accordingly, Montaigne’s opposition to an ethic of self-abasement and self-
denial pervades the Essays. He seeks to undermine the traditional Greco-Roman idea 
that virtue has to do with the overcoming of natural instinct and the avoidance of bodily 
pleasure. The following passage, representative of countless others, captures the essence 
of Montaigne’s position: ‘It suffices that a man should rein in his affections and 
moderate them [brider et modérer], for it is not in his power to suppress [emporter] 
them’ (II.2; T328, S389 [250]). Not once does he advocate the repression or elimination 
of any emotion, passion or desire, admitting that in his own life he has taken a course 
contrary to exemplars of ‘excessive virtue’, whether Stoic or Christian: ‘Sound or sick I 
willingly let myself follow such appetites as become pressing. I grant considerable 
authority to my desires and predispositions’ (III.13; T1064, S1232 [832]). In this total 
acceptance of his own nature, Montaigne displays an attitude very much in line with the 
wisdom of the primitives of the New World, who exemplify a simple, natural and self-
affirmative virtue (I.31; T209, S237 [156]). Some scholars, on account of Montaigne’s 
increasing stress on the importance of pleasure, characterize Book III of the Essays as 
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Epicurean or hedonistic. But Montaigne’s willingness to follow his desires and 
predispositions and indulge bodily pleasures goes well beyond Epicureanism—which, 
in fact, he sees as no less restrictive than Stoicism (II.11; T401, S473 [307]). The 
hedonism of Book III does not reflect an endorsement of pleasure for pleasures sake, 
but is a direct and inevitable consequence of his naturalism, the affirmation of all 
aspects of human nature, including natural bodily instinct and desire: ‘I … readily 
follow the slope of Nature’s inclining. … [I] sedulously … welcome the pleasures of 
this life’ (III.13; T1086-7, S1256 [849]).  
 Nietzsche’s assault on traditional morality is many-sided and complex. Far more 
comprehensive than Montaigne’s, his critique not only includes a genealogical 
investigation of conventional moral values but also involves the undermining of 
traditional conceptions of agency and free will, which prop up the notion of moral 
responsibility. Nonetheless, what ultimately guides Nietzsche’s thinking is the same 
commitment to ethical naturalism that shapes Montaigne’s. In the preface to the 
Genealogy, Nietzsche states that the crucial issue at stake with regard to conventional 
morality is the ‘value of the “un-egoistic”, the instincts of compassion, self-abnegation, 
self-sacrifice’ (GM P5). But he then adds the following: ‘It was here I saw the 
beginning of the end … the will turning against life’ (ibid.). Essentially, his objection to 
selflessness and compassion, to the values of slave morality, reflects an antipathy to 
what is anti-natural and thus anti-life. Consequently, later in the Genealogy, he 
describes ascetic ideals as having grown out of ‘unnatural inclinations … the anti-
instinctual, the anti-animal’ (GM 2.24). This way of framing the problem of morality 
continues in Twilight of the Idols, where Nietzsche devotes an entire section to the 
subject of ‘Morality as Anti-Nature’. And in Ecce Homo, he asserts that what ‘horrifies’ 
him most about Christian morality is ‘the absence of nature … the absolutely horrible 
state of affairs where anti-nature itself has been given the highest honour as morality’ 
(EH 4.7). Of course, Montaigne makes similar statements in the Essays, while not 
directly challenging Christianity: ‘[quoting Seneca] Nature is unconquerable; yet we 
have corrupted our souls with unrealities’ (I.14; T59, S62 [40]); ‘We have abandoned 
Nature and want to teach her own lessons to her’ (III.12; T1026, S1188 [803]).  
At the core of Nietzsche’s critique of traditional morality we thus find many of 
the same arguments as those advanced in the Essays—although, admittedly, 
Montaigne’s presentation of the naturalist position is less forceful and sustained. Most 
significantly, Nietzsche takes over and expands upon Montaigne’s central criticism of 
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traditional morality: that it aims for the suppression of natural passions, desires and 
predispositions. In Twilight, he mocks the ‘old moral monsters’ who were unanimous in 
urging people ‘to fight against the passions’, maintaining that the attempt to ‘destroy the 
passions and desires’ represents ‘a particularly acute form of stupidity’ (TI 5.1). This is 
a point Nietzsche returns to frequently in his late works. In Ecce Homo he says that the 
word ‘immoralist’ entails the negation of moral doctrines that promote the ‘castration’ 
of humanity’s strongest instincts (EH 4.4). What is more, if Montaigne rejects ascetic 
morality out of a concern for vitality and ‘power of soul’, Nietzsche, convinced that 
even the most dangerous passions must be enhanced if life is to be enhanced, repudiates 
Christian morality on the basis that ‘attacking the root of the passions means attacking 
the root of life’ (TI 5.1). From the point of view of both Montaigne and Nietzsche as 
ethical naturalists, as advocates for the instincts of the body, for the passions and 
desires, ‘all the methods that have been used so far to try make humanity moral have 
been thoroughly immoral’ (TI 7.5). 
While the section ‘Morality as Anti-Nature’ in Twilight obviously owes a great 
deal to the Essays, Nietzsche makes no mention of Montaigne. This is typical of his late 
works, where he attaches more importance to stressing the radical nature of his own 
thought than giving credit to other philosophers where credit is due. In any case, there is 
evidence elsewhere in Nietzsche’s writing pertaining to the significance of the Essays 
for his distinctive understanding of ‘immoralism’. For instance, in Human, All Too 
Human, in an aphorism entitled ‘Shakespeare as moralist’, he ranks Montaigne above 
the dramatist in terms of an understanding of ‘the passions’, no doubt as a consequence 
of the essayist’s insights on the interrelationship between good and evil passions, on the 
necessity of ‘unruly emotion’ for the performance of virtuous action (HAH 176). More 
significant still is the final aphorism of Assorted Opinions and Maxims, where 
Nietzsche names the four pairs of past thinkers to whom he constantly looks for 
guidance, one of which is Epicurus and Montaigne. What this pair share is the 
conviction that each individual must determine their own good for themselves, that 
one’s own desires and pleasures have ultimate value. Namely, they share a distinctly un-
Christian viewpoint. Nietzsche thus claims Epicurus as an ally in the fight against the 
‘corruption of the soul’ brought about by the predominance of a Christian way of 
thinking, and he suggests that Pascal, time and again, felt the need to defend Christian 
thought against the danger of Montaigne (AC 58; KSA 12: 7[69]). However, even if 
Nietzsche sees Epicurus as an ally, he ultimately rejects Epicureanism as a system of 
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thought, and for the same reason that Montaigne does. Epicureanism, with its 
denigration of the body and its aim of reducing desire to a minimum, betrays a lingering 
attachment to Platonic moral asceticism: ‘Only someone who is continually suffering 
could invent such happiness … never has voluptuousness been so modest’ (GS 45).
14
 
By contrast, there is nothing remotely modest about the voluptuousness of 
Montaigne, who insists that we ‘must cling tooth and claw to the … pleasures of this 
life’ (I.39; T241, S276 [182]). As compared with the writings of Lucretius—the main 
source for our knowledge of Epicureanism—the Essays, emphasizing the importance of 
the body and valorising instinct, passions and desire, represent a far broader acceptance 
of the human condition. Montaigne, not only acknowledging but affirming the necessity 
of vice, refuses to apologize or repent for any aspect of human nature in general, or for 
any of his own flaws in particular: ‘My doings are ruled by what I am and are in 
harmony with how I was made. I cannot do better. … I do not find fault with myself’ 
(III.2; T791-2, S916-7 [617-8]). All this goes some way to explain why Nietzsche never 
repudiates Montaigne as he does Epicurus, why he continues to seek Montaigne’s 
counsel up to the end of his writing life. Montaigne’s celebration of all sides of human 
nature, the evil as well as the good, prefigures the type of ‘affirmative’ attitude 
cultivated by the Nietzschean immoralist, who does ‘not easily negate’, but opens its 
‘heart’ to every kind of ‘approval’ (TI 5.6). Both thinkers aim to free individuals from 
unhealthy self-denial and self-contempt, from fear and disgust at natural inclinations. 
As regards the question of how to deal effectively with the passions, Montaigne 
and Nietzsche both advocate moderation, and not extirpation, agreeing that such 
powerful sources of energy and strength must be harnessed, not destroyed. But they 
agree also on a further point, one that completely overturns the traditional view of 
ascetic morality. Counter to the notion that self-denial presents the greatest ethical 
challenge and makes the greatest demand on the will, Nietzsche maintains that the 
‘same methods—castration, eradication—are instinctively chosen by people whose 
wills are too weak … to exercise any restraint in a struggle against desire. … [T]he 
inability not to react to a stimulus, is … just another form of degeneration’ (TI 5.2). 
                                                             
14 Lampert draws our attention to what is perhaps the key issue for Nietzsche in his opposition to 
Epicurus: ‘romanticism’—and this connects up with our earlier discussion on redemption. In the 
Nietzschean conception, at the root of romanticism is ‘the impulse to seek salvation or deliverance 
from the world’ (“Who Is Nietzsche’s Epicurus?”, p. 103). Lampert suggests that ‘Epicurus was the 
opposite of a “Dionysian Pessimist” for he thought it possible and desirable to be delivered from the 
world’. And in this way, unlike Montaigne, ‘Epicurus shared with Christianity a post-classical 
sensibility happy to let the world go’ (ibid.). 
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Montaigne argues similarly, if less caustically, in the Essays: ‘a man has more means of 
living an unworried life in poverty than in duly controlled abundance; behaviour duly 
governed by reason is more thorny than abstinence. Moderation is a virtue which makes 
more demands on you than suffering does’ (II.33; T712-3, S832 [555-6]). And later in 
the Essays, in ‘On diversion’, he offers some instruction on the most appropriate 
method whereby moderation may be imposed on a vehement passion, by describing 
how he once helped a young prince who had become overwhelmed by a need for 
‘vengeance’. Given that ‘vengeance is a sweet passion deeply ingrained in us by 
nature’, Montaigne advised not the rooting out of this passion, but rather, leaving 
vengeance aside, he sought to make the prince ‘savour the beauty of the opposite 
picture: the honour … and goodwill he would acquire from clemency’ (III.4; T812-3, 
S940-1 [634]). That is to say, he ‘diverted him toward ambition’ (ibid.): the moderation 
of a tyrannical passion is achieved by diverting a portion of its energies towards other, 
more salutary passions, allowing it to be managed effectively, while at the same time 
avoiding the loss of overall vitality that would result from a method of castration or 
extirpation.  
Nietzsche, in much greater detail, explains a comparable procedure in Daybreak, 
but what Montaigne calls ‘diversion’ is here referred to as a ‘dislocation of one’s quanta 
of energy’ or ‘a dislocation of forces’ (D 109). One may achieve mastery over a drive or 
passion, Nietzsche argues, ‘by deliberately subjecting oneself to a new stimulus and 
pleasure’, thereby ‘directing one’s thoughts … into other channels’ (ibid.). However, 
this insight, that passions or drives may be rechanneled or diverted, and thus 
transformed in their mode of expression, attains a far greater significance in Nietzsche’s 
writing than it does in Montaigne’s. In Twilight, he stresses—in a way Montaigne does 
not—how passions may be ‘spiritualized, beautified, deified’ (TI 5.1). Nietzsche is of 
the view not just that some passions may be diverted into the stream of other passions 
but that they may be managed or cultivated in such a way as to flow in new, more 
refined directions. Sensuality, for example, may be ‘spiritualized’ so as to issue in 
‘love’ (ibid. 3). For Nietzsche, the psychological mechanism of spiritualization 
underlies the most important features of human life. Indeed, all intellectual, social and 
cultural developments, on the Nietzschean account, ‘represent the “spiritualization” of 
various more rudimentary drives and impulses’.
15
 From such a perspective he argues 
                                                             
15 Schacht, Nietzsche, p. 324. 
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that the ‘drive for knowledge can be traced back [zurückzuführen] to a drive to 
appropriate and conquer [Überwältigungstrieb]’ (KSA 13: 14[142] (WP 423)).
16
 
Nietzsche’s account of ‘spiritualization’ thus serves to make plain the ‘stupidity’ of the 
policy of castration/extirpation, which frees one from dangerous passions at the cost 




A shift from morality to ‘health’ 
Both thinkers cast the move away from traditional ascetic virtue, from the morality of 
self-denial, as a return to ‘health’, physiological and psychological. As regards 
physiological health, we must, Montaigne maintains, learn from the animals. For insofar 
as we presumptuously attribute ‘purely imaginary and fantastical’ goods to ourselves, 
goods such as ‘knowledge, rationality or pre-eminence’, we thereby miss out on the 
‘palpable goods’ that the animals boast: ‘peace, repose, security, innocence, health. … 
Health! the fairest and finest gift that Nature can bestow’ (II.12; T464, S540 [357]). 
What ensures the health of the animals is that they live lives in complete harmony with 
their own nature, guided by their most basic and necessary instincts. Given his stress 
throughout the Essays on the importance of the body and the legitimacy of bodily 
sensations and pleasures, what becomes clear is that Montaigne wants us to learn two 
main lessons from the animals: firstly, that we are subject to the ‘same sort of non-
rational instincts’ as they are, and secondly that we, too, in order to achieve a state of 
physiological health, should follow ‘the laws of our condition … as these manifest 
themselves in our physical sensations and appetites’.
17
 He reinforces this second point 
in his discussion of the primitives of the New World, who, more virtuous than their 
European contemporaries, exhibit an enviable degree of physiological and 
psychological well-being. The virtue of the primitives is not that of extirpation or 
                                                             
16 Needless to say, this idea of spiritualization or sublimation elucidates, in a more psychologically 
sophisticated way, the intimate relationship that Montaigne posits between good and evil drives 
and passions. Moreover, Nietzsche’s exposition of the workings of sublimation is further enriched 
by his hypothesis that ‘our entire instinctive life’ can be understood as ‘the development and 
ramification of one basic form of the will—namely, of the will to power’ (BGE 36). When the theory 
of sublimation is combined with the doctrine of will to power we have a picture of the human 
psyche in which good drives can be understood as spiritualizations of more primitive drives, and all 
drives, whether good or evil, may be seen as manifestations of will to power at different levels of 
refinement. The doctrine of will to power thus helps to complete Nietzsche’s view on the 
derivability of all ‘good impulses’ from ‘wicked ones’ (BGE 23). 
17 Schaefer, The Political Philosophy of Montaigne, p. 284. 
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castration, but a ‘natural’ virtue, defined in terms of ‘true’ and ‘vigorous’ living (I.31; 
T203, S232 [152]). Like the animals, the primitives, embracing the wisdom of nature, 
satisfy their essential needs without shame or guilt. And unlike the Stoic or the 
Christian, they accept themselves as they are, seeing nothing wicked or sinful about 
bodily appetites, thus giving free rein to their passions and desires. In many ways, 
Montaigne adopts this model of natural virtue as his own, in the sense that he neither 
repents for nor strives in opposition to any aspect of his nature: ‘I let myself go as I 
came in: I combat nothing’ (III.12; T1037, S1201 [811]). 
As Montaigne conceives it, ethical naturalism in large part has to do with the 
‘freeing’ of ‘our “natural”, corporeal instincts from the moral constraints that have been 
imposed upon them’.
18
 In this way, the traditional moral perspective must be 
overturned, the traditional moral ideals transformed, being no longer directed toward the 
transcendence of human nature but rather toward the most vital and healthy expression 
of that nature. Such an overturning captures the essence of Nietzschean immoralism. If 
Montaigne recommends that we look to the animals and primitive cultures for 
instruction in our moral lives, Nietzsche states: ‘Lead, as I do, the flown away virtue 
back to the earth … back to body and life. … May your spirit and your virtue have the 
sense of the earth. … [F]or the one who understands, all drives sanctify themselves’ (Z 
1.22.2). In this connection, it is worth noting that both thinkers lament the way in which 
we have devalued certain instincts and functions of the body simply because they are 
necessities, Montaigne describing this tendency as an ‘error’, while Nietzsche suggests 
that it is ‘dreadful to make necessary and regularly recurring sensations into sources of 
inner misery’ (III.13; T1094, S1266 [855]; D 76). There is no more emphasized theme 
in Nietzsche’s later works than the dangerous antagonism between traditional moral 
virtue and the fundamental instincts of life. In Ecce Homo, for instance, he suggests that 
what hitherto has been deemed ‘morality’ has meant nothing less than humanity’s 
‘physiological ruin’, inasmuch as we have constructed moral systems ‘out of contempt 
for the body … [and] resistance to natural instincts’ (EH, ‘D’ 2). By contrast, displaying 
no fear or distrust of human nature, the Nietzschean immoralist, having overcome bad 
conscience, pursues a ‘new life-affirming [lebensbejahenden]’ morality, a natural, 
earthly virtue that develops out of a reverence for the body.
19
 Invigorated by a 
                                                             
18 Ibid., p. 281. 
19 Salaquarda, “Der Antichrist”, p. 135. 
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multiplicity of drives and passions, the life of such an individual, ‘physiologically’ 
speaking, presupposes what Nietzsche calls ‘great health’ (GS 382; EH, ‘Z’ 2).  
In addition, Nietzsche repudiates moralities of self-denial not simply because he 
wishes to foster ‘great health’. The passions and instincts, after all, as well as being 
indispensable to overall vitality, are also valuable sources of experience—and thus of 
self-knowledge. Policies of extirpation, by destroying these sources, impede true self-
understanding. The methods endorsed by traditional moralists, therefore, are completely 
at odds with the kind of philosophizing that Nietzsche advocates: an experimental 
philosophizing that engages the ‘great reason’ of the body. Only the individual who 
accepts and affirms human nature, and who strives to moderate and sublimate powerful 
passions, is in a position to enjoy the ‘dangerous privilege of living experimentally’ 
(HAH P4). Of course, no less than Nietzsche, Montaigne’s philosophy is one of 
experience and experiment, stressing the importance of the passions and the corporeal 
aspects of existence. Both Montaigne and Nietzsche, sceptical of the capacities of 
reason, seek to reorient the focus of philosophy toward experiential knowledge. To the 
extent that both thinkers deflate the role of reason in favour of non-intellectual ways of 
knowing, they see hostility to the passions and instincts as particularly egregious. In the 
Genealogy, when Nietzsche ridicules the ideal of ‘objectivity’, understood as 
‘disinterested contemplation’, instead advancing a form of objectivity based on a 
‘perspectival knowing’, he suggests that the ‘more feelings’ we allow to come to 
expression, the ‘more complete … our “objectivity” will be’, and furthermore that ‘to 
suspend the feelings altogether ‘would amount to the ‘castration of the intellect’ (GM 
3.12). And in the Essays, Montaigne repeatedly offers feeling and sensation as the 
primary routes to self-knowledge: ‘I … allow myself to be governed by the world’s 
general law, which I shall know sufficiently when I feel it’; ‘Judgements about myself I 
make from true sensation not from argument’ (III.13; T1050, S1217 [821]; ibid. T1074, 
S1243 [840]). 
Both Montaigne and Nietzsche condemn traditional notions of virtue as anti-
natural and anti-life, and seek to overcome moralities that strive for the suppression or 
repression of aspects of human nature. But what are we to make of the idea of ‘nature’ 
or ‘life’ as a value standard? How is a naturalistic moral standard to be determined? 
When one looks to the Essays for help, answers to such questions are not readily 
forthcoming, for as other commentators have noted, Montaigne never really defines 
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what he means by nature, never explains, exactly, how it is to serve as a guide.
20
 But 
there can be no doubt that Montaigne understands ‘Nature’ in a normative sense: ‘I have 
simply adopted raw that ancient precept which says that we cannot go wrong by 
following Nature’ (III.12; T1036-7, S1201 [811]); ‘The more simply we entrust 
ourselves to Nature the more wisely we do so’ (III.13; T1050, S1218 [822]). What 
certainly can be said, however, is that Montaigne comprehends nature as something 
immanent to humanity, as a kind of force that is experienced most distinctly through the 
instincts and the passions, but which is also accessible through feeling and sensation, as 
well as reason. And although ‘there is no system … for determining what he calls its 
rules, he indicates that they can be found by a return to the inner self’.
21
 Montaigne 
believes that, through studying human nature, through assaying ourselves, it remains 
possible—despite having lost our immediate connection to many natural laws—to 
discover ‘what Nature wants’ (ibid. T1094, S1266 [855]). Yet he also, as we have seen, 
understands nature as an almost cosmic force, deserving of gratitude, if not of worship. 
For Montaigne, then, nature comes to represent an ‘encompassing totality’, embracing 
‘all from the outside and all from the inside’.
22
 
Whereas Montaigne sets up a naturalistic meta-ethic based on a certain 
conception of nature, Nietzsche does so using the standard of ‘life’—though he, too, 
often characterizes particular moral ideas as anti-natural. On the Nietzschean view, 
moral systems are to be judged healthy or unhealthy depending on the extent to which 
they advance ‘life’ (while for Montaigne, the health of an ethical code is related to its 
conformity to ‘Nature’). In Twilight, he declares: ‘I will formulate a principle. Every 
naturalism in morality—which is to say: every healthy morality—is governed by an 
instinct of life’ (TI 5.4).
23
 But how is ‘life’ to be construed? And, as a concept, is it any 
more informative than the Montaignean ‘Nature’? In fact, Nietzsche offers a more 
robust account of how a naturalistic value standard might be constructed, because he, 
unlike Montaigne, attempts to define and explain the concept of ‘life’: ‘what is life? 
Here we need a new, more definitive formulation of the concept “life”. My formula for 
                                                             
20 Friedrich, Montaigne, p. 316; Levine, Sensual Philosophy, p. 122. 
21 Regosin, “Rusing with the Law”, p. 61. 
22 Friedrich, Montaigne, p. 319. 
23 Comments such as this pervade Nietzsche’s late works. To give two further examples, in The Anti-
Christ he asserts that the idea of God is a ‘crime against life’, and that the doctrines of Christianity 
are ‘against life itself’ (AC 47, 62).  
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it is: Life is will to power’ (KSA 12: 2[190] (WP 254)).
24
 And as Schacht explains, this 
notion of life as the ‘enhancement and organization of power’ can be further worked out 
and refined ‘in terms of both heightened vitality and greater cultivation and creativity’.
25
  
Although an in-depth discussion of Nietzsche’s complex and much contested 
doctrine of will to power would take us too far afield, it is uncontroversial to suggest 
that he understands will to power as a force operating at the very centre of human 
psychology. Craig Beam argues that ‘when Nietzsche describes life as will to power, he 
is saying’ that power ‘is a motive which is internal to life’, that ‘a healthy living thing 
seeks to enhance its power, to disclose its strength’.
26
 This psychological reading of will 
to power, while valid at one level of analysis, fails to do adequate justice to the 
Nietzschean conception, which, as Gregory Moore has shown, owes a great deal to the 






 Indeed, just as Montaigne 
sees a force in nature working through all living things, Nietzsche understands will to 
power as manifesting itself on the most basic physiological level. This is will to power 
conceived as ‘an active, creative force inherent to nature’.
28
 But even this more 
expansive, vitalistic interpretation does not quite come to terms with the full import of 
will to power. For, as is clear from his remarks in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche 
intends the doctrine of will to power to have application to everything that exists, 
organic and non-organic (BGE 36). So here again, as in the Essays, we find the idea of a 
natural force not only immanent to all living things but also active on a cosmic level. 
This is not to argue, of course, that Montaigne was in any significant way an influence 
as regards Nietzsche’s thinking on will to power, but merely to highlight the 
                                                             
24 Leiter argues that the idea of ‘life’ is too ‘vague’ to provide an objective measure of valuation and 
so the construal of life as will to power involves ‘no gain in precision’ (Nietzsche on Morality, p. 
126). As a consequence, he maintains that ‘the only plausible candidate for the “life” for which 
things are either valuable or disvaluable must be the lives of people’ (ibid.). More precisely, lives 
‘that manifest human excellence—i.e., the lives of “higher men”’ (ibid.). Leiter rejects the ‘strong 
doctrine’ of will to power, ‘a doctrine, to the effect, that all life … reflects the will to power’, 
preferring a weaker doctrine, according to which ‘will to power is posited as the best psychological 
explanation for a wide range of human behaviours’ (ibid. pp. 138-42). But such a reading fails to 
address the fact that in Zarathustra ‘will to power comes to light as the most fundamental matter in 
Nietzsche’s thought; it names what is true of all beings and hence of the highest beings’ (Lampert, 
Nietzsche’s Teaching, p. 241). In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche thus claims that ‘the world viewed 
from inside’ may be understood as ‘will to power and nothing else’ (BGE 36). And in the Genealogy, 
counter to the Darwinian stress on ‘adaptation’, he demands that we see the ‘essence of life’ in 
terms of ‘will to power’ (GM 2.12). Nietzsche clearly views the doctrine of will to power as 
grounding his naturalistic value standard. 
25 Schacht, Nietzsche, p. 349. 
26 Beam, Virtue Beyond Morality, p. 113. 
27 Moore, “Nietzsche and Evolutionary Theory”. 
28 Ibid., p. 520. 
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comparable task that both thinkers set themselves—that of the development of a 
naturalistic standard of valuation—and to point out similarities in the way in which they 




























Section II: Higher Naturalism 
 
Not a return to nature but an ascent 
Despite the largely favourable attitude Montaigne adopts toward primitive cultures and 
his refrain that humanity must strive to return to the wisdom of nature, the philosophy 
of the Essays should in no way be interpreted as the prefiguration of a kind of 
Rousseauian romanticism. While Rousseau may have been a reader and admirer of 
Montaigne, Montaigne would certainly have rejected Rousseau’s contention that 
civilization alienates humanity from its ‘natural goodness’.
29
 On the contrary, the 
Essays document humanity’s inherent ‘cruelty’, ‘inhumanity’, and the ‘diseased’ 
aspects that are constitutive of human nature. For Montaigne, there is simply no going 
back to a utopian period in humanity’s history. As Levine rightly observes, ‘the 
powerful praise of simplicity that Montaigne articulates marks the beginnings of a 
particularly modern kind of romanticism, and it is exactly this romantic creation of his 
that he ultimately rejects’.
30
 In the first place, the New World cultures that Montaigne 
examines are neither pre-moral nor pre-social, but represent peoples that have already 
developed laws and religions and particular moral intuitions; and in the second, it is 
clear from ‘On moderation’, the essay preceding ‘On the Cannibals’, that much in the 
New World appals him. In the former, he describes the ‘dreadful cruelty’ of their 
religious practices, how ‘all their idols are slaked with human blood’ (I.30; T199, S227 
[149]). Later in the Essays, Montaigne again takes up the theme of the horrific cruelty 
of these cultures, this time in ‘On coaches’, where he makes explicit the insufficiency of 
the New World as a complete ideal for his contemporaries to follow. Lamenting that the 
primitives were first conquered by the depraved Conquistadores, he wishes rather that 
they had first been discovered by ‘Alexander and those ancient Greeks and Romans’, 
who ‘would have gently polished those people, clearing away any wild weeds while 
encouraging and strengthening the good crop that Nature had brought forth among 
them’ (III.6; T888, S1031 [694]).  
In other words, here as elsewhere in the Essays, Montaigne’s admiration for 
Greco-Roman culture comes to the fore. For all he has to say on the beauty of the 
primitive life, the noble figures of the ancient world, whether poets, philosophers 
                                                             
29 Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Part II. 
30 Levine, Sensual Philosophy, p. 90. 
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statesmen or generals, remain for him the highest exemplars; all of Montaigne’s 
comments on the New World must be seen in this light. For him, ‘the Indians are 
intended to indicate’ merely ‘the direction’ that he wants the modern world to take 
‘rather than serving as a comprehensive ideal for emulation’.
31
 Montaigne’s ultimate 
ideal is thus a society that retains many of the features of Greco-Roman culture, the 
intellectual and philosophical sophistication, the power and vigour of mind, but is 
nonetheless infused by a more naturalistic understanding of humanity, promoting a kind 
of virtue that affirms every aspect of human nature. The ‘dream’ of a ‘sublime 
encounter [sublime rencontre]’ between the peoples of classical Greece and those of the 
New World prompts an uncharacteristically effusive comment from the normally sober 
and sceptical essayist:
32
 ‘What a renewal that would have been, what a restoration of the 
fabric of the world’ (ibid. T888, S1031 [695]). What is more, this vision of a culture 
that combines the best of Greek culture with the great health and vitality of primitive 
societies offers some insight into what Nietzsche has in mind when he writes: 
‘Progress, in my sense. … [A] “return to nature” … although it is not really a going-
back as much as a coming-[up] [hinaufkommen]—[up into] a high, free, even terrible 
nature and naturalness’ (TI 9.48).
33
 
Nietzsche also frames his conception of a return to nature in direct opposition to 
the kind of romantic ideal that Montaigne seeks to undermine: ‘Rousseau—what did he 
really want to return to? … [W]ho needed moral “dignity” in order to stand the sight of 
himself’ (ibid.).
34
 For both thinkers, the very notion that we must return to a natural 
‘goodness’ implies the denial of the ‘evil’ aspects of human life that the ‘moral fanatic’ 
finds objectionable—aspects that, by contrast, the ethical naturalist accepts and affirms. 
And like Montaigne, Nietzsche uses the lives of primitive peoples to suggest a kind of 
                                                             
31 Ibid. 
32 Defaux, “A propos ‘Des coches’ de Montaigne (III, 6)”, p. 150. 
33 Translation altered. 
34 In Human All Too Human, Nietzsche refers to ‘Rousseau’s superstition’: the belief ‘in a miraculous 
primeval but as it were buried goodness of human nature’ (HAH 463). Despite such criticism, 
Nietzsche also lists Rousseau as one of the eight thinkers with whom he has had to ‘come to terms’, 
and as a thinker from whom he will ‘accept judgment’ (AOM 408). Keith Ansell Pearson sums up the 
‘ambiguous’ relationship between Nietzsche and Rousseau thus: ‘Rousseau was without doubt a 
key thinker for Nietzsche, one who played an important adversarial role in his construal of 
modernity. … Nietzsche is close to Rousseau because like him he demands a transfiguration of 
human nature, a transfiguration which for both must take place in the context of a decadent 
civilization. What separates the two is how they construe the problem of decadence, which can be 
seen in their opposing conceptions of how the humanity of the future is to be cultivated. Rousseau 
wishes humanity to realize … its “natural goodness”, while Nietzsche teaches that humanity must 
learn how to become more “evil”’ (Nietzsche contra Rousseau, pp. 19-20). 
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physiological health that contemporary Europeans no longer possess. In the Genealogy, 
he compares ‘tame’, civilized, modern Europe to the ‘energy’, the ‘boldness’ and the 
‘freedom’ of the earliest European tribal societies (GM 1.11). But of course, the higher 
naturalism that Nietzsche envisions very much supersedes the naturalism of the 
‘barbarian’. In Twilight he offers Napoleon as a model for the ‘high, free … naturalness’ 
that he has in mind, carrying on a theme from Beyond Good and Evil, where other brave 
commanders (Caesar and Alcibiades) are put forward as exemplars of human greatness 
(TI 9.44; BGE 200). In this regard also Nietzsche follows Montaigne, who, by way of a 
running argument that develops throughout the Essays, explores which of the great 
generals of the ancient world—Caesar, or Alexander, or Epaminondas—constitute the 
highest expression of human achievement. 
The Goths and Vandals and figures such as Napoleon and Caesar, in their own 
very different ways, point towards—without fully embodying—the Nietzschean ideal of 
a higher naturalism. What these primitive, ancient and modern examples share is an 
overflowing health and vitality, representing human existence at its most joyful, 
triumphant and free. What distinguishes the Goth or Vandal from a Napoleon is the 
degree to which brute instinct has become refined. In either case, powerful passions are 
in evidence, but in the latter such passions have undergone the moderating processes of 
sublimation and spiritualization. Yet Napoleon is not Nietzsche’s final word on the 
matter of a higher naturalism, since another step onward in refinement brings us to 
Goethe, ‘a magnificent attempt to overcome the eighteenth century by returning to 
nature’; it is the figure of Goethe, more than any other, who comes closest to fulfilling 
the Nietzschean ideal (TI 9.49). For Nietzsche, Goethe moves ‘toward … the naturalism 
of the Renaissance’, but in so doing he also signifies a rebirth of classical Greek culture:  
 
[H]e did not remove himself from life, he put himself squarely in the middle 
of it … he took as much as he could on himself, to himself, in himself. What 
he wanted was totality; he fought against the separation of reason, 
sensibility, feeling, will … , he disciplined himself to wholeness (ibid.).  
 
This very much follows the Nietzschean view of Greek culture, as expressed in ‘On the 
Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’: ‘the Greek conception of culture … the 
conception of culture as a new and improved physis … , culture as a unanimity of life, 
thought, appearance and will’ (HL 10). Goethe epitomizes the kind of nobility that 
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Nietzsche would advance, a nobility envisioned along naturalistic lines, striving toward 
the realization of the full range of human potential, representing a form of cultural 
progress attained through the celebration and cultivation of natural human drives and 
capacities.  
Montaigne, writing as an individual of noble birth for others of the same rank, 
also looks to a radical re-imagining of the meaning of nobility. Perhaps the best way to 
understand the return to nature that he has in mind is in terms of what Levine calls 
‘sophisticated simplicity’: ‘Montaigne wants it all. He wants the simplicity and 
innocence of nature [and] the freedom and self-awareness of philosophy’—a statement 
that could be made with equal force in relation to Nietzsche.
35
 Simplicity has to do with 
a loyalty to instinct and passion as well as an openness to feeling and sensation; 
innocence with the overcoming of shame and guilt, a reorientation in our attitude 
toward the body—which is why ethical naturalism must be seen as a prerequisite to the 
ascent to a higher naturalness. But simplicity and a ‘second innocence’ are not enough 
for either thinker (GM 2.20). Just as the masters of Nietzsche’s Genealogy are defeated 
by the cleverer, more intellectually sophisticated slaves, the primitives of the Essays are 
destroyed by the more culturally and scientifically advanced Europeans. Although both 
thinkers place the value of instinct and passion above that of reason, this is not in any 
way to deny reason’s importance, but merely to reject its supremacy, its tyranny over 
other aspects of life. Rationality, like feeling and sensation, is a capacity inherent and 
natural to humanity, one that must be explored and exploited as part of any naturalizing 
project. Furthermore, a well-developed rationality is essential to the self-knowledge and 
self-discipline required for the moderation and spiritualization of passion and instinct—
to any culture that aspires to a ‘new and improved physis’. Both Montaigne and 
Nietzsche agree that nature is ‘good’, but both would find ‘unthinking obedience’ to 
instinct ‘unsuitable’ for a being that boasts a unique ability for ‘reflective self-
awareness’.
36
 Indeed, it is only an individual like Goethe who, refusing to separate 
reason, sensibility, feeling and will, could possibly ‘dare to allow himself the entire 





                                                             
35 Levine, Sensual Philosophy, p. 85. 
36 Ibid., p. 101. 
37 Translation altered. 
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Custom as a second nature 
But there appears to be a deep tension at the centre of Montaigne’s naturalism: How can 
he promote cultural and intellectual sophistication at the same time as he advocates a 
return to nature? How are his primitivism and Philhellenism to be reconciled? 
Montaigne not only sets up a stark opposition between the beauty and natural virtue of 
the New World primitives and the corruption and artificiality of his European 
contemporaries, but he also recommends that we see nature both as a source of wisdom 
and guide to ethical behaviour. It seems he cannot tolerate any deviation from nature’s 
ways, seeking ‘her traces everywhere’ (III.13; T1094, S1266 [855]). Thus, on the face 
of it, much of what we read in the Essays argues against cultural progress, Greco-
Roman or otherwise. However, Montaigne’s final view on human ‘artifice’, our 
capacity to develop habits and customs, is not nearly so negative or so simple. And to 
begin to resolve the apparent tension is his thought we must bear in mind the close 
relationship he describes between ‘nature’ and ‘custom’—so close as to almost erase 
any clear distinction between them. For Montaigne very much complicates the meaning 
of nature, by fundamentally redrawing and expanding its boundaries: 
 
If what Nature precisely and basically requires for the preservation of our 
being is too little … than let us allow ourselves to take a little more: let us 
call “nature” the habits and endowments of each of us; let us appraise 
ourselves and treat ourselves by that measure. … For as far as that, it does 
seem we have a good excuse: custom is a second nature and no less 
powerful (III.10; T987, S1141-2 [772]).  
 
In reality, there can be no sharp opposition between nature and custom, because human 
nature always constitutes an amalgam of first nature and second nature, a second nature 
formed by culture. One of Montaigne’s principal insights relates to his emphasis on the 
way in which conventional human practices, through habituation, may ‘appear to belong 
to our genus, to be natural’ (I.23; T114, S130 [83]). As discussed earlier, he argues that 
the conscience and our moral intuitions, no matter how deeply felt, belong not to human 
nature but ‘are born of custom’. What all this means is that humanity, alone among the 
animals, has the capacity to shape its own nature, for good or ill, and the interaction 
between nature and culture—insofar as culture, over time, passes into nature—
represents one of the most fundamental processes in human life. 
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 There can be little doubt that, as Williams suggests, Nietzsche enthusiastically 
‘take[s] over’ the Montaignean conception of custom as a ‘second nature’.
38
 In an early 
note from the summer of 1872, a time in which he was reading the French moralists 
intensely, we find him writing that ‘[i]mitation is the medium of all culture. … The 
instillation of a second nature by way of imitation’ (KSA 7: 19 [226]). And in ‘On the 
Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’, published two years later, just as he is 
beginning to see Montaigne as one of his most important exemplars, he defines cultural 
progress in terms of the implantation of ‘a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature’ 
that combats our ‘our inborn heritage’ (HL 3). Throughout his middle works, enriching 
the Montaignean account, Nietzsche stresses the key role that pleasure plays in the 
habituation process. He explains how we prefer to engage in behaviour that can be 
performed with great ease and fluency, behaviour that feels natural because it ‘demands 
no cogitation’ (HAH 97) A custom may be considered second nature when it has 
become so ingrained as to feel ‘necessary’, to the extent that ‘it counts as the sole 
condition under which one can feel happy’ (ibid.).  
 There can also be little doubt, however, that Nietzsche, benefiting from a post-
Darwin understanding of humanity’s cultural and physiological evolution, develops the 
idea of a ‘second nature’ in radically new directions, extending its realm of application 
beyond that of our conscience and moral intuitions, which are primarily Montaigne’s 
focus, to include the most deep-seated cognitive and psychological faculties.
39
 He even 
suggests, in Daybreak, that dissimulation, if practiced long enough, ‘at last becomes 
nature: dissimulation in the end sublimates itself, and organs and instincts are the 
surprising fruit of the garden of hypocrisy’ (D 248). But the Genealogy offers 
Nietzsche’s most far-reaching remarks on the ways in which humanity has been formed 
by cultural means, the ‘social straitjacket’: ‘The enormous labour of what I have called 
the “morality of custom”—the special work of man on himself throughout the longest 
era of the human race’ (GM 2.2). While Montaigne describes how our conscience arises 
as a second nature, Nietzsche explains that the conscience itself ‘is the product of a long 
                                                             
38 Williams, Nietzsche and the French, p. 82. 
39 John Richardson argues that Nietzsche’s thought marks an advance on Darwinian accounts of our 
evolutionary past, with his understanding of custom as a form of ‘social selection’ that ‘modifies’ the 
mechanisms of natural selection: social selection, through certain customs and social practices 
(morality in particular), ‘“designs” our drives and values for different ultimate ends than the 
organism’s reproductive success’ (Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, pp. 81-3). As a consequence, custom 
may be seen ‘as a new mechanism for propagating or replicating behavioural dispositions, one that 
involves ‘both a rewriting and overwriting of the dispositions shaped by natural selection’ (ibid.). 
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history and series of transformation’ (GM 2.3). As examined earlier, before the concept 
of conscience could arise, humanity had first to make the individual ‘necessary, 
uniform, an equal among equals, regular and consequently calculable’, and second 
humanity had to ‘forge a memory for itself’—both accomplished through the ‘cruellest’ 
social practices (GM 2.1-3). And it is only because of such transformations that other, 
more sophisticated developments became possible, that the human being, in other 
words, became the ‘most interesting animal’, the animal ‘pregnant with the future’ (A 




There remains another worry with this notion of redrawing the boundaries of nature to 
include dispositions instilled by custom and culture: both thinkers display as much 
determination to be free of habit and convention as they do to return to nature and be 
guided by its wisdom. We have seen how they characterize the move away from 
convention as a liberation, understanding habit as a tyrannical force that frustrates self-
knowledge: ‘the principal activity of custom is to seize us and grip us in her claws so 
that it is hardly in our power to come back to ourselves’ (I.23; T114, S130 [83]). And as 
ethical naturalists and philosophical anthropologists, both advocate the overcoming of 
the false certainties and biases of prevailing opinion. But this tension—between custom 
understood as a salutary second nature and custom understood as a powerful force that 
alienates us from ourselves—may also be resolved, if one bears in mind that, depending 
on the specific characteristics of the second nature involved, both thinkers see custom as 
a great positive or a great negative, as a blessing or a curse. For while the return to 
nature they have in mind, a higher naturalism, implies a commitment to cultural 
progress, such progress can only be achieved through a second nature that harmonizes 
with and improves upon ‘first nature’. 
 Neither Montaigne nor Nietzsche sees the individual as endlessly malleable, 
capable of adopting any second nature, without detrimental consequences for well-
being. They agree that there are certain habits and instincts the implantation of which 
would prove ruinous to overall health and vitality. Precisely for this reason Nietzsche 
aims to reveal ‘the eternal basic text of homo natura’ (BGE 230) and Montaigne, 
through his project in self-study, aims to ‘discover’ the contours of our ‘forme 
168 
 
maitresse’, our ‘master form’ (III.2; T789, S914 [615]).
40
 For both thinkers, there exists 
an essential form or bedrock of human nature, an ineradicable first nature, a givenness 
in the body and physiology that must be respected. Despite their seeming endorsement 
of custom as a second nature, Montaigne and Nietzsche stress the absolute supremacy 
of the demands of our first nature. For Montaigne, nature is ‘unconquerable’, and 
‘against long nurture’ will inevitably break ‘forcibly out and [find] expression’ (ibid.). 
Nietzsche, at the same time as he recommends giving ‘style to one’s character’ by 
adding ‘a great mass of second nature’, makes clear that ‘we must become the best 
students and discoverers of everything lawful and necessary’ (GS 290, 335). Therefore, 
the opposition at play in both their works is not that between nature and custom but 
between nature and unhealthy custom: customs involving cultural practices 
fundamentally at odds with human nature—those practices, for instance, informed by 
the values of asceticism. Such are the kinds of customs and practices we must fight 
against, and resist their internalization as instinct. Moreover, it is by way of ‘testing and 
experimentation’ that one may determine which aspects of one’s second nature should 
be resisted and which reinforced; ‘refined self-observation’ is central to this process:
41
 
‘Provided that he listens to himself there is no one who does not discover in himself a 
form entirely his own … which struggles against his education (III.2; T789, S914 
[615]).
42
 A view we find echoed in Nietzsche, if stated more fatalistically: ‘at the 
bottom of us … there is … something unteachable, some granite of spiritual fatum, of 
predetermined decision’ (BGE 231). 
For Montaigne, by listening to ourselves and gaining insight into our forme 
maitresse, it remains possible for us not only to refine our second nature but also to 
surpass—without supressing or denying—our first nature. An appropriate second nature 
may enhance and complement what is given in our body and physiology. The 
Montaignean ideal of sophisticated simplicity entails a self-aware naturalness, the 
moderation and cultivation of natural instincts and passions through cultural means. If 
Montaigne sets up the ideal of a sophisticated simplicity, it is Nietzsche who explains 
the natural processes that would allow such a higher naturalism to be possible. In 
Beyond Good and Evil, he claims that every cultural norm, every morality, constitutes 
                                                             
40 Frances Goyet suggests that what Montaigne means by ‘master form’ is something ‘fundamental’, 
‘innate’ and ‘given by nature [donné par la nature]’ (“La Notion éthique d’habitude dans les Essais”, 
p. 1084). 
41 Ansell Pearson, “The Incorporation of Truth”, p. 242. 
42 For those who do not listen, this form may well become a ‘repressed unconscious [un inconscient 
refoulé]’ (Goyet, “La Notion éthique d’habitude dans les Essais”, p. 1084). 
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‘a bit of tyranny against “nature”’ (BGE 188). Furthermore, and more importantly, he 
goes on to say the following: 
 
But the curious fact is that all there is or has been on earth of freedom, 
subtlety, boldness … and masterly sureness … has developed only owing to 
the “tyranny of such capricious laws”; and … the probability is by no means 
small that precisely this is “nature” and “natural” (ibid.). 
 
Humanity’s emergence as a social animal, because of internalization and the 
development of bad conscience, made possible the conditions for ‘obedience’. And the 
capacity for ‘obedience’, in turn, helped humanity become the most interesting animal, 
the animal that could forge its own nature through the instillation of a second nature. In 
addition, it is essential to recognize, Nietzsche argues, that where there is ‘obedience 
over a long time and in a single direction … something always develops … for whose 
sake it is worthwhile to live on earth; for example, virtue, art, music … spirituality’ 
(ibid.). That is to say, something always develops when a habituated second nature 
compels us to think and act within ‘limited horizons’, disciplining us to cultivate a range 
of instincts in one direction rather than another. Thus, as Parkes explains, Nietzsche 
‘understands … humanity’s cultural achievements as resulting from self-imposed 
tyranny against the nature in us … yet a tyranny exercised … by nature, through a 
second nature within ourselves’.
43
 Nietzsche’s higher naturalism, seeking to impose a 
stern discipline on nature—the unanimity of reason, sensibility, feeling and will—
represents a form of cultural tyranny like any other, but one that forgoes the major 
limitation of the kind of constraint imposed by the Stoic and Christian schemas. 
Nietzsche does not deny that Stoicism and Christianity have been responsible for 
‘educating the spirit’. This education, however, came at great cost, since to live 
according to their ascetic doctrines required that ‘an irreplaceable amount of strength 
and spirit had to be crushed, stifled and ruined’ (ibid.). Not so with Nietzsche’s higher 
naturalism, a tyranny in line with the fundamental dictates of homo natura, a tyranny 
that aims to educate the spirit through the sublimation, and not the extirpation, of 
passions and instincts. 
                                                             
43 Parkes, “Zhuangzi and Nietzsche on the Human and Nature”, p. 16. 
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 What is more, naturalism, as Nietzsche understands it, marks a move away from 
the kind of ‘capricious’, ‘anti-rational’ and anti-natural laws that past moral systems 
have used to mould human nature, and in particular a move away from the ‘grandiose 
stupidity’ of the Christian-moral interpretation (ibid.). A higher naturalism comes to 
dominate culture once mankind has transformed itself ‘from a moral to a knowing 
mankind’, once mankind, that is, has taken up the ‘task of assimilating knowledge and 
making it instinctive’ (HH 107; GS 11).
44
 For Nietzsche, then, the task of translating 
humanity back into nature must go together with that of knowledge assimilation, since it 
is only as knowledge increasingly comes to take on the status of a second nature that 
well-chosen, rational, and natural laws can begin to be embedded as cultural norms, 
thereby ensuring the healthy spiritualization of the passions.
45
 Grounded in a deep 
understanding of homo natura, a higher naturalism thus avoids the ‘grandiose stupidity’ 
of a moral code that would make ‘mistrust of the instincts into second nature’, miring 
humanity in a debilitating ‘physiological self-contradiction’ (EH 4.8; TI 9.41).
46
 
Nietzsche wants us to recognize the ‘enormous potential’ there is ‘for creatively 
channelling our cognitive capacities back into, or onto, instinct, which would have the 
effect of naturalizing human beings at the same time that spiritualizing continues 
apace’.
47
 Indeed, the Essays provide ample evidence for why this kind of channelling 
remains absolutely necessary. Montaigne fully accepts that there can be no simple 
return to nature, to the extent that ‘nature is both the goal and part of the problem’.
48
 
After all, he presents ‘presumption’, the human tendency that he most decries, as a 
natural and ineradicable part of the soul, and more significant still, he argues that 
                                                             
44 Assimilation (Einverleibung) ‘means literally a taking into the body, and on the level of human 
existence it denotes a complex practice of spiritual ingestion’ (Ansell Pearson, “The Incorporation of 
Truth’, p. 235). 
45 ‘Rather than blocking and vilifying our ingrained drives’, Nietzsche seeks ‘to use and satisfy 
them—while redirecting them’ (Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, p. 122). Of course, the ‘new 
truths’ that we make instinctive in our bodies would also offer the opportunity to resolve some of 
‘the earlier and younger errors’ that have become part of our cognitive capacities (Müller-Lauter, 
Über Freiheit und Chaos, p. 61). As a consequence, Ansell Pearson argues that ‘when Nietzsche 
inquires after the incorporation of truth, he is in essence asking after the possibility of the 
overhuman’ (“The Incorporation of Truth”, p. 230-1). For the project of assimilating knowledge 
‘demands that we go beyond what is prescribed within evolution’, beyond the fundamental ‘errors’ 
in perception and judgement that have proven advantageous to our species survival, thereby 
allowing us, in a sense, to become ‘“more than” human’ (pp. 238-9). 
46 Physiological self-contradiction is a consequence of forms of ‘social selection’ that encourage the 
cultivation of ‘dispositional commitments’ which are ‘hostile to the body and its drives’ 
(Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism, p. 92). 
47 Del Caro, Grounding the Nietzsche Rhetoric of Earth, p. 376.  
48 Levine, Sensual Philosophy, p. 122. 
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‘metaphysical delusions originate from a natural faculty: the imagination’.
49
 Guarding 
against our propensity for arrogance and self-delusion and the excesses of the 
imagination, sophisticated simplicity, like Nietzsche’s higher naturalism, is a naturalism 




For Montaigne, sophisticated simplicity issues in a form of virtue that he describes in 
terms of ‘a state of innocence’, a state that he himself exemplifies (II.11; T406, S478 
[311]). He draws a sharp distinction between his own virtue and the Stoic model, 
according to which virtue represents a struggle against the desires and passions within, a 
struggle that must ensure the rule of reason in the soul. There is, Montaigne stresses, 
much to admire in this latter kind of virtue, especially when—as in the case of a 
Socrates or a Cato—the demanding work of self-mastery has been overcome, the need 
for struggle transcended. In the lives of Socrates and Cato we find virtue striding 
‘victoriously along, stately and at her ease’, since in ‘the souls of those two great men’ 
there is ‘such a perfect acquisition of the habit of virtue that it has become a matter of 
their complexion’, their virtue constituting ‘the very being of their souls’ (Ibid. T402-4, 
S474-6 [308-10]). Yet, in Montaigne’s view, such a virtue, while natural to an extent, 
insofar as it has become embedded as a second nature, lacks the qualities of a 
thoroughgoing naturalism. For the victory they both achieve amounts to no real victory 
at all, representing as it does an attack on the morally repugnant aspects of the soul, the 
conquering of their own first nature, the denial and suppression of their ‘forme 
maitresse’.  
And it is precisely in order to avoid the unhealthy tension inherent to Stoic 
virtue, caused by a fundamental opposition between first and second natures—what 
Nietzsche calls a ‘physiological self-contradiction’—that Montaigne becomes the 
practitioner of an ‘innocent’ virtue: ‘Unlike Socrates, I have not corrected my natural 
complexion by the power of reason, and I have in no wise let my inclinations become 
confused by artifice’ (III.12; T1037, S1201 [811]). Montaigne’s virtue is more natural 
than Socrates, more fully expressive of his true nature. Free of guilt or shame, he feels 
no compulsion to ‘correct’ what has been given in his physiology, evinces no mistrust 
                                                             
49 Ibid., p. 133. 
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of his most ‘pressing desires’ (II.11; T406, S478 [311]). In other words, ‘he rejects self-
correction in favour of self-affirmation’.
50
 Nietzsche, just as much an opponent of 
Socratic or Stoic virtue, when elaborating his conception of a higher naturalism, follows 
the Montaignean ideal of a natural, innocent and self-expressive virtue. In Zarathustra, 
after lamenting that notions of good and evil have been ‘lied’ into the very ‘ground’ of 
our souls, the protagonist comments on the ‘filth’ of words such as ‘revenge, 
punishment, reward and punishment’, their complete inapplicability to the question of 
virtue, and then offers the following recommendation: ‘That your virtue may be your 
Self and not something foreign, a skin, a covering. … That your Self be in the action, as 





















                                                             
50 Brush, From the Perspective of the Self, p. 237. 
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Section III: The Self-Enjoying Soul 
 
Denial of autonomous reason 
Montaigne’s rejection of the traditional view of the soul as a unified and fixed entity, 
and his dissolution of the self into a multiplicity of voices, faces and personalities, 
clearly influences Nietzsche’s thinking, anticipating many of the lines of thought that 
come together in the assault on ‘soul atomism’ that is to be found in Beyond Good and 
Evil. Moreover, neither thinker wishes to contain the soul’s complexity, to restrain its 
diverse and contradictory impulses; they rather seek to develop the potential that 
multiplicity offers, endorsing an experimental philosophizing that would exploit an 
endless variety of perspectives in the service of self-knowledge. In addition, both 
Montaigne and Nietzsche are as committed to the maintenance of diversity and 
contradiction within the soul as they are reluctant to repress or destroy any instinct, 
desire or passion. As ethical naturalists, they aim to jettison traditional ascetic virtue in 
favour of a natural virtue directed toward psychological and physiological health. We 
thus have a picture of self-cultivation in which the widest possible range of 
contradictory impulses draws energy and sustenance from the full economy of the soul. 
Yet, for all that, neither thinker advocates a mere letting-go to instinct, the giving-in to 
desire. Rather, they conceive the ‘return to nature’ as an ascent to a higher, self-aware 
naturalism, a sophisticated naturalism that emerges out of the disciplined moderation 
and spiritualization of the passions. And the aim of this higher naturalism is the 
instillation of a second nature—by way of a culture devoted to the assimilation of 
knowledge—that does no violence to first nature. 
But before deciding whether such a higher naturalism is at all possible, some 
questions remain to be answered, for instance: How is moderation to be imposed on 
powerful and unruly passions? Does a freedom of instinct preclude the kind of self-
discipline necessary even for an ‘innocent’ virtue? Can harmonious self-control be 
achieved in a soul that embraces diversity and contradiction? Such questions become 
especially pressing with regard to Montaigne and Nietzsche, in view of their 
abandonment of the traditional ascetic route to self-mastery: reason as sovereign judge 
of the passions and controller of the soul. While Montaigne simply admits that he is not 
a follower of Socratic virtue, Nietzsche castigates Socrates for his unhealthy, anti-
instinctual doctrine of ‘“Rationality” at any price’, the way in which he makes a ‘tyrant’ 
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out of reason (EH, ‘BT’ 1; TI 2.9). At every turn we see both thinkers deflating the 
power and importance of the intellect, stressing instead the authority of sensation, 
feeling and instinct, the wisdom of the body. Owing to a deeper understanding of the 
psyche than is to be found in Greco-Roman thought, an understanding of the complexity 
of motivation and the significance of unconscious forces, both Montaigne and Nietzsche 
attempt to move beyond the notion of the human being as an essentially rational agent, 
and the simplistic image of the soul as an arena in which the battle between reason and 
the passions plays itself out. In complete opposition to Socratic and Stoic moral 
psychology, they would deny that there is any fundamental distinction between the 
apparently cool demands of reason and the more heated promptings of the passions. 
Early in the Essays, in passages that borrow heavily from the Stoically-inclined 
Seneca, Montaigne appears to conceive of reason as a fully distinct and separate faculty 
within the soul. In ‘On constancy’, for example, he worries about the possibility of 
strong emotions ‘infecting’ what he calls ‘the seat of reason’ (I.12; T48, S49 [31]). Yet, 
when one looks to Book II of the Essays, we find him referring to ‘our slight capacity 
for discursive reason’, and describing the notion of a pure ‘rationality’ as ‘imaginary 
and fantastical’ (II.8; T366, S434 [279]; II.12; T464, S540 [357]). For Montaigne, 
reason is neither autonomous nor impartial, but passionate to the core; the passions 
dominate the soul, twisting the intellect this way and that: ‘What varied thoughts and 
reasons, what conflicting notions, are presented to us by our various passions’ (ibid. 
T551, S640 [427]). On this view, reason, far from being sovereign ruler over the soul, is 
slave to the passions. Montaigne’s position, however, is more revolutionary still: 
 
By reason I always mean that appearance of rationality which each of us 
constructs for himself—the kind of reason which can characteristically have 
a thousand contrary reactions. … A thousand chance emotions, unbidden, 
are in turmoil within me; sometimes a melancholic humour gets hold of me; 
at others a choleric one; sometimes grief or joy dominate me, for reasons of 
their own (ibid. T548, S636-7 [425]). 
 
To the extent that Montaigne sees reason as playing an important but instrumental role 
in the psyche, moved to judgement as a consequence of unknown forces, as something 
individual and subjective, rather than universal and objective, the Essays prefigure 
much of what Nietzsche has to say on the nature of the intellect, and in particular what 
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he has to say in two especially rich sections from Daybreak, 109 and 119. In the former, 
he suggests that in the ‘entire procedure’ of self-mastery ‘our intellect’ is only ever ‘the 
blind instrument of another drive which is a rival of the drive whose vehemence is 
tormenting us’; while in the latter he seeks to explain the kind of variability in our 
reasoning that Montaigne observes, by probing beneath the incitements of ‘chance 
emotions’: ‘today’s prompter of the reasoning faculty was different from yesterday’s—a 
different drive wanted to gratify itself, to be active, to exercise itself, to refresh itself, to 
discharge itself’. More significant still, Nietzsche’s more penetrating understanding of 
the unconscious doesn’t simply allow him to illuminate the workings of the intellect in a 
way the Essays cannot; it also leads him to effect a more radical subversion of 
autonomous reason than Montaigne, who, even if he sees the intellect as a servant of the 
passions, still believes reason to be in some way opposed to them. But Nietzsche, in a 
total repudiation of Greco-Roman thought, argues that there can be no real and 
fundamental conflict between the rational and appetitive sides of the soul, since the 
intellect may be properly viewed as merely ‘a certain behaviour of the drives toward 
each other’ (GS 333). The intellect, that is to say, ‘is not something separate from or 






Montaigne’s rejection of Socratic rationalism and ascetic virtue has led to some 
disagreement as to what alternative conception of self-mastery, if any, he would want to 
advance. Philip Hallie, for instance, based on a particular reading of ‘Of cruelty’, rightly 
argues that Montaigne aims to overturn the ‘Inward Government Theory’, the theory of 
ethics which would understand virtue as the control of reason over the passions. What 
the Essays actually promote, he goes on to claim, is an other-orientated ethic, an ethic 
that, renouncing the goal of self-mastery altogether, moves away from a self-centred 
preoccupation with the ordering of one’s soul.
52
 Taking the Essays as a whole, however, 
there is scant textual support for this kind of reading; indeed, the evidence to the 
contrary is overwhelming. After all, Montaigne frames his entire writing project in 
terms of an art of living, a care of the self, apologizing throughout the Essays for his 
                                                             
51 Parkes, Composing the Soul, p. 353. 
52 Hallie, “The Ethics of Montaigne’s ‘De la cruauté’”. Agreeing with Hallie, Schaeffer even goes so far 
as to suggest that Montaigne seeks to supplant the ‘Inward Government Theory’ approach with a 
‘social utility … criterion of moral evaluation’ (The Political Philosophy of Montaigne, p. 245). 
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exclusively self-centred focus. Everything he reads or writes has value for him only 
insofar as it serves to enhance the virtue of his own character: ‘For many years now the 
target of my thoughts has been myself alone; I examine nothing, I study nothing, but 
me; and if I do study anything else, it is to apply it at once to myself, or more correctly, 
within myself’ (II.6; T358, S424 [273]). Furthermore, when comparing and ranking his 
exemplars, he does so by considering their evident self-discipline and self-control, the 
way in which they manage the most difficult passions and emotions. On this basis, 
Montaigne places the characters of Caesar and Alexander beneath that of Epaminondas, 
the Theban general, whose wise and ‘well-ordered soul’ ensured an ‘ever abundant 
virtue’ (II.36; T734-5, S855-6 [573]). Moreover, when contrasting his own virtue with 
that of Socrates, he develops the opposition not by outlining an other-orientated ethic 
that looks to the social utility of our actions, but rather by stressing a healthier, more 
natural attitude that one could adopt toward one’s own soul.
53
 
 In line with Hallie and Schaeffer, Hartle maintains that ‘in Montaigne’s own 
goodness there is no element of struggle … the virtues and vices are re-ordered in 
accordance with a model of moral action in which there is no mastery’.
54
 Such a view 
seems poorly placed to capture the type of ‘innocent’ virtue Montaigne has in mind, not 
least because it fails to take account of explicit statements that he makes to the contrary. 
The capacity to order and control the passions and impose self-constraint remains 
central to his understanding of virtue, despite his refusal of a particular form of self-
mastery: ‘True freedom is to have power over oneself to do anything with oneself’ 
(III.12; T1022, S1184 [800]). And this comment, coming in the penultimate easy of the 
volume, merely follows on from the near impossible ideal expressed by the essayist a 
few essays earlier: ‘I want to be in every way a master of myself’ (III.5; T818, S948 
[639]). Admittedly, the theme of self-mastery is not a dominant one in the Essays. Yet 
as Frame observes, throughout the Essays, amid the ‘disclaimers of resistance we find 
evidence of control’.
55
 What is more, this is self-control of a quite extraordinary kind, 
demanding constant self-awareness and the most rigorous self-discipline: ‘I do control 
                                                             
53 Montaigne, like Nietzsche, may be understood as a ‘moral perfectionist’: the Essays exemplify the 
conviction that ‘one’s primary, overriding—and perhaps sole—ethical “obligation” is to attend to 
the perfection of one’s ownmost self (Conway, Nietzsche and the Political, p. 54). Any “obligations 
that one might choose to observe to others are strictly derivative of, and secondary to, the 
imperative to perfect oneself’ (ibid.). Indeed, for Brobjer, both thinkers promote a form of ethics 
that could be best described as ‘an ethics of character’ (Nietzsche’s Ethics of Character, p. 42). 
54 Hartle, “The Transformation of Virtue in Montaigne’s Essays”, p. 11. 
55 Frame, Montaigne, p. 262. 
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my vices, preventing them from being contaminated by others. … I prune … and train 
them’ (II.11; T407-8, S479-80 [312]); ‘There is hardly an emotion in me that sneaks 
away and … is not governed by the consent of almost all my parts’ (III.2; T790, S915 
[616]); ‘I stop the first movements of my emotions. … I can feel in time the tiny breezes 
which come … as forerunners of gales’ (III.10; T994-5, S1150 [778]); ‘my soul … is 
ever probing and feeling herself. … Each onslaught against me I confront and oppose 
equipped in full amour’ (III.6; T878, S1019 [686]). But even if one puts aside such 
comments, and even if one dismisses Montaigne’s express wish to be the master of 
himself as an isolated remark, one is still left with the reality that his way of life, given 
the contradiction and multiplicity he discovers within himself, presupposes a high level 
of internal struggle, the need to order and moderate conflicting passions, and thus 
implies a degree of self-mastery that would at the very least allow for the subjective 
multiplicity of the soul to be harnessed in a unified direction.  
 Montaigne’s goal, therefore, is not to abandon the Stoic ideal of self-mastery 
outright, but to substantially revise it, reconceiving the proper ordering of the soul along 
more naturalistic lines, reflecting an understanding of the multiplicity of the self and an 
appreciation of the value of passion and instinct. To reject a reason-centred mastery is 
not to reject mastery in toto. But how, exactly, is self-mastery to be construed in the 
absence of a fixed, stable and unchanging self, and without the dominance of reason 
within the soul? In order to answer this question, we should look to Nietzsche, who, 
based on a similar conception of the soul and a similar opposition to the ‘correction’ of 
human nature by reason, offers a richer account of the kind of self-mastery that 
Montaigne has in mind. Indeed, not only do both thinkers begin at a comparable starting 
point—in terms of a naturalistic understanding of the self—but they also arrive at a 
shared ideal: a form of mastery that manifests in an instinctual, effortless and relaxed 
virtue. And both seek to underplay the difficult work of self-analysis, self-
experimentation and self-discipline that must precede the attainment of such a virtue, 
through a rhetoric of ease and nonchalance.  
 Parkes offers a compelling account of the Nietzschean understanding of self-
mastery, which could be described in terms of a ‘two-phase relationship’ among the 
drives of the soul.
56
 The first phase involves the imposition of a protracted constraint on 
the conflicting and competing aspects of the self, not by way of reason, as in the Greco-
                                                             
56 Parkes, Composing the Soul, p. 357. 
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Roman model, but through the dominance of a particular drive or group of drives. 
Nietzsche is far more open than Montaigne about the need for rigorous self-discipline, if 
not self-tyranny: ‘Look for the highest type … where the highest resistance is constantly 
being overcome: five paces away from tyranny … if you understand “tyrant” to mean 
the merciless and terrible instincts that provoke the maximal amount of authority and 
discipline against themselves’ (TI 9.38). Nevertheless, for Nietzsche, this kind of self-
discipline, in itself, is not sufficient to bring about the most ideal ordering of the soul. 
For he suggests that, once self-control has moved beyond the stage of internal struggle 
to a state of perfect habituation, self-tyranny may then, for a certain period of time, be 
‘relaxed in such a way that one can enjoy spontaneous existence’.
57
 In this second 
phase, Nietzsche, given his ethical naturalism, his conviction that ‘evil’ drives are 
essential for health and vitality, is concerned to ‘retain as many powerful energies as 
possible within the …  soul’, thus averting the worst excesses of the 




Overcoming of the affects?—No, if what is implied is their weakening and 
extirpation. But taking them into service: which may also mean subjecting 
them to protracted tyranny. … At last they are confidently granted [a 
trusting] freedom again: they love us as good servants and go voluntarily 




There are clear affinities between this two-phase model and the ideal of self-cultivation 
that Montaigne portrays in the Essays.
60
 Like Nietzsche, he, too, strives for mastery 
                                                             
57 Parkes, Composing the Soul, p. 355. 
58 Ibid., p. 357. 
59 Translation altered. 
60 Where Nietzsche and Montaigne disagree is on the question of self-tyranny. While Montaigne 
certainly advocates a high level of self-control and self-discipline, a constant vigilance regarding 
one’s passions and emotions, he would find the notion of a ‘maximal amount of authority and 
discipline’ against oneself as too excessive. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, ‘a form of tyranny in 
which … a particular complex of drives … holds ruthless sway over the other members of the 
psychical community may be a most productive arrangement’, owing to the tremendous power and 
energy that such an arrangement can help to accumulate (Parkes, Composing the Soul, p. 351). In 
the section from Twilight of the Idols quoted above, he goes on to offer Julius Caesar as ‘the most 
magnificent type’, the greatest exponent of self-tyranny (TI 9.38). But Montaigne—even if his 
description of the organizational characteristics of the general’s soul is in remarkable agreement 
with Nietzsche’s—explicitly rejects Caesar as a model of psychic health, and he does so precisely 
because of Caesar’s tyrannical drive for ambition: ‘His passionate ambition ruled so sovereignly 
over all other passions and possessed his soul with such authority, that, wherever it wanted to go, it 
carried him there. … [A]ll [his other] beautiful dispositions were stifled and corrupted. … [T]hat one 
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over the contradictory impulses within, while at the same time also denying that rigid 
self-control represents the pinnacle of the virtuous existence: ‘To see the exertions that 
Seneca imposed upon himself … to see him sweat and grunt in order to stiffen and 
reassure himself during his long struggles on his pedestal’ (III.12; T1016-7, S1177 
[795]). If Nietzsche looks to a life of freedom and spontaneity, Montaigne characterizes 
the ‘most beautiful’ soul as that which exhibits the greatest adaptability and ‘flexibility’ 
(III.3; T796, S922 [621]). In contrast to the unbending virtue of Seneca, the virtue of 
Montaigne involves a suppleness of movement and action, the capacity to change and 
adapt to circumstance, which can only come about from a relaxation of self-control, all 
internal resistance overcome.
61
 Throughout the Essays, so determined is he to 
emphasize the limitations of ascetic virtue, Montaigne devotes his attention entirely to 
highlighting the second phase of self-mastery, the ease and suppleness that follow self-
discipline, the phase that the Stoic practitioner never reaches. Offering his own life as an 
example, he forces the point home through the following kind of rhetoric—choosing not 
to mention the elements of self-control that his own art of living shares with the 
traditional conception: ‘Assays of myself have not revealed the presence in my soul of 
any firmness in resisting the passions. … I do not know how to sustain inner conflicts 
and debates. … Was it due to some … accident of birth?’ (II.11; T406, S478 [311]) This 
Montaignean trope represents one more aspect of the Essays that finds its way into 
Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo: ‘I have no memory of ever having made an effort,—you will 
not detect any trace of struggle in my life, I am the opposite of a heroic nature … there 





                                                                                                                                                                                  
vice alone … undid the most beautiful and most richly endowed soul that ever was’ (II.33; T708-10, 
S828-30 [552-4]). 
61 It is conspicuous that, as regards the qualities of flexibility and adaptability, Montaigne 
puts forward Alcibiades, less tyrannized by ambition than Caesar, as the model we have most 
to learn from: ‘I have often noted with great astonishment the extraordinary character of 
Alcibiades who, without impairing his health, could so readily adapt to diverse manners’ 
(I.26; T166-7, S187 [124]). Conspicuous because Nietzsche places Alcibiades alongside 
Caesar as an exemplar who displays ‘a real mastery and subtlety in … self-control’ (BGE 200). 
So even if Montaigne may not see self-tyranny as a necessary condition of mastery, he does 




Becoming what you are 
Yet there are other, significant parallels between the Montaignean and Nietzschean 
accounts of self-mastery, especially when one looks to the importance they both attach 
to the idea of self-creation. For both thinkers, the ‘self’ that does the controlling and 
tyrannizing is not something fixed and given, but represents an ever-evolving, self-
formed or self-fashioned complex of emotions, instincts and passions. In one of his 
opening essays, Montaigne admits that ‘where I seek myself I cannot find myself’ (I.10; 
T34, S41 [26-7]). And he never succeeds, strictly speaking, in finding himself, as this 
later passage makes plain: 
 
Since I was modelling this portrait on myself, it was so often necessary to 
prepare myself and to pose so as to draw out the detail that the original has 
acquired more definition and has to some extent shaped itself. … I have not 
made my book any more than my book has made me’ [emphasis added] 
(II.18; T647-8, S755 [504]). 
 
When completing the Essays, therefore, through self-study and self-experimentation, 
Montaigne does not so much discover a self as create a self. And it is his writing 
project, the mission to make himself known, that enables Montaigne to impose a 
measure of order on the multiplicity he finds within, to guide the opposed tendencies of 
his soul in a unified direction.
62
 
 Whereas Montaigne speaks about the self in terms of self-shaping and self-
fashioning, Nietzsche claims that ‘[a]ctive, successful natures act … as if there hovered 
before them the commandment … thou shalt become a self’ (AOM 366). Self-creation 
is central to the process of becoming a self, what Nietzsche most often refers to as 
‘becoming what you are’. In The Gay Science, he characterizes ‘human beings’ who 
become what they are as those ‘who are new, unique, incomparable, who give 
themselves laws, who create themselves’ (GS 335). In fact, such is the importance of 
this ideal for Nietzsche, he sees fit to have it as the subtitle of Ecce Homo (Ecce Homo: 
How to Become What you Are). What is more, Ecce Homo offers insight into the crucial 
relationship between becoming a self and one’s life ‘task’ (EH 2.2): 
                                                             
62 Zahi Anbra Zalloua argues that Montaigne does not intend the Essays to reflect ‘an already formed 
subject’; rather, he sees ‘his ethical self’ as taking shape ‘through the very process of writing’ 
(Montaigne and the Ethics of Skepticism, p. 1).  
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The whole surface of consciousness … has to be kept free from all of the 
great imperatives. … In the meantime, the organizing ‘idea’ keeps growing 
deep inside,—it starts commanding … one by one, it develops all the servile 
faculties before giving any clue as to the domineering task, the ‘goal’, the 
‘purpose’, the ‘meaning’ (EH 2.9). 
 
Thus, in the Nietzschean conception, the ideal ordering of the soul is one in which 
‘one’s task in life, as constituted by a particular complex of drives’, rules over the 
contradictory aspects of the soul.
63
 One’s ‘domineering task’ functions as a powerful 
disciplining and ordering force in the psyche, around with which the self—to use the 
Montaignean phrase—shapes itself.
64
 And while Montaigne’s task emerges as the 
overcoming of Greco-Roman philosophy and Christian theology through a study of 
himself, Nietzsche’s develops into the self-overcoming of the entire Western 
philosophical and religious traditions by way of a ‘revaluation of values’ (ibid.). 
 As Williams notes, all the major elements of Nietzsche’s conception of 
‘becoming what you are’ are anticipated in the Essays, not only a recognition of the 
relationship between self-creation and one’s ‘task’ but also the understanding that self-
creation is essentially a matter of self-legislation.
65
 That one must live by one’s own 
laws and judge according to standards one sets for oneself is a view pervading the 
writing of both Montaigne and Nietzsche. In ‘On repenting’, Montaigne insists that ‘we 
must establish an inner model to serve as touchstone of our actions’, and then offers 
himself as an example: ‘I have my own laws and law-court to pass judgement on me 
and I appeal to them rather than elsewhere’ (III.2; T785, S911 [613]). Like so much of 
Montaigne’s thought—on cruelty, on morality as custom, on the instrumental nature of 
reason—this idea is also present in Daybreak, where Nietzsche considers a possible 
future in which ‘lawgiving’ would be ‘founded on the idea “I submit only to the law 
which I myself have given”’ (D 187). Rejecting the notion of an absolute good or the 
existence of universal moral norms, both thinkers—ethical naturalists rather than moral 
fanatics—promote a way of life in which each individual’s highest ethical duty is to 
themselves, legislating for themselves in such a way as to ensure the realization of their 
                                                             
63 Parkes, Composing the Soul, p. 351. 
64 ‘The “higher type” … fashions the constellation of drives that comprise the self into a coherent 
unity in which all drives and instincts receive expression, not in a wanton or anarchic manner, but 
in a way that is answerable to an organizing principle, a master drive, the “law of one’s own being”’ 
(Came, “The Themes of Affirmation in The Birth of Tragedy and Beyond”, p. 219). 
65 Williams, Nietzsche and the French, p. 107.  
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own true nature, self-given laws issuing in self-expressive virtue. Montaigne thus boasts 
that he does not ‘suffer from the common failing of judging another individual by 
himself’, but can instead ‘conceive and believe that there are thousands of different 
ways of living’ (I.37; T225, S257 [169]). And Nietzsche, contra Kant, argues that 
‘everyone should invent his own virtues, his own categorical imperative’ (AC 11). In 
this way, they both make the same urgent demand on their readers: ‘Can you give 
yourself your own evil and your own good, and hang your will over yourself as a law?’ 
(Z 1.17) 
 Individuals create themselves to the extent that they act in accordance with laws 
of their own making, shaping their lives in line with internal need rather than external 
constraint. Becoming what you are, therefore, has little to do with an arbitrary 
constructing of the self based on some kind of aesthetic criteria, but rather involves a 
form of self-fashioning that presupposes the deepest self-knowledge.
66
 For Montaigne, 
self-creation entails ‘listening’ to oneself, so as to discover one’s true ‘form’ (III.2; 
T789, S914 [615]), and then submitting to its dictates: ‘[quoting Cicero] We must so 
live as not to struggle against Nature in general; having safeguarded such things, we 
should follow our own nature’ (III.9; T967, S1118 [756]). Nietzsche, on the other hand, 
describes how there ‘are spirits all around us … but we refuse to listen to these spirit-
                                                             
66 I follow Ur and Conant in seeing the ‘aestheticist’ interpretation of Nietzsche as very much 
mistaken. On this view, Nietzschean self-fashioning constitutes a primarily aesthetic or stylistic 
affair. For Nehamas, who offers the most influential reading in this regard, the Essays also exemplify 
this aestheticist approach. He argues that, for philosophers like Montaigne and Nietzsche, self-
cultivation primarily involves the creation of a new and unique literary persona, their respective 
arts of living having less to do with self-mastery and the development of character than with the 
adoption of ‘a particular style’ (The Art of Living, p. 143; see also Life as Literature). But this way of 
construing their philosophies completely obscures the extent to which both understand the thought 
of the philosopher as grounded in the body and literary style as the expression of physiology. What 
is more, as regards the notion of the philosopher as literary persona, it would be difficult to set out 
a conception of the philosophical life more at odds with the ideal Nietzsche explicitly offers: the 
example of the philosopher ‘must be supplied by his outward life and not merely in his books—in 
the way, that is, in which the philosophers of Greece taught, through their bearing … rather than by 
what they said, let alone what they wrote [emphasis added]’ (SE 3). According to this model, to 
which both Nietzsche and Montaigne subscribe, ‘the central purpose of philosophy is to live well … 
[and] the value of philosophical writing lies in the manner of life it enables the philosopher to lead; 
without this life it is valueless’; in other words, philosophical writing is ‘an instrument through 
which the self can work upon and transform itself’ (Ure, Nietzsche’s Therapy, p. 31). Of course, this 
is not to deny that the self-fashioning as practiced by Nietzsche and Montaigne includes a marked 
aesthetic component. If Nietzsche talks of ‘an artistic plan’ and ‘a single taste’ that rules and shapes 
the self (GS 290), Montaigne consistently values qualities of character in aesthetic terms: not only 
did Caesar have a ‘beautiful’ nature, but in the character of Alexander we may witness ‘beauty 
shimmering with … lustre’ (I, 24; T128, S145 [94]). However, in their respective accounts of self-
fashioning, we may understand both thinkers as offering an ethical model with an ‘aesthetic 
dimension’, rather than—as Nehamas would have it—an aesthetic model with an ethical dimension 
(Conant, “Nietzsche’s Perfectionism”, p. 220). 
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voices (SE 5), yet through psychological dissection and honest self-analysis we may 
uncover ‘the fundamental law of [our] own true self’ (SE 1). On his view, only higher 
individuals—a Goethe or a Montaigne—those practiced in severe self-discipline, are in 
a position to grant obedience to such a law. Self-creation in the Nietzschean sense is a 
possibility only for ‘those who experience their most exquisite pleasure … in being 
bound by but also perfected under their own law’ (GS 290).
67
 
 For both thinkers, the details of one’s task emerge slowly and for the most part 
unconsciously; one discovers one’s true form or fundamental law only after long effort: 
‘[I] found my way … the way to “myself”, to my task. That concealed and imperious 
something’ (HAH II P4). Furthermore, given that self-creation has to do with self-
legislation, and that self-legislation involves obeying what is given in one’s nature, both 
Montaigne and Nietzsche see self-creation in terms of a kind of fatedness. Montaigne—
who continually invokes the notion of fate or fortune to account for the ‘chance’ 
character of our decisions and actions—having described how he legislates according to 
his ‘own laws’, goes on, a few passages later, to state the following: 
 
My doings are ruled by what I am and in harmony with how I was made. I 
do not find fault with myself. … I blame not what I did but my fortune. … I 
am always comforted by the thought that they had to happen that way 
[emphasis added] (III.2; T791-3, S916-18 [617-9]). 
 
Consequently, on the Montaignean account, self-shaping must go hand in hand with an 
acceptance of fate, but this is fate conceived naturalistically, not metaphysically, fate, 
                                                             
67 Although arguing for self-legislation, neither thinker would endorse value relativism. To 
deny that there is such a thing as absolute goodness and to reject the existence of a universal 
moral standard is not to give up on the idea of objectively true or false value statements. 
Montaigne and Nietzsche both endorse value relationalism, not value relativism. According to 
a relational theory of value, particular laws or values can be good or bad for different types of 
people, depending on their specific natures, on certain natural facts about them—their 
abilities, desires, physiological predispositions. Thus we find Montaigne making statements 
such as the following: ‘I can easily believe that others have qualities quite distinct from my 
own. … [E]ach of us should be judged apart’ (I.37; T225, S257 [169]); ‘Men differ in tastes and 
fortitude: they must each be brought, by differing routes, to what is good for them, each 
according to his nature’ (III.12; T1029, S1191 [805]). And Nietzsche argues that, regarding 
morality, ‘the question is always who he is, and who the other person is. In a person, for 
example, who is called and made to command, denial and modest self-effacement would not 
be a virtue but the waste of a virtue’ (BGE 221). Peter Railton offers a cogent analysis of 
Nietzsche’s relational theory of value, which he describes as ‘a theory of how to live well’, one 
that ‘treats value as part of the fabric of lived existence, something we directly experience and 
learn by doing’ (“Nietzsche’s Normative Theory? The Art and Skill of Living Well”, pp. 47-8). 
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that is, as manifested in one’s bodily condition, in the irrefutable directives of one’s 
own, unique psycho-physiology. Just such a naturalized fatalism suffuses Nietzsche’s 
late works, Ecce Homo in particular. If Montaigne, not faulting himself, finds comfort 
in the thought that his life had to unfold as it did, Nietzsche asks us to accept ourselves 
‘as a fate’, demanding that we refrain from wanting to change anything about ourselves 
(EH 1.6). And as regards his ‘domineering task’, he reveals that he ‘had absolutely no 
idea what was growing inside’, until one day all his ‘capabilities suddenly leapt out’ 
(EH 2.9). Nietzsche intends the ideal of ‘becoming what you are’ to encapsulate the 
kind of self-creation as fatalism that the Essays would seek to represent: self-creation 
that is rooted in the great reason of the body, that develops the potential latent in the 
‘chance’ workings of our unconscious drives, that respects the particular laws of our 
own being as well as the more general laws of homo natura. Self-creation so understood 
is therefore ‘by no means independent or separable from one’s native talents, one’s 
“instincts”, one’s environment’; rather, ‘self-making (“becoming”) already embraces 






We recall that what first draws Nietzsche’s attention to the Essays is Montaigne’s 
remarkable ‘cheerfulness’, his capacity to celebrate existence, to be completely ‘at 
home in the world’ (SE 3). As he moves away from Schopenhauer’s ‘world-denying’ 
philosophy, Nietzsche looks to Montaigne as a new exemplar, an exemplar more in tune 
with the world-affirming attitude he would want to advance. And throughout 
Nietzsche’s middle works, in the experimental philosophizing of the free spirit, we may 
see the unmistakeable influence of the Essays, in matters both philosophical and 
stylistic. In his late works, Nietzsche continues to take up Montaigne’s ideas—further 
radicalizing and naturalizing them. Yet, notwithstanding the Essays’ resolute this-
worldliness, it is, more than anything else, Montaigne’s affirmation of existence that 
helps to sustain Nietzsche’s admiration to the end of his writing life. For not only does 
Montaigne, like Nietzsche, endeavour to become what he is, to obey the laws of his own 
nature, but he also, prefiguring the ‘higher’ individual of Nietzsche’s mature works, 
seeks to affirm what he is through a love of a fate and a celebration of the moment. 
                                                             
68 Solomon, “Nietzsche’s Fatalism”, p. 420.  
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 For both thinkers, the highest and healthiest affirmation of life begins in an 
unconditional love of the self. Through the conception of a natural, self-expressive 
virtue—a virtue based on an appreciation of the reciprocal dependence of good and evil 
drives, on a policy of diversion or spiritualization rather than extirpation—Montaigne 
and Nietzsche aim to replace traditional ascetic virtue, the virtue of self-denial and self-
abasement, with an ethic of self-love, freeing individuals from shame, from disgust at 
human nature. Shunning Christian opposition to self-love, with its emphasis on guilt 
and original sin, Montaigne wants us to recognize the ‘true degree of love that each’ 
individual owes to themselves, what he calls ‘a healthy, measured love [une amitié 
salutaire et réglée]’, a love that, he would suggest, ‘represents the pinnacle of human 
happiness and of joy’ (III.10; T984, S1138 [769]). Such self-love moves us well beyond 
the care of the soul or self-cultivation prescribed by Greco-Roman thought, entailing no 
tyranny of reason, no suppression of passion, no denial of our instinctual first nature. 
Embracing all aspects of the self, the kind of self-love that Montaigne has in mind is 
also at the very centre of Nietzsche’s mature thought, forming a key plank in the 
teaching of Zarathustra: ‘One must learn to love oneself … with a wholesome and 
healthy love: so that one can tolerate oneself and not have to roam about’ (Z 3.11.2). 
 This wholesome self-love has little to do with presumptuous self-regard, an 
unthinking narcissism, but rather implies rigorous self-scrutiny, ‘for it is love alone that 
can bestow on the soul not only a clear, discriminating … view of itself, but also the 
desire to look beyond itself and to seek with all its might for a higher self as yet 
concealed from it’ (SE 6). Montaigne, who studies himself ‘more than any other 
subject’, and rejecting ‘false’ self-love, draws a distinction between self-love and self-
esteem, the latter reflecting a tendency to give in to complacent pride and vanity (III.13; 
1050, S1217 [821]; III.10; T984, S1138 [769]). Hence, at the same time as he endorses 
self-love, we also find him saying that ‘it would be hard for anyone to esteem himself 
less than I do’ (II.17; T618, S722 [481]). Nietzsche characterizes such an attitude as that 
of ‘being ashamed of oneself without any accompanying feeling of distress’ (SE 6). In 
this way, the form of self-love that both Montaigne and Nietzsche advocate is one that 
includes a penetrating understanding of one’s own limitations, that accepts the need to 
discipline, master and shape the self in a way that would allow one to become what one 
is. In the Montaignean conception, such a stance toward the self is akin to a ‘loving-
friendship’ (III.10; T984, S1138 [769]). 
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Both Montaigne and Nietzsche view healthy self-love as a necessary corrective 
to the ascetic ideals that have come to dominate Western culture, ideals that foster self-
mistrust and self-hatred. For Montaigne, ‘[w]e show our ingenuity only by ill-treating 
ourselves’, while Nietzsche, through the mouth of Zarathustra, declares: ‘Shame, 
shame, shame—that is the history of the human. … Ever since there have been human 
beings, they have enjoyed themselves too little: that alone, my brothers, is our original 
sin!’ (III.5; T857, S994 [670]; Z 2.3) From neither thinker, though they sometimes offer 
glimpses of humorous self-mockery, do we ever see expressions of guilt, remorse, or 
regret, and certainly no admissions of self-contempt. Montaigne, in particular, appears 
to delight in his own existence: ‘I am concerned with no one but me. … I watch myself, 
savour myself [je me goûte]. … I turn round and round in myself’ (II.17; T641, S747 
[499]). Defiantly egoistic and defiantly unchristian, not once does he praise the value of 
selflessness; in fact, he explicitly advises against it: ‘we must … give ourselves to 
ourselves alone’ (III.10; T980, S1134 [767]). And perhaps a look to Nietzsche may give 
us some insight into this Montaignean opposition to selflessness. Perhaps Montaigne 
suspects, as Nietzsche does, that ‘only the will to mistreat the self supplies the condition 
for the value of the un-egoistic’, that behind the ideal of altruism, an ideal intimately 
related to bad conscience, there lurks an unhealthy resistance to natural instinct (GM 
2.18). For this reason, Nietzsche argues that the ‘noble soul’ must aspire not to 
selflessness, but ‘self reverence’, argues, furthermore, that such a soul must possess a 
‘fundamental certainty … about itself’, thereby allowing no basis for self-mistrust or 





Love of fate 
Whereas Montaigne views proper self-love as constituting ‘the pinnacle’ of human 
happiness and of joy, Nietzsche offers the ideal of the ‘self-enjoying soul’, the 
‘powerful soul’ that exhibits a ‘wholesome, healthy, selfishness’ (Z 3.10.2). Moreover, 
given that, for both thinkers, the ‘self’ of this self-enjoying soul represents something 
that is fashioned in accordance with laws given in one’s nature, represents, that is to 
                                                             
69 On the Nietzschean account, ‘one’s being a certain type of human being … explains one’s ability to 
be well disposed to oneself to a great degree’ (Janaway, “Nietzsche on Morality, Drives and Human 
Greatness”, p. 192). Only those who are ‘internally constituted in the right way will be … capable of 
the ideal attitude of self-affirmation’ (ibid.). In other words, he capacity for self-affirmation is 




say, something fated, love of the self necessarily manifests itself in a love of fate. That 
Montaigne is a lover of fate, seeking to alter not the slightest thing about his life, is the 
principal message of ‘On repentance’. After telling us that he ‘rarely repents’ and that 
‘he cannot do better’, he goes on to admit to having ‘few regrets for affairs of any sort’, 
since ‘no idea of yours, by wish or by thought, can change one jot without overturning 
the whole order of Nature, both past and future’ (III.2; T793, S918 [618]). But 
Montaigne’s attitude toward the fatedness of his life reflects no Stoical resignation, the 
calm acceptance of fate through the alignment of one’s thoughts with the rational order 
of the universe; it reflects, rather, an embrace of fate, the unconditional affirmation of 
his own life, an affirmation encapsulated in the following statement: ‘If I had to live 
again, I would live as I have done; I neither regret the past nor fear for the future’ (ibid. 
T794, S920 [620]). So, despite having lived through a brutal civil war and despite the 
great pain and suffering of his life—suffering that only intensifies as he ages—
Montaigne would, if offered the chance of another life, not want a different life or a 
better life, but the very same life again. 
Molner goes so far as to suggest that Montaigne could have been a ‘sketch’ for 
Nietzsche’s conception of the overhuman, and though admitting that this speculation 
‘may seem problematic’, he sees striking similarities between the overhuman’s 
disposition toward life and the basic ‘character’ of Montaigne’s affirmation.
70
 A 
comparison between Montaigne and the overhuman may seem problematic because, 
unlike the overhuman, Montaigne’s affirmation does not represent what Nietzsche 
considers to be the ‘highest’ possible affirmation of life (EH, ‘Z’ 1): the ‘most world-
affirming human being’ is one ‘who has not only come to terms and learned to get along 
with whatever was and is’, but is an individual ‘who also wants to have what was and is 
repeated into all eternity’ (BGE 56). Thus, while Montaigne frames his affirmation 
personally, and exclusively in terms of his own life, the overhuman’s affirmation takes 
on cosmic dimensions, for as Lampert explains, in the case of willing the eternal 
recurrence of the same, ‘affirmation of the self circles into affirmation of the whole as 
its source, which circles into affirmation of the self’.
71
 Yet, for all that, it must be 
                                                             
70 Molner, “The Influence of Montaigne on Nietzsche”, p. 93.  
71 Lampert, Nietzsche’s Task, p. 119. There are, of course, other, important differences between 
Montaigne’s affirmation of life and that of the overhuman, owing to the changed historical context 
between the early modern and late modern periods. The overhuman, living in a scientifically 
advanced age, post-Galileo and post-Darwin, has to shoulder a ‘greater burden’ of ‘intellectual 
conscience’ than an individual of the late Renaissance (Pippin, Nietzsche, Psychology and First 
Philosophy, p. 123). The overhuman’s transvaluation of values represents a response to the unique 
188 
 
acknowledged that affirming eternal recurrence necessarily involves cultivating, as 
Montaigne strives to do, an attitude of amor fati, a love of fate. The affirmer of eternal 
recurrence—one who desires to have ‘what was and is repeated into all eternity’—must 
be a lover of fate: ‘My formula for human greatness is amor fati: that you do not want 
anything to be different … not just to tolerate necessity … but to love it’ (EH 2.10).
72
 
 Nietzsche, then, follows Montaigne in conceiving life affirmation in terms of a 
love of necessity. And looking beyond this shared endorsement of a particular 
existential attitude, there are further parallels between the two thinkers in this regard 
that should also be noted. For instance, when Nietzsche first broaches the idea of eternal 
recurrence, in the form of a thought experiment in the Gay Science, he ponders ‘how 
well disposed’ the affirmer of eternal recurrence would have to be to themselves in 
order ‘to long for nothing more fervently than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and 
seal’ (GS 341). For Ure, this formulation of eternal recurrence ‘echoes the Stoic notion 
that the aim of self-testing is to … become … one’s own friend’.
73
 But of course, it also 
strongly echoes Montaigne’s understanding of the ideal relationship toward the self as 
one of loving friendship, and given the many other ways in which the Essays prefigure 
the Nietzschean ideal of becoming what you are—as well as his intensive study of the 
Essays in the 1883-5 period—perhaps Montaigne should be viewed as a more important 
influence in this respect. In addition, whereas Montaigne, foregoing regret, wishes to 
alter nothing about his life, as to do so would entail ‘overturning the whole order of 
nature’, Nietzsche casts his fatalism in the following manner: ‘An individual is a piece 
of fate. … To say to an individual: “change yourself” means demanding that everything 
change. … But we who are different, we immoralists, have opened our hearts to all 
types of … approval’ (TI 5.6). And if Montaigne conceives his ‘approval’ of existence 
in terms of an opposition to ‘repentance’, to feelings of guilt and remorse of any kind, 
Nietzsche stresses the seriousness with which, through the doctrines of eternal 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
and momentous cultural situation that modern science has helped bring about: the ‘death of God’ 
and the loss of any basis for transcendent meaning and value (GS 125). On the Nietzschean view, 
European society is on the brink of a cultural crisis, ‘the death of God’ precipitating the onset of a 
passive nihilism. As a consequence, for Nietzsche, the overhuman’s willing of the eternal recurrence 
of the same—thereby conferring on earthly life the highest possible value—constitutes the 
overcoming of this passive nihilism (see Magnus, “Eternal Recurrence”, pp. 369-70). 
72 We can thus understand Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence as the ‘essential item’ in a 
possible future religion of earthly gratitude, since it offers an ideal that is ‘rooted in the passion of 
love and gratitude for life and world as they are’ (Lampert, “Nietzsche’s Philosophy and True 
Religion”, pp. 141-3). 
73 Ure, Nietzsche’s Therapy, p. 73. 
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recurrence and amor fati, his philosophy has taken up ‘the fight against lingering and 






For Nietzsche, the highest possible affirmation of life entails not just a love of fate but 
also a particular relationship to temporality. In Zarathustra, in the section entitled ‘On 
the Vision and Riddle’, we find an investigation of the riddle of time, commencing with 
the metaphor of a gateway: Zarathustra and the Dwarf stop before a gateway, over 
which is inscribed ‘the moment’. Zarathustra observes that the gateway has two faces; a 
lane stretches out from each face onto eternity. The Dwarf proposes that ‘time itself is a 
circle’, suggesting that in eternity the opposite lanes unite in the gateway (Z 3.2.2). 
Zarathustra, however, rejects this simplistic answer, as to characterize time as cyclical 
fails to capture the infinite significance the moment attains if one accepts the eternal 
recurrence of the same. For if everything recurs eternally, Zarathustra asks, ‘are not all 
things knotted together so tightly that this moment draws after it all things that are to 
come?’ (ibid.) In other words, each moment of the eternal past and the eternal future 
may be understood as being ‘contained’ in the present. With the notion of the eternal 
recurrence of the same, Nietzsche thus intends the most extreme intensification of the 
moment.
75
 Accordingly, in The Gay Science, he describes the task of affirming eternal 
recurrence as the ‘heaviest weight’, implying the enormous burden of responsibility on 
the individual once one accepts that time recurs eternally. The overhuman’s affirmation 
of eternal recurrence, therefore, may be viewed as indicative of an ‘attitude which 
would transform the finite moment into a fated eternity’.
76
 
                                                             
74 Again, for Ure, Nietzsche comes to develop his ideal of amor fati primarily via his reading of the 
Stoics (pp. 28, 73). But Montaigne and Nietzsche hold a common opposition to the Stoic response to 
fate. Nietzsche accuses the Stoics of trying to impose on nature their own vision of a universal 
Logos, labouring under ‘the insane hope that because you know how to tyrannize yourselves—
Stoicism is self-tyranny—nature, too, lets herself be tyrannized’ (BGE 9). Nietzsche rejects this 
tyrannical way of overcoming fate, in favour of amor fati, an approach he describes in terms of a 
‘trusting fatalism’ (TI 9.49). Such a fatalism is on display in the Essays. Montaigne, in contrast to the 
sage who attempts to ‘maim fortune herself’, to ‘bully’ and ‘master’ fate, through the rigidity of a 
‘strong and solid’ soul, fashions the kind of ‘adaptable’ and ‘flexible’ soul that  would embrace and 
affirm fate unconditionally (I.42; T252, S290 [190]; I.54; T298-9, S349 [226]). 
75 ‘This model stresses to us … how the present never leaves behind the past, and how it is also tied 
to a fated future. In thinking time as a circle, we imagine that the future has already been, and that 
the past will be again, which conveys the relevance they really do have to meaning now. We 
imagine them all “present” together in the ring’ (Richardson, “Nietzsche on Time and Becoming”, p. 
224).  
76 Magnus, Nietzsche’s Existential Imperative, p. 142. 
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 Molner fails to mention the overhuman’s celebration of time and becoming, yet 
in this regard also a comparison with Montaigne is warranted. Always framed in the 
present, although composed over a twenty year period, the Essays document a ‘series’ 
of moments, what Montaigne ‘feels now’.
77
 Following the Stoics, he counsels against 
dwelling on the past, or worrying about the future, for such concerns ‘rob us’ of the 
‘now’; rather, we should, he urges, strive to ‘rejoice in the present’ (I.3; T18, S11 [8]; 
I.11; T43, S43 [28]). And though Montaigne may not see the moment in quite the same 
manner as the overhuman, as recurring eternally, his love of fate takes the form of a 
complete immersion in the present: 
 
I do not know how to “pass” time, I savour it and hold on to it. … I know 
life to be of great account and delightful. … I want to arrest the swiftness of 
its passing by the swiftness of my capture, compensating for the speed with 
which it drains away by the intensity of my enjoyment (III.13; T1091-2, 
S1262-3 [853-4]). 
 
As with the doctrine of eternal recurrence, here we may see the vertical expansion of the 
moment, a radical heightening in the significance of the content of experience. Here, 
too, we see a highly personal and existential engagement with temporality. Montaigne, 
like Nietzsche, aims to have the immeasurable value of existence before one’s 
consciousness at all times, ‘bestowing upon each moment of life the fullest possible 
justification’:
78
 ‘When I dance, I dance. When I sleep, I sleep; and when I am strolling 
in a beautiful orchard … I bring [my thoughts] back to the walk, to the orchard, to the 
delight of being alone there’ (ibid. T1087-8, S1258 [850]). What is more, both thinkers, 
determined to attain a way of life lived with the utmost intensity in the present, offer a 
picture of time that is radically discontinuous, each moment being entirely discrete. 
Hence, Nietzsche conceives the moment as a ‘fated eternity’, while Montaigne takes 
each instant as ‘an absolute beginning’.
79
  
 Both Montaigne and Nietzsche seek to translate humanity back into nature, and 
return sacredness to the earth. Philosophers of immanence, affirming the here and now, 
they draw us back to what Nietzsche refers to as ‘the closest things’: back to the body, 
                                                             
77 Sayce, The Essays of Montaigne, p. 100. 
78 Starobinski, Montaigne in Motion, p. 78. 
79 Ibid., p. 86. 
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to feeling and sensation, to matters of climate, location and nutrition, to true and 
vigorous living in the present. Philosophies of transcendence and ascetic ideals for too 
long have taught humanity ‘to despise the present and neighbourhood and life’, such 
that, for both thinkers, it is high time that we once again ‘become good neighbours to 
the closest things’ (WS 16). Consequently, Montaigne, throughout the Essays, aims to 
show ‘how, by attending to them properly, the most banal and quotidian activities—
eating, drinking … moving, breathing and so on—can provide … the spiritual 
sustenance which allows us to affirm even our misfortunes and sufferings’.
80
 For this 
reason, he expresses admiration for ‘that girl from Miletus who, seeing the local 
philosopher Thales with his eyes staring upward … made him trip over’, so that he 
might redirect his attention downward, earthward, ‘to everything lying before his feet’ 
(II.12; T519, S604 [402]). Moreover, to affirm time and becoming is to invest what lies 
before and near us with the highest value, in the sense that ‘learning to dignify the 
closest things’ becomes ‘the very practice of temporal awareness’.
81
 Lovers of fate, 
Montaigne and Nietzsche promote an art of living or way of life in which the self-
enjoying soul savours and celebrates every moment. Practitioners of a religion of 
earthly gratitude, they would treat the simple and the mundane with the deepest 
reverence. Montaigne, when contemplating the ideal circumstances under which his life 
might come to an end, offers us the following image: ‘I want death to find me planting 
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In so many ways, just as he begins to move forward as a thoroughly independent 
thinker—no longer burdened by the demands of a university position, newly recovered 
from Schopenhauerian pessimism, at last free of Wagner’s overbearing influence—
Nietzsche finds an exemplar in Montaigne. With his cheerful embrace of life and his 
resolutely naturalized perspective, Montaigne offers Nietzsche support in his effort to 
elaborate a ‘robust’ form of pessimism, a pessimism of strength—a Dionysian 
pessimism. What is more, an examination of the influence of the Essays on Nietzsche’s 
thought also forces us to consider the significance of the Untimely Meditations to an 
understanding of Nietzsche’s mature philosophy, not only in terms of his conception of 
the philosopher but also in terms of the kind of existential attitude he would wish to 
endorse. In ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ he proposes that to be a genuine philosopher 
one must, like Montaigne, possess the strength to say ‘Yes’ to life and be its ‘advocate’. 
In addition, seeing Montaigne—a philosopher who embraces becoming and celebrates 
the body—as an exemplar for Nietzsche as he writes ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, 
allows us to draw out continuities in thought between this work and The Birth of 
Tragedy.  
With respect to Nietzsche’s philosophical development, Montaigne’s importance 
goes far beyond that of an encouraging voice, merely confirming the legitimacy of a 
philosophical path already taken. Most fundamentally, what Nietzsche learned from the 
Essays was the importance of self-knowledge and the ‘art of psychological dissection’, 
an art that would, among other things, help him to appreciate the roots of the unhealthy 
‘metaphysical need’ that had led him to endorse romantic pessimism. What he learned, 
too, was a philosophical method: experimental philosophizing. Moreover, as an 
exemplar who connects the early and middle phases of Nietzsche’s philosophical career, 
Montaigne helps us to make sense of what appears to be a complete turnaround in 
Nietzsche’s thinking between the Untimely Meditations and Human, All Too Human: if 
one takes Montaigne as Nietzsche’s ‘educator’, his change in writing style and 
transition to a more psychologically-orientated philosophy looks more like a natural 
progression than a startling reversal. To view Montaigne as Nietzsche’s educator also 
compels us to recognize the many themes that the Untimely Meditations and Human, All 
Too Human share in common—to do with caring for the soul, ‘authentic’ existence and 
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the importance of the Socratic imperative: ‘Know thyself’. Indeed, once we understand 
Montaigne as a model for the Nietzschean free spirit, we come to appreciate that 
Nietzsche’s conception of the free spirit has its beginnings in ‘Schopenhauer as 
Educator’, with his presentation of the philosopher as an individual of complete 
intellectual independence, who lives an ‘awakened life’ beyond the deadening grip of 
custom. 
Unlike the other French moralists, Montaigne continues to be a major influence 
on the works of Nietzsche’s late period. As regards Nietzsche’s attack on soul atomism 
and his ‘new’ conception of the soul as a subjective multiplicity—not to mention his 
appreciation of the unconscious workings of the mind—the Essays would have provided 
ample stimulation to his thought. Montaigne’s denunciation of ascetic ideals and his 
diagnosis of an axiological sickness at the heart of European culture prefigure central 
motifs of Nietzsche’s mature philosophy. Repudiating the idea of a fundamental 
opposition between good and evil drives and passions, both thinkers condemn 
traditional notions of morality as anti-natural and anti-life, providing instead a 
conception of the ethical life centred on psychological and physiological health—the 
denial or suppression of natural desires and predispositions playing no part. More 
significant still, not only does Montaigne’s influence extend to the final years of 
Nietzsche’s productive life but we also discover that the Essays were of crucial 
significance for the writing of his philosophical autobiography, Ecce Homo. A thinker 
who acknowledges the intimate connection between philosophy and biography and who 
displays an unparalleled ability to turn pain and suffering into a higher form of ‘health’, 
Montaigne demonstrates the kind of ‘wisdom’ and ‘cleverness’ that Ecce Homo seeks to 
document. And the Essays, centred on ideas of self-fashioning, self-legislation and an 
understanding of the self as fate, offers, like Ecce Homo, a blueprint in ‘How to Become 
What you Are’. 
This study of the Montaigne-Nietzsche relationship has enabled us to explore 
and make plain the more radical aspects of the Essays: Montaigne’s rejection of 
metaphysics and any transcendent basis for morality; his analysis of the origins of 
morality in the all-too-human aspects of human nature; his understanding of the 
psychology of extreme virtue and the relationship between cruelty and voluptuous 
pleasure; his willingness to construe human existence as just another form of animal 
life; his disavowal of Judaeo-Christian values. Nietzsche’s Montaigne is a ‘critical 
spirit’ as well as a ‘free spirit’, a true exponent of the ‘plastic power’ of the individual to 
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creatively engage tradition—and certainly no advocate of orthodoxy. To explore the 
Essays from a Nietzschean perspective is to gain fresh insight into the wealth of ideas 
they offer, relating to such diverse matters as the importance of smells and the 
foundations of morality. Furthermore, if the Montaigne that Nietzsche idolizes is a very 
different figure to the Montaigne of conventional scholarly opinion—deserving pride of 
place in the ranks of philosophers—the Nietzsche that Montaigne inspires is a very 
different philosopher to the Nietzsche of popular opinion, the gloomy disciple of 
Schopenhauerian pessimism.  
 And in coming to accept Montaigne as a key exemplar for Nietzsche, one 
achieves a clearer insight into Nietzsche’s conception of the philosophical life as an art 
of living. While both thinkers follow the Greco-Roman model of philosophy—where 
philosophy is understood as a form of self-therapy and care of the soul—they reject 
central features of that model: both Montaigne and Nietzsche, placing the demands of 
passion and instinct above those of reason, promote a form of self-mastery that seeks to 
cultivate a spontaneity and flexibility of character, an effortless virtue. One also attains 
a better understanding of the roots of Nietzsche’s naturalism—a scientian naturalism 
that recognizes the limitations of mechanistic laws and casual-deterministic reasoning—
and what he means by a ‘stronger’ scepticism: an experimental mode of enquiry 
compatible with life-affirmation and a ‘certainty of value standards’. To fully appreciate 
Nietzsche’s thought, it should be recognized that, from the beginning to the end of his 
philosophical life, Montaigne was for him a thinker of the deepest personal and 
philosophical significance, perhaps his favourite writer. 
 Owing to considerations of space, I have barely touched on the aestheticism of 
both thinkers. For even if they are naturalists who advocate a return to nature, they also 
see art, artifice and the aesthetic as centrally involved in all domains of life. More than 
that, they understand our desire for appearance and illusion as itself natural, as an 
essential feature of the human condition. In this way, both Montaigne and Nietzsche 
could perhaps be best described as ‘artful’ naturalists.
1
 At the most basic level, they 
understand human perception as inherently creative and inventive, and human cognition 
as a fundamentally imaginative and fantasizing capacity. We have seen how both 
thinkers soften the line between nature and convention, but they also blur the distinction 
between appearance and reality as well as the boundary between authentic self and 
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 Christa Davis Acampora suggests that Nietzsche’ philosophical project can be best understood in terms 
of an ‘artful naturalism’ (“Naturalism and Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology”). 
195 
 
social mask. We thus find Montaigne and Nietzsche emphasizing the motif of the world 
as theatre and life as play. The relationship between naturalism and aestheticism, then, 
is of paramount importance to the philosophies of both thinkers. Further study on the 
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